| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| InvoicePlane is a self-hosted open source application for managing invoices, clients, and payments. Prior to 1.7.2, InvoicePlane's Cron::recur() method writes an invalid cron key from the URL path directly to the application log without neutralizing CRLF characters. An unauthenticated requester can place forged log lines into the audit trail by supplying a crafted cron_key value. The injected entries can corrupt forensic records and interfere with log-based monitoring. This issue is fixed in version 1.7.2. |
| Zammad is a web based open source helpdesk/customer support system. Prior to 7.1.2, when a Microsoft Graph request fails, Zammad logs the error including the authentication token used to access the mailbox. The system attempts to hide this token in the log, but the masking is incomplete: for the token format Microsoft uses (JWT), only the first part is hidden, while the remaining parts remain readable in plain text. A Zammad admin with Microsoft Graph channel access can view these logs and see the partial token, which may reveal sensitive claims such as the account scope, tenant, or timing, and could assist in reconstructing the full token while it is still valid. This issue is fixed in version 7.1.2. |
| GLPI is a free asset and IT management software package. From 11.0.6 until 11.0.8, an authenticated technician can store active markup in supplier website fields. Any user who opens the affected item's suppliers list triggers the stored cross-site scripting payload. This issue is fixed in version 11.0.8. |
| An incorrect buffer size calculation vulnerability exists in tinyexpr commit 4a7456e in new_expr(). For arity-0 expression nodes, including constants, variables, and zero-argument functions, the function allocates less memory than sizeof(te_expr) but treats the returned allocation as a complete te_expr object. This results in undefined behavior and can cause deterministic process termination in UBSan-instrumented builds. |
| simdjson 4.6.1 contains a one-byte out-of-bounds read vulnerability in dom::parser::parse_unpadded(). A specially crafted truncated JSON document whose final structural token closes a nested array or object can cause json_iterator::walk_document() to access buf[len] after the input buffer has been exhausted. This results in a heap out-of-bounds read and may cause application termination, leading to denial of service. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: cfg80211: validate assoc response length before status and IE access
cfg80211_rx_assoc_resp() initialises the status and response-IE fields
of cfg80211_connect_resp_params from the management frame before
proving that the frame is long enough for those offsets. S1G and
regular association responses also have different IE offsets, but the
S1G path only patched resp_ie after the unsafe initialiser had already
run.
Defer resp_ie, resp_ie_len, and status to after the link-iteration
loop. Use a bool to remember whether the frame is S1G, then validate
the appropriate minimum length and set all three fields in a single
if/else block. Funnel short-frame and SME-reject cleanup through a
shared free_bss label for the abandon paths. |
| No description is available for this CVE. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
f2fs: validate inline dentry name lengths before conversion
Inline dentry conversion copies names out of the inline dentry area
before checking that each recorded name length fits in the available
filename slots.
A corrupted image can therefore make the conversion path read past
the inline filename storage while building the regular dentry block.
Validate each inline dentry name length against the inline filename
area before copying it. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ACPICA: Enhance buffer validation in acpi_ut_walk_aml_resources()
Enhance buffer validation in acpi_ut_walk_aml_resources() to prevent
buffer overflows. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ACPICA: add boundary checks in acpi_ps_get_next_field()
Add boundary checks in acpi_ps_get_next_field() to prevent out-of-bounds
access. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
media: v4l2-ctrls: validate AV1 tile counts
The stateless AV1 decoders use tile_info.tile_cols and tile_rows as loop
bounds and as indices into the mi_*_starts[] and *_in_sbs_minus_1[]
arrays, as the divisor for context_update_tile_id, and their product
bounds the per-tile descriptor buffers, but std_validate_compound() does
not bound these u8 fields. Reject a V4L2_CTRL_TYPE_AV1_FRAME whose
tile_cols or tile_rows exceeds V4L2_AV1_MAX_TILE_COLS / _ROWS, or whose
product exceeds V4L2_AV1_MAX_TILE_COUNT. A zero tile count is left to the
consuming driver so the zero-initialised control that existing userspace
submits is still accepted. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bnxt_en: Bound SW TPA IDs to prevent crashes
FW supports up to 1024 concurrent TPAs, so the FW TPA ID is in the range
0..1023 (see commit ec4d8e7cf024 ("bnxt_en: Add TPA ID mapping logic for
57500 chips.")). bnxt_alloc_agg_idx is intended to wrap the FW ID down to a
software ID which is used to index rxr->rx_tpa, and to generate a mapping
between FW IDs and the wrapped software ID.
On a 57608 with firmware version 233, the firmware advertises 32
concurrent TPAs. As of the commit under fixes, bp->max_tpa on this NIC
is set to 32.
If the software ID from bnxt_alloc_agg_idx is above 31, this results in
an invalid address being loaded on this line:
tpa_info = &rxr->rx_tpa[agg_id];
because rx_tpa is allocated with only bp->max_tpa (32) entries. Writes
to tpa_info later in the code are out of bounds.
This bug results in a crash at boot:
Oops: general protection fault, kernel NULL pointer dereference 0x8: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI
RIP: 0010:bnxt_rx_pkt+0xc0/0x1560
RSP: 0018:ffffc900009b8c78 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000048 RCX: 0000000206682516
RDX: ffffc900009b8db4 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 01ffffff038fe1c0
RBP: ffffc9006e687480 R08: ffffc9006e687000 R09: 0000000000003048
R10: 0000000000000480 R11: ffff8881c6083900 R12: 0000000006682516
R13: ffff8881c6095400 R14: 0000000000000016 R15: ffff8881c6b66680
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88fef3c77000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007fc8bda40584 CR3: 000000807c812001 CR4: 0000000008772ef0
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
? __netif_receive_skb_list_core+0x1ca/0x250
__bnxt_poll_work+0x152/0x280
bnxt_poll_p5+0x1cd/0x480
__napi_poll+0x30/0x180
net_rx_action+0x20b/0x3b0
? note_gp_changes+0x53/0xe0
? tick_setup_sched_timer+0x180/0x180
? __napi_schedule+0x9a/0xb0
? bnxt_msix+0x24/0x30
handle_softirqs+0xdd/0x2c0
__irq_exit_rcu.llvm.3171231171502365008+0x47/0xf0
common_interrupt+0x85/0x90
</IRQ>
<TASK>
asm_common_interrupt+0x22/0x40
This stack trace is from a crash triggered when an out of bounds rx_tpa
is dereferenced. The invalid write mentioned above is silent in this
particular crash.
Fix this by allocating rx_tpa with bp->max_tpa rounded up to the next
power of 2 (bp->max_tpa_roundup_size) entries and masking the FW TPA ID
with that size, so the wrapped ID can never index past the end of the
array. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xfs: fix the rtrmap and rtrefcount _maxlevels_ondisk functions
The _maxlevels_ondisk functions are used to compute the size of
in-memory btree cursors for each btree type. Unfortunately, LOLLM
noticed that the rtrmap and rtrefcount versions of these functions
forget to account for the inode root, which means that we could access
beyond the end of the cursor given a sufficiently large btree. Fix
this. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: qla2xxx: Validate BSG request_len before reading vendor_cmd[]
The FC BSG transport allocates job->request via memdup_user() using the
exact user-supplied request_len. For FC_BSG_HST_VENDOR,
fc_bsg_host_dispatch() only guarantees request_len covers msgcode and
vendor_id; it does not account for the vendor_cmd[] flexible array.
qla2xxx then reads the command selector vendor_cmd[0] and, in several
sub-handlers, vendor_cmd[1]/[2] or structures overlaid on the vendor
command area without verifying request_len. A caller holding
CAP_SYS_RAWIO can submit a short request whose vendor_id matches the
host, triggering out-of-bounds heap reads (KASAN-detectable, and able to
mis-select a command or panic).
Add a central guard in qla2x00_process_vendor_specific() so the selector
is always in bounds, restrict the early vendor_cmd[0] read in
qla24xx_bsg_request() to sufficiently long vendor messages, and add
request_len checks to the sub-handlers that read further:
qla24xx_proc_fcp_prio_cfg_cmd(), qla2x00_process_loopback(),
qla84xx_reset(), qla84xx_updatefw(), qla2x00_read_optrom(),
qla2x00_update_optrom(), qlafx00_mgmt_cmd() and
qla28xx_validate_flash_image(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipv6: sr: restore network header before routing and forwarding
ipv6_srh_rcv() runs with skb->data at the Segment Routing Header (SRH)
while skb_network_header() points at the IPv6 header.
When segments_left > 0, ipv6_srh_rcv() previously restored the skb->data
position by pushing sizeof(struct ipv6hdr), assuming the SRH immediately
followed the fixed IPv6 header. If another extension header (such as a
Hop-by-Hop options header) precedes the SRH, skb_network_offset()
remained negative.
This led to two problems:
1. During ip6_route_input(), fib6_rules_early_flow_dissect() invokes
__skb_flow_dissect() which passes the negative skb_network_offset()
to flow dissection, breaking BPF and C flow dissector logic.
2. If forwarded via ip6_forward() or redirected via act_mirred, downstream
handlers (like sch_fragment() or neighbour output) pass the negative
offset as an unsigned length, triggering OOB memcpy or buffer overflows.
Fix this by pushing -skb_network_offset(skb) before routing, ensuring
skb_network_offset(skb) is 0 for route lookup / flow dissection as well as
downstream forwarding. On the loopback path, pull skb_transport_offset(skb)
to restore skb->data to the SRH before looping back. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
media: verisilicon: rockchip: guard VPU981 AV1 divisor and tile buffer
rockchip_vpu981_av1_dec_set_tile_info() divides context_update_tile_id by
tile_info->tile_cols and writes one descriptor per tile into the tile_info
DMA buffer, which holds AV1_MAX_TILES entries; tile_cols and tile_rows
come from the bitstream. Guard the division against a zero tile_cols by
initialising the context-update values to zero and computing them only
when tile_cols is non-zero, and stop the descriptor writes once the
tile_info buffer is full. The tile geometry written to the hardware
registers is left unmodified; the per-dimension and total tile bounds are
enforced by the control validation. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
media: mediatek: vcodec: bound AV1 tile-start copy to the array capacity
vdec_av1_slice_setup_tile() copies tile_cols + 1 / tile_rows + 1 entries
into mi_col_starts[] / mi_row_starts[] from the bitstream tile_info. Bound
the copy to the array capacity. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: mpls: clear inner_protocol when the last label is popped
skb_mpls_push() records the pre-encapsulation network header once, gated
on !skb->inner_protocol. skb_mpls_pop() never clears that record, so it
outlives the encapsulation it describes.
Open vSwitch can then re-push MPLS onto a packet whose
inner_network_header still points at the older, deeper offset: push a
label, pop every label, recirculate (ovs_flow_key_update() re-derives
key->eth.type and resets network_header, but leaves inner_*), then push
again. ovs_fragment() trusts the record:
skb->network_header = skb->inner_network_header;
so skb_network_offset() goes negative. The bound check is signed:
if (skb_network_offset(skb) > MAX_L2_LEN)
a negative offset passes it, and prepare_frag() widens the value:
unsigned int hlen = skb_network_offset(skb);
memcpy(&data->l2_data, skb->data, hlen);
which is a ~4GiB memcpy out of a 30-byte per-CPU buffer.
Reproduced on v7.3-rc1. RDX is the truncated length, (unsigned int)(-8):
BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffe8ffffc16000
#PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode
Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI
RIP: 0010:memcpy+0x8/0x20
RDX: 00000000fffffff8 RSI: ffff888105d732db RDI: ffffe8ffffc16000
prepare_frag+0x3df/0x4e0
ovs_fragment+0x589/0x7e0
do_output+0x4ce/0x5e0
do_execute_actions+0x55d2/0x7b30
ovs_execute_actions+0xea/0x450
Same root-cause shape as commit 975b5b067f52 ("ipv6: sr: restore network
header before routing and forwarding"): a stale network header offset
reaching a consumer that widens it. Here it originates in the MPLS
push/pop path.
Clear inner_protocol once the packet is no longer MPLS, so a later push
re-records the current header. net/sched/act_mpls.c is the only other
skb_mpls_pop() caller and gets the same fix; sch_frag.c saves and
restores inner_protocol around fragmentation in the same way OVS does. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/rockchip: analogix_dp: fix unchecked bound endpoint name length
rockchip_dp_drm_encoder_enable() uses sprintf() to format a device tree
path into a 32-byte stack buffer. Device tree paths are not limited to
this size, so a sufficiently long path can overflow the buffer.
Use snprintf() with the destination size to truncate the generated name
and keep the writes within bounds. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ASoC: sprd: validate compress buffer sizes against fixed allocations
sprd_platform_compr_open() allocates the stage 0 IRAM buffer (32K data
area) and the stage 1 DDR buffer (2M data area) with fixed sizes, but
sprd_platform_compr_copy() derives all copy lengths from the user
controlled runtime->fragment_size and the write() count, never
comparing them against the physical buffer sizes. The compress core
only checks fragment_size * fragments for an u32 overflow in
snd_compress_check_input(), so a local user can configure a logical
buffer of up to ~4GB via SNDRV_COMPRESS_SET_PARAMS, far exceeding the
fixed allocations.
A fragment_size larger than the 32K IRAM data area makes the stage 0
copy_from_user() overflow past the IRAM allocation, and a buffer_size
larger than the 2M DDR buffer makes the wrapping copy at the end of
sprd_platform_compr_copy() write fully user controlled data past the
buffer. No SNDRV_PCM_TRIGGER_START is needed, a write() in SETUP
state reaches the copy callback directly.
Reject parameters that do not fit into the fixed buffers in
set_params(), and fix the advertised max fragment size: 128K never
fitted into the 32K IRAM buffer. The caps values may have been carried over
from the qdsp6 driver, which allocates its buffers according to the
advertised maxima, unlike this driver. With 32K as max fragment size
the advertised limits are self-consistent: 32K * 64 = 2M equals the
DDR buffer size.
Discovered by Atuin - Automated Vulnerability Discovery Engine. |
