| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ceph: properly decrypt filenames in vmalloc() buffers
The fscrypt subsystem uses the scatterlist crypto API, inheriting its
requirement that any buffers are in the linear mapping region. However,
the messenger client uses kvmalloc() to create buffers for messages,
which will occasionally place those buffers in the vmalloc() region when
physical memory fragmentation doesn't permit a large enough kmalloc().
The various callers of ceph_fname_to_usr() directly pass (slices of) raw
messages from the MDS without considering that the messages may be in
vmalloc() buffers, resulting in oopses especially on non-x86 platforms
(see 'Closes:' for more details and a reproducer).
Make ceph_fname_to_usr() explicitly tolerant of vmalloc()-allocated
fname->ctext, fname->name, and/or oname->name buffers, using `tname`
(which, when non-null, must be a linear address; when null, is briefly
allocated as necessary) as a bounce buffer to avoid passing any
inappropriate addresses to fscrypt_fname_disk_to_usr().
Additionally change parse_reply_info_readdir() -- the only function to
supply its own `tname` -- to follow the new "tname must never come from
vmalloc()" rule by passing NULL when the message is not in the linear
region. Though this causes a per-dentry kmalloc()+kfree(), this overhead
exists only when processing the minority of messages that spill into
vmalloc(). My (crude) testing puts this at only about 1 in 8,000 readdir
messages. Still, if the overhead proves unreasonable in the future, it
is easy enough to mitigate: a future change could allocate a bounce
buffer in parse_reply_info_readdir() and use that as `tname` instead. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
HID: wacom: validate report length in wacom_intuos_pro2_bt_irq
wacom_intuos_pro2_bt_irq() receives the wire report length in `len`
but never consults it before parsing. After the report-id gate it
unconditionally calls wacom_intuos_pro2_bt_pen() and then, selected by
features.type, a fixed chain of sub-parsers, none of which receive
`len`:
wacom_intuos_pro2_bt_pen(wacom);
if (type == INTUOSP2_BT || type == INTUOSP2S_BT) {
wacom_intuos_pro2_bt_touch(wacom);
wacom_intuos_pro2_bt_pad(wacom);
wacom_intuos_pro2_bt_battery(wacom);
} else {
wacom_intuos_gen3_bt_pad(wacom);
wacom_intuos_gen3_bt_battery(wacom);
}
Each sub-parser dereferences wacom->data at fixed offsets. The furthest
byte touched on each branch is:
INTUOSP2_BT / INTUOSP2S_BT: wacom_intuos_pro2_bt_pad() reads data[285]
(the touchring byte), so the report must be at least 286 bytes;
INTUOSHT3_BT ("gen3"): wacom_intuos_gen3_bt_battery() reads data[45],
so the report must be at least 46 bytes.
features.type is selected from the VID/PID id_table entry and
wacom_setup_device_quirks() force-registers the pen/pad/touch inputs
for that type independent of the report descriptor, so a malicious or
malfunctioning paired/spoofed Bluetooth peripheral can advertise that
VID/PID and send an undersized report that still satisfies the
data[0] == 0x80/0x81 gate. The driver then reads past the received
report and forwards the bytes to userspace via evdev (MSC_SERIAL /
ABS_MISC / ABS_WHEEL on the pen and pad input nodes), an out-of-bounds
read with a concrete userspace read-back channel, and a true
out-of-bounds read on transports whose backing buffer is sized to the
(small) report descriptor rather than a fixed-size staging buffer.
This is the same class of bug commit 2f1763f62909 ("HID: wacom: fix
out-of-bounds read in wacom_intuos_bt_irq") already hardened in the
sibling wacom_intuos_bt_irq(), which guards each report id against its
minimum length before parsing.
Guard wacom_intuos_pro2_bt_irq() the same way: before parsing, reject
reports shorter than the furthest offset the selected branch actually
dereferences, warn, and bail out. Because the whole pen/touch/pad/
battery chain runs unconditionally per branch, a single up-front check
against the maximum offset (286 bytes for INTUOSP2_BT/INTUOSP2S_BT,
46 bytes for the gen3 branch) bounds every sub-parser. Returning 0 on
a short report also skips those calls for the same malformed report,
which is the safe, conservative behavior. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: image: mdc800: change kmalloc() to kzalloc()
Change the kmalloc() calls in usb_mdc800_init() for irq_urb_buffer and
download_urb_buffer to kzalloc(), avoiding potential stack leaks if a
shorter message is received in mdc800_usb_irq() and
mdc800_usb_download_notify() |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nvme: skip the zoned limits update if the zone info query failed
nvme_query_zone_info() returns either a negative errno or a positive
NVMe status code, but nvme_update_ns_info_block() only tests for the
negative case:
ret = nvme_query_zone_info(ns, lbaf, &zi);
if (ret < 0)
goto out;
If the device fails the Identify Namespace (I/O Command Set specific)
command, or the Identify Controller command issued by
nvme_set_max_append(), the positive status falls through and setup
continues with the zero-initialized zone info. nvme_update_zone_info()
then marks the queue zoned with chunk_sectors and ns->head->zsze set to
zero.
blk_validate_zoned_limits() does not check chunk_sectors, so the limits
commit succeeds. blk_revalidate_disk_zones() does reject the zero zone
size, but by then the limits are live and nothing rolls them back, so
I/O keeps being submitted to a zoned queue with a zero zone size and
disk_zone_no() shifts by ilog2(0):
nvme0n1: Invalid non power of two zone size (0)
UBSAN: shift-out-of-bounds in include/linux/blkdev.h:747:16
shift exponent -1 is negative
disk_zone_no include/linux/blkdev.h:747 [inline]
bio_straddles_zones include/linux/blkdev.h:1058 [inline]
blk_zone_wplug_handle_write block/blk-zoned.c:1423 [inline]
blk_zone_plug_bio.cold+0x25/0x1c8 block/blk-zoned.c:1605
blk_mq_submit_bio+0x18fb/0x2870 block/blk-mq.c:3196
submit_bh_wbc+0x575/0x740 fs/buffer.c:2824
__block_write_full_folio+0x728/0xdd0 fs/buffer.c:1933
Any device, firmware or NVMe-oF target that fails this one command
reaches this.
Skip the zoned limits update in that case, and log which of the two
things happened: during a revalidation the queue keeps the zone
geometry it was last validated with, and on a first scan the namespace
is registered without zoned limits, so that it is still available as a
handle for admin commands. Neither of the paths in
nvme_query_zone_info() that return a positive status logs anything, so
the failure would otherwise be silent.
zi.zone_size is an exact indicator: every path that returns a positive
status returns before it is assigned, and after that the only failure
left is -ENODEV, which the caller already handles.
Found by FuzzNvme. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nvme-tcp: check the data direction of a C2HData PDU
nvme_tcp_handle_c2h_data() finds the request by command id and checks
that it has a payload, but it does not check that the command asked for
data to be read. A controller that answers a write command with C2HData
therefore reaches nvme_tcp_recv_data(), where _copy_to_iter() hits
WARN_ON_ONCE(i->data_source) and returns 0. The receive path turns that
into -EFAULT and resets the controller.
No data is copied, so this is not memory corruption. What a controller
gets is a kernel warning it can raise at will, which is fatal on a host
booted with panic_on_warn.
The send path already knows the direction - it consults rq_data_dir()
when it builds a command - and nvme_tcp_handle_r2t() checks the length
and the offset of the request it names. The C2HData path does not check
the direction at all.
Reject a C2HData PDU whose command is not a read. Rejecting it fails
the command and resets the controller, as the neighbouring check in this
function does; what goes away is the warning.
[ 6.885580] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 6.886457] WARNING: lib/iov_iter.c:193 at _copy_to_iter+0x289/0x1330, CPU#0: kworker/0:1H/71
[ 6.888137] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 71 Comm: kworker/0:1H Not tainted 7.2.0-rc5-NVMETCP-gf5098b6bae76 #1 PREEMPT(lazy)
[ 6.891165] Workqueue: nvme_tcp_wq nvme_tcp_io_work
[ 6.891875] RIP: 0010:_copy_to_iter+0x289/0x1330
[ 6.903739] Call Trace:
[ 6.904085] <TASK>
[ 6.909254] __skb_datagram_iter+0x433/0x820
[ 6.911026] skb_copy_datagram_iter+0x37/0x120
[ 6.911622] nvme_tcp_recv_skb+0xa07/0x4320
[ 6.913378] __tcp_read_sock+0x1ab/0x810
[ 6.915788] nvme_tcp_try_recv+0x152/0x1e0
[ 6.918222] nvme_tcp_io_work+0x1e4/0x6c0
[ 6.926906] </TASK>
[ 6.927226] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
[ 6.927878] nvme nvme0: queue 1 failed to copy request 0x71 data
[ 6.928709] nvme nvme0: receive failed: -14 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nvme-fabrics: fix DHCHAP secret leak on parse failure
nvmf_parse_options() duplicates dhchap_secret and dhchap_ctrl_secret
with match_strdup() before validating the DHHC-1: representation.
If validation fails, the parser returns -EINVAL before the temporary
string in p is assigned to opts->dhchap_secret or
opts->dhchap_ctrl_secret. nvmf_create_ctrl() subsequently frees opts,
but nvmf_free_options() cannot release the unassigned temporary string.
Each rejected option therefore leaks one allocation.
This is easy to miss because valid secrets transfer ownership to opts
and are freed normally, while the malformed-secret path still returns
the expected -EINVAL to userspace.
With CONFIG_NVME_HOST_AUTH enabled, the leak is reachable before the
required-option checks and transport lookup. No NVMe-oF target or
working transport connection is required; for example, repeatedly
writing
dhchap_secret=BAD
or
dhchap_ctrl_secret=BAD
to /dev/nvme-fabrics deterministically takes the leaking parse path.
Free the temporary string before leaving both validation error paths.
Use kfree_sensitive() because the copied option may contain secret
material even when its representation is rejected, matching the
sensitive cleanup used for stored DHCHAP secrets. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
LoongArch: KVM: Preserve memslot arch flags on KVM_MR_FLAGS_ONLY
kvm_arch_prepare_memory_region() computes new->arch.flags, i.e. whether
a memslot is KVM_MEM_HUGEPAGE_CAPABLE or KVM_MEM_HUGEPAGE_INCAPABLE,
only for KVM_MR_CREATE and KVM_MR_MOVE, and returns early for every
other change. But the generic code allocates a zeroed memslot for every
change and never copies old->arch, so after a KVM_MR_FLAGS_ONLY update,
e.g. toggling KVM_MEM_LOG_DIRTY_PAGES for live migration, the active
memslot has arch.flags == 0.
With both flags clear, fault_supports_huge_mapping() falls through to
the alignment check on the HVA range alone, which no longer verifies
that the GPA and HVA have the same offset within a PMD. A memslot that
was marked KVM_MEM_HUGEPAGE_INCAPABLE because of a GPA/HVA offset
mismatch can then be mapped with PMD entries on read faults, and since
kvm_map_page() aligns the gfn and the pfn independently, the guest ends
up accessing the wrong host pages, exactly the "d -> f, e -> g" case
described in the comment above the check.
Carry the arch flags over from the old memslot for KVM_MR_FLAGS_ONLY,
as the GPA, HVA and size are guaranteed to be unchanged for that case. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: s390: Free guest debug data on vcpu destroy
kvm_s390_clear_bp_data() is only called from
kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_set_guest_debug(), i.e. when user space changes or
disables debugging. A vCPU that is destroyed while hardware breakpoints
are still armed - the normal case when the VMM just exits or crashes -
leaks hw_bp_info, hw_wp_info and all old_data buffers, since generic KVM
frees the vCPU right after kvm_arch_vcpu_destroy().
That is bounded by MAX_BP_COUNT entries, so roughly 8 KiB per vCPU, but
it is unbounded over VM lifetimes. The allocations are
GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT, so the charge also outlives the exiting process and
pins dying memcgs.
Fix by clearing the debug data on vCPU destruction. Calling it
unconditionally is fine: struct kvm_vcpu is zero allocated, so for a vCPU
that never enabled debugging the counters are 0 and the pointers NULL. |
| The LearnPress WordPress plugin before 4.4.7 does not restrict the correctness flags it returns when a quiz answer is checked, allowing unauthenticated attackers to obtain the correct answer to every option of a question, along with the instructor's explanation, on courses configured to be taken without enrolling. |
| Tanium addressed an information disclosure vulnerability in Discover. |
| OpenTelemetry-Go is the Go implementation of OpenTelemetry. From version 1.5.0 to 1.44.0, sdk/trace.NewTracerProvider emits a TracerProvider created internal Info-level diagnostic event whose MarshalLog implementations recursively include span processor, exporter, and client configuration. Applications that call otel.SetLogger to enable OpenTelemetry internal Info logging can therefore record OTLP gRPC and HTTP collector endpoints, the OTLP HTTP Insecure flag, and complete Zipkin collector URLs. A person or system with access to those logs can learn internal collector topology and can recover credentials or tokens embedded in Zipkin URL user information or query strings. The default OpenTelemetry logger does not emit the event, and this path does not log OTLP authentication headers, TLS key material, or span payloads. This issue is fixed in version 1.45.0. |
| vm2 before 3.11.7 exposes Node's shared Buffer pool to sandboxed code, allowing disclosure of host memory used by Buffer.from, Buffer.concat, and related allocations. Sandboxed code can read and write to host-realm buffers by acquiring ArrayBuffers from small allocations, leading to sensitive data exposure and potential denial-of-service. |
| vm2 versions 3.11.0 through 3.11.6 leak absolute host filesystem paths to sandboxed code through error stack formatting. Attacker-supplied code can force the host-realm source transformer to throw a SyntaxError (for example by calling eval with malformed source) and then read the error's .stack property; the bridge forwards the .stack read to the host-realm formatter, bypassing the sandbox-side host-path redaction introduced for GHSA-v27g-jcqj-v8rw. The returned stack string discloses absolute paths from vm2, Node.js internals, and the embedding application's own source tree, along with host function names. Default new VM() and new NodeVM() configurations are affected without any special options, and the issue persists when string eval is disabled because the host-side transformer throws before eval is handled. The impact is information disclosure only; no code execution results. Fixed in vm2 3.11.7. |
| Improper input validation in Safebrowsing in Google Chrome prior to 152.0.7977.65 allowed a remote attacker to bypass system access restrictions via a crafted file. (Chromium security severity: Medium) |
| Improper input validation in Network in Google Chrome prior to 152.0.7977.65 allowed a remote attacker to potentially bypass web origin policy via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: Medium) |
| Improper input validation in Variations in Google Chrome prior to 152.0.7977.65 allowed a remote attacker to potentially bypass web origin policy via crafted network traffic. (Chromium security severity: Medium) |
| Improper input validation in Safebrowsing in Google Chrome prior to 152.0.7977.65 allowed a remote attacker to bypass system access restrictions via a crafted file. (Chromium security severity: Medium) |
| Improper input validation in DeviceBoundSessionCredentials in Google Chrome prior to 152.0.7977.65 allowed a remote attacker leveraging social engineering to bypass web origin policy via crafted network traffic. (Chromium security severity: Low) |
| Improper input validation in StorageAccessAPI in Google Chrome prior to 152.0.7977.65 allowed a remote attacker who had compromised the renderer process to bypass web origin policy via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: Medium) |
| A privacy issue was addressed with improved handling of user preferences. This issue is fixed in iOS 27 and iPadOS 27. An app may be able to identify what other apps a user has installed. |
