| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb: client: fail DACL rewrite when the new DACL exceeds 64K
replace_sids_and_copy_aces() and set_chmod_dacl() accumulate the size of
the DACL they build in a u16. That accumulator can wrap.
validate_dacl() caps num_aces at (dacl_size - sizeof(struct smb_acl)) /
20, i.e. 3276 for a maximally sized DACL, while each rewritten ACE can
grow to sizeof(struct smb_ace) (76 bytes) once its SID is replaced with
one carrying SID_MAX_SUB_AUTHORITIES sub-authorities. The worst case is
therefore sizeof(struct smb_acl) + 3276 * 76 = 248984 bytes, far beyond
what a u16 can hold. A wraparound is reached with 863 ACEs.
After the wraparound, ndacl_ptr->size becomes meaningless and the offset
will point anywhere in the ACE array. As a result, we will see
corruption of the DACL, which then gets sent to the server. This is not
an out-of-bounds write as the allocation now covers the worst-case
expansion, so writes will always go into the buffer.
Adjust the code to use a u32 internally and return -EOVERFLOW in the
overflow case. The operation must be refused, because a DACL can only
hold 2^16-1 bytes on the wire and larger DACLs cannot be represented.
set_chmod_dacl() carries the same pattern and is fixed the same way. It
only wraps once the source DACL comes within roughly 380 bytes of the
64K ceiling, but the failure mode is identical. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: usb: pegasus: don't rely on id table pointer arithmetic
The current code is broken when dynamic ID is involved; in such cases
usb_device_id parameter of probe lives on the heap and the pointer
arithmetic will get an index that is wildly out of bound. Instead of
keeping a side table for additional information, use driver_info field of
the usb_device_id.
The dynamic ID parsing code needs to be updated for this; convert it to
just write to the reserved entry for dynamic ID and remove the weird loop. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: xusbatm: don't rely on id table pointer arithmetic
The current code is broken when dynamic ID is involved; in such cases
usb_device_id parameter of probe lives on the heap and the pointer
arithmetic will get an index that is wildly out of bound. xusbatm
initialize the USB device IDs dynamically so it can just use driver_info
too.
Even with conversion, xusbatm still cannot support dynamic IDs, so also set
no_dynamic_id. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: qla2xxx: Null out freed pointers in qla2x00_mem_alloc() error path
When qla2x00_mem_alloc() fails, qla2x00_probe_one() jumps to
probe_hw_failed and calls qla2x00_mem_free(). Several error labels in
qla2x00_mem_alloc() freed adapter members (elsrej.c, purex_dma_pool,
flt, sfp_data, loop_id_map, async_pd, sf_init_cb, ex_init_cb, npiv_info)
but left the pointers dangling. qla2x00_mem_free() then freed them a
second time. Worse, for the dma_pool members it issued
dma_pool_free(ha->s_dma_pool, ...) after s_dma_pool had already been
destroyed and set to NULL at fail_s_dma_pool, dereferencing a NULL pool.
Clear each freed pointer (and its DMA handle) in the error labels so the
subsequent qla2x00_mem_free() skips them. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: qla2xxx: Validate BSG request_len before reading vendor_cmd[]
The FC BSG transport allocates job->request via memdup_user() using the
exact user-supplied request_len. For FC_BSG_HST_VENDOR,
fc_bsg_host_dispatch() only guarantees request_len covers msgcode and
vendor_id; it does not account for the vendor_cmd[] flexible array.
qla2xxx then reads the command selector vendor_cmd[0] and, in several
sub-handlers, vendor_cmd[1]/[2] or structures overlaid on the vendor
command area without verifying request_len. A caller holding
CAP_SYS_RAWIO can submit a short request whose vendor_id matches the
host, triggering out-of-bounds heap reads (KASAN-detectable, and able to
mis-select a command or panic).
Add a central guard in qla2x00_process_vendor_specific() so the selector
is always in bounds, restrict the early vendor_cmd[0] read in
qla24xx_bsg_request() to sufficiently long vendor messages, and add
request_len checks to the sub-handlers that read further:
qla24xx_proc_fcp_prio_cfg_cmd(), qla2x00_process_loopback(),
qla84xx_reset(), qla84xx_updatefw(), qla2x00_read_optrom(),
qla2x00_update_optrom(), qlafx00_mgmt_cmd() and
qla28xx_validate_flash_image(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: nl80211: reject beacons with bad HE operation
The HE operation element not only needs to be longer than
the fixed part, but also have an appropriate size for the
variable part inside of it. Check this. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: rtw89: phy: check length before parsing PHY status IE
Hardware might report PHY status IE with unexpected length, and parser
might access out of range. Check the length ahead. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amdkfd: Check bounds for allocate_sdma_queue restore_sdma_id
allocate_sdma_queue has an option where the sdma queue id can be
specified (used by CRIU). We weren't bounds-checking that
value.
Confirm it's less than the maximum number of queues. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amdkfd: Fix OOB memory exposure in get_wave_state()
The get_wave_state() function for v9 trusts cp_hqd_cntl_stack_size and
cp_hqd_cntl_stack_offset values read directly from the MQD, which are
written by GPU microcode and fully attacker-controlled on the
CRIU-restore path (via AMDKFD_IOC_RESTORE_PROCESS with H3).
this leads to an unbounded copy_to_user() that can leak adjacent
GTT/kernel memory. If offset > size, integer underflow produces a ~4 GiB
read length, if size is set to 1 MiB against a 4 KiB allocation, we leak
1 MiB of adjacent kernel memory (other queues' MQDs, ring buffers, KASLR
pointers).
Fix by clamping both cp_hqd_cntl_stack_size to the actual allocated
buffer size (q->ctl_stack_size) and cp_hqd_cntl_stack_offset to the
clamped size before performing arithmetic and copy_to_user().
This ensures we never read beyond the allocated kernel BO regardless of
attacker-supplied MQD field values. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amdkfd: Check bounds on allocate_doorbell
allocated_doorbell has an option to set the doorbell id
to a specific value (used by CRIU). This value was not
bounds checked.
Check to confirm it's less than KFD_MAX_NUM_OF_QUEUES_PER_PROCESS. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
jfs: handle set_blocksize failures
jfs uses buffer_heads, which don't handle block size > PAGE_SIZE well.
Without this, mounting we will hit the
BUG_ON(offset >= folio_size(folio));
in folio_set_bh on the first __bread_gfp call. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
omfs: handle set_blocksize failures
omfs uses buffer_heads, which don't handle block size > PAGE_SIZE well.
Without this, mounting we will hit the
BUG_ON(offset >= folio_size(folio));
in folio_set_bh on the first __bread_gfp call. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ACPICA: Fix condition check in acpi_ps_parse_loop()
Fix condition check for AML_ELSE_OP in acpi_ps_parse_loop() to prevent
out-of-bounds access. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ACPICA: add boundary checks in acpi_ps_get_next_field()
Add boundary checks in acpi_ps_get_next_field() to prevent out-of-bounds
access. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ACPICA: Fix integer overflow in acpi_ex_opcode_3A_1T_1R() (mid_op)
Add overflow check for Index + Length to prevent integer overflow
when calculating the truncation length. This prevents negative
size parameter being passed to memcpy(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ACPICA: Add package limit checks in parser functions
Add package limit checks in parser functions to prevent out-of-bounds
access. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ACPICA: Enhance buffer validation in acpi_ut_walk_aml_resources()
Enhance buffer validation in acpi_ut_walk_aml_resources() to prevent
buffer overflows. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ACPICA: add boundary checks in two places
Add boundary checks in acpi_ps_get_next_namestring() and
acpi_ps_peek_opcode() to prevent out-of-bounds access. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ata: ahci: fail probe if BAR too small for claimed ports
When an AHCI controller is disabled in BIOS, its HOST_CAP register may
contain a bogus value, e.g. 0xFFFFFFFF.
Since CAP.NP (Number of Ports) is a zeroes based 5-bit register field,
a value of 0x1f means 32 ports. If CAP.NP claims more ports than can
physically fit within the mapped BAR region, accessing port registers
beyond the BAR boundary causes a kernel panic.
Add validation in ahci_init_one() to check that the BAR size is
sufficient for the number of ports claimed in CAP.NP. The check
calculates the required MMIO size as:
required_size = 0x100 (global registers) + max_ports * 0x80
If required_size exceeds the actual BAR size, the probe fails with
-ENODEV, preventing the panic and providing a clear error message.
[cassel: commit log] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fs/ntfs3: validate index entry key bounds
[BUG]
A malformed NTFS directory index entry can advertise a key_size larger
than the bytes actually present in its NTFS_DE payload. Directory lookup
then passes that malformed key to cmp_fnames(), which can read past the
end of the kmalloc'ed index buffer.
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in fname_full_size fs/ntfs3/ntfs.h:590 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in cmp_fnames+0x1ea/0x230 fs/ntfs3/index.c:46
Read of size 1 at addr ffff88801c313018 by task syz.6.3365/9279
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:94 [inline]
dump_stack_lvl+0xbe/0x130 lib/dump_stack.c:120
print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:378 [inline]
print_report+0xd1/0x650 mm/kasan/report.c:482
kasan_report+0xfb/0x140 mm/kasan/report.c:595
__asan_report_load1_noabort+0x14/0x30 mm/kasan/report_generic.c:378
fname_full_size fs/ntfs3/ntfs.h:590 [inline]
cmp_fnames+0x1ea/0x230 fs/ntfs3/index.c:46
hdr_find_e.isra.0+0x3ed/0x670 fs/ntfs3/index.c:762
indx_find+0x4b5/0x900 fs/ntfs3/index.c:1186
dir_search_u+0x2c0/0x460 fs/ntfs3/dir.c:254
ntfs_lookup+0x1cc/0x2a0 fs/ntfs3/namei.c:85
__lookup_slow+0x241/0x450 fs/namei.c:1816
lookup_slow fs/namei.c:1833 [inline]
walk_component+0x31c/0x570 fs/namei.c:2151
link_path_walk+0x592/0xd60 fs/namei.c:2519
path_lookupat+0x138/0x660 fs/namei.c:2675
filename_lookup+0x1f3/0x560 fs/namei.c:2705
filename_setxattr+0xad/0x1c0 fs/xattr.c:660
path_setxattrat+0x1d8/0x280 fs/xattr.c:713
__do_sys_lsetxattr fs/xattr.c:754 [inline]
__se_sys_lsetxattr fs/xattr.c:750 [inline]
__x64_sys_lsetxattr+0xd0/0x150 fs/xattr.c:750
...
Allocated by task 9279:
kasan_save_stack+0x39/0x70 mm/kasan/common.c:56
kasan_save_track+0x14/0x40 mm/kasan/common.c:77
kasan_save_alloc_info+0x37/0x60 mm/kasan/generic.c:573
poison_kmalloc_redzone mm/kasan/common.c:400 [inline]
__kasan_kmalloc+0xc3/0xd0 mm/kasan/common.c:417
kasan_kmalloc include/linux/kasan.h:262 [inline]
__do_kmalloc_node mm/slub.c:5650 [inline]
__kmalloc_noprof+0x2bd/0x900 mm/slub.c:5662
kmalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:961 [inline]
indx_read+0x41d/0xad0 fs/ntfs3/index.c:1059
indx_find+0x447/0x900 fs/ntfs3/index.c:1179
dir_search_u+0x2c0/0x460 fs/ntfs3/dir.c:254
ntfs_lookup+0x1cc/0x2a0 fs/ntfs3/namei.c:85
__lookup_slow+0x241/0x450 fs/namei.c:1816
lookup_slow fs/namei.c:1833 [inline]
walk_component+0x31c/0x570 fs/namei.c:2151
link_path_walk+0x592/0xd60 fs/namei.c:2519
path_lookupat+0x138/0x660 fs/namei.c:2675
filename_lookup+0x1f3/0x560 fs/namei.c:2705
filename_setxattr+0xad/0x1c0 fs/xattr.c:660
path_setxattrat+0x1d8/0x280 fs/xattr.c:713
__do_sys_lsetxattr fs/xattr.c:754 [inline]
__se_sys_lsetxattr fs/xattr.c:750 [inline]
__x64_sys_lsetxattr+0xd0/0x150 fs/xattr.c:750
...
[CAUSE]
The index-header validators only validated INDEX_HDR-level geometry.
They did not walk each NTFS_DE to verify entry alignment, subnode
layout, or that key_size fit inside the entry payload. They also
allowed a last sentinel entry to carry a non-zero key_size.
[FIX]
Walk every NTFS_DE in ntfs3's index-header validators and reject
entries with invalid layout, mismatched subnode state, oversized
key_size, or non-zero sentinel keys before lookup or log replay can
consume them. |
