| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fbdev: core: Fix pointer desynchronization in fb_io_read()
In fb_io_read(), if copy_to_user() performs a partial copy (e.g., due to
a faulty user buffer), the loop adjusts the chunk size 'c' and updates
the remaining 'count'. However, the hardware 'src' pointer has already
been eagerly advanced by the original chunk size.
If the loop is allowed to continue, the read will resume from an
incorrect, over-advanced offset. Since the remaining 'count' was only
decremented by the successful bytes, this desynchronization causes the
next iterations to execute more hardware reads than originally bounded,
eventually leading to out-of-bounds I/O reads.
Fix this by breaking out of the loop immediately upon a partial
copy_to_user(). A partial copy indicates a faulty user buffer, making
subsequent read attempts futile. Breaking out ensures we return the
number of successfully read bytes without risking out-of-bounds hardware
accesses in subsequent mismatched iterations. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ASoC: codecs: lpass-tx-macro: Fix enum kcontrol accesses
The "DEC0 MODE" to "DEC7 MODE" controls are enumerated, but
tx_macro_dec_mode_get() and tx_macro_dec_mode_put() access their
value through ucontrol->value.integer.value[0] (a long) instead of
ucontrol->value.enumerated.item[0] (an unsigned int).
This same pattern was fixed in the sibling drivers by
commit bcfe5f76cc40 ("ASoC: codecs: rx-macro: fix accessing array
out of bounds for enum type") and
commit 0ea5eff7c606 ("ASoC: codecs: va-macro: fix accessing array
out of bounds for enum type"), but tx-macro was missed.
On 64-bit kernels built with CONFIG_SND_CTL_DEBUG, the elem value
sanity check catches the 4 bytes written past the enumerated item
and every read of these controls fails with -EINVAL:
snd-sm8250 sound: control 2:0:0:DEC0 MODE:0: access overflow |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mptcp: reclaim forward-allocated memory on RX path errors
After commit 9db5b3cec4ec ("mptcp: borrow forward memory from subflow"),
errors in the receive path prior to queueing skbs into the receive
queue do not trigger forward-allocated memory reclaiming.
Prevent forward memory from growing unboundedly in pathological drop
scenarios by explicitly reclaiming memory when skbs are dropped. |
| Applications that evaluate user-supplied Spring Expression Language (SpEL) expressions may be vulnerable to a Denial of Service (DoS) attack when the power operator (^) is used with a BigDecimal or BigInteger operand and a large exponent value.
Spring Framework 7.0.0 - 7.0.8
Spring Framework 6.2.0 - 6.2.19
Spring Framework 6.1.0 - 6.1.28
Spring Framework 6.0.0 - 6.0.30
Spring Framework 5.3.0 - 5.3.49
Spring Framework 5.2.25.RELEASE and earlier |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/sched: cls_bpf: reject dev-bound programs bound to a different device
cls_bpf_prog_from_efd() obtained a SCHED_CLS program via
bpf_prog_get_type_dev() but never verified that a device-bound (offloaded)
program's bound netdev matches the TC netdev the classifier is being
attached to. This let a program loaded with prog_ifindex for device A be
attached via cls_bpf + skip_sw to device B; deleting device A then
destroyed the program's offload state while it was still attached to
device B, triggering a netdevsim WARN (panic with panic_on_warn=1).
Mirror the XDP attach path (net/core/dev.c) and reject the attach with
-EINVAL when a dev-bound program's bound device does not match the
target device. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: ethernet: ti: am65-cpsw-nuss: Fix port_id extraction from SRC TAG
On the packet reception path, the ID of the MAC Port on which the packet
was received, is embedded in the RX DMA Descriptor's metadata. The ID is
extracted using the helper function cppi5_desc_get_tags_ids() which fills
in the 16-bit Source Tag into the 'port_id' variable. However, it is only
the lower 8-bits of the 16-bit Source Tag that represent the MAC Port ID,
while the upper 8-bits are Hardware-Reserved and carry an arbitrary value.
With the existing logic, sporadic kernel crash is observed due to the
subsequent driver code accessing out-of-bound memory because of an invalid
port_id.
Hence, fix the port_id extraction logic to use only the lower 8-bits of the
Source Tag as the MAC Port ID. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipvlan: inherit needed_headroom and needed_tailroom from phy_dev
ipvlan devices inherit hard_header_len from phy_dev during ipvlan_init(),
but leave needed_headroom and needed_tailroom set to 0.
When the underlying phy_dev (or stacked lower device) requires extra headroom
or tailroom for headers/trailers (e.g. macsec, ipsec, wireguard, tunnels, or
veth with rx headroom), upper layers calculating packet headroom and tailroom
fail to reserve sufficient space.
This can result in reallocation overhead, skb headroom underflows, or KASAN
slab-use-after-free crashes when dev_hard_header() / ipvlan_hard_header()
prepends header data or when lower devices append tailroom.
Fix this by:
1. Inheriting needed_headroom and needed_tailroom from phy_dev in ipvlan_init().
2. Propagating needed_headroom and needed_tailroom updates to attached ipvlans
in ipvlan_device_event() when receiving NETDEV_FEAT_CHANGE events. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
s390/zcrypt: Improve CCA CPRB length and overflow checks
The xcrb_msg_to_type6cprb_msgx() function lacks proper input
validation, creating security vulnerabilities:
1. Integer overflow after CEIL4 alignment: Signed int variables could
overflow during 4-byte boundary alignment, causing undersized
buffer allocations or incorrect bounds checking.
2. Missing minimum size validation: The CPRBX structure is copied from
userspace without verifying sufficient buffer length. Undersized
buffers cause uninitialized memory access when reading structure
fields like cprbx.cprb_len and cprbx.domain.
3. Arithmetic overflow in sum calculations: Adding control block and
data block sizes could overflow, bypassing size checks and enabling
buffer overflows.
Fix by using size_t for length calculations, adding U32_MAX boundary
checks after alignment, validating minimum control block size before
copying from userspace, and detecting sum calculation overflows. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
s390/vfio_ccw: Move cp cleanup out of not operational
The fsm_notoper() routine is called when the device has been
lost, and is (by definition) no longer operational. Since this
can happen asynchronously from the normal behavior of the
driver, the cleanup may happen when holding other locks
in the calling sequence (notably, the cio subchannel lock).
Push the cleanup of the private->cp resources to a workqueue,
where it can be done out from under that lock sequence and
a future patch can safely manage the locking requirements. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
s390/vfio_ccw: Cancel existing workqueues
The initialization of the io_work and crw_work workqueues begs the
question of whether they should be un-initialized. Add the corresponding
cleanup tags in _release_dev to ensure work isn't dispatched after
the private struct is free'd. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mmc: atmel-mci: Fix use-after-free in atmci_remove due to race condition
In atmci_probe, &host->bh_work is bound with atmci_work_func, and
atmci_interrupt, atmci_timeout_timer and atmci_dma_complete can all
queue this work on system_bh_wq.
If we remove the module, atmci_remove makes cleanup and the memory
allocated for host with devm_kzalloc() is released after the remove
callback returns, while the work mentioned above may still be pending
or running. The sequence of operations that may lead to a UAF bug is
as follows:
CPU0 CPU1
| atmci_interrupt
| queue_work(system_bh_wq,
| &host->bh_work)
atmci_remove |
atmci_cleanup_slot(...) |
atmci_writel(host, ATMCI_IDR, ~0UL) |
timer_delete_sync(&host->timer) |
dma_release_channel(host->dma.chan) |
free_irq(platform_get_irq(pdev, 0), host) |
| atmci_work_func
| // use host
// devm resources released after |
// remove returns, host is freed |
| // use host (use-after-free)
Fix it by canceling the work after all the sources that can schedule
it (IRQ handler, timeout timer and DMA completion callback) have been
stopped, and before proceeding with the remaining cleanup in
atmci_remove. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Input: cs40l50-vibra - validate custom data from user space
cs40l50_add() copies the custom data of an FF_PERIODIC/FF_CUSTOM effect
straight from the ff_effect the user passed to EVIOCSFF, without
requiring it to hold anything:
work_data.custom_data = memdup_array_user(periodic->custom_data,
periodic->custom_len,
sizeof(s16));
work_data.custom_len = periodic->custom_len;
The driver then reads two words out of that buffer: custom_data[0] as the
waveform bank in cs40l50_effect_bank_set(), and custom_data[1] as the
index within the bank in cs40l50_effect_index_set(). Neither read is
covered by a length check, and custom_len is fully user controlled:
- custom_len == 0 makes memdup_array_user() call memdup_user() with a
length of zero, which returns ZERO_SIZE_PTR rather than an error, so
custom_data[0] dereferences it.
- custom_len == 1 allocates two bytes. A bank of ROM or RAM keeps
effect->type out of the OWT case, and custom_data[1] is then read one
word past the allocation.
The bank value itself is also mishandled. It is masked with
CS40L50_CUSTOM_DATA_MASK (0xffff) but stored in an s16, so a
custom_data[0] of 0x8000 or above wraps to a negative value that passes
the "bank_type >= CS40L50_WVFRM_BANK_NUM" test.
cs40l50_effect_index_set() indexes vib->dsp.banks[] with it before the
switch statement's default case gets a chance to reject it:
base_index = vib->dsp.banks[effect->type].base_index;
max_index = vib->dsp.banks[effect->type].max_index;
Require the two words the driver reads to be present, and hold the masked
bank in a u32 so the existing upper-bound test covers the whole range.
The da7280 haptic driver already range checks custom_len this way. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fbdev: clear fb_info->mode before deleting a videomode
fb_set_var() can delete a mode from info->modelist when userspace
passes FB_ACTIVATE_INV_MODE through FBIOPUT_VSCREENINFO. The code
checks that the mode being deleted is not the current info->var and
that fbcon is not using it, but it does not check fb_info->mode.
fb_info->mode may still point into the modelist entry being deleted.
If the entry is freed, later mode sysfs reads through show_mode() can
dereference a stale pointer.
Clear fb_info->mode before calling fb_delete_videomode() when it
matches the mode being removed. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mptcp: avoid combining some incoming suboptions
Some MPTCP suboptions are mutually exclusive according to the RFC8684,
but also because in different places, the code doesn't expect some
combinations to be present. That's specially true for suboptions that
would be present twice, but with different attributes.
The new restrictions are the same as the ones applied on the output
side, with mptcp_write_options. The same rules can be reused with a
small fix: an MP_FASTCLOSE can be used with a DSS when the sender picks
this option [1], which is not the case on Linux. Here are the rules:
Which options can be used together?
X: mutually exclusive
O: often used together
C: can be used together in some cases
P: could be used together but we prefer not to (optimisations)
| Opt: | MPC | MPJ | DSS | ADD | RM | PRIO | FAIL | FC |
|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| MPC |------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| MPJ | X |------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| DSS | X | X |------|------|------|------|------|------|
| ADD | X | X | P |------|------|------|------|------|
| RM | C | C | C | P |------|------|------|------|
| PRIO | X | C | C | C | C |------|------|------|
| FAIL | X | X | C | X | X | X |------|------|
| FC | X | X | P | X | X | X | X |------|
| RST | X | X | X | X | X | X | O | O |
|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
The only difference is with the 'P': another stack could send and
ADD_ADDR with other suboptions (DSS, RM_ADDR), and this should be
allowed.
A few points of attention:
- In theory, an MP_CAPABLE could be used with a RM_ADDR, but there is
no reason to add it with a SYN. Note that even with a 4th ACK, it
doesn't seem to be useful, except when IDs are known in advance via
another channel. Better not to break that.
- Now, combining both an MP_CAPABLE and an MP_JOIN will no longer
result to a reject of the two options, but only the second suboption
is ignored. That seems OK to do that for this unexpected error. At
least now all inconsistent combinations are handled the same way.
This could change later in next. This also means the explicit checks
for having both MPC + MPJ in subflow.c will now be unreachable.
That's fine, they will be removed in a follow-up patch.
- In case of conflicting combinations, the extra suboption(s) is/are
ignored: having such combinations either means the remote peer is
buggy, or is evil. The simplest action is then taken in this case:
stop processing the current suboption.
- In mp_opt->suboptions, there is also a bit reserved to the checksum,
which can be used in an MP_CAPABLE and a DSS. Each time a DSS option
can be used in parallel with another option, the checksum can be set,
so the verification is combined into a new OPTIONS_MPTCP_DSS macro.
- An MP_CAPABLE ACK can carry a Data-Level Length, and an optional
Checksum: they are the same as the ones found in a DSS, because a DSS
cannot be used in parallel to an MP_CAPABLE. Similarly, even if there
is room, a DSS cannot be used with an MP_JOIN. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Input: focaltech - fix array out-of-bounds in focaltech_process_rel_packet
Make finger2 (and also finger1) unsigned, so that if the finger index in
the packet is 0 then subtracting 1 creates an array index which overflows
above the existing check for FOC_MAX_FINGERS, as the existing comment says
it should, instead of writing to state->fingers[-1]. |
| A remote attacker with user privileges may use a malicious or compromised NASL vulnerability test (VT) on the affected products to trigger a stack buffer overflow and gain full access on the compromised system. |
| Unauthenticated Cross Site Request Forgery (CSRF) in FluentBooking Pro <= 2.2.4 versions. |
| Editor Broken Access Control in FluentPlayer Pro <= 1.3.2 versions. |
| Unauthenticated Cross Site Scripting (XSS) in CozyStay <= 1.10.0 versions. |
| Editor PHP Object Injection in Fluent Boards Pro <= 2.0.11 versions. |
