| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| Denial-of-service vulnerability in M-Files Server versions before 26.5.16015.3 allows an authenticated admin user to cause the M-Files Server process to crash and fail to restart. |
| IOTSmartHome's gui/login.php checkCookie() function builds an authentication query as SELECT * FROM users WHERE ID='<decoded lastLogin cookie>' after base64-decoding the client-supplied lastLogin cookie via safe_decode(), which performs URL-safe base64 decoding with no sanitization of the decoded value before it is concatenated into the SQL string. An unauthenticated attacker can set a lastLogin cookie containing a base64-encoded SQL injection payload (e.g. base64("' OR '1'='1")) to bypass authentication and, via UNION-based injection, extract arbitrary data including user credentials. |
| Crater's NotePolicy checks only a blanket Bouncer ability (manage-all-notes / view-all-notes) with no company-ownership comparison, unlike InvoicePolicy and other sibling policies which additionally verify $user->hasCompany($model->company_id). NotesController's show(), update(), and destroy() actions authorize via $this->authorize('view notes'/'manage notes') without passing the target Note model, and Note's company-scoping (scopeWhereCompany) is applied only in the list endpoint, not in show/update/destroy. Any authenticated user of one company can read, edit, or delete another company's notes by ID. This is a distinct finding from the previously reported CustomerPolicy company-ownership omission (a different policy class and controller). |
| The backmeup npm package assembles shell command strings by directly concatenating its option values (name, source, destination, filter) - e.g. cmd = "mkdir -p " + path.join(info.destination, info.name) + "; " - and executes the resulting string through a shell via ssh2-exec (locally via child_process, or remotely via SSH when an ssh handle is supplied), rather than using execFile/spawn with an argument array. The only processing applied is path.normalize()/path.join(), which do not neutralize shell metacharacters (;, |, &, $(), backticks, newline). Any application that passes attacker-influenced values into these options (e.g. a user-chosen backup name) is vulnerable to arbitrary OS command execution on the backup host, or on the remote SSH target when one is configured. |
| Pixelfed's SearchController (behind the auth middleware) accepts a URL via its remote-search parameters and fetches it server-side through ActivityPubFetchService, whose validateUrl() only blocks the literal hosts 127.0.0.1, localhost, and ::1 and requires https, without checking the resolved IP against private, internal, or link-local ranges (e.g. 169.254.169.254). Optional DNS validation is disabled by default and, when enabled, only confirms a DNS record exists without filtering by IP range. The fetch response body is returned to the requester only when the Content-Type matches an ActivityPub content type, making this a semi-blind but authenticated SSRF primitive reachable by any logged-in user. |
| Inventory-Management-System-PHP's login.php constructs its authentication query via direct string concatenation of raw POST parameters: $sql = "select * from user where email = '$email' and password = '$password'", with no escaping or parameterization, allowing authentication bypass via a payload such as email=' OR 1=1 LIMIT 1-- -. Separately, delete.php executes mysqli_query($db, "DELETE FROM product WHERE product_id=" . $_GET['id']) with no authentication check and no validation of the id parameter, allowing an unauthenticated attacker to delete arbitrary product rows or perform blind SQL injection via payloads such as id=0 OR SLEEP(5). |
| Akaunting's shared download route (app/Http/Controllers/Common/Uploads.php::download(), reachable at uploads/{id}/download behind only generic auth middleware) fetched the requested Media record by ID with no verification that it belonged to the requesting portal customer's own company, allowing any authenticated portal customer to download any other company's uploaded files by guessing or enumerating media IDs. Fixed in commit 80ef6d3 (2026-07-12), which added an explicit ownership check comparing the media's parent record contact_id against the requesting user's own contact. |
| InvoiceNinja v5-stable renders an invoice or quote's "terms" field in the client portal using Laravel Blade's raw output directive {!! $entity->terms !!} (resources/views/portal/ninja2020/invoices/includes/terms.blade.php) with no HTML sanitization. StoreInvoiceRequest.php only strips newlines from the field and does not purify HTML. An authenticated user with invoice creation access can set the terms field via the REST API (PUT /api/v1/invoices/{id}) to an HTML/JavaScript payload that executes in the client's browser when they view the invoice, enabling session cookie theft and client account takeover. This is a distinct code path from the previously published invoice line-item description field XSS (GHSA-98wm-cxpw-847p / CVE-2026-33628). |
| Magistrala's Rules Engine allows authenticated users to create rules with embedded Go or Lua scripts executed server-side when IoT messages arrive. The Go script engine (re/golang.go) runs scripts through the Yaegi interpreter with stdlib.Symbols, exposing the full Go standard library (including os and net/http) with validation limited to a regex blocking goroutines and panic() calls; dangerous functions such as os.ReadFile, os.WriteFile, os.Remove, and os.Environ remain fully accessible. The Lua script engine (re/lua.go) performs no input validation at all and preloads dangerous libraries: db (arbitrary database access), ioutil (file I/O), an HTTP client (SSRF), and filepath (traversal). An authenticated low-privileged user can achieve arbitrary file read/write, environment variable leakage, database access, and SSRF against internal microservices. |
| Book-Management-System's Flask API endpoints /student, /record, /books, /find_stu_book, and /find_not_return_book are missing the @login_required decorator that protects sibling routes (/search_student, /storage) in the same file. This allows any unauthenticated remote user to retrieve student PII (name, gender, card validity, debt status) and full book-borrowing history by supplying a card_id. Because card_id values are sequential integers, the entire student database can be enumerated without authentication. |
| DjangoCRM's toggle_default_sorting view is the only route in common/urls.py that is not wrapped in login_required or staff_member_required, and it redirects to a caller-supplied next_url GET parameter after only checking secure_url(next_url), which merely verifies the target host matches the current site's domain (blocking only cross-domain redirects) while allowing any same-site path with no authentication required to reach the view. This enables unauthenticated phishing redirects and referrer-based token leakage via redirect chains. |
| A flaw was found in libtiff. A remote attacker could exploit this vulnerability by providing a specially crafted PixarLog-compressed TIFF image. This issue occurs when decoding Pixarlog codec images with the PIXARLOGDATAFMT_8BITABGR output format and a specific stride value, leading to a heap-based buffer overflow. This could potentially result in arbitrary code execution or a denial of service (DoS). |
| DjangoCRM's massmail module renders user-controlled EmlMessage fields (subject, content) through Django's Template() constructor with no sanitization, in at least three locations: message_previews.py builds an f-string embedding message.subject/message.content directly into a Template() call; email_creators.py passes eml_message.subject directly as a template string to Template(); and helpers.py contains the same f-string interpolation pattern. An authenticated user with mass-mail message edit rights can inject Django template syntax ({{ }} / {% %}) that executes at render time, enabling disclosure of other users' data and password hashes via request context variables, CSRF token forgery, and inclusion of arbitrary registered templates. |
| Documize Community's attachment download route (domain/attachment/endpoint.go, Download function, registered via AddPublic with no auth middleware) accepts a `secure` query parameter and grants access whenever the parameter is simply non-empty (len(secureToken) > 0), without comparing it to any server-stored value. Any non-empty string, such as ?secure=x, bypasses authentication entirely and allows downloading any organization's attachments. Sibling handlers in the same file (togglePublish, delete) correctly enforce session-based authorization, confirming this is an inconsistency rather than intended design. |
| MacCMS10's admin template editor (application/admin/controller/Template.php) blocks dangerous PHP functions in template content via a blacklist regex, but the blacklist omitted exec, passthru, popen, show_source, create_function, register_shutdown_function, register_tick_function, and error_log. Combined with ThinkPHP's {if} template tag, which embeds the condition attribute directly into raw PHP (<?php if(condition): ?>), an authenticated administrator could inject a payload such as {if condition="exec('id > /tmp/pwned.txt')"}{/if} to achieve remote code execution. Fixed in commit 71ad3bb29570e110d8e973acff68040a3050ddf0 (2026-06-22), which added the missing functions to the filter. |
| Koha's reports/issues_stats.pl (the circulation statistics report) builds its calculation query in sub calculate by concatenating several user-controlled request parameters directly into the SQL string. The PeriodTypeSel, PeriodDaySel, and PeriodMonthSel parameters are interpolated raw into single-quoted equality and function-comparison fragments, and the Filter slots plus the Line and Column identifiers are likewise interpolated with no whitelist and no placeholder binding. An authenticated staff user holding the reports module permission can inject arbitrary SQL and read any table reachable by the Koha database user, including borrowers (password hashes, two-factor secrets, personal data), api_keys, and sessions. |
| Koha's reports/bor_issues_top.pl builds dynamic SQL in sub calculate by concatenating several user-controlled request parameters directly into the query string. The Criteria parameter is only normalized by a table-name prefix and is never whitelisted, landing verbatim in identifier positions (SELECT DISTINCTROW, GROUP BY, ORDER BY); Filter values are concatenated raw into single-quoted LIKE, BETWEEN, and comparison fragments, and the Limit parameter is appended raw to a LIMIT clause. An authenticated staff user holding the reports module permission can inject arbitrary SQL and read any table reachable by the Koha database user, including borrowers (password hashes, two-factor secrets, personal data), api_keys, and sessions. |
| Koha's reports/issues_avg_stats.pl builds dynamic SQL in sub calculate by concatenating several user-controlled request parameters directly into the query string. The Line and Column parameters are not validated against any whitelist and land verbatim in identifier positions (SELECT DISTINCTROW, GROUP BY, ORDER BY), and each Filter slot is concatenated raw into single-quoted LIKE, BETWEEN, and comparison fragments with no bound parameters. An authenticated staff user holding the reports module permission can inject arbitrary SQL and read any table reachable by the Koha database user, including borrowers (password hashes, two-factor secrets, personal data), api_keys, and sessions. |
| Koha's reports/catalogue_stats.pl builds dynamic SQL in sub calculate by interpolating the user-controlled Line and Column request parameters directly into identifier positions of the query (SELECT DISTINCTROW, GROUP BY, ORDER BY) with no whitelist validation. When Line contains itemcallnumber and the cotedigits parameter is truthy, cotedigits is additionally concatenated raw as the numeric argument of a LEFT() call. An authenticated staff user holding the reports module permission can inject arbitrary SQL and read any table reachable by the Koha database user, including borrowers (password hashes, two-factor secrets, personal data), api_keys, and sessions. |
| Koha's reports/acquisitions_stats.pl builds its per-cell statistics query in sub calculate by interpolating the user-controlled Filter request parameters directly into WHERE fragments covering aqbasket.closedate, aqorders.datereceived, aqbooksellers.name, items.homebranch, items.ccode, biblioitems.itemtype, aqbudgets.budget_code, aqorders.sort1, and aqorders.sort2. The statement is prepared and executed with no bound parameters. An authenticated staff user holding the reports module permission can inject arbitrary SQL and read any table reachable by the Koha database user, including borrowers (password hashes, two-factor secrets, personal data), borrower_password_recovery, api_keys, and sessions. |
