| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| Out-of-bounds Write in GitHub repository vim/vim prior to 8.2. |
| A heap-based buffer overflow flaw was found in libmodbus in function modbus_reply() in src/modbus.c. |
| Mbed TLS before 3.6.4 has a race condition in AESNI detection if certain compiler optimizations occur. An attacker may be able to extract an AES key from a multithreaded program, or perform a GCM forgery. |
| Mbed TLS before 3.6.4 allows a use-after-free in certain situations of applications that are developed in accordance with the documentation. The function mbedtls_x509_string_to_names() takes a head argument that is documented as an output argument. The documentation does not suggest that the function will free that pointer; however, the function does call mbedtls_asn1_free_named_data_list() on that argument, which performs a deep free(). As a result, application code that uses this function (relying only on documented behavior) is likely to still hold pointers to the memory blocks that were freed, resulting in a high risk of use-after-free or double-free. In particular, the two sample programs x509/cert_write and x509/cert_req are affected (use-after-free if the san string contains more than one DN). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
jfs: fix slab-out-of-bounds read in ea_get()
During the "size_check" label in ea_get(), the code checks if the extended
attribute list (xattr) size matches ea_size. If not, it logs
"ea_get: invalid extended attribute" and calls print_hex_dump().
Here, EALIST_SIZE(ea_buf->xattr) returns 4110417968, which exceeds
INT_MAX (2,147,483,647). Then ea_size is clamped:
int size = clamp_t(int, ea_size, 0, EALIST_SIZE(ea_buf->xattr));
Although clamp_t aims to bound ea_size between 0 and 4110417968, the upper
limit is treated as an int, causing an overflow above 2^31 - 1. This leads
"size" to wrap around and become negative (-184549328).
The "size" is then passed to print_hex_dump() (called "len" in
print_hex_dump()), it is passed as type size_t (an unsigned
type), this is then stored inside a variable called
"int remaining", which is then assigned to "int linelen" which
is then passed to hex_dump_to_buffer(). In print_hex_dump()
the for loop, iterates through 0 to len-1, where len is
18446744073525002176, calling hex_dump_to_buffer()
on each iteration:
for (i = 0; i < len; i += rowsize) {
linelen = min(remaining, rowsize);
remaining -= rowsize;
hex_dump_to_buffer(ptr + i, linelen, rowsize, groupsize,
linebuf, sizeof(linebuf), ascii);
...
}
The expected stopping condition (i < len) is effectively broken
since len is corrupted and very large. This eventually leads to
the "ptr+i" being passed to hex_dump_to_buffer() to get closer
to the end of the actual bounds of "ptr", eventually an out of
bounds access is done in hex_dump_to_buffer() in the following
for loop:
for (j = 0; j < len; j++) {
if (linebuflen < lx + 2)
goto overflow2;
ch = ptr[j];
...
}
To fix this we should validate "EALIST_SIZE(ea_buf->xattr)"
before it is utilised. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: at76c50x: fix use after free access in at76_disconnect
The memory pointed to by priv is freed at the end of at76_delete_device
function (using ieee80211_free_hw). But the code then accesses the udev
field of the freed object to put the USB device. This may also lead to a
memory leak of the usb device. Fix this by using udev from interface. |
| Vasion Print (formerly PrinterLogic) before Virtual Appliance Host 1.0.735 Application 20.0.1330 allows Configuration File Contains CA & Private Key V-2022-001. |
| Vasion Print (formerly PrinterLogic) before Virtual Appliance Host 1.0.735 Application 20.0.1330 allows Debug Bundle Contains Sensitive Data V-2022-003. |
| Vasion Print (formerly PrinterLogic) before Virtual Appliance Host 1.0.735 Application 20.0.1330 allows Driver Unrestricted Upload of File with Dangerous Type V-2022-006. |
| Vasion Print (formerly PrinterLogic) before Virtual Appliance Host 22.0.933 Application 20.0.2368 allows Local Privilege Escalation V-2024-007. |
| Vasion Print (formerly PrinterLogic) before Virtual Appliance Host 22.0.1002 Application 20.0.2614 allows Privilege Escalation V-2024-015. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
proc: fix UAF in proc_get_inode()
Fix race between rmmod and /proc/XXX's inode instantiation.
The bug is that pde->proc_ops don't belong to /proc, it belongs to a
module, therefore dereferencing it after /proc entry has been registered
is a bug unless use_pde/unuse_pde() pair has been used.
use_pde/unuse_pde can be avoided (2 atomic ops!) because pde->proc_ops
never changes so information necessary for inode instantiation can be
saved _before_ proc_register() in PDE itself and used later, avoiding
pde->proc_ops->... dereference.
rmmod lookup
sys_delete_module
proc_lookup_de
pde_get(de);
proc_get_inode(dir->i_sb, de);
mod->exit()
proc_remove
remove_proc_subtree
proc_entry_rundown(de);
free_module(mod);
if (S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
if (de->proc_ops->proc_read_iter)
--> As module is already freed, will trigger UAF
BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: fffffbfff80a702b
PGD 817fc4067 P4D 817fc4067 PUD 817fc0067 PMD 102ef4067 PTE 0
Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN PTI
CPU: 26 UID: 0 PID: 2667 Comm: ls Tainted: G
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996)
RIP: 0010:proc_get_inode+0x302/0x6e0
RSP: 0018:ffff88811c837998 EFLAGS: 00010a06
RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ffffffffc0538140 RCX: 0000000000000007
RDX: 1ffffffff80a702b RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffffffffc0538158
RBP: ffff8881299a6000 R08: 0000000067bbe1e5 R09: 1ffff11023906f20
R10: ffffffffb560ca07 R11: ffffffffb2b43a58 R12: ffff888105bb78f0
R13: ffff888100518048 R14: ffff8881299a6004 R15: 0000000000000001
FS: 00007f95b9686840(0000) GS:ffff8883af100000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: fffffbfff80a702b CR3: 0000000117dd2000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
<TASK>
proc_lookup_de+0x11f/0x2e0
__lookup_slow+0x188/0x350
walk_component+0x2ab/0x4f0
path_lookupat+0x120/0x660
filename_lookup+0x1ce/0x560
vfs_statx+0xac/0x150
__do_sys_newstat+0x96/0x110
do_syscall_64+0x5f/0x170
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
[adobriyan@gmail.com: don't do 2 atomic ops on the common path] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
x86/microcode/AMD: Fix out-of-bounds on systems with CPU-less NUMA nodes
Currently, load_microcode_amd() iterates over all NUMA nodes, retrieves their
CPU masks and unconditionally accesses per-CPU data for the first CPU of each
mask.
According to Documentation/admin-guide/mm/numaperf.rst:
"Some memory may share the same node as a CPU, and others are provided as
memory only nodes."
Therefore, some node CPU masks may be empty and wouldn't have a "first CPU".
On a machine with far memory (and therefore CPU-less NUMA nodes):
- cpumask_of_node(nid) is 0
- cpumask_first(0) is CONFIG_NR_CPUS
- cpu_data(CONFIG_NR_CPUS) accesses the cpu_info per-CPU array at an
index that is 1 out of bounds
This does not have any security implications since flashing microcode is
a privileged operation but I believe this has reliability implications by
potentially corrupting memory while flashing a microcode update.
When booting with CONFIG_UBSAN_BOUNDS=y on an AMD machine that flashes
a microcode update. I get the following splat:
UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/amd.c:X:Y
index 512 is out of range for type 'unsigned long[512]'
[...]
Call Trace:
dump_stack
__ubsan_handle_out_of_bounds
load_microcode_amd
request_microcode_amd
reload_store
kernfs_fop_write_iter
vfs_write
ksys_write
do_syscall_64
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe
Change the loop to go over only NUMA nodes which have CPUs before determining
whether the first CPU on the respective node needs microcode update.
[ bp: Massage commit message, fix typo. ] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
vlan: enforce underlying device type
Currently, VLAN devices can be created on top of non-ethernet devices.
Besides the fact that it doesn't make much sense, this also causes a
bug which leaks the address of a kernel function to usermode.
When creating a VLAN device, we initialize GARP (garp_init_applicant)
and MRP (mrp_init_applicant) for the underlying device.
As part of the initialization process, we add the multicast address of
each applicant to the underlying device, by calling dev_mc_add.
__dev_mc_add uses dev->addr_len to determine the length of the new
multicast address.
This causes an out-of-bounds read if dev->addr_len is greater than 6,
since the multicast addresses provided by GARP and MRP are only 6
bytes long.
This behaviour can be reproduced using the following commands:
ip tunnel add gretest mode ip6gre local ::1 remote ::2 dev lo
ip l set up dev gretest
ip link add link gretest name vlantest type vlan id 100
Then, the following command will display the address of garp_pdu_rcv:
ip maddr show | grep 01:80:c2:00:00:21
Fix the bug by enforcing the type of the underlying device during VLAN
device initialization. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: Explicitly verify target vCPU is online in kvm_get_vcpu()
Explicitly verify the target vCPU is fully online _prior_ to clamping the
index in kvm_get_vcpu(). If the index is "bad", the nospec clamping will
generate '0', i.e. KVM will return vCPU0 instead of NULL.
In practice, the bug is unlikely to cause problems, as it will only come
into play if userspace or the guest is buggy or misbehaving, e.g. KVM may
send interrupts to vCPU0 instead of dropping them on the floor.
However, returning vCPU0 when it shouldn't exist per online_vcpus is
problematic now that KVM uses an xarray for the vCPUs array, as KVM needs
to insert into the xarray before publishing the vCPU to userspace (see
commit c5b077549136 ("KVM: Convert the kvm->vcpus array to a xarray")),
i.e. before vCPU creation is guaranteed to succeed.
As a result, incorrectly providing access to vCPU0 will trigger a
use-after-free if vCPU0 is dereferenced and kvm_vm_ioctl_create_vcpu()
bails out of vCPU creation due to an error and frees vCPU0. Commit
afb2acb2e3a3 ("KVM: Fix vcpu_array[0] races") papered over that issue, but
in doing so introduced an unsolvable teardown conundrum. Preventing
accesses to vCPU0 before it's fully online will allow reverting commit
afb2acb2e3a3, without re-introducing the vcpu_array[0] UAF race. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
rtc: pcf85063: fix potential OOB write in PCF85063 NVMEM read
The nvmem interface supports variable buffer sizes, while the regmap
interface operates with fixed-size storage. If an nvmem client uses a
buffer size less than 4 bytes, regmap_read will write out of bounds
as it expects the buffer to point at an unsigned int.
Fix this by using an intermediary unsigned int to hold the value. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: gadget: f_tcm: Don't free command immediately
Don't prematurely free the command. Wait for the status completion of
the sense status. It can be freed then. Otherwise we will double-free
the command. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
memory: tegra20-emc: fix an OF node reference bug in tegra_emc_find_node_by_ram_code()
As of_find_node_by_name() release the reference of the argument device
node, tegra_emc_find_node_by_ram_code() releases some device nodes while
still in use, resulting in possible UAFs. According to the bindings and
the in-tree DTS files, the "emc-tables" node is always device's child
node with the property "nvidia,use-ram-code", and the "lpddr2" node is a
child of the "emc-tables" node. Thus utilize the
for_each_child_of_node() macro and of_get_child_by_name() instead of
of_find_node_by_name() to simplify the code.
This bug was found by an experimental verification tool that I am
developing.
[krzysztof: applied v1, adjust the commit msg to incorporate v2 parts] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: MGMT: Fix slab-use-after-free Read in mgmt_remove_adv_monitor_sync
This fixes the following crash:
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in mgmt_remove_adv_monitor_sync+0x3a/0xd0 net/bluetooth/mgmt.c:5543
Read of size 8 at addr ffff88814128f898 by task kworker/u9:4/5961
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 5961 Comm: kworker/u9:4 Not tainted 6.12.0-syzkaller-10684-gf1cd565ce577 #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 09/13/2024
Workqueue: hci0 hci_cmd_sync_work
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:94 [inline]
dump_stack_lvl+0x241/0x360 lib/dump_stack.c:120
print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:378 [inline]
print_report+0x169/0x550 mm/kasan/report.c:489
kasan_report+0x143/0x180 mm/kasan/report.c:602
mgmt_remove_adv_monitor_sync+0x3a/0xd0 net/bluetooth/mgmt.c:5543
hci_cmd_sync_work+0x22b/0x400 net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c:332
process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3229 [inline]
process_scheduled_works+0xa63/0x1850 kernel/workqueue.c:3310
worker_thread+0x870/0xd30 kernel/workqueue.c:3391
kthread+0x2f0/0x390 kernel/kthread.c:389
ret_from_fork+0x4b/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:244
</TASK>
Allocated by task 16026:
kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:47 [inline]
kasan_save_track+0x3f/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:68
poison_kmalloc_redzone mm/kasan/common.c:377 [inline]
__kasan_kmalloc+0x98/0xb0 mm/kasan/common.c:394
kasan_kmalloc include/linux/kasan.h:260 [inline]
__kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x243/0x390 mm/slub.c:4314
kmalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:901 [inline]
kzalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:1037 [inline]
mgmt_pending_new+0x65/0x250 net/bluetooth/mgmt_util.c:269
mgmt_pending_add+0x36/0x120 net/bluetooth/mgmt_util.c:296
remove_adv_monitor+0x102/0x1b0 net/bluetooth/mgmt.c:5568
hci_mgmt_cmd+0xc47/0x11d0 net/bluetooth/hci_sock.c:1712
hci_sock_sendmsg+0x7b8/0x11c0 net/bluetooth/hci_sock.c:1832
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:711 [inline]
__sock_sendmsg+0x221/0x270 net/socket.c:726
sock_write_iter+0x2d7/0x3f0 net/socket.c:1147
new_sync_write fs/read_write.c:586 [inline]
vfs_write+0xaeb/0xd30 fs/read_write.c:679
ksys_write+0x18f/0x2b0 fs/read_write.c:731
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
Freed by task 16022:
kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:47 [inline]
kasan_save_track+0x3f/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:68
kasan_save_free_info+0x40/0x50 mm/kasan/generic.c:582
poison_slab_object mm/kasan/common.c:247 [inline]
__kasan_slab_free+0x59/0x70 mm/kasan/common.c:264
kasan_slab_free include/linux/kasan.h:233 [inline]
slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:2338 [inline]
slab_free mm/slub.c:4598 [inline]
kfree+0x196/0x420 mm/slub.c:4746
mgmt_pending_foreach+0xd1/0x130 net/bluetooth/mgmt_util.c:259
__mgmt_power_off+0x183/0x430 net/bluetooth/mgmt.c:9550
hci_dev_close_sync+0x6c4/0x11c0 net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c:5208
hci_dev_do_close net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:483 [inline]
hci_dev_close+0x112/0x210 net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:508
sock_do_ioctl+0x158/0x460 net/socket.c:1209
sock_ioctl+0x626/0x8e0 net/socket.c:1328
vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline]
__do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:906 [inline]
__se_sys_ioctl+0xf5/0x170 fs/ioctl.c:892
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
media: uvcvideo: Remove dangling pointers
When an async control is written, we copy a pointer to the file handle
that started the operation. That pointer will be used when the device is
done. Which could be anytime in the future.
If the user closes that file descriptor, its structure will be freed,
and there will be one dangling pointer per pending async control, that
the driver will try to use.
Clean all the dangling pointers during release().
To avoid adding a performance penalty in the most common case (no async
operation), a counter has been introduced with some logic to make sure
that it is properly handled. |
