| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
platform/x86: ISST: Fix the KASAN report slab-out-of-bounds bug
Attaching SST PCI device to VM causes "BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds".
kasan report:
[ 19.411889] ==================================================================
[ 19.413702] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in _isst_if_get_pci_dev+0x3d5/0x400 [isst_if_common]
[ 19.415634] Read of size 8 at addr ffff888829e65200 by task cpuhp/16/113
[ 19.417368]
[ 19.418627] CPU: 16 PID: 113 Comm: cpuhp/16 Tainted: G E 6.9.0 #10
[ 19.420435] Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware20,1/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS VMW201.00V.20192059.B64.2207280713 07/28/2022
[ 19.422687] Call Trace:
[ 19.424091] <TASK>
[ 19.425448] dump_stack_lvl+0x5d/0x80
[ 19.426963] ? _isst_if_get_pci_dev+0x3d5/0x400 [isst_if_common]
[ 19.428694] print_report+0x19d/0x52e
[ 19.430206] ? __pfx__raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x10/0x10
[ 19.431837] ? _isst_if_get_pci_dev+0x3d5/0x400 [isst_if_common]
[ 19.433539] kasan_report+0xf0/0x170
[ 19.435019] ? _isst_if_get_pci_dev+0x3d5/0x400 [isst_if_common]
[ 19.436709] _isst_if_get_pci_dev+0x3d5/0x400 [isst_if_common]
[ 19.438379] ? __pfx_sched_clock_cpu+0x10/0x10
[ 19.439910] isst_if_cpu_online+0x406/0x58f [isst_if_common]
[ 19.441573] ? __pfx_isst_if_cpu_online+0x10/0x10 [isst_if_common]
[ 19.443263] ? ttwu_queue_wakelist+0x2c1/0x360
[ 19.444797] cpuhp_invoke_callback+0x221/0xec0
[ 19.446337] cpuhp_thread_fun+0x21b/0x610
[ 19.447814] ? __pfx_cpuhp_thread_fun+0x10/0x10
[ 19.449354] smpboot_thread_fn+0x2e7/0x6e0
[ 19.450859] ? __pfx_smpboot_thread_fn+0x10/0x10
[ 19.452405] kthread+0x29c/0x350
[ 19.453817] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
[ 19.455253] ret_from_fork+0x31/0x70
[ 19.456685] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
[ 19.458114] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
[ 19.459573] </TASK>
[ 19.460853]
[ 19.462055] Allocated by task 1198:
[ 19.463410] kasan_save_stack+0x30/0x50
[ 19.464788] kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30
[ 19.466139] __kasan_kmalloc+0xaa/0xb0
[ 19.467465] __kmalloc+0x1cd/0x470
[ 19.468748] isst_if_cdev_register+0x1da/0x350 [isst_if_common]
[ 19.470233] isst_if_mbox_init+0x108/0xff0 [isst_if_mbox_msr]
[ 19.471670] do_one_initcall+0xa4/0x380
[ 19.472903] do_init_module+0x238/0x760
[ 19.474105] load_module+0x5239/0x6f00
[ 19.475285] init_module_from_file+0xd1/0x130
[ 19.476506] idempotent_init_module+0x23b/0x650
[ 19.477725] __x64_sys_finit_module+0xbe/0x130
[ 19.476506] idempotent_init_module+0x23b/0x650
[ 19.477725] __x64_sys_finit_module+0xbe/0x130
[ 19.478920] do_syscall_64+0x82/0x160
[ 19.480036] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
[ 19.481292]
[ 19.482205] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888829e65000
which belongs to the cache kmalloc-512 of size 512
[ 19.484818] The buggy address is located 0 bytes to the right of
allocated 512-byte region [ffff888829e65000, ffff888829e65200)
[ 19.487447]
[ 19.488328] The buggy address belongs to the physical page:
[ 19.489569] page: refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0xffff888829e60c00 pfn:0x829e60
[ 19.491140] head: order:3 entire_mapcount:0 nr_pages_mapped:0 pincount:0
[ 19.492466] anon flags: 0x57ffffc0000840(slab|head|node=1|zone=2|lastcpupid=0x1fffff)
[ 19.493914] page_type: 0xffffffff()
[ 19.494988] raw: 0057ffffc0000840 ffff88810004cc80 0000000000000000 0000000000000001
[ 19.496451] raw: ffff888829e60c00 0000000080200018 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
[ 19.497906] head: 0057ffffc0000840 ffff88810004cc80 0000000000000000 0000000000000001
[ 19.499379] head: ffff888829e60c00 0000000080200018 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
[ 19.500844] head: 0057ffffc0000003 ffffea0020a79801 ffffea0020a79848 00000000ffffffff
[ 19.502316] head: 0000000800000000 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000
[ 19.503784] page dumped because: k
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nfsd: map the EBADMSG to nfserr_io to avoid warning
Ext4 will throw -EBADMSG through ext4_readdir when a checksum error
occurs, resulting in the following WARNING.
Fix it by mapping EBADMSG to nfserr_io.
nfsd_buffered_readdir
iterate_dir // -EBADMSG -74
ext4_readdir // .iterate_shared
ext4_dx_readdir
ext4_htree_fill_tree
htree_dirblock_to_tree
ext4_read_dirblock
__ext4_read_dirblock
ext4_dirblock_csum_verify
warn_no_space_for_csum
__warn_no_space_for_csum
return ERR_PTR(-EFSBADCRC) // -EBADMSG -74
nfserrno // WARNING
[ 161.115610] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 161.116465] nfsd: non-standard errno: -74
[ 161.117315] WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 780 at fs/nfsd/nfsproc.c:878 nfserrno+0x9d/0xd0
[ 161.118596] Modules linked in:
[ 161.119243] CPU: 1 PID: 780 Comm: nfsd Not tainted 5.10.0-00014-g79679361fd5d #138
[ 161.120684] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.14.0-0-g155821a1990b-prebuilt.qe
mu.org 04/01/2014
[ 161.123601] RIP: 0010:nfserrno+0x9d/0xd0
[ 161.124676] Code: 0f 87 da 30 dd 00 83 e3 01 b8 00 00 00 05 75 d7 44 89 ee 48 c7 c7 c0 57 24 98 89 44 24 04 c6
05 ce 2b 61 03 01 e8 99 20 d8 00 <0f> 0b 8b 44 24 04 eb b5 4c 89 e6 48 c7 c7 a0 6d a4 99 e8 cc 15 33
[ 161.127797] RSP: 0018:ffffc90000e2f9c0 EFLAGS: 00010286
[ 161.128794] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000
[ 161.130089] RDX: 1ffff1103ee16f6d RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: fffff520001c5f2a
[ 161.131379] RBP: 0000000000000022 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffff8881f70c1827
[ 161.132664] R10: ffffed103ee18304 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 0000000000000021
[ 161.133949] R13: 00000000ffffffb6 R14: ffff8881317c0000 R15: ffffc90000e2fbd8
[ 161.135244] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8881f7080000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 161.136695] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 161.137761] CR2: 00007fcaad70b348 CR3: 0000000144256006 CR4: 0000000000770ee0
[ 161.139041] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[ 161.140291] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[ 161.141519] PKRU: 55555554
[ 161.142076] Call Trace:
[ 161.142575] ? __warn+0x9b/0x140
[ 161.143229] ? nfserrno+0x9d/0xd0
[ 161.143872] ? report_bug+0x125/0x150
[ 161.144595] ? handle_bug+0x41/0x90
[ 161.145284] ? exc_invalid_op+0x14/0x70
[ 161.146009] ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x12/0x20
[ 161.146816] ? nfserrno+0x9d/0xd0
[ 161.147487] nfsd_buffered_readdir+0x28b/0x2b0
[ 161.148333] ? nfsd4_encode_dirent_fattr+0x380/0x380
[ 161.149258] ? nfsd_buffered_filldir+0xf0/0xf0
[ 161.150093] ? wait_for_concurrent_writes+0x170/0x170
[ 161.151004] ? generic_file_llseek_size+0x48/0x160
[ 161.151895] nfsd_readdir+0x132/0x190
[ 161.152606] ? nfsd4_encode_dirent_fattr+0x380/0x380
[ 161.153516] ? nfsd_unlink+0x380/0x380
[ 161.154256] ? override_creds+0x45/0x60
[ 161.155006] nfsd4_encode_readdir+0x21a/0x3d0
[ 161.155850] ? nfsd4_encode_readlink+0x210/0x210
[ 161.156731] ? write_bytes_to_xdr_buf+0x97/0xe0
[ 161.157598] ? __write_bytes_to_xdr_buf+0xd0/0xd0
[ 161.158494] ? lock_downgrade+0x90/0x90
[ 161.159232] ? nfs4svc_decode_voidarg+0x10/0x10
[ 161.160092] nfsd4_encode_operation+0x15a/0x440
[ 161.160959] nfsd4_proc_compound+0x718/0xe90
[ 161.161818] nfsd_dispatch+0x18e/0x2c0
[ 161.162586] svc_process_common+0x786/0xc50
[ 161.163403] ? nfsd_svc+0x380/0x380
[ 161.164137] ? svc_printk+0x160/0x160
[ 161.164846] ? svc_xprt_do_enqueue.part.0+0x365/0x380
[ 161.165808] ? nfsd_svc+0x380/0x380
[ 161.166523] ? rcu_is_watching+0x23/0x40
[ 161.167309] svc_process+0x1a5/0x200
[ 161.168019] nfsd+0x1f5/0x380
[ 161.168663] ? nfsd_shutdown_threads+0x260/0x260
[ 161.169554] kthread+0x1c4/0x210
[ 161.170224] ? kthread_insert_work_sanity_check+0x80/0x80
[ 161.171246] ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
i3c: master: svc: Fix use after free vulnerability in svc_i3c_master Driver Due to Race Condition
In the svc_i3c_master_probe function, &master->hj_work is bound with
svc_i3c_master_hj_work, &master->ibi_work is bound with
svc_i3c_master_ibi_work. And svc_i3c_master_ibi_work can start the
hj_work, svc_i3c_master_irq_handler can start the ibi_work.
If we remove the module which will call svc_i3c_master_remove to
make cleanup, it will free master->base through i3c_master_unregister
while the work mentioned above will be used. The sequence of operations
that may lead to a UAF bug is as follows:
CPU0 CPU1
| svc_i3c_master_hj_work
svc_i3c_master_remove |
i3c_master_unregister(&master->base)|
device_unregister(&master->dev) |
device_release |
//free master->base |
| i3c_master_do_daa(&master->base)
| //use master->base
Fix it by ensuring that the work is canceled before proceeding with the
cleanup in svc_i3c_master_remove. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
btrfs: wait for fixup workers before stopping cleaner kthread during umount
During unmount, at close_ctree(), we have the following steps in this order:
1) Park the cleaner kthread - this doesn't destroy the kthread, it basically
halts its execution (wake ups against it work but do nothing);
2) We stop the cleaner kthread - this results in freeing the respective
struct task_struct;
3) We call btrfs_stop_all_workers() which waits for any jobs running in all
the work queues and then free the work queues.
Syzbot reported a case where a fixup worker resulted in a crash when doing
a delayed iput on its inode while attempting to wake up the cleaner at
btrfs_add_delayed_iput(), because the task_struct of the cleaner kthread
was already freed. This can happen during unmount because we don't wait
for any fixup workers still running before we call kthread_stop() against
the cleaner kthread, which stops and free all its resources.
Fix this by waiting for any fixup workers at close_ctree() before we call
kthread_stop() against the cleaner and run pending delayed iputs.
The stack traces reported by syzbot were the following:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __lock_acquire+0x77/0x2050 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5065
Read of size 8 at addr ffff8880272a8a18 by task kworker/u8:3/52
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 52 Comm: kworker/u8:3 Not tainted 6.12.0-rc1-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 09/13/2024
Workqueue: btrfs-fixup btrfs_work_helper
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:94 [inline]
dump_stack_lvl+0x241/0x360 lib/dump_stack.c:120
print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:377 [inline]
print_report+0x169/0x550 mm/kasan/report.c:488
kasan_report+0x143/0x180 mm/kasan/report.c:601
__lock_acquire+0x77/0x2050 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5065
lock_acquire+0x1ed/0x550 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5825
__raw_spin_lock_irqsave include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:110 [inline]
_raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0xd5/0x120 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:162
class_raw_spinlock_irqsave_constructor include/linux/spinlock.h:551 [inline]
try_to_wake_up+0xb0/0x1480 kernel/sched/core.c:4154
btrfs_writepage_fixup_worker+0xc16/0xdf0 fs/btrfs/inode.c:2842
btrfs_work_helper+0x390/0xc50 fs/btrfs/async-thread.c:314
process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3229 [inline]
process_scheduled_works+0xa63/0x1850 kernel/workqueue.c:3310
worker_thread+0x870/0xd30 kernel/workqueue.c:3391
kthread+0x2f0/0x390 kernel/kthread.c:389
ret_from_fork+0x4b/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:244
</TASK>
Allocated by task 2:
kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:47 [inline]
kasan_save_track+0x3f/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:68
unpoison_slab_object mm/kasan/common.c:319 [inline]
__kasan_slab_alloc+0x66/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:345
kasan_slab_alloc include/linux/kasan.h:247 [inline]
slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slub.c:4086 [inline]
slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:4135 [inline]
kmem_cache_alloc_node_noprof+0x16b/0x320 mm/slub.c:4187
alloc_task_struct_node kernel/fork.c:180 [inline]
dup_task_struct+0x57/0x8c0 kernel/fork.c:1107
copy_process+0x5d1/0x3d50 kernel/fork.c:2206
kernel_clone+0x223/0x880 kernel/fork.c:2787
kernel_thread+0x1bc/0x240 kernel/fork.c:2849
create_kthread kernel/kthread.c:412 [inline]
kthreadd+0x60d/0x810 kernel/kthread.c:765
ret_from_fork+0x4b/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:244
Freed by task 61:
kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:47 [inline]
kasan_save_track+0x3f/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:68
kasan_save_free_info+0x40/0x50 mm/kasan/generic.c:579
poison_slab_object mm/kasan/common.c:247 [inline]
__kasan_slab_free+0x59/0x70 mm/kasan/common.c:264
kasan_slab_free include/linux/kasan.h:230 [inline]
slab_free_h
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tracing/timerlat: Fix a race during cpuhp processing
There is another found exception that the "timerlat/1" thread was
scheduled on CPU0, and lead to timer corruption finally:
```
ODEBUG: init active (active state 0) object: ffff888237c2e108 object type: hrtimer hint: timerlat_irq+0x0/0x220
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 426 at lib/debugobjects.c:518 debug_print_object+0x7d/0xb0
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 426 Comm: timerlat/1 Not tainted 6.11.0-rc7+ #45
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.13.0-1ubuntu1.1 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:debug_print_object+0x7d/0xb0
...
Call Trace:
<TASK>
? __warn+0x7c/0x110
? debug_print_object+0x7d/0xb0
? report_bug+0xf1/0x1d0
? prb_read_valid+0x17/0x20
? handle_bug+0x3f/0x70
? exc_invalid_op+0x13/0x60
? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x16/0x20
? debug_print_object+0x7d/0xb0
? debug_print_object+0x7d/0xb0
? __pfx_timerlat_irq+0x10/0x10
__debug_object_init+0x110/0x150
hrtimer_init+0x1d/0x60
timerlat_main+0xab/0x2d0
? __pfx_timerlat_main+0x10/0x10
kthread+0xb7/0xe0
? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
ret_from_fork+0x2d/0x40
? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
</TASK>
```
After tracing the scheduling event, it was discovered that the migration
of the "timerlat/1" thread was performed during thread creation. Further
analysis confirmed that it is because the CPU online processing for
osnoise is implemented through workers, which is asynchronous with the
offline processing. When the worker was scheduled to create a thread, the
CPU may has already been removed from the cpu_online_mask during the offline
process, resulting in the inability to select the right CPU:
T1 | T2
[CPUHP_ONLINE] | cpu_device_down()
osnoise_hotplug_workfn() |
| cpus_write_lock()
| takedown_cpu(1)
| cpus_write_unlock()
[CPUHP_OFFLINE] |
cpus_read_lock() |
start_kthread(1) |
cpus_read_unlock() |
To fix this, skip online processing if the CPU is already offline. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
rxrpc: Fix a race between socket set up and I/O thread creation
In rxrpc_open_socket(), it sets up the socket and then sets up the I/O
thread that will handle it. This is a problem, however, as there's a gap
between the two phases in which a packet may come into rxrpc_encap_rcv()
from the UDP packet but we oops when trying to wake the not-yet created I/O
thread.
As a quick fix, just make rxrpc_encap_rcv() discard the packet if there's
no I/O thread yet.
A better, but more intrusive fix would perhaps be to rearrange things such
that the socket creation is done by the I/O thread. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Fix helper writes to read-only maps
Lonial found an issue that despite user- and BPF-side frozen BPF map
(like in case of .rodata), it was still possible to write into it from
a BPF program side through specific helpers having ARG_PTR_TO_{LONG,INT}
as arguments.
In check_func_arg() when the argument is as mentioned, the meta->raw_mode
is never set. Later, check_helper_mem_access(), under the case of
PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE as register base type, it assumes BPF_READ for the
subsequent call to check_map_access_type() and given the BPF map is
read-only it succeeds.
The helpers really need to be annotated as ARG_PTR_TO_{LONG,INT} | MEM_UNINIT
when results are written into them as opposed to read out of them. The
latter indicates that it's okay to pass a pointer to uninitialized memory
as the memory is written to anyway.
However, ARG_PTR_TO_{LONG,INT} is a special case of ARG_PTR_TO_FIXED_SIZE_MEM
just with additional alignment requirement. So it is better to just get
rid of the ARG_PTR_TO_{LONG,INT} special cases altogether and reuse the
fixed size memory types. For this, add MEM_ALIGNED to additionally ensure
alignment given these helpers write directly into the args via *<ptr> = val.
The .arg*_size has been initialized reflecting the actual sizeof(*<ptr>).
MEM_ALIGNED can only be used in combination with MEM_FIXED_SIZE annotated
argument types, since in !MEM_FIXED_SIZE cases the verifier does not know
the buffer size a priori and therefore cannot blindly write *<ptr> = val. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ACPI: sysfs: validate return type of _STR method
Only buffer objects are valid return values of _STR.
If something else is returned description_show() will access invalid
memory. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
f2fs: fix to check atomic_file in f2fs ioctl interfaces
Some f2fs ioctl interfaces like f2fs_ioc_set_pin_file(),
f2fs_move_file_range(), and f2fs_defragment_range() missed to
check atomic_write status, which may cause potential race issue,
fix it. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: iwlwifi: mvm: set the cipher for secured NDP ranging
The cipher pointer is not set, but is derefereced trying to set its
content, which leads to a NULL pointer dereference.
Fix it by pointing to the cipher parameter before dereferencing. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nbd: fix race between timeout and normal completion
If request timetout is handled by nbd_requeue_cmd(), normal completion
has to be stopped for avoiding to complete this requeued request, other
use-after-free can be triggered.
Fix the race by clearing NBD_CMD_INFLIGHT in nbd_requeue_cmd(), meantime
make sure that cmd->lock is grabbed for clearing the flag and the
requeue. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
sched/fair: Fix NEXT_BUDDY
Adam reports that enabling NEXT_BUDDY insta triggers a WARN in
pick_next_entity().
Moving clear_buddies() up before the delayed dequeue bits ensures
no ->next buddy becomes delayed. Further ensure no new ->next buddy
ever starts as delayed. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/smc: check iparea_offset and ipv6_prefixes_cnt when receiving proposal msg
When receiving proposal msg in server, the field iparea_offset
and the field ipv6_prefixes_cnt in proposal msg are from the
remote client and can not be fully trusted. Especially the
field iparea_offset, once exceed the max value, there has the
chance to access wrong address, and crash may happen.
This patch checks iparea_offset and ipv6_prefixes_cnt before using them. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nvme-rdma: unquiesce admin_q before destroy it
Kernel will hang on destroy admin_q while we create ctrl failed, such
as following calltrace:
PID: 23644 TASK: ff2d52b40f439fc0 CPU: 2 COMMAND: "nvme"
#0 [ff61d23de260fb78] __schedule at ffffffff8323bc15
#1 [ff61d23de260fc08] schedule at ffffffff8323c014
#2 [ff61d23de260fc28] blk_mq_freeze_queue_wait at ffffffff82a3dba1
#3 [ff61d23de260fc78] blk_freeze_queue at ffffffff82a4113a
#4 [ff61d23de260fc90] blk_cleanup_queue at ffffffff82a33006
#5 [ff61d23de260fcb0] nvme_rdma_destroy_admin_queue at ffffffffc12686ce
#6 [ff61d23de260fcc8] nvme_rdma_setup_ctrl at ffffffffc1268ced
#7 [ff61d23de260fd28] nvme_rdma_create_ctrl at ffffffffc126919b
#8 [ff61d23de260fd68] nvmf_dev_write at ffffffffc024f362
#9 [ff61d23de260fe38] vfs_write at ffffffff827d5f25
RIP: 00007fda7891d574 RSP: 00007ffe2ef06958 RFLAGS: 00000202
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000055e8122a4d90 RCX: 00007fda7891d574
RDX: 000000000000012b RSI: 000055e8122a4d90 RDI: 0000000000000004
RBP: 00007ffe2ef079c0 R8: 000000000000012b R9: 000055e8122a4d90
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 0000000000000004
R13: 000055e8122923c0 R14: 000000000000012b R15: 00007fda78a54500
ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001 CS: 0033 SS: 002b
This due to we have quiesced admi_q before cancel requests, but forgot
to unquiesce before destroy it, as a result we fail to drain the
pending requests, and hang on blk_mq_freeze_queue_wait() forever. Here
try to reuse nvme_rdma_teardown_admin_queue() to fix this issue and
simplify the code. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/smc: check v2_ext_offset/eid_cnt/ism_gid_cnt when receiving proposal msg
When receiving proposal msg in server, the fields v2_ext_offset/
eid_cnt/ism_gid_cnt in proposal msg are from the remote client
and can not be fully trusted. Especially the field v2_ext_offset,
once exceed the max value, there has the chance to access wrong
address, and crash may happen.
This patch checks the fields v2_ext_offset/eid_cnt/ism_gid_cnt
before using them. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Prevent tailcall infinite loop caused by freplace
There is a potential infinite loop issue that can occur when using a
combination of tail calls and freplace.
In an upcoming selftest, the attach target for entry_freplace of
tailcall_freplace.c is subprog_tc of tc_bpf2bpf.c, while the tail call in
entry_freplace leads to entry_tc. This results in an infinite loop:
entry_tc -> subprog_tc -> entry_freplace --tailcall-> entry_tc.
The problem arises because the tail_call_cnt in entry_freplace resets to
zero each time entry_freplace is executed, causing the tail call mechanism
to never terminate, eventually leading to a kernel panic.
To fix this issue, the solution is twofold:
1. Prevent updating a program extended by an freplace program to a
prog_array map.
2. Prevent extending a program that is already part of a prog_array map
with an freplace program.
This ensures that:
* If a program or its subprogram has been extended by an freplace program,
it can no longer be updated to a prog_array map.
* If a program has been added to a prog_array map, neither it nor its
subprograms can be extended by an freplace program.
Moreover, an extension program should not be tailcalled. As such, return
-EINVAL if the program has a type of BPF_PROG_TYPE_EXT when adding it to a
prog_array map.
Additionally, fix a minor code style issue by replacing eight spaces with a
tab for proper formatting. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/cxgb4: Added NULL check for lookup_atid
The lookup_atid() function can return NULL if the ATID is
invalid or does not exist in the identifier table, which
could lead to dereferencing a null pointer without a
check in the `act_establish()` and `act_open_rpl()` functions.
Add a NULL check to prevent null pointer dereferencing.
Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with SVACE. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: seeq: Fix use after free vulnerability in ether3 Driver Due to Race Condition
In the ether3_probe function, a timer is initialized with a callback
function ether3_ledoff, bound to &prev(dev)->timer. Once the timer is
started, there is a risk of a race condition if the module or device
is removed, triggering the ether3_remove function to perform cleanup.
The sequence of operations that may lead to a UAF bug is as follows:
CPU0 CPU1
| ether3_ledoff
ether3_remove |
free_netdev(dev); |
put_devic |
kfree(dev); |
| ether3_outw(priv(dev)->regs.config2 |= CFG2_CTRLO, REG_CONFIG2);
| // use dev
Fix it by ensuring that the timer is canceled before proceeding with
the cleanup in ether3_remove. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
btrfs: fix race setting file private on concurrent lseek using same fd
When doing concurrent lseek(2) system calls against the same file
descriptor, using multiple threads belonging to the same process, we have
a short time window where a race happens and can result in a memory leak.
The race happens like this:
1) A program opens a file descriptor for a file and then spawns two
threads (with the pthreads library for example), lets call them
task A and task B;
2) Task A calls lseek with SEEK_DATA or SEEK_HOLE and ends up at
file.c:find_desired_extent() while holding a read lock on the inode;
3) At the start of find_desired_extent(), it extracts the file's
private_data pointer into a local variable named 'private', which has
a value of NULL;
4) Task B also calls lseek with SEEK_DATA or SEEK_HOLE, locks the inode
in shared mode and enters file.c:find_desired_extent(), where it also
extracts file->private_data into its local variable 'private', which
has a NULL value;
5) Because it saw a NULL file private, task A allocates a private
structure and assigns to the file structure;
6) Task B also saw a NULL file private so it also allocates its own file
private and then assigns it to the same file structure, since both
tasks are using the same file descriptor.
At this point we leak the private structure allocated by task A.
Besides the memory leak, there's also the detail that both tasks end up
using the same cached state record in the private structure (struct
btrfs_file_private::llseek_cached_state), which can result in a
use-after-free problem since one task can free it while the other is
still using it (only one task took a reference count on it). Also, sharing
the cached state is not a good idea since it could result in incorrect
results in the future - right now it should not be a problem because it
end ups being used only in extent-io-tree.c:count_range_bits() where we do
range validation before using the cached state.
Fix this by protecting the private assignment and check of a file while
holding the inode's spinlock and keep track of the task that allocated
the private, so that it's used only by that task in order to prevent
user-after-free issues with the cached state record as well as potentially
using it incorrectly in the future. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
f2fs: Require FMODE_WRITE for atomic write ioctls
The F2FS ioctls for starting and committing atomic writes check for
inode_owner_or_capable(), but this does not give LSMs like SELinux or
Landlock an opportunity to deny the write access - if the caller's FSUID
matches the inode's UID, inode_owner_or_capable() immediately returns true.
There are scenarios where LSMs want to deny a process the ability to write
particular files, even files that the FSUID of the process owns; but this
can currently partially be bypassed using atomic write ioctls in two ways:
- F2FS_IOC_START_ATOMIC_REPLACE + F2FS_IOC_COMMIT_ATOMIC_WRITE can
truncate an inode to size 0
- F2FS_IOC_START_ATOMIC_WRITE + F2FS_IOC_ABORT_ATOMIC_WRITE can revert
changes another process concurrently made to a file
Fix it by requiring FMODE_WRITE for these operations, just like for
F2FS_IOC_MOVE_RANGE. Since any legitimate caller should only be using these
ioctls when intending to write into the file, that seems unlikely to break
anything. |
