| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iomap: guard io_size EOF trim against concurrent truncate underflow
iomap: fix zero padding data issue in concurrent append writes
changed ioend accounting so that io_size tracks only valid data
within EOF. This trims io_size when a writeback range extends
past end_pos:
ioend->io_size += map_len;
if (ioend->io_offset + ioend->io_size > end_pos)
ioend->io_size = end_pos - ioend->io_offset;
However, if end_pos ends up below ioend->io_offset, the subtraction
becomes negative and is stored in size_t io_size, causing an unsigned
wrap to a huge value. This can happen when writeback continues past
byte-level EOF up to a block-aligned range, or when a concurrent
truncate shrinks the file after end_pos was sampled in
iomap_writeback_handle_eof().
A wrapped io_size can mislead append detection and corrupt
completion-time size handling, since filesystem end_io paths consume
io_size for decisions such as on-disk EOF updates and unwritten/COW
completion ranges.
Fix this by clamping io_size to zero when EOF has moved to or before
the ioend start offset. This preserves the original intent of trimming
io_size to valid in-EOF data while avoiding the underflow. |
| libheif is a HEIF and AVIF file format decoder and encoder. In 1.23.0 and earlier, a crafted HEIF or AVIF file containing a clean aperture box can reduce an image dimension to zero and crash or corrupt tiling results when heif_image_handle_get_image_tiling(handle, 1, &tiling) is called. ImageItem::get_heif_image_tiling() returns already transformed dimensions, and process_image_transformations_on_tiling() applies the clean aperture transformation again. The second application passes zero to Box_clap::left_rounded(0), where image_width minus one underflows and constructs Fraction(0xFFFFFFFF, 2). Debug builds reach an assertion and abort, while release builds can return a corrupt crop and zero-width tiling result. The affected implementation spans libheif/image-items/image_item.cc, libheif/context.cc, and libheif/box.cc. This issue is fixed in version 1.23.1. |
| Microsoft ODBC Driver for SQL Server Remote Code Execution Vulnerability |
| Microsoft PostScript and PCL6 Class Printer Driver Remote Code Execution Vulnerability |
| Netatalk is a Free and Open Source file server suite for Unix-like operating systems. In versions 3.1.19 through 4.4.2, a stack-based buffer overflow exists in the copydir() function of Netatalk's afpd daemon due to an integer underflow in the calculation of the remaining buffer size used for path construction. copydir() is a utility function called when a file operation crosses a device boundary inside an AFP shared volume, which the standard library's renameat() cannot handle. The function attempts to track available buffer space using srem and drem for source and destination paths. Incorrect arithmetic causes both srem and drem to underflow to SIZE_MAX. Consequently, boundary checks against strlen(de->d_name) always pass, allowing strcpy() to append filenames into nearly full stack buffers. Version 4.4.3 patches the issue. As a workaround, configure each AFP shared volume to be structured as a single file system, in other words no subdirectory of a shared volume should be a mount point for a different file system. |
| Netatalk is a Free and Open Source file server suite for Unix-like operating systems. In versions 3.1.19 through 4.4.2, a stack-based buffer overflow exists in the deletedir() function of Netatalk's afpd daemon due to an integer underflow in the calculation of the remaining buffer size used for path construction. deletedir() is a utility function called when a file operation crosses a device boundary inside an AFP shared volume, which the standard library's renameat() cannot handle. The function attempts to prevent buffer overflows by tracking available space in a size_t remain variable. However, the arithmetic used to compute remain results in an unsigned integer underflow, causing the variable to become SIZE_MAX. Because of this, the subsequent boundary check always evaluates as safe, allowing an unbounded strcpy() operation to copy attacker-controlled filenames into a nearly full stack buffer. Version 4.4.3 patches the issue. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/hugetlb: fix hugetlb cgroup rsvd charge/uncharge mismatch
In alloc_hugetlb_folio(), a single h_cg pointer is used for both the rsvd
and non-rsvd hugetlb cgroup charges. When map_chg is set,
hugetlb_cgroup_charge_cgroup_rsvd() stores the charged cgroup in h_cg, but
the immediately following hugetlb_cgroup_charge_cgroup() overwrites h_cg
with the non-rsvd cgroup pointer.
As a result, hugetlb_cgroup_commit_charge_rsvd() stores the wrong
(non-rsvd) cgroup pointer into the folio's rsvd slot.
When the folio is later freed, free_huge_folio() unconditionally calls
both hugetlb_cgroup_uncharge_folio() and
hugetlb_cgroup_uncharge_folio_rsvd(). The rsvd uncharge reads back the
wrong cgroup from the folio and decrements a counter that was never
charged for that cgroup, causing a page_counter underflow:
page_counter underflow: -512 nr_pages=512
WARNING: mm/page_counter.c:61 at page_counter_cancel
Fix this by introducing a separate h_cg_rsvd pointer exclusively for the
rsvd charge path, keeping the rsvd and non-rsvd charges fully independent
through their charge, commit, and error uncharge paths. |
| Capstone is a disassembly framework. Prior to version 6.0.0-Alpha9, Capstone's public `cs_insn_name()` API forwards caller-supplied instruction IDs directly to the selected architecture backend. Most backends validate the ID before indexing instruction-name tables, but the M68K and RISCV backends have missing or incomplete bounds checks. On a Capstone handle opened for M68K or RISCV, a caller-controlled invalid instruction ID can trigger an out-of-bounds read and crash the process. The demonstrated impact is availability loss in applications or bindings that expose instruction-name lookup to untrusted IDs. No code execution or data disclosure was demonstrated. Version 6.0.0-Alpha9 patches the issue. |
| IBM i 7.6, 7.5, 7.4, and 7.3 could allow a remote attacker to cause a denial of service and obtain sensitive information due to an integer underflow. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tipc: prevent snt_unacked underflow on CONN_ACK
tipc_sk_conn_proto_rcv() subtracts the peer-supplied connection ack count
from the unsigned 16-bit send counter snt_unacked without checking that it
does not exceed the number of messages actually outstanding:
tsk->snt_unacked -= msg_conn_ack(hdr);
msg_conn_ack() is read straight from a received CONN_MANAGER/CONN_ACK
message. If the ack count is larger than snt_unacked, the subtraction
wraps to a near-maximum value, leaving tsk_conn_cong() permanently true
and starving the connection of further transmits.
Validate the ACK count at the start of the CONN_ACK block and drop the
message if it acknowledges more messages than are outstanding. A peer (or,
for a local connection, the connected peer socket) can otherwise wedge a
TIPC connection's send side by sending an oversized connection ack. |
| Integer underflow (wrap or wraparound) in Windows Program Compatibility Assistant Service allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally. |
| Integer underflow (wrap or wraparound) in Windows DHCP Server allows an unauthorized attacker to disclose information over an adjacent network. |
| Integer underflow (wrap or wraparound) in Windows DHCP Server allows an unauthorized attacker to disclose information over an adjacent network. |
| Integer underflow (wrap or wraparound) in Windows DHCP Server allows an unauthorized attacker to disclose information over an adjacent network. |
| Integer underflow (wrap or wraparound) in Windows DHCP Server allows an unauthorized attacker to disclose information over an adjacent network. |
| Integer underflow (wrap or wraparound) in Windows DHCP Server allows an unauthorized attacker to disclose information over an adjacent network. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/sched: cake: reject overhead values that underflow length
CAKE accepts signed overhead values and stores them in an s16, but the
adjusted packet length calculation uses unsigned arithmetic. A negative
effective length can therefore wrap to a large value.
Such configurations make rate accounting depend on integer wraparound
rather than on the packet size userspace intended to model. A static
netlink lower bound is not enough because packets reaching CAKE can be
smaller than any reasonable manual-overhead allowance.
Fold the signed overhead adjustment into the existing datapath MPU clamp
so negative adjusted lengths are clamped before link-layer framing
adjustments. |
| Integer underflow (wrap or wraparound) in Microsoft Office allows an unauthorized attacker to execute code locally. |
| Out-of-bounds read in Microsoft Office allows an unauthorized attacker to execute code locally. |
| TimescaleDB through 2.29.1, fixed in commit 517c13e, contains an out-of-bounds read vulnerability in the Gorilla compression reverse row iterator that allows authenticated attackers to cause a denial of service by storing a crafted compressed datum with an internally inconsistent BitArray. Attackers with DML access to a compressed hypertable can trigger an unsigned integer wraparound in the reverse iterator bucket index computation, causing a read beyond the end of the bucket array, resulting in a SIGSEGV crash that can be repeatedly triggered on each subsequent reverse-order scan. |
