| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| Traefik is an open source HTTP reverse proxy and load balancer. From 3.6.11 until 3.6.25 and 3.7.10, Traefik's BasicAuth middleware in pkg/middlewares/auth/basic_auth.go deduplicates concurrent password checks with a singleflight key built from the delimiter-free concatenation of password and secret, allowing an attacker who has a valid credential and the stored hash to authenticate as an unconfigured username when headerField trusts the forwarded identity. This issue is fixed in 3.6.25 and 3.7.10. |
| RabbitMQ amqp091-go is a Go AMQP 0.9.1 client. Prior to 1.13.0, Connection.openTune in connection.go accepts a server-advertised FrameMax below the AMQP frameMinSize value of 4096 bytes because the connection negotiation loop does not enforce the protocol minimum. A malicious or compromised AMQP broker can therefore advertise an extremely small FrameMax, causing later client publications to be fragmented into excessive numbers of frames and write operations. This can consume CPU and stall the client or its host. This issue is fixed in version 1.13.0. |
| An issue was discovered in Samsung Exynos Mobile Processor, Automotive Processor, and Modem Exynos 9810, Exynos 9610, Exynos 9820, Exynos 980, Exynos 850, Exynos 1080, Exynos 2100, Exynos 2200, Exynos 1280, Exynos 1380, Exynos 1330, Exynos 9110, Exynos W920, Exynos Modem 5123, Exynos Modem 5300, an Exynos Auto T5123. In the Shannon SM Task, improper handling of a loop with an unreachable exit condition cannot guarantee the termination of a required service via a malformed SM message. |
| A vulnerability was found in FFmpeg 8.0.x. This affects the function parse_playlist of the file libavformat/hlsproto.c of the component Duration Parser. Performing a manipulation of the argument duration/target_duration results in denial of service. The attack is possible to be carried out remotely. Upgrading to version 8.1 and 9.0 is able to mitigate this issue. The patch is named 64fafd63f0b4. Upgrading the affected component is recommended. |
| Open WebUI is an extensible, feature-rich, and user-friendly self-hosted AI platform. From 0.10.0 until 0.11.1, POST /api/v1/folders/{id}/update/parent allowed a user to place a folder under itself or one of its descendants, while the folder tree walks used by DELETE /api/v1/folders/{id} and POST /api/v1/folders/{id}/read did not track visited folder identifiers. An authenticated user could persist a parent cycle and start a request that consumed CPU and memory indefinitely, with the condition remaining stored until repaired. This issue is fixed in version 0.11.1. |
| zstd-jni versions 1.4.8-4 through 1.5.7-13 fail to validate negative length parameters in ZstdInputStreamNoFinalizer.read(), allowing attackers to trigger infinite loops. Attackers can pass negative length values to cause the read method to spin indefinitely while holding the stream monitor, blocking all other threads from accessing the stream. |
| fast-uri is a dependency-free RFC 3986 URI parser for Node.js, used by Fastify and ajv, that added a mailto scheme parser in version 4.1.3. In versions 4.1.3 and 4.1.4, the mailto parser compares each query field name to the reserved names to, subject, and body while the name is still percent-encoded, and decodes it only when storing it as a generic header, so a percent-encoded spelling of a reserved field name is not recognized as that field at parse time but is re-emitted as the literal field name when the parsed URI is serialized. An application that validates, logs, or displays the recipient list from the first parse and then serializes the URI and sends it can silently gain an attacker-chosen recipient, and the subject and body fields can be smuggled across the same roundtrip. The issue is fixed in fast-uri 4.1.5, and users should upgrade to 4.1.5 or later. As a workaround, do not act on a mailto URI that fast-uri has re-serialized without first decoding and re-validating its recipient, subject, and body fields. |
| Converting crafted EUC_JISX0213 input to UCS-4 or the internal wide character encoding, for example with iconv, in the GNU C Library version 2.3 to 2.44 may result in the converter making no progress, causing the calling application to hang.
Some EUC_JISX0213 sequences decode to two code points. If the output buffer has room for only the first one, the converter stores the second in the conversion state and returns E2BIG, but it never clears that pending character after emitting it on the next call. The converter then keeps emitting the pending character without consuming further input, so an application that retries the conversion loops forever. The input must be attacker controlled and the application must convert it with an output buffer small enough to split the two code points. Only the EUC_JISX0213 character set is affected, which is not commonly used. The related defect in SHIFT_JISX0213 converter is tracked separately as CVE-2026-77117. |
| Converting crafted SHIFT_JISX0213 input to UCS-4 or the internal wide character encoding, for example with iconv, in the GNU C Library version 2.3 to 2.44 may result in the converter making no progress, causing the calling application to hang.
Some SHIFT_JISX0213 sequences decode to two code points. If the output buffer has room for only the first one, the converter stores the second in the conversion state and returns E2BIG, but it never clears that pending character after emitting it on the next call. The converter then keeps emitting the pending character without consuming further input, so an application that retries the conversion loops forever. The input must be attacker controlled and the application must convert it with an output buffer small enough to split the two code points. Only the SHIFT_JISX0213 character set is affected, which is not commonly used. The related defect in the EUC_JISX0213 converter is tracked separately as CVE-2026-80489. |
| When processing HTTP/2 SETTINGS frames, transport will enter an infinite loop of writing CONTINUATION frames if it receives a SETTINGS_MAX_FRAME_SIZE with a value of 0. |
| The Zephyr SDIO subsystem function sdio_io_rw_extended_helper() in subsys/sd/sdio.c finishes transfers with a byte-I/O loop that uses size = MIN(remaining, func->cis.max_blk_size) as the per-iteration step. The value func->cis.max_blk_size is decoded directly from the SDIO card's CIS FUNCE tuple in sdio_decode_cis() and is not validated. When a card reports a maximum block size of zero, size is always 0, remaining never decreases, and the loop spins forever.
The loop is reached from the public SDIO client API used by drivers, including sdio_read_fifo(), sdio_write_fifo(), and the incrementing register read/write helpers, each of which enters the loop while holding the per-card mutex func->card->lock. A card advertising max_blk_size == 0 therefore hangs the calling thread permanently on its first non-block-aligned transfer and never releases the mutex, denying service to the SDIO peripheral (and any subsystem such as Wi-Fi that depends on it) until the device is reset.
The malicious value must come from the SDIO card itself, so the defect is exploitable where a removable SDIO/combo card slot lets an attacker insert a crafted or malfunctioning card (a physical attack vector); on boards with a soldered SDIO peripheral it is not attacker-influenceable. There is no memory-safety, confidentiality, or integrity impact — only a permanent availability loss. The fix returns -EIO when func->cis.max_blk_size is zero, before the loop is entered. |
| strongSwan 5.1.3 through 6.0.7 has an infinite loop in the x509 plugin's attribute certificate parser for ietfAttrSyntax. |
| Open WebUI is an extensible, feature-rich, and user-friendly self-hosted AI platform. From 0.5.0 until 0.11.1, the message-chain reconstruction helper in backend/open_webui/utils/misc.py advanced through a chat history by map key but tracked visited entries using each message body's optional id field. An authenticated user could store id-less messages in a parent cycle and trigger a non-terminating walk that blocked the async event loop, grew memory until termination, and remained persistent across process restarts. This issue is fixed in version 0.11.1. |
| Open WebUI is an extensible, feature-rich, and user-friendly self-hosted AI platform. From 0.10.0 until 0.11.1, DELETE /api/v1/chats/{id}/messages/{message_id} used the chat-history deletion helper in backend/open_webui/models/chats.py to follow childrenIds without recording visited message identifiers. An authenticated user could store a cyclic chat tree and delete a message, causing a synchronous infinite loop on the server request loop that blocked every user's requests until the process was killed. This issue is fixed in version 0.11.1. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
device property: fix infinite loop in fwnode_for_each_child_node()
When iterate over children of a fwnode that has a secondary fwnode,
fwnode_get_next_child_node() can enter an infinite loop if the secondary
fwnode has more than one child.
Parent Child
(Primary fwnode) FWa: {FWa1, FWa2, FWa3}
(Secondary fwnode) FWb: {FWb1, FWb2}
In this case:
┌─> fwnode_get_next_child_node(FWa, FWa1)
│ - fwnode_call_ptr_op(FWa, get_next_child_node, FWa1) returns FWa2
│
│ ...
│
│ fwnode_get_next_child_node(FWa, FWa3)
│ - fwnode_call_ptr_op(FWa, get_next_child_node, FWa3) returns NULL
│ - fwnode_call_ptr_op(FWb, get_next_child_node, FWa3) returns FWb1
│
│ fwnode_get_next_child_node(FWa, FWb1)
│ - fwnode_call_ptr_op(FWa, get_next_child_node, FWb1) returns FWa1
└────┘
This cause fwnode_for_each_child_node() to loop indefinitely, reapeatedly
output {FWa1, FWa2, FWa3, FWb1, FWa1, ...}.
The root cause is that when the current child (FWb1) belongs to the
secondary fwnode, calling get_next_child_node() on the parimary fwnode
incorrectly returns the first child (FWa1) again instead of NULL.
Fix this by dynamically checking the parent fwnode of the current child
before calling get_next_child_node(). This approach follows the pattern
established in commit b5b41ab6b0c1 ("device property: Check
fwnode->secondary in fwnode_graph_get_next_endpoint()"). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: gadget: f_fs: Prevent deadlock during ep0 read loop
Currently, ffs_ep0_read() holds ffs->mutex when it prepares to go to
sleep waiting for an event. When no setup events are pending, it calls
wait_event_interruptible_exclusive_locked_irq() with the mutex still
held. The wait macro deliberately drops the waitqueue spinlock before
sleeping but does not drop the mutex.
If a userspace daemon is polling ep0 via read() and the gadget is
asynchronously torn down via configfs (e.g., echo "" > UDC), a
deadlock can occur:
1. The configfs teardown calls functionfs_unbind(), which queues a
FUNCTIONFS_UNBIND event.
2. The daemon wakes up, consumes the event, and drops the mutex.
3. However, if the daemon loops and immediately issues another read()
before exiting, it reacquires ffs->mutex and again goes into an
interruptible sleep.
4. Meanwhile, functionfs_unbind() continues execution and attempts to
acquire ffs->mutex to tear down ep0req.
5. The kernel deadlocks because the configfs thread is stuck in an
uninterruptible sleep waiting for the mutex, while the userspace
daemon is in an interruptible sleep holding the mutex forever
because no more events will arrive.
To fix this, we drop both the waitqueue spinlock and ffs->mutex before
going to sleep, and use wait_event_interruptible_exclusive() instead.
Upon waking up, we jump back to the `retry` label to safely reacquire
the mutex and re-evaluate the state machine. By not sleeping with
ffs->mutex held, we natively decouple gadget teardowns (which require
the mutex) from userspace polling. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: mt76: mt7615: avoid waiting for mac work under the mt76 mutex
mt7615_suspend() acquired the mt76 mutex and then called
cancel_delayed_work_sync() on mac_work. mt7615_mac_work() acquires the
same mutex via mt7615_mutex_acquire() at the top of the worker, so if
mac_work is already running and blocked on the mutex, the suspend path
deadlocks waiting for the work it holds the mutex against.
Flush scan_work and mac_work before taking the mutex, matching the
suspend paths in mt7921 and mt7925. scan_work only takes the mt76
spinlock, but moving it keeps the sequence consistent. This also keeps
mac_work from running over an already suspended HIF, which the previous
split (async cancel under the lock, sync cancel after release) would
have allowed. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: ath11k: fix RCU stall while reaping monitor destination ring
While processing the monitor destination ring, MSDUs are reaped from the
link descriptor based on the corresponding buf_id.
However, sometimes the driver cannot obtain a valid buffer corresponding
to the buf_id received from the hardware. This causes an infinite loop
in the destination processing, resulting in a kernel crash.
kernel log:
ath11k_pci 0000:58:00.0: data msdu_pop: invalid buf_id 309
ath11k_pci 0000:58:00.0: data dp_rx_monitor_link_desc_return failed
ath11k_pci 0000:58:00.0: data msdu_pop: invalid buf_id 309
ath11k_pci 0000:58:00.0: data dp_rx_monitor_link_desc_return failed
Fix this by skipping the problematic buf_id and reaping the next entry,
replacing the break with the next MSDU processing.
Tested-on: WCN6855 hw2.0 PCI WLAN.HSP.1.1-03125-QCAHSPSWPL_V1_V2_SILICONZ_LITE-3.6510.30
Tested-on: QCN9074 hw1.0 PCI WLAN.HK.2.7.0.1-01744-QCAHKSWPL_SILICONZ-1 |
| A flaw was found in libkcapi. A local attacker can influence an application that uses the Asynchronous Input/Output (AIO) interface. By reusing an AIO-enabled handle after a prior completion error, the _kcapi_aio_read_all() function can enter a non-terminating wait loop. This can lead to a persistent denial of service, making the affected application or thread unresponsive. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ceph: do not repeat ceph_trim_dentries() if no progress possible
ceph_cap_reclaim_work() re-queues itself for as long as
ceph_trim_dentries() returns -EAGAIN, which happens whenever a lease
walk exhausts its `nr_to_scan` budget. This creates a busy loop that
consumes CPU without making any progress when there is nothing to
reclaim: with no cap pressure (`count==0`) and every scanned lease
still valid, each pass runs the full scan budget down to zero and
returns `-EAGAIN`, only to be queued again immediately.
The dir-lease walk made this worse. When `expire_dir_lease` is
`false` (i.e. we have no intention of reclaiming dir leases),
__dir_lease_check() returned `TOUCH` for every valid lease. `TOUCH`
moves the dentry to the tail of the list and resets `di->time` via
__dentry_dir_lease_touch(), so a walk over N valid leases pointlessly
rewrote the list, refreshed the timestamps (preventing them from ever
aging out) and always drained `nr_to_scan`, guaranteeing the `-EAGAIN`
requeue.
Fix this in three steps:
- Return `KEEP` instead of `TOUCH` when `expire_dir_lease` is
`false`. If we are not going to reclaim the lease, leave it in
place instead of churning the list and resetting its timestamp; the
walk then terminates naturally (or via `STOP` at the first fresh
lease).
- Only return `-EAGAIN` from the first (dentry-lease) walk when something
was actually freed. A full batch that frees nothing means retrying
the same list immediately is futile; fall through to the dir-lease
walk instead.
- After both walks, bail out with success (0) when nothing was freed
and there is no cap pressure (`count==0`). There is no reason to
keep retrying when we are not over the cap limit and made no
progress.
Under real cap pressure (`count>0`) the reclaim path is unchanged and
still retries via `-EAGAIN`.
Without this patch, I saw 500 ceph_trim_dentries() calls per second on
our web servers. This is very visible in `/proc/lock_stat` (5 minute
capture):
class name con-bounces contentions waittime-min waittime-max waittime-total waittime-avg acq-bounces acquisitions holdtime-min holdtime-max holdtime-total holdtime-avg
&mdsc->dentry_list_lock: 126180 128218 0.04 8063.44 15986965.20 124.69 1573354 5296812 0.04 8291.28 74164526.48 14.00
-----------------------
&mdsc->dentry_list_lock 111736 [<000000007b11e319>] __ceph_dentry_dir_lease_touch+0x7c/0xa8
&mdsc->dentry_list_lock 2631 [<0000000050597999>] __dentry_leases_walk+0x64/0x2c8
&mdsc->dentry_list_lock 3878 [<00000000c0022f62>] __ceph_dentry_lease_touch+0x5c/0xa8
&mdsc->dentry_list_lock 9973 [<000000002f27cb6f>] __dentry_lease_unlist+0x50/0xa0
-----------------------
&mdsc->dentry_list_lock 123621 [<0000000050597999>] __dentry_leases_walk+0x64/0x2c8
&mdsc->dentry_list_lock 1822 [<000000007b11e319>] __ceph_dentry_dir_lease_touch+0x7c/0xa8
&mdsc->dentry_list_lock 2720 [<000000002f27cb6f>] __dentry_lease_unlist+0x50/0xa0
&mdsc->dentry_list_lock 55 [<00000000c0022f62>] __ceph_dentry_lease_touch+0x5c/0xa8
With this patch:
class name con-bounces contentions waittime-min waittime-max waittime-total waittime-avg acq-bounces acquisitions holdtime-min holdtime-max holdtime-total holdtime-avg
&mdsc->dentry_list_lock: 1203 1215 0.16 408.88 33082.88 27.23 4320501 7357389 0.04 500.64 1961578.00 0.27
-----------------------
&mdsc->dentry_list_lock 1029 [<000000003c9aea8a>] __ceph_dentry_dir_lease_touch+0x7c/0xa8
&mdsc->dentry_list_lock 1
---truncated--- |
