| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
sched/eevdf: Fix se->slice being set to U64_MAX and resulting crash
There is a code path in dequeue_entities() that can set the slice of a
sched_entity to U64_MAX, which sometimes results in a crash.
The offending case is when dequeue_entities() is called to dequeue a
delayed group entity, and then the entity's parent's dequeue is delayed.
In that case:
1. In the if (entity_is_task(se)) else block at the beginning of
dequeue_entities(), slice is set to
cfs_rq_min_slice(group_cfs_rq(se)). If the entity was delayed, then
it has no queued tasks, so cfs_rq_min_slice() returns U64_MAX.
2. The first for_each_sched_entity() loop dequeues the entity.
3. If the entity was its parent's only child, then the next iteration
tries to dequeue the parent.
4. If the parent's dequeue needs to be delayed, then it breaks from the
first for_each_sched_entity() loop _without updating slice_.
5. The second for_each_sched_entity() loop sets the parent's ->slice to
the saved slice, which is still U64_MAX.
This throws off subsequent calculations with potentially catastrophic
results. A manifestation we saw in production was:
6. In update_entity_lag(), se->slice is used to calculate limit, which
ends up as a huge negative number.
7. limit is used in se->vlag = clamp(vlag, -limit, limit). Because limit
is negative, vlag > limit, so se->vlag is set to the same huge
negative number.
8. In place_entity(), se->vlag is scaled, which overflows and results in
another huge (positive or negative) number.
9. The adjusted lag is subtracted from se->vruntime, which increases or
decreases se->vruntime by a huge number.
10. pick_eevdf() calls entity_eligible()/vruntime_eligible(), which
incorrectly returns false because the vruntime is so far from the
other vruntimes on the queue, causing the
(vruntime - cfs_rq->min_vruntime) * load calulation to overflow.
11. Nothing appears to be eligible, so pick_eevdf() returns NULL.
12. pick_next_entity() tries to dereference the return value of
pick_eevdf() and crashes.
Dumping the cfs_rq states from the core dumps with drgn showed tell-tale
huge vruntime ranges and bogus vlag values, and I also traced se->slice
being set to U64_MAX on live systems (which was usually "benign" since
the rest of the runqueue needed to be in a particular state to crash).
Fix it in dequeue_entities() by always setting slice from the first
non-empty cfs_rq. |
| Arbitrary file deletion vulnerabilities have been identified in the command-line interface of an AOS-8 Controller/Mobility Conductor. Successful exploitation of these vulnerabilities could allow an authenticated remote malicious actor to delete arbitrary files within the affected system. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
btrfs: zoned: return EIO on RAID1 block group write pointer mismatch
There was a bug report about a NULL pointer dereference in
__btrfs_add_free_space_zoned() that ultimately happens because a
conversion from the default metadata profile DUP to a RAID1 profile on two
disks.
The stack trace has the following signature:
BTRFS error (device sdc): zoned: write pointer offset mismatch of zones in raid1 profile
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000058
#PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
#PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
PGD 0 P4D 0
Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
RIP: 0010:__btrfs_add_free_space_zoned.isra.0+0x61/0x1a0
RSP: 0018:ffffa236b6f3f6d0 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff96c8132f3400 RCX: 0000000000000001
RDX: 0000000010000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff96c8132f3410
RBP: 0000000010000000 R08: 0000000000000003 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 00000000ffffffff R12: 0000000000000000
R13: ffff96c758f65a40 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: 000011aac0000000
FS: 00007fdab1cb2900(0000) GS:ffff96e60ca00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000000000058 CR3: 00000001a05ae000 CR4: 0000000000350ef0
Call Trace:
<TASK>
? __die_body.cold+0x19/0x27
? page_fault_oops+0x15c/0x2f0
? exc_page_fault+0x7e/0x180
? asm_exc_page_fault+0x26/0x30
? __btrfs_add_free_space_zoned.isra.0+0x61/0x1a0
btrfs_add_free_space_async_trimmed+0x34/0x40
btrfs_add_new_free_space+0x107/0x120
btrfs_make_block_group+0x104/0x2b0
btrfs_create_chunk+0x977/0xf20
btrfs_chunk_alloc+0x174/0x510
? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
btrfs_inc_block_group_ro+0x1b1/0x230
btrfs_relocate_block_group+0x9e/0x410
btrfs_relocate_chunk+0x3f/0x130
btrfs_balance+0x8ac/0x12b0
? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
? __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x14c/0x3e0
btrfs_ioctl+0x2686/0x2a80
? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
? ioctl_has_perm.constprop.0.isra.0+0xd2/0x120
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x97/0xc0
do_syscall_64+0x82/0x160
? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
? __memcg_slab_free_hook+0x11a/0x170
? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
? kmem_cache_free+0x3f0/0x450
? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x10/0x210
? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
? do_syscall_64+0x8e/0x160
? sysfs_emit+0xaf/0xc0
? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
? seq_read_iter+0x207/0x460
? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
? vfs_read+0x29c/0x370
? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x10/0x210
? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
? do_syscall_64+0x8e/0x160
? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
? exc_page_fault+0x7e/0x180
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
RIP: 0033:0x7fdab1e0ca6d
RSP: 002b:00007ffeb2b60c80 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000003 RCX: 00007fdab1e0ca6d
RDX: 00007ffeb2b60d80 RSI: 00000000c4009420 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00007ffeb2b60cd0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000013
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 00007ffeb2b6343b R14: 00007ffeb2b60d80 R15: 0000000000000001
</TASK>
CR2: 0000000000000058
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
The 1st line is the most interesting here:
BTRFS error (device sdc): zoned: write pointer offset mismatch of zones in raid1 profile
When a RAID1 block-group is created and a write pointer mismatch between
the disks in the RAID set is detected, btrfs sets the alloc_offset to the
length of the block group marking it as full. Afterwards the code expects
that a balance operation will evacuate the data in this block-group and
repair the problems.
But before this is possible, the new space of this block-group will be
accounted in the free space cache. But in __btrfs_
---truncated--- |
| Arbitrary file deletion vulnerabilities have been identified in the command-line interface of an AOS-8 Controller/Mobility Conductor. Successful exploitation of these vulnerabilities could allow an authenticated remote malicious actor to delete arbitrary files within the affected system. |
| Arbitrary file deletion vulnerabilities have been identified in the command-line interface of an AOS-8 Controller/Mobility Conductor. Successful exploitation of these vulnerabilities could allow an authenticated remote malicious actor to delete arbitrary files within the affected system. |
| An authenticated command injection vulnerability exists in the command line interface binary of AOS-10 GW and AOS-8 Controllers/Mobility Conductor operating system. Exploitation of this vulnerability requires physical access to the hardware controllers. A successful attack could allow an authenticated malicious actor with physical access to execute arbitrary commands as a privileged user on the underlying operating system. |
| Arbitrary file download vulnerabilities exist in the CLI binary of AOS-10 GW and AOS-8 Controller/Mobility Conductor operating systems. Successful exploitation could allow an authenticated malicious actor to download arbitrary files through carefully constructed exploits. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
interconnect: exynos: fix node leak in probe PM QoS error path
Make sure to add the newly allocated interconnect node to the provider
before adding the PM QoS request so that the node is freed on errors. |
| Arbitrary file download vulnerabilities exist in the CLI binary of AOS-10 GW and AOS-8 Controller/Mobility Conductor operating systems. Successful exploitation could allow an authenticated malicious actor to download arbitrary files through carefully constructed exploits. |
| Arbitrary file download vulnerabilities exist in the CLI binary of AOS-10 GW and AOS-8 Controller/Mobility Conductor operating systems. Successful exploitation could allow an authenticated malicious actor to download arbitrary files through carefully constructed exploits. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
LoongArch: Only call get_timer_irq() once in constant_clockevent_init()
Under CONFIG_DEBUG_ATOMIC_SLEEP=y and CONFIG_DEBUG_PREEMPT=y, we can see
the following messages on LoongArch, this is because using might_sleep()
in preemption disable context.
[ 0.001127] smp: Bringing up secondary CPUs ...
[ 0.001222] Booting CPU#1...
[ 0.001244] 64-bit Loongson Processor probed (LA464 Core)
[ 0.001247] CPU1 revision is: 0014c012 (Loongson-64bit)
[ 0.001250] FPU1 revision is: 00000000
[ 0.001252] BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at kernel/locking/mutex.c:283
[ 0.001255] in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 1, non_block: 0, pid: 0, name: swapper/1
[ 0.001257] preempt_count: 1, expected: 0
[ 0.001258] RCU nest depth: 0, expected: 0
[ 0.001259] Preemption disabled at:
[ 0.001261] [<9000000000223800>] arch_dup_task_struct+0x20/0x110
[ 0.001272] CPU: 1 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/1 Not tainted 6.2.0-rc7+ #43
[ 0.001275] Hardware name: Loongson Loongson-3A5000-7A1000-1w-A2101/Loongson-LS3A5000-7A1000-1w-A2101, BIOS vUDK2018-LoongArch-V4.0.05132-beta10 12/13/202
[ 0.001277] Stack : 0072617764726148 0000000000000000 9000000000222f1c 90000001001e0000
[ 0.001286] 90000001001e3be0 90000001001e3be8 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
[ 0.001292] 90000001001e3be8 0000000000000040 90000001001e3cb8 90000001001e3a50
[ 0.001297] 9000000001642000 90000001001e3be8 be694d10ce4139dd 9000000100174500
[ 0.001303] 0000000000000001 0000000000000001 00000000ffffe0a2 0000000000000020
[ 0.001309] 000000000000002f 9000000001354116 00000000056b0000 ffffffffffffffff
[ 0.001314] 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 90000000014f6e90 9000000001642000
[ 0.001320] 900000000022b69c 0000000000000001 0000000000000000 9000000001736a90
[ 0.001325] 9000000100038000 0000000000000000 9000000000222f34 0000000000000000
[ 0.001331] 00000000000000b0 0000000000000004 0000000000000000 0000000000070000
[ 0.001337] ...
[ 0.001339] Call Trace:
[ 0.001342] [<9000000000222f34>] show_stack+0x5c/0x180
[ 0.001346] [<90000000010bdd80>] dump_stack_lvl+0x60/0x88
[ 0.001352] [<9000000000266418>] __might_resched+0x180/0x1cc
[ 0.001356] [<90000000010c742c>] mutex_lock+0x20/0x64
[ 0.001359] [<90000000002a8ccc>] irq_find_matching_fwspec+0x48/0x124
[ 0.001364] [<90000000002259c4>] constant_clockevent_init+0x68/0x204
[ 0.001368] [<900000000022acf4>] start_secondary+0x40/0xa8
[ 0.001371] [<90000000010c0124>] smpboot_entry+0x60/0x64
Here are the complete call chains:
smpboot_entry()
start_secondary()
constant_clockevent_init()
get_timer_irq()
irq_find_matching_fwnode()
irq_find_matching_fwspec()
mutex_lock()
might_sleep()
__might_sleep()
__might_resched()
In order to avoid the above issue, we should break the call chains,
using timer_irq_installed variable as check condition to only call
get_timer_irq() once in constant_clockevent_init() is a simple and
proper way. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: usb: lan78xx: Limit packet length to skb->len
Packet length retrieved from descriptor may be larger than
the actual socket buffer length. In such case the cloned
skb passed up the network stack will leak kernel memory contents.
Additionally prevent integer underflow when size is less than
ETH_FCS_LEN. |
| An attacker with a valid read-only account can bypass Doris MCP Server’s read-only mode due to improper access control, allowing modifications that should have been prevented by read-only restrictions.
Impact:
Bypasses read-only mode; attackers with read-only access may perform unauthorized modifications.
Recommended action for operators: Upgrade to version 0.6.0 as soon as possible (this release contains the fix). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ocfs2: fix data corruption after failed write
When buffered write fails to copy data into underlying page cache page,
ocfs2_write_end_nolock() just zeroes out and dirties the page. This can
leave dirty page beyond EOF and if page writeback tries to write this page
before write succeeds and expands i_size, page gets into inconsistent
state where page dirty bit is clear but buffer dirty bits stay set
resulting in page data never getting written and so data copied to the
page is lost. Fix the problem by invalidating page beyond EOF after
failed write. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/xe/userptr: fix notifier vs folio deadlock
User is reporting what smells like notifier vs folio deadlock, where
migrate_pages_batch() on core kernel side is holding folio lock(s) and
then interacting with the mappings of it, however those mappings are
tied to some userptr, which means calling into the notifier callback and
grabbing the notifier lock. With perfect timing it looks possible that
the pages we pulled from the hmm fault can get sniped by
migrate_pages_batch() at the same time that we are holding the notifier
lock to mark the pages as accessed/dirty, but at this point we also want
to grab the folio locks(s) to mark them as dirty, but if they are
contended from notifier/migrate_pages_batch side then we deadlock since
folio lock won't be dropped until we drop the notifier lock.
Fortunately the mark_page_accessed/dirty is not really needed in the
first place it seems and should have already been done by hmm fault, so
just remove it.
(cherry picked from commit bd7c0cb695e87c0e43247be8196b4919edbe0e85) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mtd: inftlcore: Add error check for inftl_read_oob()
In INFTL_findwriteunit(), the return value of inftl_read_oob()
need to be checked. A proper implementation can be
found in INFTL_deleteblock(). The status will be set as
SECTOR_IGNORE to break from the while-loop correctly
if the inftl_read_oob() fails. |
| Multiple vulnerabilities exist in the web-based management interface of AOS-10 GW and AOS-8 Controller/Mobility Conductor. Successful exploitation of these vulnerabilities could allow an authenticated, remote attacker to download arbitrary files from the filesystem of an affected device. |
| This vulnerability allows access to arbitrary files in the application server file system due to a path traversal vulnerability in JavaServer Faces (JSF) 2.2.20 documented in CVE-2020-6950. The remediation for this vulnerability contained in this security fix provides additional changes to the remediation announced in May 2021 tracked by ETN IIQSAW-3585 and January 2024 tracked by IIQFW-336. This vulnerability in IdentityIQ is assigned CVE-2024-2227. |
| This vulnerability allows an authenticated user to perform a Lifecycle Manager flow or other QuickLink for a target user outside of the defined QuickLink Population. |
| A vulnerability in the Captive Portal of an AOS-10 GW and AOS-8 Controller/Mobility Conductor could allow a remote attacker to conduct a reflected cross-site scripting (XSS) attack. Successful exploitation could enable the attacker to execute arbitrary script code in the victim's browser within the context of the affected interface. |