| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| NLTK versions before 3.10.0 default to ENFORCE=False in pathsec.py, causing all security validation functions to emit warnings instead of raising exceptions. Attackers can bypass path traversal and pickle deserialization protections by exploiting the disabled security controls that are only active when manually enabled. |
| SpringBlade versions from 2.7.3 up to but not including 5.0.0 contain a privilege escalation vulnerability that allows authenticated attackers to create system administrator accounts by sending crafted POST requests to an unprotected internal Feign user-creation endpoint exposed via @RestController without authorization checks. Attackers can exploit the gateway's authentication filter, which only validates JWT parsing without verifying user roles or caller identity, and leverage a hardcoded JWT signing key embedded in publicly available JARs to forge tokens and escalate privileges from a low-privilege user to administrator, enabling cross-tenant data pollution and persistent backdoor access. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: hci_sync: hold conn in hci_connect_acl/le_sync() callbacks
There is theoretical UAF if the conn is freed while the hci_sync task
is running.
Hold refcount to avoid that. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/vmwgfx: fix guest_memory_dirty bitfield clobbered as size
Two sites in vmwgfx_resource.c assign boolean literals to
res->guest_memory_size, which is an unsigned long allocation-size
field; the intended target is the adjacent res->guest_memory_dirty
bitfield. After the assignments the field holds 0 or 1 instead of
the resource's MOB allocation size:
- vmw_resource_release() writes 0 (false), and
- vmw_resource_unbind_list() writes 1 (true).
Subsequent revalidation paths read guest_memory_size when computing
the dirty page range (vmw_bo_dirty_transfer_to_res()) and the buffer
allocation size (vmw_resource_buf_alloc()), producing zero-length
walks or wrap-around ranges that read or write past the MOB bitmap.
The dirty-tracking intent of the original code (mark the resource as
dirtied since the last sync) is also lost, since guest_memory_dirty
is never updated.
Rename both assignments to guest_memory_dirty. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
can: j1939: transport: j1939_session_fresh_new(): initialize receive buffer
Zero the allocated buffer in j1939_session_fresh_new() to ensure it
contains no residual data.
While there is a potential performance impact if users allocate maximum
sized ETP buffers, most real-world use cases are not noticeably affected
since the maximum known buffer size is typically around 65K.
[mkl: add Message-ID] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
batman-adv: dat: ensure accessible eth_hdr proto field
When batadv_get_vid() accesses the proto field of the ethernet header, it
is not checking if the data itself is accessible. The caller is responsible
for it. But in contrast to other call sites, batadv_dat_get_vid() and its
caller didn't make sure this is true. This could have caused an
out-of-bounds access. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: nf_conntrack_irc: fix parse_dcc() off-by-one OOB read
parse_dcc() treats data_end as an inclusive end pointer, but its only
caller passes data_limit = ib_ptr + datalen, which points one past the
last valid byte.
The newline search loop iterates while tmp <= data_end, so when no
newline is present, *tmp is read at tmp == data_end, one byte beyond
the region filled by skb_header_pointer().
irc_buffer is kmalloc'd as MAX_SEARCH_SIZE + 1 bytes and datalen is
capped at MAX_SEARCH_SIZE, so the stray read does not fault. The byte
is uninitialized or stale; if it contains an ASCII digit, simple_strtoul
will consume it and produce a wrong DCC IP or port in the conntrack
expectation. The extra allocation byte is also a fragile guard: if the
cap or allocation size changes, this becomes a real out-of-bounds read.
Change the loop and its post-loop check to use strict less-than,
consistent with the caller's exclusive-end convention. Update the
function comment accordingly. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
accel/amdxdna: Fix iommu domain lifetime race during device removal
When force_iova mode is enabled, amdxdna_remove() frees xdna->domain. If
amdxdna_gem_obj_free() is called after device removal, it may attempt to
access xdna->domain, resulting in a use-after-free.
Fix the race by adding freeing xdna->domain as a managed release action,
so its lifetime is managed by DRM and remains valid until all managed
resources are released. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: lwtunnel: Drop skb metadata before LWT encapsulation
skb metadata is meant for passing information between XDP and TC. It lives
in the skb headroom, immediately before skb->data. LWT programs cannot
access the __sk_buff->data_meta pseudo-pointer to metadata.
However, LWT encapsulation prepends outer headers, moving skb->data back
over the headroom where the metadata sits. On an RX-originated (forwarded)
packet that still carries XDP metadata this goes wrong in two different
ways, depending on the encap type:
1. Non-BPF LWT encaps (mpls, seg6, ioam6 ...) call skb_push()/skb_pull()
and silently overwrite the metadata that sits in the headroom.
2) BPF LWT xmit calls bpf_skb_change_head(), which uses skb_data_move().
That helper expects metadata immediately before skb->data. But since
the IP output path runs LWT xmit before neighbour output has built
the outgoing L2 header, for forwarded packets skb->data points at the
L3 header while skb_mac_header() still points at the old L2 header.
skb_data_move() sees metadata ending at skb_mac_header(), not before
skb->data, warns and clears metadata:
WARNING: CPU: 21 PID: 454557 at include/linux/skbuff.h:4609 skb_data_move+0x47/0x90
CPU: 21 UID: 0 PID: 454557 Comm: napi/iconduit-g Tainted: G O 6.18.21 #1
RIP: 0010:skb_data_move+0x47/0x90
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
bpf_skb_change_head+0xe6/0x1a0
bpf_prog_...+0x213/0x2e3
run_lwt_bpf.isra.0+0x1d3/0x360
bpf_xmit+0x46/0xe0
lwtunnel_xmit+0xa1/0xf0
ip_finish_output2+0x1e7/0x5e0
ip_output+0x63/0x100
__netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x85/0xa0
process_backlog+0x9c/0x150
__napi_poll+0x2b/0x190
net_rx_action+0x40b/0x7f0
handle_softirqs+0xd2/0x270
do_softirq+0x3f/0x60
</IRQ>
That is what happens, as for how to fix it - a received packet that
carries metadata can reach an encap through any of the three LWT
redirect modes:
LWTUNNEL_STATE_INPUT_REDIRECT
ip6_rcv_finish
dst_input
lwtunnel_input
LWTUNNEL_STATE_OUTPUT_REDIRECT
ip6_rcv_finish
dst_input
ip6_forward
ip6_forward_finish
dst_output
lwtunnel_output
LWTUNNEL_STATE_XMIT_REDIRECT
ip6_rcv_finish
dst_input
ip6_forward
ip6_forward_finish
dst_output
ip6_output
ip6_finish_output
ip6_finish_output2
lwtunnel_xmit
Every encap funnels through the three LWT dispatch helpers, so drop the
metadata there, right before handing the skb to the encap op. This
single chokepoint covers all encap types and all three redirect modes:
- lwtunnel_input(): seg6, rpl, ila, seg6_local
- lwtunnel_output(): ioam6
- lwtunnel_xmit(): mpls, LWT BPF xmit
Alternatively, we could clear the metadata right after TC ingress hook.
That would require a compromise, however. Metadata would become
inaccessible from TC egress (in setups where it actually reaches the
hook it tact, that is without any L2 tunnels on path). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
veth: fix NAPI leak in XDP enable error path
During XDP enablement in veth, if xdp_rxq_info_reg() or
xdp_rxq_info_reg_mem_model() fails, the driver rolls back the changes.
However, the rollback loop:
for (i--; i >= start; i--) {
decrements the loop index 'i' before the first iteration. This
correctly skips unregistering the rxq for the failed index 'i' (as
registration failed or was already cleaned up), but it also
erroneously skips calling netif_napi_deli() for rq[i].xdp_napi.
Since netif_napi_add() was already called for index 'i', this leaves
a dangling napi_struct in the device's napi_list. When the veth
device is later destroyed, the freed queue memory (which contains the
leaked NAPI structure) can be reused.
The subsequent device teardown iterates the NAPI list and
corrupts the reallocated memory, leading to UAF.
Fix this by explicitly deleting the NAPI association for the failed
index 'i' before rolling back the successfully configured queues. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: emac: Fix NULL pointer dereference in emac_probe
Move devm_request_irq() after devm_platform_ioremap_resource() so that
dev->emacp is mapped before the interrupt handler can fire. An early
interrupt hitting emac_irq() would dereference the NULL dev->emacp and
crash.
Also remove redundant error message. devm_platform_ioremap_resource()
already returns an error message with dev_err_probe(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: s390: pci: Fix NULL dereference on AIBV allocation failure
The airq_iv_create() can return NULL on failure, but the return value was
never checked. If it fails, zdev->aibv will be NULL and fail when
dereferenced in kvm_zpci_set_airq(). Add a NULL check and free the
previously allocated AISB bit and zdev->aisb on failure. |
| A security vulnerability has been detected in macrozheng mall up to 1.0.3. This impacts an unknown function of the file /order/submit of the component Order Submission. The manipulation leads to race condition. It is possible to initiate the attack remotely. The attack is considered to have high complexity. The exploitability is said to be difficult. The vendor deleted the GitHub issue for this vulnerability without and explanation. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
idpf: bound interrupt-vector register fill to the allocated array
idpf_get_reg_intr_vecs() fills the caller-allocated reg_vals[] array from
the VIRTCHNL2_OP_ALLOC_VECTORS reply in adapter->req_vec_chunks, bounding
its inner loop only by the per-chunk num_vectors. The array is sized
separately: idpf_intr_reg_init() allocates
kzalloc_objs(struct idpf_vec_regs, total_vecs) from
caps.num_allocated_vectors and only checks the returned count after the
fill. The sum of per-chunk num_vectors is never reconciled against
total_vecs, so a reply with a small num_allocated_vectors but chunks
summing higher writes past the end of reg_vals[].
Impact: a control plane (a PF or hypervisor device model) that returns a
VIRTCHNL2_OP_ALLOC_VECTORS reply whose per-chunk num_vectors sum exceeds
num_allocated_vectors writes struct idpf_vec_regs entries past the end of
the reg_vals kmalloc allocation (KASAN slab-out-of-bounds write).
Bound the fill loop to the array capacity passed in by the callers,
mirroring the sibling idpf_vport_get_q_reg(). The existing
num_regs < num_vecs check then rejects an undersized reply without the
out-of-bounds write happening first. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
can: softing: fw_parse(): validate firmware record spans
fw_parse() reads a fixed record header, a firmware-provided payload,
and a trailing checksum without knowing the end of the firmware blob. A
truncated record can therefore make those reads exceed the blob.
The same record also supplies addresses and lengths for writes into
DPRAM. The generic loader uses wrap-prone mixed signed arithmetic for its
bounds check, while the application loader does not bound the staging
copy at all.
Pass the firmware end to the parser and validate the full source record.
Use a signed wide offset for generic DPRAM records and validate the
application staging span against the mapped DPRAM before copying. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
spi: spi-qpic-snand: write the feature value before executing SET_FEATURE
qcom_spi_send_cmdaddr() programs NAND_FLASH_CMD/NAND_EXEC_CMD and submits
the descriptors, which makes the controller execute the command
immediately. For SPINAND_SET_FEATURE the value to be written is only
placed into NAND_FLASH_FEATURES afterwards, by qcom_spi_io_op(), in a
second submission - so the chip is programmed with whatever that register
happened to hold from a previous operation, and the intended value is only
applied by the *next* SET_FEATURE.
Measured on a TP-Link Archer AX55 v1 (IPQ5018, ESMT F50L1G41LB): writing
0x40 to the configuration register (0xb0) leaves the chip at 0x00, and the
subsequent write of 0x00 leaves it at 0x40 - every write lands one
operation late.
This stayed unnoticed until v6.18 added SPI-NAND OTP support together
with OTP entries for ESMT chips. spinand_otp_rw() enables OTP mode,
reads, and disables it again, and mtd_otp_nvmem_add() does this during
MTD registration. With the off-by-one, the "disable" write actually
applies the previously requested value, so CFG_OTP_ENABLE ends up set:
the chip stays in OTP mode, every subsequent array read returns the OTP
area instead of the array (UBI reports an empty device) and all writes
fail with -EIO because the OTP area is write protected. On this board
that makes the whole flash unusable and the device unbootable.
Write the feature value into NAND_FLASH_FEATURES as part of the same
transaction, before NAND_EXEC_CMD. While at it, copy only the bytes the
operation actually carries - the previous code dereferenced a 4-byte
pointer on a one-byte buffer (spinand->scratchbuf).
With this patch the flash contents read back bit-identical to a
known-good dump of the same board taken under the vendor firmware
(md5-verified across partitions), and writes work. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
qede: fix out-of-bounds check for cqe->len_list[]
Move index check before element access. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
char: tlclk: fix use-after-free in tlclk_cleanup()
This patch improves the module cleanup process in the tlclk driver to
prevent potential use-after-free and race conditions.
Currently, the file_operations structure does not specify the .owner
field, which could allow the module to be unloaded while user-space
processes are still interacting with the device. Additionally, the
tlclk_cleanup() function frees the alarm_events memory before ensuring
that blocked processes in the waitqueue are fully awakened and that the
switchover_timer has completed.
To address these cases, this patch:
- Sets '.owner = THIS_MODULE' in tlclk_fops to safely defer module
unloading while the device is in use.
- Updates tlclk_cleanup() to explicitly wake up all blocked readers
(wake_up_all), properly release hardware I/O regions, and safely
delete the timer (timer_delete_sync) prior to freeing memory. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipv6: guard against possible NULL deref in __in6_dev_stats_get()
dev_get_by_index_rcu() could return NULL if the original physical
device is unregistered.
Found by Sashiko. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
hfsplus: Add a sanity check for btree node size
Syzbot reported an uninit-value bug in [1] with a corrupted HFS+ image,
during the file system mounting process, specifically while loading the
catalog, a corrupted node_size value of 1 caused the rec_off argument
passed to hfs_bnode_read_u16() (within hfs_bnode_find()) to be excessively
large. Consequently, the function failed to return a valid value to
initialize the off variable, triggering the bug [1].
Every node starts from BTree node descriptor: struct hfs_bnode_desc.
So, the size of node cannot be lesser than that. However, technical
specification declares that: "The node size (which is expressed in bytes)
must be power of two, from 512 through 32,768, inclusive." Add a check
for btree node size base on technical specification.
[1]
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in hfsplus_bnode_find+0x141c/0x1600 fs/hfsplus/bnode.c:584
hfsplus_bnode_find+0x141c/0x1600 fs/hfsplus/bnode.c:584
hfsplus_btree_open+0x169a/0x1e40 fs/hfsplus/btree.c:382
hfsplus_fill_super+0x111f/0x2770 fs/hfsplus/super.c:553
get_tree_bdev_flags+0x6e6/0x920 fs/super.c:1694
get_tree_bdev+0x38/0x50 fs/super.c:1717
hfsplus_get_tree+0x35/0x40 fs/hfsplus/super.c:709
vfs_get_tree+0xb3/0x5d0 fs/super.c:1754
fc_mount fs/namespace.c:1193 [inline] |
