| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| FreeRDP is a free implementation of the Remote Desktop Protocol. Prior to version 3.21.0, in ClearCodec, when `glyphData` is present, `clear_decompress` calls `freerdp_image_copy_no_overlap` without validating the destination rectangle, allowing an out-of-bounds read/write via crafted RDPGFX surface updates. A malicious server can trigger a client‑side heap buffer overflow, causing a crash (DoS) and potential heap corruption with code‑execution risk depending on allocator behavior and surrounding heap layout. Version 3.21.0 contains a patch for the issue. |
| FreeRDP is a free implementation of the Remote Desktop Protocol. Prior to version 3.21.0, a client-side heap buffer overflow occurs in the RDPGFX ClearCodec decode path when maliciously crafted residual data causes out-of-bounds writes during color output. A malicious server can trigger a client‑side heap buffer overflow, causing a crash (DoS) and potential heap corruption with code‑execution risk depending on allocator behavior and surrounding heap layout. Version 3.21.0 contains a patch for the issue. |
| FreeRDP is a free implementation of the Remote Desktop Protocol. Prior to version 3.21.0, FastGlyph parsing trusts `cbData`/remaining length and never validates against the minimum size implied by `cx/cy`. A malicious server can trigger a client‑side global buffer overflow, causing a crash (DoS). Version 3.21.0 contains a patch for the issue. |
| FreeRDP is a free implementation of the Remote Desktop Protocol. Prior to version 3.21.0, `xf_Pointer_New` frees `cursorPixels` on failure, then `pointer_free` calls `xf_Pointer_Free` and frees it again, triggering ASan UAF. A malicious server can trigger a client‑side use after free, causing a crash (DoS) and potential heap corruption with code‑execution risk depending on allocator behavior and surrounding heap layout. Version 3.21.0 contains a patch for the issue. |
| FreeRDP is a free implementation of the Remote Desktop Protocol. Prior to version 3.21.0, offscreen bitmap deletion leaves `gdi->drawing` pointing to freed memory, causing UAF when related update packets arrive. A malicious server can trigger a client‑side use after free, causing a crash (DoS) and potential heap corruption with code‑execution risk depending on allocator behavior and surrounding heap layout. Version 3.21.0 contains a patch for the issue. |
| Incorrect security UI in Split View in Google Chrome prior to 144.0.7559.59 allowed a remote attacker to perform UI spoofing via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: Low) |
| Avahi is a system which facilitates service discovery on a local network via the mDNS/DNS-SD protocol suite. In versions 0.9rc2 and below, avahi-daemon can be crashed via a segmentation fault by sending an unsolicited mDNS response containing a recursive CNAME record, where the alias and canonical name point to the same domain (e.g., "h.local" as a CNAME for "h.local"). This causes unbounded recursion in the lookup_handle_cname function, leading to stack exhaustion. The vulnerability affects record browsers where AVAHI_LOOKUP_USE_MULTICAST is set explicitly, which includes record browsers created by resolvers used by nss-mdns. This issue is patched in commit 78eab31128479f06e30beb8c1cbf99dd921e2524. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/mlx5e: Fix crash on profile change rollback failure
mlx5e_netdev_change_profile can fail to attach a new profile and can
fail to rollback to old profile, in such case, we could end up with a
dangling netdev with a fully reset netdev_priv. A retry to change
profile, e.g. another attempt to call mlx5e_netdev_change_profile via
switchdev mode change, will crash trying to access the now NULL
priv->mdev.
This fix allows mlx5e_netdev_change_profile() to handle previous
failures and an empty priv, by not assuming priv is valid.
Pass netdev and mdev to all flows requiring
mlx5e_netdev_change_profile() and avoid passing priv.
In mlx5e_netdev_change_profile() check if current priv is valid, and if
not, just attach the new profile without trying to access the old one.
This fixes the following oops, when enabling switchdev mode for the 2nd
time after first time failure:
## Enabling switchdev mode first time:
mlx5_core 0012:03:00.1: E-Switch: Supported tc chains and prios offload
workqueue: Failed to create a rescuer kthread for wq "mlx5e": -EINTR
mlx5_core 0012:03:00.1: mlx5e_netdev_init_profile:6214:(pid 37199): mlx5e_priv_init failed, err=-12
mlx5_core 0012:03:00.1 gpu3rdma1: mlx5e_netdev_change_profile: new profile init failed, -12
workqueue: Failed to create a rescuer kthread for wq "mlx5e": -EINTR
mlx5_core 0012:03:00.1: mlx5e_netdev_init_profile:6214:(pid 37199): mlx5e_priv_init failed, err=-12
mlx5_core 0012:03:00.1 gpu3rdma1: mlx5e_netdev_change_profile: failed to rollback to orig profile, -12
^^^^^^^^
mlx5_core 0000:00:03.0: E-Switch: Disable: mode(LEGACY), nvfs(0), necvfs(0), active vports(0)
## retry: Enabling switchdev mode 2nd time:
mlx5_core 0000:00:03.0: E-Switch: Supported tc chains and prios offload
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000038
#PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
#PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
PGD 0 P4D 0
Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI
CPU: 13 UID: 0 PID: 520 Comm: devlink Not tainted 6.18.0-rc4+ #91 PREEMPT(voluntary)
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-2.fc40 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:mlx5e_detach_netdev+0x3c/0x90
Code: 50 00 00 f0 80 4f 78 02 48 8b bf e8 07 00 00 48 85 ff 74 16 48 8b 73 78 48 d1 ee 83 e6 01 83 f6 01 40 0f b6 f6 e8 c4 42 00 00 <48> 8b 45 38 48 85 c0 74 08 48 89 df e8 cc 47 40 1e 48 8b bb f0 07
RSP: 0018:ffffc90000673890 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8881036a89c0 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: ffff888113f63800 RSI: ffffffff822fe720 RDI: 0000000000000000
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000002dcd R09: 0000000000000000
R10: ffffc900006738e8 R11: 00000000ffffffff R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff8881036a89c0 R15: 0000000000000000
FS: 00007fdfb8384740(0000) GS:ffff88856a9d6000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000000000038 CR3: 0000000112ae0005 CR4: 0000000000370ef0
Call Trace:
<TASK>
mlx5e_netdev_change_profile+0x45/0xb0
mlx5e_vport_rep_load+0x27b/0x2d0
mlx5_esw_offloads_rep_load+0x72/0xf0
esw_offloads_enable+0x5d0/0x970
mlx5_eswitch_enable_locked+0x349/0x430
? is_mp_supported+0x57/0xb0
mlx5_devlink_eswitch_mode_set+0x26b/0x430
devlink_nl_eswitch_set_doit+0x6f/0xf0
genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0xe8/0x140
genl_rcv_msg+0x18b/0x290
? __pfx_devlink_nl_pre_doit+0x10/0x10
? __pfx_devlink_nl_eswitch_set_doit+0x10/0x10
? __pfx_devlink_nl_post_doit+0x10/0x10
? __pfx_genl_rcv_msg+0x10/0x10
netlink_rcv_skb+0x52/0x100
genl_rcv+0x28/0x40
netlink_unicast+0x282/0x3e0
? __alloc_skb+0xd6/0x190
netlink_sendmsg+0x1f7/0x430
__sys_sendto+0x213/0x220
? __sys_recvmsg+0x6a/0xd0
__x64_sys_sendto+0x24/0x30
do_syscall_64+0x50/0x1f0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
RIP: 0033:0x7fdfb8495047 |
| A vulnerability in huggingface/text-generation-inference version 3.3.6 allows unauthenticated remote attackers to exploit unbounded external image fetching during input validation in VLM mode. The issue arises when the router scans inputs for Markdown image links and performs a blocking HTTP GET request, reading the entire response body into memory and cloning it before decoding. This behavior can lead to resource exhaustion, including network bandwidth saturation, memory inflation, and CPU overutilization. The vulnerability is triggered even if the request is later rejected for exceeding token limits. The default deployment configuration, which lacks memory usage limits and authentication, exacerbates the impact, potentially crashing the host machine. The issue is resolved in version 3.3.7. |
| An issue was discovered in 6.0 before 6.0.2, 5.2 before 5.2.11, and 4.2 before 4.2.28.
Raster lookups on ``RasterField`` (only implemented on PostGIS) allows remote attackers to inject SQL via the band index parameter.
Earlier, unsupported Django series (such as 5.0.x, 4.1.x, and 3.2.x) were not evaluated and may also be affected.
Django would like to thank Tarek Nakkouch for reporting this issue. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: hv_netvsc: reject RSS hash key programming without RX indirection table
RSS configuration requires a valid RX indirection table. When the device
reports a single receive queue, rndis_filter_device_add() does not
allocate an indirection table, accepting RSS hash key updates in this
state leads to a hang.
Fix this by gating netvsc_set_rxfh() on ndc->rx_table_sz and return
-EOPNOTSUPP when the table is absent. This aligns set_rxfh with the device
capabilities and prevents incorrect behavior. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
vsock/virtio: Coalesce only linear skb
vsock/virtio common tries to coalesce buffers in rx queue: if a linear skb
(with a spare tail room) is followed by a small skb (length limited by
GOOD_COPY_LEN = 128), an attempt is made to join them.
Since the introduction of MSG_ZEROCOPY support, assumption that a small skb
will always be linear is incorrect. In the zerocopy case, data is lost and
the linear skb is appended with uninitialized kernel memory.
Of all 3 supported virtio-based transports, only loopback-transport is
affected. G2H virtio-transport rx queue operates on explicitly linear skbs;
see virtio_vsock_alloc_linear_skb() in virtio_vsock_rx_fill(). H2G
vhost-transport may allocate non-linear skbs, but only for sizes that are
not considered for coalescence; see PAGE_ALLOC_COSTLY_ORDER in
virtio_vsock_alloc_skb().
Ensure only linear skbs are coalesced. Note that skb_tailroom(last_skb) > 0
guarantees last_skb is linear. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: qla2xxx: Sanitize payload size to prevent member overflow
In qla27xx_copy_fpin_pkt() and qla27xx_copy_multiple_pkt(), the frame_size
reported by firmware is used to calculate the copy length into
item->iocb. However, the iocb member is defined as a fixed-size 64-byte
array within struct purex_item.
If the reported frame_size exceeds 64 bytes, subsequent memcpy calls will
overflow the iocb member boundary. While extra memory might be allocated,
this cross-member write is unsafe and triggers warnings under
CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE.
Fix this by capping total_bytes to the size of the iocb member (64 bytes)
before allocation and copying. This ensures all copies remain within the
bounds of the destination structure member. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
platform/x86: hp-bioscfg: Fix kernel panic in GET_INSTANCE_ID macro
The GET_INSTANCE_ID macro that caused a kernel panic when accessing sysfs
attributes:
1. Off-by-one error: The loop condition used '<=' instead of '<',
causing access beyond array bounds. Since array indices are 0-based
and go from 0 to instances_count-1, the loop should use '<'.
2. Missing NULL check: The code dereferenced attr_name_kobj->name
without checking if attr_name_kobj was NULL, causing a null pointer
dereference in min_length_show() and other attribute show functions.
The panic occurred when fwupd tried to read BIOS configuration attributes:
Oops: general protection fault [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000000-0x0000000000000007]
RIP: 0010:min_length_show+0xcf/0x1d0 [hp_bioscfg]
Add a NULL check for attr_name_kobj before dereferencing and corrects
the loop boundary to match the pattern used elsewhere in the driver. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/sched: act_ife: avoid possible NULL deref
tcf_ife_encode() must make sure ife_encode() does not return NULL.
syzbot reported:
Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000000: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000000-0x0000000000000007]
RIP: 0010:ife_tlv_meta_encode+0x41/0xa0 net/ife/ife.c:166
CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 8990 Comm: syz.0.696 Not tainted syzkaller #0 PREEMPT(full)
Call Trace:
<TASK>
ife_encode_meta_u32+0x153/0x180 net/sched/act_ife.c:101
tcf_ife_encode net/sched/act_ife.c:841 [inline]
tcf_ife_act+0x1022/0x1de0 net/sched/act_ife.c:877
tc_act include/net/tc_wrapper.h:130 [inline]
tcf_action_exec+0x1c0/0xa20 net/sched/act_api.c:1152
tcf_exts_exec include/net/pkt_cls.h:349 [inline]
mall_classify+0x1a0/0x2a0 net/sched/cls_matchall.c:42
tc_classify include/net/tc_wrapper.h:197 [inline]
__tcf_classify net/sched/cls_api.c:1764 [inline]
tcf_classify+0x7f2/0x1380 net/sched/cls_api.c:1860
multiq_classify net/sched/sch_multiq.c:39 [inline]
multiq_enqueue+0xe0/0x510 net/sched/sch_multiq.c:66
dev_qdisc_enqueue+0x45/0x250 net/core/dev.c:4147
__dev_xmit_skb net/core/dev.c:4262 [inline]
__dev_queue_xmit+0x2998/0x46c0 net/core/dev.c:4798 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ALSA: scarlett2: Fix buffer overflow in config retrieval
The scarlett2_usb_get_config() function has a logic error in the
endianness conversion code that can cause buffer overflows when
count > 1.
The code checks `if (size == 2)` where `size` is the total buffer size in
bytes, then loops `count` times treating each element as u16 (2 bytes).
This causes the loop to access `count * 2` bytes when the buffer only
has `size` bytes allocated.
Fix by checking the element size (config_item->size) instead of the
total buffer size. This ensures the endianness conversion matches the
actual element type. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: xen: scsiback: Fix potential memory leak in scsiback_remove()
Memory allocated for struct vscsiblk_info in scsiback_probe() is not
freed in scsiback_remove() leading to potential memory leaks on remove,
as well as in the scsiback_probe() error paths. Fix that by freeing it
in scsiback_remove(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tracing: Fix crash on synthetic stacktrace field usage
When creating a synthetic event based on an existing synthetic event that
had a stacktrace field and the new synthetic event used that field a
kernel crash occurred:
~# cd /sys/kernel/tracing
~# echo 's:stack unsigned long stack[];' > dynamic_events
~# echo 'hist:keys=prev_pid:s0=common_stacktrace if prev_state & 3' >> events/sched/sched_switch/trigger
~# echo 'hist:keys=next_pid:s1=$s0:onmatch(sched.sched_switch).trace(stack,$s1)' >> events/sched/sched_switch/trigger
The above creates a synthetic event that takes a stacktrace when a task
schedules out in a non-running state and passes that stacktrace to the
sched_switch event when that task schedules back in. It triggers the
"stack" synthetic event that has a stacktrace as its field (called "stack").
~# echo 's:syscall_stack s64 id; unsigned long stack[];' >> dynamic_events
~# echo 'hist:keys=common_pid:s2=stack' >> events/synthetic/stack/trigger
~# echo 'hist:keys=common_pid:s3=$s2,i0=id:onmatch(synthetic.stack).trace(syscall_stack,$i0,$s3)' >> events/raw_syscalls/sys_exit/trigger
The above makes another synthetic event called "syscall_stack" that
attaches the first synthetic event (stack) to the sys_exit trace event and
records the stacktrace from the stack event with the id of the system call
that is exiting.
When enabling this event (or using it in a historgram):
~# echo 1 > events/synthetic/syscall_stack/enable
Produces a kernel crash!
BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: 0000000000400010
#PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
#PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
PGD 0 P4D 0
Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI
CPU: 6 UID: 0 PID: 1257 Comm: bash Not tainted 6.16.3+deb14-amd64 #1 PREEMPT(lazy) Debian 6.16.3-1
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.17.0-debian-1.17.0-1 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:trace_event_raw_event_synth+0x90/0x380
Code: c5 00 00 00 00 85 d2 0f 84 e1 00 00 00 31 db eb 34 0f 1f 00 66 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 <49> 8b 04 24 48 83 c3 01 8d 0c c5 08 00 00 00 01 cd 41 3b 5d 40 0f
RSP: 0018:ffffd2670388f958 EFLAGS: 00010202
RAX: ffff8ba1065cc100 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: fffff266ffda7b90 RDI: ffffd2670388f9b0
RBP: 0000000000000010 R08: ffff8ba104e76000 R09: ffffd2670388fa50
R10: ffff8ba102dd42e0 R11: ffffffff9a908970 R12: 0000000000400010
R13: ffff8ba10a246400 R14: ffff8ba10a710220 R15: fffff266ffda7b90
FS: 00007fa3bc63f740(0000) GS:ffff8ba2e0f48000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000000400010 CR3: 0000000107f9e003 CR4: 0000000000172ef0
Call Trace:
<TASK>
? __tracing_map_insert+0x208/0x3a0
action_trace+0x67/0x70
event_hist_trigger+0x633/0x6d0
event_triggers_call+0x82/0x130
trace_event_buffer_commit+0x19d/0x250
trace_event_raw_event_sys_exit+0x62/0xb0
syscall_exit_work+0x9d/0x140
do_syscall_64+0x20a/0x2f0
? trace_event_raw_event_sched_switch+0x12b/0x170
? save_fpregs_to_fpstate+0x3e/0x90
? _raw_spin_unlock+0xe/0x30
? finish_task_switch.isra.0+0x97/0x2c0
? __rseq_handle_notify_resume+0xad/0x4c0
? __schedule+0x4b8/0xd00
? restore_fpregs_from_fpstate+0x3c/0x90
? switch_fpu_return+0x5b/0xe0
? do_syscall_64+0x1ef/0x2f0
? do_fault+0x2e9/0x540
? __handle_mm_fault+0x7d1/0xf70
? count_memcg_events+0x167/0x1d0
? handle_mm_fault+0x1d7/0x2e0
? do_user_addr_fault+0x2c3/0x7f0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
The reason is that the stacktrace field is not labeled as such, and is
treated as a normal field and not as a dynamic event that it is.
In trace_event_raw_event_synth() the event is field is still treated as a
dynamic array, but the retrieval of the data is considered a normal field,
and the reference is just the meta data:
// Meta data is retrieved instead of a dynamic array
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
uacce: fix cdev handling in the cleanup path
When cdev_device_add fails, it internally releases the cdev memory,
and if cdev_device_del is then executed, it will cause a hang error.
To fix it, we check the return value of cdev_device_add() and clear
uacce->cdev to avoid calling cdev_device_del in the uacce_remove. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
arm64/fpsimd: signal: Allocate SSVE storage when restoring ZA
The code to restore a ZA context doesn't attempt to allocate the task's
sve_state before setting TIF_SME. Consequently, restoring a ZA context
can place a task into an invalid state where TIF_SME is set but the
task's sve_state is NULL.
In legitimate but uncommon cases where the ZA signal context was NOT
created by the kernel in the context of the same task (e.g. if the task
is saved/restored with something like CRIU), we have no guarantee that
sve_state had been allocated previously. In these cases, userspace can
enter streaming mode without trapping while sve_state is NULL, causing a
later NULL pointer dereference when the kernel attempts to store the
register state:
| # ./sigreturn-za
| Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000000
| Mem abort info:
| ESR = 0x0000000096000046
| EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
| SET = 0, FnV = 0
| EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
| FSC = 0x06: level 2 translation fault
| Data abort info:
| ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000046, ISS2 = 0x00000000
| CM = 0, WnR = 1, TnD = 0, TagAccess = 0
| GCS = 0, Overlay = 0, DirtyBit = 0, Xs = 0
| user pgtable: 4k pages, 52-bit VAs, pgdp=0000000101f47c00
| [0000000000000000] pgd=08000001021d8403, p4d=0800000102274403, pud=0800000102275403, pmd=0000000000000000
| Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000046 [#1] SMP
| Modules linked in:
| CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 153 Comm: sigreturn-za Not tainted 6.19.0-rc1 #1 PREEMPT
| Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
| pstate: 214000c9 (nzCv daIF +PAN -UAO -TCO +DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
| pc : sve_save_state+0x4/0xf0
| lr : fpsimd_save_user_state+0xb0/0x1c0
| sp : ffff80008070bcc0
| x29: ffff80008070bcc0 x28: fff00000c1ca4c40 x27: 63cfa172fb5cf658
| x26: fff00000c1ca5228 x25: 0000000000000000 x24: 0000000000000000
| x23: 0000000000000000 x22: fff00000c1ca4c40 x21: fff00000c1ca4c40
| x20: 0000000000000020 x19: fff00000ff6900f0 x18: 0000000000000000
| x17: fff05e8e0311f000 x16: 0000000000000000 x15: 028fca8f3bdaf21c
| x14: 0000000000000212 x13: fff00000c0209f10 x12: 0000000000000020
| x11: 0000000000200b20 x10: 0000000000000000 x9 : fff00000ff69dcc0
| x8 : 00000000000003f2 x7 : 0000000000000001 x6 : fff00000c1ca5b48
| x5 : fff05e8e0311f000 x4 : 0000000008000000 x3 : 0000000000000000
| x2 : 0000000000000001 x1 : fff00000c1ca5970 x0 : 0000000000000440
| Call trace:
| sve_save_state+0x4/0xf0 (P)
| fpsimd_thread_switch+0x48/0x198
| __switch_to+0x20/0x1c0
| __schedule+0x36c/0xce0
| schedule+0x34/0x11c
| exit_to_user_mode_loop+0x124/0x188
| el0_interrupt+0xc8/0xd8
| __el0_irq_handler_common+0x18/0x24
| el0t_64_irq_handler+0x10/0x1c
| el0t_64_irq+0x198/0x19c
| Code: 54000040 d51b4408 d65f03c0 d503245f (e5bb5800)
| ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
Fix this by having restore_za_context() ensure that the task's sve_state
is allocated, matching what we do when taking an SME trap. Any live
SVE/SSVE state (which is restored earlier from a separate signal
context) must be preserved, and hence this is not zeroed. |
