| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| Nanomsg versions 0.5-beta through 1.x before 1.2.3 has a remotely exploitable buffer overflow in the WebSocket transport, due to an unchecked copy of the Sec-WebSocket-Version header, through snprintf. |
| Fabasoft Folio Client before 2026, a locally installed component that communicates with the Fabasoft browser extension via web messaging, does not restrict which web origins may invoke its functions by default. The registry value VALIDDOMAINS, which limits permitted origins, was optional and empty by default, resulting in all domains being trusted. As a consequence, any website visited by a user with the Folio Client and browser extension installed could invoke client functions, e.g., related to downloading documents, opening documents, and synchronizing files. The first fixed builds are Fabasoft Folio Client 2026 (Build 26.0.0.10) and Fabasoft Folio Client 2026 April Release (Build 26.4.0.76). This client is, for example, shipped with Fabasoft eGov-Suite. |
| A flaw was found in FreeIPA. A remote, unauthenticated attacker can exploit a vulnerability in the `/ipa/i18n_messages` endpoint by sending an arbitrarily large request body. This can cause the service to consume excessive memory, leading to memory exhaustion, degraded responsiveness, and a denial of service (DoS) condition. |
| Dell Command Powershell Provider (DCPP), versions prior to 2.10.2 contain an Insertion of Sensitive Information into Log File vulnerability. A low privileged attacker with local access could potentially exploit this vulnerability, leading to Information Disclosure. |
| SigNoz from v0.8.0 before v0.143.0 defaults the JWT tokenizer signing secret (tokenizer::jwt::secret, set via SIGNOZ_TOKENIZER_JWT_SECRET or the deprecated SIGNOZ_JWT_SECRET) to an empty string, and Config.Validate() does not reject the empty value, so a deployment that does not configure a secret starts up and both signs and verifies session tokens with an empty HMAC key. Because the JWT tokenizer was the default provider, any such deployment is affected. An unauthenticated attacker who knows the ID of an existing user can forge a valid session token for that user — including an administrator — by signing the id, orgId and email claims with an empty key; the organization ID (and whether an email is registered) can be obtained without authentication from /api/v2/sessions/context. A forged refresh token can be exchanged at /api/v2/sessions/rotate for a new token pair and cannot be revoked, so it remains usable for its full lifetime (30 days by default). Fixed in v0.143.0, which requires a JWT secret when the jwt provider is selected and changes the default provider to opaque. |
| RunAdHocCommand.build_args() appends limit as bare
positional (args.append(limit)) instead of using
args.extend(['-l', limit]) like RunJob. A limit beginning
with - is parsed as an ansible CLI option. Currently
limited to short-circuit flags (--version, --help) since
injected element displaces required pattern positional.
Would escalate if ansible-core ever defaults pattern. |
| LaunchConfigurationBaseSerializer.scm_branch has no
validate_scm_branch() leading-dash check, unlike
Project/JobTemplate/JobLaunch serializers. Schedule and
WFJT Node accept --upload-pack=/bin/id as scm_branch.
Currently blocked at runtime by jobs.py:1502 ValueError
check (defense-in-depth), but the API validation gap
means sole reliance on a task-layer guard. Refactoring
that guard away would promote this to RCE. |
| Notification template Jinja AST whitelist only inspects
static Getattr nodes. Dynamic subscripts (job['job'+'_env'])
and {% if job.id > 100 %} conditional gating bypass both
the AST check and the test-render (stub has small job.id).
At runtime, the gated branch executes and exceptions write
full tracebacks into notification body, which is POSTed
to attacker-controlled webhook URL. Leaks install paths,
Python version, source line numbers. |
| An argument-injection flaw was found in the Ansible Automation Platform automation-controller
system-job subsystem. The system-job template launch endpoint stores a user-supplied "days"
variable without running the integer validation defined elsewhere for that field, and the
dispatcher flattens the management-command argument list into a single string with spaces before
the job runner re-splits it, so spaces in the value become additional command-line arguments.
Because system jobs are executed in-process on the control node without the container isolation
applied to all other job types, an authenticated user with superuser privileges can inject
arbitrary arguments — including Python's path option — into the control-plane awx-manage process,
controlling its argument vector and the first entry of its module search path. Full remote code
execution requires an additional import gadget that is not present in the current management
commands, so the demonstrated impact is argument injection with control of the process search
path rather than confirmed code execution. |
| A flaw was found in the Ansible Automation Platform automation-controller. The
WorkflowJobNode.ancestor_artifacts database column, which stores the raw merged set_stats
artifacts propagated between workflow nodes, is not wrapped in prevent_search() and is therefore
accepted for arbitrary field lookups by the REST filter backend, even though it is omitted from
the API serializer. Because the column is persisted before Ansible's no_log masking is applied,
a user with only read access to a workflow — or, via a regular-expression lookup that bypasses
the JSON cross-relation filter guard through the world-readable credential-types endpoint, any
authenticated user with no roles — can use the result count as a boolean/count oracle to recover,
character by character, secret values that a playbook author explicitly marked no_log, including
across organizations. |
| A flaw was found in the Ansible Automation Platform automation-controller. In the shipped
production configuration, the Controller trusts the client-supplied X-Forwarded-For header as
the request's client IP without verifying that it originated from a trusted proxy, and selects
the leftmost (attacker-controlled) header value. As a result, an attacker can forge the source
IP address recorded for their requests in the Controller's audit and access logs, degrading
the integrity of forensic and SIEM attribution. The flaw does not grant additional access. |
| A flaw was found in the Ansible Automation Platform automation-controller. The unauthenticated
Bitbucket Data Center webhook receiver skips HMAC signature verification for diagnostics:ping
events after it has already looked up the target template, causing the endpoint to return HTTP
200 for a template that has a Bitbucket DC webhook configured and HTTP 403 otherwise. An
unauthenticated remote attacker can use this response discrepancy as an oracle to enumerate
which Job Template and Workflow Job Template IDs have Bitbucket DC webhooks configured, without
knowing the secret webhook_key. |
| A flaw was found in the automation-controller instance
install-bundle endpoint. When a System Administrator downloads
an execution/hop node's install bundle, the controller signs an
X.509 certificate with the receptor mesh certificate authority
in which the Common Name, DNS subject-alternative-name, and
receptor node-id are taken verbatim from the caller-chosen
instance hostname, with a hard-coded ten-year validity, a random
serial, and no issuance log or revocation list. Because the
hostname charset validator is case-insensitive while the
uniqueness validator is case-sensitive, an administrator can
register a case variant of an existing control node's hostname
and obtain a mesh-CA-signed certificate that TLS peers, which
match hostnames case-insensitively, accept as that control node.
In managed/hosted deployments — where the customer holds
controller superuser but the platform operator runs the mesh —
this yields a long-lived, non-revocable mesh peer credential and,
with an on-path position, TLS impersonation or interception of
control/hybrid mesh nodes. It does not grant direct remote code
execution, because receptor work submission is gated by a
separate signing key not included in the bundle. |
| A flaw was found in the automation-controller API. The
unauthenticated health-check endpoint /api/v2/ping/
(ApiV2PingView, AllowAny) over-serializes RBAC-gated
automation-mesh data into its anonymous response, exposing the
full instance inventory (node hostnames, node types, UUIDs,
heartbeats, capacities, and exact versions), all instance-group
names and membership, the deployment install UUID, and the
active control node. A remote, unauthenticated attacker can use
this to map the control plane and fingerprint software versions
for targeted attacks. This flaw affects confidentiality only;
it does not expose secrets, credentials, or tenant data. |
| A flaw was found in Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform's automation-
controller. Survey questions of type password are write-only and stored
encrypted, displayed only as a placeholder on read. When a schedule or
workflow job template node is revalidated against a tightened survey
specification, the controller decrypts the stored password and includes its
plaintext value in the minimum/maximum length validation error message
returned in the HTTP response. A user with the delegated JobTemplate Admin
role can tighten the survey length constraint and trigger revalidation of a
schedule or node created by another, higher-privileged user, thereby
recovering that user's stored password in plaintext. |
| A flaw was found in Ansible Automation Platform's automation-controller (AWX).
The Bulk Job Launch API (POST /api/v2/bulk/job_launch/) authorizes the
requested instance_groups with only a read-level permission check, whereas the
standard single-job launch path requires use-level permission on the same
field. A principal that holds read (but not use) permission on an instance
group -- for example the built-in read-only System Auditor role -- together
with execute permission on a job template can launch bulk jobs onto instance
groups they are not authorized to use, bypassing execution-placement
isolation. |
| StringListPathField.to_internal_value() calls
os.path.exists() on unbounded user-supplied paths.
200 vs 400 response reveals existence of arbitrary
absolute paths on the controller-web pod. Tenant
superuser can confirm /etc/tower/SECRET_KEY, k8s
service-account token, receptor sockets, ConfigMap
mount points. Mainly impactful on managed AAP
(ansiblecloud.com) where tenant admin != host admin. |
| /api/v2/config/ is protected only by IsAuthenticated.
license_info (account_number, subscription_id, pool_id,
sku, support_level, instance counts) returned to any
authenticated user. The superuser/auditor gate only covers
project_base_dir/project_local_paths/custom_virtualenvs,
not license_info. Enables social engineering against
Red Hat support and estate sizing reconnaissance. |
| JobJobEventsChildrenSummary view has no model/parent_model.
ModelAccessPermission.check_get_permissions() falls through
(returns True) for any authenticated user. The view uses
raw get_object_or_404(Job, pk) without DRF object-level
permission check. Zero-privilege user reads event tree
structure, event_processing_finished status, and enumerates
Job IDs platform-wide via 200/404 oracle. Sibling endpoint
/jobs/{id}/job_events/ correctly returns 403. |
| URLModificationMiddleware resolves named-URL lookups
against unfiltered Model.objects before RBAC. The 403→404
shim only rewrites 403 responses, leaving the pk=0 miss
path with a different 404 detail string. Differential
"Not found." vs "No <Model> matches..." reveals whether
a named resource (org, credential, inventory, host) exists
anywhere on the platform. Enables cross-tenant internal
hostname enumeration. |
