| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
octeontx2-pf: avoid double free of pool->stack on AQ init failure
otx2_pool_aq_init() frees pool->stack when mailbox sync or retry
allocation fails, but leaves the pointer unchanged. Later,
otx2_sq_aura_pool_init() unwinds the partial setup through
otx2_aura_pool_free(), which frees pool->stack again. The CN20K-specific
cn20k_pool_aq_init() implementation has the same bug in
its corresponding error path.
Set pool->stack to NULL immediately after the local free so the shared
cleanup path does not free the same stack again while cleaning up
partially initialized pool state.
The bug was first flagged by an experimental analysis tool we are
developing for kernel memory-management bugs while analyzing
v6.13-rc1. The tool is still under development and is not yet publicly
available. Manual inspection confirms that the bug is still present in
v7.1-rc3.
Runtime validation was not performed because reproducing this path
requires OcteonTX2/CN20K hardware. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
x86/mm: Disable broadcast TLB flush when PCID is disabled
Booting with "nopcid" clears X86_FEATURE_PCID and keeps CR4.PCIDE from being
set to one. On AMD CPUs that support INVLPGB, broadcast TLB flushing remains
enabled.
There are two checks that decide whether the global ASID code runs,
mm_global_asid() and consider_global_asid(), that key off of the
X86_FEATURE_INVLPGB feature. Once an mm becomes active on more than three
CPUs, consider_global_asid() assigns it a global ASID, after which
flush_tlb_mm_range() takes the broadcast_tlb_flush() path using a non-zero
PCID. Issuing an INVLPGB with a non-zero PCID while CR4.PCIDE is not set
results in a #GP:
Oops: general protection fault, kernel NULL pointer dereference 0x1: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI
CPU: 158 UID: 0 PID: 3119 Comm: snap Not tainted 7.1.0-rc3 #1 PREEMPT(full)
Hardware name: ...
RIP: 0010:broadcast_tlb_flush
Code: ... 89 da 48 83 c8 07 <0f> 01 fe eb 08 cc cc cc ...
Call Trace:
<TASK>
flush_tlb_mm_range
ptep_clear_flush
wp_page_copy
? _raw_spin_unlock
__handle_mm_fault
handle_mm_fault
do_user_addr_fault
exc_page_fault
asm_exc_page_fault
All processors that support broadcast TLB invalidation also have PCID support,
so it is only the "nopcid" scenario that is of concern. In this situation just
disable the broadcast TLB support using the CPUID dependency support by making
X86_FEATURE_INVLPGB dependent on X86_FEATURE_PCID.
[ bp: Massage commit message. ] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fuse-uring: fix moving cancelled entry to ent_in_userspace list
fuse_uring_cancel() moves entries that are available (these have no reqs
attached) to the ent_in_userspace list. ent_list_request_expired()
checks the first entry on ent_in_userspace and dereferences
ent->fuse_req unconditionally, which will crash on a cancelled entry
that was moved to this list.
Fix this by freeing the entry and dropping queue_refs directly in
fuse_uring_cancel(). This is safe because cancel is the cancel handler
itself - after io_uring_cmd_done(), no more cancels will be dispatched
for this command, and teardown serializes with cancel via queue->lock.
Since cancel now decrements queue_refs, fuse_uring_abort() must no
longer gate fuse_uring_abort_end_requests() on queue_refs > 0, as
cancelled entries may have already dropped queue_refs while requests are
still queued. Remove the gate so abort always flushes requests and stops
queues. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fuse: clear intr_entry in fuse_resend and fuse_remove_pending_req
When fuse_resend() moves a request from fpq->processing back to
fiq->pending, it sets FR_PENDING and clears FR_SENT but does not
remove the requests intr_entry from fiq->interrupts. If the
request had FR_INTERRUPTED set from a prior signal, intr_entry
remains dangling on fiq->interrupts. When the requesting task
then receives a fatal signal, fuse_remove_pending_req() sees
FR_PENDING=1, removes the request from fiq->pending and frees it
via the refcount path, also without cleaning intr_entry. The
stale intr_entry causes use-after-free when fuse_read_interrupt()
iterates fiq->interrupts:
- list_del_init(&req->intr_entry) -> UAF write on freed slab
- req->in.h.unique -> UAF read, data leaked to userspace
Remove intr_entry from fiq->interrupts in fuse_resend() for
interrupted requests before they are placed back on fiq->pending.
Add a WARN_ON if the intr_entry is not empty on request destruction. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: arm64: nv: Avoid dereferencing NULL VNCR pseudo-TLB
VNCR TLB invalidation occurs from MMU notifiers or TLBI instructions,
and either can race against a vcpu not being onlined yet (no pseudo-TLB
allocated). Similarly, the TLB might be invalid, and the invalidation
should be skipped in this case.
Both kvm_invalidate_vncr_ipa() and kvm_invalidate_vncr_va() are
expected to perform the same checks, except that the latter doesn't
check for the allocation and blindly dereferences the pointer.
Solve this by introducing a new iterator built on top of the usual
kvm_for_each_vcpu() that checks for both of the above conditions,
and convert the two users to it. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm: page_ext: add count limit to page_ext_iter_next to prevent invalid PFN access
The page_ext iteration API does not validate if the PFN still belongs to a
valid section while advancing the iterator. When dynamically adding
memory in the hotplug path, it can lead to a NULL pointer dereference
during page_ext_lookup at the boundary of the last valid section when
iterator count equals __pgcount.
The for_each_page_ext() macro calls page_ext_iter_next() as its loop
increment. for_each_page_ext() does a "__page_ext =
page_ext_iter_next(&__iter)" at the end. This causes page_ext_iter_next()
to increment iter->index past __pgcount and call page_ext_lookup(start_pfn
+ __pgcount). During memory hotplug (online), the PFN at start_pfn +
__pgcount may belong to a section that has not yet been initialized,
causing page_ext_lookup() to trigger a NULL pointer dereference.
[ 14.555124][ T846] Call trace:
[ 14.555125][ T846] lookup_page_ext+0x6c/0x108 (P)
[ 14.555127][ T846] page_ext_lookup+0x30/0x3c
[ 14.555129][ T846] __reset_page_owner+0x11c/0x260
[ 14.571201][ T846] __free_pages_ok+0x5e8/0x8e0
[ 14.571204][ T846] __free_pages_core+0x78/0xf0
[ 14.571206][ T846] generic_online_page+0x14/0x24
[ 14.597782][ T846] online_pages+0x178/0x30c
[ 14.597784][ T846] memory_block_change_state+0x284/0x32c
[ 14.597787][ T846] memory_subsys_online+0x4c/0x64
[ 14.597789][ T846] device_online+0x88/0xb0
[ 14.597791][ T846] online_memory_block+0x30/0x40
[ 14.597793][ T846] walk_memory_blocks+0xac/0xe8
[ 14.597794][ T846] add_memory_resource+0x280/0x298
[ 14.656161][ T846] add_memory+0x60/0x98
Move the iteration boundary enforcement inside the iterator functions, so
callers cannot inadvertently access beyond the requested range. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
module: decompress: check return value of module_extend_max_pages()
module_extend_max_pages() calls kvrealloc() internally and returns
-ENOMEM on allocation failure. The return value is never checked.
If the initial allocation fails, info->pages remains NULL and
info->max_pages remains 0. Subsequent calls to module_get_next_page()
will attempt to dynamically grow the array by calling
module_extend_max_pages(info, 0) since info->used_pages is 0. This
results in kvrealloc(NULL, 0) returning ZERO_SIZE_PTR, which is treated
as a success, leading to a dereference of ZERO_SIZE_PTR and a kernel
oops.
Fix: add the missing error check after module_extend_max_pages() and
return immediately on failure. This matches the pattern used by every
other kvrealloc() caller in the module loading path.
[Sami: Corrected the analysis in the commit message.] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
crypto: chacha20poly1305 - validate poly1305 template argument
chachapoly_create() still accepts the compatibility poly1305 parameter
in the template name, but it assumes the second template argument is
always present and immediately passes it to strcmp().
When the argument is missing, crypto_attr_alg_name() returns an error
pointer. Check for that before comparing the name so malformed template
instantiations fail with an error instead of dereferencing the error
pointer in strcmp().
This matches the surrounding Crypto API template pattern where
crypto_attr_alg_name() results are validated before string-specific use. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: gadget: composite: fix dead empty check in the USB_DT_OTG handler
The OTG branch of composite_setup() falls back to the first
configuration when none is selected:
if (cdev->config)
config = cdev->config;
else
config = list_first_entry(&cdev->configs,
struct usb_configuration, list);
if (!config)
goto done;
...
memcpy(req->buf, config->descriptors[0], value);
list_first_entry() never returns NULL. On an empty list it returns
container_of() of the list head. So the "if (!config)" check is dead.
When cdev->configs is empty, config points at the head inside struct
usb_composite_dev. config->descriptors[0] reads whatever sits at that
offset. The memcpy copies up to w_length bytes of it into the response
buffer.
cdev->configs can be empty in two cases. One is a teardown race on
gadget unbind with a control transfer in flight. The other is a driver
that sets is_otg before it adds a config. A reproducer that holds
cdev->configs empty triggers a KASAN fault in this branch.
Use list_first_entry_or_null() so the existing check does its job. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tracing: Fix NULL pointer dereference in func_set_flag()
func_set_flag() dereferences tr->current_trace_flags before verifying
that the current tracer is actually the function tracer. When the active
tracer has been switched away from "function" (e.g., to "wakeup_rt"),
tr->current_trace_flags can be NULL, leading to a NULL pointer
dereference and kernel crash.
The call chain that triggers this is:
trace_options_write()
-> __set_tracer_option()
-> trace->set_flag() /* func_set_flag */
In func_set_flag(), the first operation is:
if (!!set == !!(tr->current_trace_flags->val & bit))
This dereferences tr->current_trace_flags unconditionally. The safety
check that guards against a non-function tracer:
if (tr->current_trace != &function_trace)
return 0;
is placed *after* the dereference, which is too late.
This was observed with the following crash dump:
BUG: unable to handle page fault at 0000000000000000
RIP: func_set_flag+0xd
Call Trace:
__set_tracer_option+0x27
trace_options_write+0x75
vfs_write+0x12a
ksys_write+0x66
do_syscall_64+0x5b
RIP: ffffffff914c973d RSP: ff67ec88b01dfdf0 RFLAGS: 00010202
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ff3a826e80354580 RCX: 0000000000000001
RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffffffff93918080
The disassembly confirms the fault:
func_set_flag+0: mov 0x1f08(%rdi), %rax ; RAX = tr->current_trace_flags = NULL
func_set_flag+13: mov (%rax), %eax ; page fault: dereference NULL
At the time of the crash:
tr->current_trace_flags = 0x0 (NULL)
tr->current_trace = wakeup_rt_tracer (not function_trace)
The scenario is that a process opens a function tracer option file (such
as "func_stack_trace"), then the current tracer is switched to another
tracer (e.g., "wakeup_rt"), which sets current_trace_flags to NULL. When
the process subsequently writes to the option file, func_set_flag() is
invoked and crashes on the NULL dereference.
Fix this by moving the current_trace check before the
current_trace_flags dereference, so that func_set_flag() returns early
when the function tracer is not active. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
x86,fs/resctrl: Prevent out-of-bounds access while offlining CPU when SNC enabled
The architecture updates the cpu_mask in a domain's header to track which
online CPUs are associated with the domain. When this mask becomes empty
the architecture initiates offline of the domain that includes calling
on resctrl fs to offline the domain. If it is a monitoring domain in
which LLC occupancy is tracked resctrl fs forces the limbo handler to
clear all busy RMID state associated with the domain.
The limbo handler always reads the current event value associated with a
busy RMID irrespective of it being checked as part of regular "is it still
busy" check or whether it will be forced released anyway. When reading an
RMID on a system with SNC enabled the "logical RMID" is converted to the
"physical RMID" and this conversion requires the NUMA node ID of the
resctrl monitoring domain that is in turn determined by querying the NUMA
node ID of any CPU belonging to the monitoring domain.
When the monitoring domain is going offline its cpu_mask is empty causing
the NUMA node ID query via cpu_to_node() to be done with "nr_cpu_ids" as
argument resulting in an out-of-bounds access.
Refactor the limbo handler to skip reading the RMID when the RMID will
just be forced to no longer be dirty in the domain anyway. Add a safety
check to the architecture's RMID reader to protect against this scenario. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ALSA: gus: check snd_ctl_new1() return value
snd_ctl_new1() can return NULL when memory allocation fails.
snd_gf1_pcm_volume_control() does not check the return value before
dereferencing kctl->id.index, which can lead to a NULL pointer
dereference.
Add a NULL check after snd_ctl_new1() and return -ENOMEM if it fails. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iio: adc: ti-ads1119: fix PM reference leak in buffer preenable
ads1119_triggered_buffer_preenable() resumes the device with
pm_runtime_resume_and_get() before starting a conversion.
If i2c_smbus_write_byte() fails, the function returns the error directly
and leaves the runtime PM usage counter elevated. The matching
postdisable callback is not called when preenable fails, so the reference
is leaked and the device may remain runtime-active indefinitely.
Store the I2C transfer result in ret and drop the runtime PM reference on
failure before returning the error. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iio: accel: kxsd9: fix runtime PM imbalance on write_raw() error
kxsd9_write_raw() takes a runtime PM reference with pm_runtime_get_sync()
but returns -EINVAL directly when a scale with a non-zero integer part is
requested, skipping the matching pm_runtime_put_autosuspend(). This leaks
a runtime PM usage-counter reference on every such write, after which the
device can no longer autosuspend.
Set the error code and fall through to the existing put instead of
returning early. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/sched: cls_api: Handle TC_ACT_CONSUMED in tcf_qevent_handle
tcf_classify() can return TC_ACT_CONSUMED while the skb is held by the
defragmentation engine (e.g. act_ct on out-of-order fragments). When
that happens the skb is no longer owned by the caller and must not be
touched again.
tcf_qevent_handle() did not handle TC_ACT_CONSUMED: it fell through the
switch and returned the skb to the caller as if classification had
passed. The only qdisc that wires up qevents today is RED, via three call sites
(qe_mark on RED_PROB_MARK/HARD_MARK, qe_early_drop on congestion_drop)
red_enqueue() was continuing to operate on an skb it no longer owns in this
case -- enqueueing it, dropping it, or updating statistics. Resulting in a UAF.
tc qdisc add dev eth0 root handle 1: red ... qevent early_drop block 10
tc filter add block 10 ... action ct
(with ct defrag enabled and traffic that produces out-of-order
fragments, e.g. a fragmented UDP stream)
Handle TC_ACT_CONSUMED in tcf_qevent_handle() the same way the ingress
and egress fast paths do: treat it as stolen and return NULL without
touching the skb. Unlike the TC_ACT_STOLEN case, the skb must not be
dropped/freed here, as it is no longer owned by us. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
crypto: qat - remove unused character device and IOCTLs
The QAT driver exposes a character device (qat_adf_ctl) with IOCTLs
for device configuration, start, stop, status query and enumeration.
These IOCTLs are not part of any public uAPI header and have no known
in-tree or out-of-tree users. Device lifecycle is already managed via
sysfs.
The ioctl interface also increases the attack surface and is the
subject of a number of bug reports.
Remove the character device, the IOCTL definitions, and the related
data structures (adf_dev_status_info, adf_user_cfg_key_val,
adf_user_cfg_section, adf_user_cfg_ctl_data). Drop the now-unused
adf_cfg_user.h header and strip adf_ctl_drv.c down to the minimal
module_init/module_exit hooks for workqueue, AER, and crypto/compression
algorithm registration.
Clean up leftover dead code that was only reachable from the removed
IOCTL paths: adf_cfg_del_all(), adf_devmgr_verify_id(),
adf_devmgr_get_num_dev(), adf_devmgr_get_dev_by_id(),
adf_get_vf_real_id() and the unused ADF_CFG macros.
Additionally, drop the entry associated to QAT IOCTLs in
ioctl-number.rst. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/handshake: Take a long-lived file reference at submit
handshake_nl_accept_doit() needs the file pointer backing
req->hr_sk->sk_socket to survive the window between
handshake_req_next() and the subsequent FD_PREPARE() and get_file().
The submit-side sock_hold() does not provide that. sk_refcnt keeps
struct sock alive, but struct socket is owned by sock->file: when
the consumer fputs the last file reference, sock_release() tears
the socket down regardless of any sock_hold.
Add an hr_file pointer to struct handshake_req and acquire an
explicit reference on sock->file during handshake_req_submit().
handshake_complete() and handshake_req_cancel() release the
reference on the completion-bit-winning path.
The submit error path must also release the file reference, but
after rhashtable insertion a concurrent handshake_req_cancel() can
discover the request and race the error path. Gate the error-path
cleanup -- sk_destruct restoration, fput, and request destruction
-- with test_and_set_bit(HANDSHAKE_F_REQ_COMPLETED), the same
serialization handshake_complete() and handshake_req_cancel()
already use. When cancel has already claimed ownership, the submit
error path returns without touching the request; socket teardown
handles final destruction.
The accept-side dereferences are not yet retargeted; that change
comes in the next patch. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iio: event: Fix event FIFO reset race
`iio_event_getfd()` creates the event file descriptor with
`anon_inode_getfd()`, which allocates a new fd, creates the anonymous
file and installs it in the process fd table before returning to the
caller.
The IIO code resets the event FIFO after `anon_inode_getfd()` has returned,
but before `IIO_GET_EVENT_FD_IOCTL` has copied the fd number to userspace.
But since fd tables are shared between threads, another thread can guess
the newly allocated fd number and issue a `read()` on it as soon as the fd
has been installed.
This means the `kfifo_to_user()` in `iio_event_chrdev_read()` can run in
parallel with the `kfifo_reset_out()` in `iio_event_getfd()`.
The kfifo documentation says that `kfifo_reset_out()` is only safe when it
is called from the reader thread and there is only one concurrent reader.
Otherwise it is dangerous and must be handled in the same way as
`kfifo_reset()`.
If that happens, `kfifo_to_user()` can advance the FIFO `out` index based
on state from before the reset, after the reset has already moved the `out`
index to the current `in` index. That can leave the FIFO with an `out`
index past the `in` index. A later `read()` can then see an underflowed
FIFO length and copy more data than the event FIFO buffer contains. This
can result in an out-of-bounds read and leak adjacent kernel memory to
userspace.
Move the FIFO reset before `anon_inode_getfd()`. At that point the event fd is
marked busy, but the new fd has not been installed yet, so userspace cannot
access it while the FIFO is reset. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
6lowpan: fix NHC entry use-after-free on error path
lowpan_nhc_do_uncompression() looks up an NHC descriptor while holding
lowpan_nhc_lock. If the descriptor has no uncompress callback, the error
path drops the lock before printing nhc->name.
lowpan_nhc_del() removes descriptors under the same lock and then relies
on synchronize_net() before the owning module can be unloaded. That only
waits for net RX RCU readers. lowpan_header_decompress() is also exported
and can be reached from callers that are not necessarily covered by the net
core RX critical section, for example the Bluetooth 6LoWPAN L2CAP receive
path.
This leaves a race where one task drops lowpan_nhc_lock in the error path,
another task unregisters and frees the matching descriptor after
synchronize_net() returns, and the first task then dereferences nhc->name
for the warning.
With the post-unlock window widened, KASAN reports:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in lowpan_nhc_do_uncompression+0x1f4/0x220
Read of size 8
lowpan_nhc_do_uncompression
lowpan_header_decompress
Fix this by printing the warning before dropping lowpan_nhc_lock, so the
descriptor name is read while unregister is still excluded. The malformed
packet is still rejected with -ENOTSUPP. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
staging: vme_user: bound slave read/write to the kern_buf size
The SLAVE-path helpers buffer_to_user() and buffer_from_user() copy
'count' bytes into/out of the fixed-size kern_buf (size_buf ==
PCI_BUF_SIZE == 0x20000, 128 KiB) using *ppos as the offset, without
bounding *ppos + count against size_buf.
vme_user_write()/vme_user_read() only clamp count to the VME window size
(image_size = vme_get_size(resource)), which VME_SET_SLAVE sets from the
user-supplied slave.size -- validated against the VME address space (up
to VME_A32_MAX = 4 GiB), not against PCI_BUF_SIZE. When the window
exceeds 128 KiB, a write()/read() copies past the kern_buf allocation.
Clamp count against size_buf in both helpers, with an early return when
*ppos is already at/after the buffer end. *ppos is >= 0 here (the caller
rejects negative offsets), so size_buf - *ppos cannot wrap. This mirrors
the existing clamp in the MASTER-path helpers resource_to_user() /
resource_from_user(), and matches the read()/write() convention of a
short transfer at end-of-buffer.
Found by static analysis (CodeQL taint tracking + CBMC bounded model
checking) and confirmed dynamically under KASAN with the vme_fake bridge:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in _copy_from_user+0x2d/0x80
Write of size 262144 at addr ffff888004100000 by task trigger/68
_copy_from_user+0x2d/0x80
vme_user_write+0x13e/0x240 [vme_user]
vfs_write+0x1b8/0x7a0
ksys_write+0xb8/0x150 |
