| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: spacemit: clear TX descriptor on fragment mapping failure
emac_tx_mem_map() writes TX_DESC_0_OWN into the ring descriptor for
every slot beyond old_head as soon as that slot's memset()'d local
copy is committed with "*tx_desc_addr = tx_desc", i.e. before the
buffers for that slot have necessarily all been mapped successfully.
If emac_tx_map_frag() then fails on a later fragment, the err_free_skb
path calls emac_free_tx_buf() to unmap and drop the skb, but leaves
the already-written descriptor memory untouched, and tx_ring->head is
never advanced past old_head (the "tx_ring->head = head" store is
skipped by the goto).
So a slot between old_head and the rolled-back head can be left with
TX_DESC_0_OWN set and buffer_addr_{1,2} pointing at DMA mappings that
emac_free_tx_buf() just tore down, while software considers that slot
free again. The next successful emac_tx_mem_map() call only rebuilds
old_head itself; if the DMA engine auto-advances into the following
descriptor once it finishes old_head's packet, it will fetch that
stale, already-unmapped address.
emac_tx_clean_desc() already treats emac_free_tx_buf() and clearing
the descriptor as a pair when reclaiming completed descriptors; do
the same in the mapping failure path. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: mac80211: reject invalid 320 MHz CSA bandwidth
The HT/VHT channel definition validator can receive a 320 MHz
bandwidth indication from a received CSA frame on a non-6 GHz link.
It warns for this unsupported width but continues with an uninitialized
vht_operation.chan_width, which is then read by
ieee80211_chandef_vht_oper(). With panic_on_warn enabled, this lets a
received frame panic the kernel.
Reject the channel definition before entering the VHT operation
conversion. This preserves the existing CSA fallback while avoiding
both the warning and the uninitialized read. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: restrict SO_RESERVE_MEM to TCP sockets and cap max value
Commit 2bb2f5fb21b0 ("net: add new socket option SO_RESERVE_MEM") and
commit d00c8ee31729 ("net: fix possible NULL deref in sock_reserve_memory")
only checked sk_has_account(sk), which is true for both TCP and UDP
sockets.
However, SO_RESERVE_MEM and sk_unused_reserved_mem() are currently only
supported by TCP:
- On UDP sockets, sk->sk_forward_alloc is protected by
sk->sk_receive_queue.lock, whereas sock_reserve_memory() and
sock_release_reserved_memory() only acquire lock_sock(sk). Concurrent
UDP packet reception/release and setsockopt(SO_RESERVE_MEM) corrupt
sk_forward_alloc and memcg accounting.
- udp_rmem_release() reclaims excess sk_forward_alloc without
accounting for sk_unused_reserved_mem(sk).
Restrict sock_reserve_memory() to TCP sockets (sk_is_tcp(sk)) for now.
Supporting SO_RESERVE_MEM for UDP (acquiring sk_receive_queue.lock and
honoring sk_unused_reserved_mem() in udp_rmem_release()) can be done in
a future net-next series if needed.
In addition, reject val > SZ_1G with -EINVAL in
sk_setsockopt(SO_RESERVE_MEM). Without an upper bound, values near
INT_MAX cause sk_mem_pages(delta) and (pages << PAGE_SHIFT) to overflow
32-bit signed int, corrupting sk->sk_forward_alloc and
sk->sk_reserved_mem. Using a page-aligned cap (SZ_1G) ensures that the
page-rounded sk->sk_reserved_mem reported by getsockopt(SO_RESERVE_MEM)
can always be passed back to setsockopt(SO_RESERVE_MEM). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ip_gre: Reject enabling collect metadata through changelink
ipgre_netlink_parms() can enable collect_md on an existing GRE, GRETAP
or ERSPAN device. Unlike newlink, changelink does not enforce metadata
tunnel uniqueness. Converting a non-metadata device can therefore
replace the metadata receive entry for another device of the same type
in the same netns. Deleting either device then clears the shared entry,
breaking metadata receive lookup for the surviving device.
If parameter validation fails after collect_md is set, deleting the
modified device can also clear an entry it never owned.
Reject enabling metadata mode in both changelink callbacks before any
encapsulation or tunnel parameters are modified. Allow requests that
repeat the metadata attribute on an existing metadata device. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: skbuff: fix pull-bound underflow in skb_checksum_setup_ipv6()
skb_maybe_pull_tail() subtracts skb_headlen(skb) from the unsigned max
argument and passes the result to __pskb_pull_tail() as a signed int. The
function does not ensure that max is at least skb_headlen(skb).
This can happen while parsing IPv6 extension headers when an skb already
has a linear area larger than MAX_IPV6_HDR_LEN. Once the parser needs data
beyond the linear area, max - skb_headlen(skb) wraps and is converted to a
negative delta. __pskb_pull_tail() then passes that negative length to
skb_copy_bits(), where it can become a very large copy length.
Pass the requested length itself as the pull bound at the three
extension-header call sites, so the delta can no longer go negative. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nfc: llcp: fix slab-out-of-bounds reads when logging service names
nfc_llcp_wks_sap() and nfc_llcp_build_sdreq_tlv() pass non-null-
terminated strings to pr_debug() using the %s format specifier.
The buffers are allocated via kmemdup() or come from netlink
attributes and are not guaranteed to be null-terminated, causing
__dynamic_pr_debug() to read beyond the allocated region:
KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds Read in __dynamic_pr_debug
Fix both call sites by using %.*s with the explicit length to limit
the output to the actual length of the string. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Fix bounds check for skb-backed dynptrs
The skb_pointer_if_linear() function checks whether a
memory region of length len starting at offset off into
the skb is in the linear area, and returns a pointer to
the region if so. The check currently subtracts between
skb_headlen and offset of the check, and since skb_headlen
is unsigned the subtraction can underflow. This causes the
bounds check to spuriously pass and generate an arbitrary
pointer of the form *(skb->data + off).
The only user of this helper is currently skb-backed BPF
dynptr code. Returning the wrong pointer leads to the
dynptr erroneously being backed with invalid memory.
Ensure the subtraction cannot underflow, and fail the check if
it would. Use u64 arithmetic to also prevent overflow when
calculating (skb_headlen(skb) - off) since off is unsigned. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: RFCOMM: Reject short EA=0 frames in rfcomm_recv_frame()
While rfcomm_recv_frame() verifies that skb->len is at least
sizeof(*hdr) + 1 (4 bytes: 3-byte header + 1-byte FCS), an RFCOMM frame
with an extended 2-byte length field (!__test_ea(hdr->len)) has a 4-byte
header plus a 1-byte FCS (5 bytes minimum, sizeof(*hdr) + 2).
When a 4-byte RFCOMM frame with EA == 0 arrives:
1. The initial skb->len < sizeof(*hdr) + 1 check passes (4 < 4 is false).
2. Trimming the FCS byte decrements skb->len to 3.
3. If __check_fcs() succeeds, skb_pull(skb, 4) fails (4 > 3) and returns
NULL without advancing skb->data.
4. Because the return value of skb_pull() is ignored, the un-pulled
3-byte struct rfcomm_hdr remains at skb->data and is either queued as
application payload via rfcomm_recv_data() or parsed as a multiplexer
control command via rfcomm_recv_mcc() on DLCI 0.
Fix this by extending the length check in rfcomm_recv_frame() to also
require skb->len >= sizeof(*hdr) + 2 when !__test_ea(hdr->len). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ovpn: replace bind when clearing stale local source
The UDP output fallback clears bind->local in place when the remembered
source address is no longer usable. The bind is RCU-published and read
locklessly by concurrent TX, so an IPv6 reader can observe a torn
address.
Retry the route lookup with source address autoselection without
modifying the bind. After a successful lookup, revalidate the bind and
route key under peer->lock, reset the dst cache, and best-effort publish
a replacement bind with a wildcard local address.
Do not cache the resolved dst when clearing the local source. Replacing
the source invalidates all per-CPU cache entries, while
dst_cache_set_ip4 and dst_cache_set_ip6 update only the current CPU
slot. The current packet can still use the resolved route; if bind
allocation fails, a later cache miss retries the repair. |
| Allocation of resources without limits in the parsing components in Amazon Athena ODBC driver before 2.1.0.0 might allow a threat actor to cause a denial of service by delivering crafted input that triggers excessive resource consumption during the driver's parsing operations.
To remediate this issue, users should upgrade to version 2.1.0.0. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: nf_nat_sip: rewind offset when NAT shrinks the packet
sashiko says:
If map_addr() changes the packet length, such as when the public NAT IP
string is shorter or longer than the internal IP, coff will still point to
the offset relative to the pre-mangled packet.
If the packet shrinks, coff could overshoot the correct position,
potentially causing the next ct_sip_parse_header_uri() call to silently
skip bytes and miss subsequent Contact headers. Could this lead to a
failure to NAT those subsequent headers and leak internal network details? |
| Improper certificate validation in the identity provider connection components in Amazon Athena ODBC driver before 2.1.0.0 might allow a man-in-the-middle threat actor to intercept authentication credentials due to insufficient default transport security when connecting to identity providers. This only applies to connections with external identity providers and does not apply to connections with Athena.
To remediate this issue, users should upgrade to version 2.1.0.0. |
| Out-of-bounds write in the query processing components in Amazon Athena ODBC driver before 2.1.0.0 might allow a threat actor to crash the driver by using specially crafted data that is processed by the driver during query operations.
To remediate this issue, users should upgrade to version 2.1.0.0. |
| Improper neutralization of special elements in the authentication components in Amazon Athena ODBC driver before 2.1.0.0 might allow a threat actor to execute arbitrary code or redirect authentication flows by using specially crafted connection parameters that are processed by the driver during user-initiated authentication.
To remediate this issue, users should upgrade to version 2.1.0.0. |
| OS command injection in the browser-based authentication component in Amazon Athena ODBC driver before 2.0.5.1 on Linux might allow a threat actor to execute arbitrary code by using specially crafted connection parameters that are loaded by the driver during a local user-initiated connection.
To remediate this issue, users should upgrade to version 2.0.5.1 or later. |
| Insufficient authentication security controls in the browser-based authentication components in Amazon Athena ODBC driver before 2.1.0.0 might allow a threat actor to intercept or hijack authentication sessions due to insufficient protections in the browser-based authentication flows.
To remediate this issue, users should upgrade to version 2.1.0.0. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ppp_async: drop the errored frame instead of resetting its headroom
ppp_receive_nonmp_frame() prepends a two-byte direction tag before running
the pass/active BPF filters:
*(__be16 *)skb_push(skb, 2) = htons(PPP_FILTER_INBOUND_TAG);
Nothing on the receive path guarantees those two bytes of headroom. The
frame-error path in ppp_async's process_input_packet() resets a reused skb's
headroom to zero while claiming to restore it to a freshly allocated state -
but a fresh skb from dev_alloc_skb() carries NET_SKB_PAD:
err:
if (skb) {
/* make skb appear as freshly allocated */
skb_trim(skb, 0);
skb_reserve(skb, - skb_headroom(skb));
}
ap->rpkt still points at that skb, so the next frame is reassembled into it
with no headroom at all. A peer that sends a bad-FCS frame followed by one
beginning ff 03 then leaves a single byte of headroom by the time the filter
tag is pushed, which lands one byte below skb->head:
skbuff: skb_under_panic: len:49 put:2 head:ffff888003c10000
data:ffff888003c0ffff tail:0x30 end:0x640 dev:<NULL>
kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:214!
RIP: 0010:skb_panic+0x13e/0x230
Call Trace:
skb_push+0xbd/0x100
ppp_receive_nonmp_frame+0x48a/0x1d10
ppp_input+0x4e9/0x2f80
ppp_async_process+0x2a/0xe0
tasklet_action_common+0x20f/0x8a0
handle_softirqs+0x18e/0x590
Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt
Zeroing the headroom violates the NET_SKB_PAD guarantee that dev_alloc_skb()
gives the rest of the receive path. Besides the filter panic above, when CCP
compression is enabled ppp_decompress_frame() hands skb->data - 2 to
->decompress()/->incomp(), which then reads out of bounds before skb->head
for the same reason.
Rather than restore the headroom, drop the errored frame - as ppp_synctty
already does on its error path - and clear ap->rpkt so the next frame is
reassembled into a fresh skb with proper headroom. This is simpler and fixes
both the filter under-panic and the CCP out-of-bounds read.
The original V1 of this patch made room in ppp_receive_nonmp_frame() with
skb_cow_head(); Eric pointed out that fixing the root cause in the transport
is the right approach.
Found by fuzzing the PPP receive path with a mutating peer on a pty; it is an
interesting (remote) DoS: root configures PPP, the peer supplies two crashing
frames. The reproducer (repro-ppp-skb.c, unchanged from v1) panics in about a
second, and returns cleanly with this applied. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
EDAC/device_sysfs: Use kstrtouint() for poll_msec to prevent truncation
The poll_msec sysfs store file uses simple_strtoul() which accepts an unsigned
long, but the target field (poll_msec) is unsigned int. On 64-bit systems,
a value > UINT_MAX is silently truncated when stored.
Fix the mismatch by using kstrtouint() instead. This rejects values larger
than UINT_MAX at parse time, making truncation impossible. Also add a check
for value < 1 to reject the 0-delay case, which would cause the poll work to
spin without delay and consume 100% CPU. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
accel/qaic: Address potential out-of-bounds read in resp_worker()
Although 'commit 2feec5ae5df7 ("accel/qaic: Handle DBC deactivation if the
owner went away")' fixes the scenario it was intended for by walking the
message and only decoding QAIC_TRANS_DEACTIVATE_FROM_DEV, if present, it
skipped over the bounds checking code that is included in decode_message().
This could lead to issues such as reading past the slab allocation's end,
infinite loops or kernel panics. For those issues to happen, a malformed
wire message is needed to be sent from the device.
Instead of duplicating the bounds checking code already present in
decode_message(), use the function inside resp_worker(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nvme-rdma: fix -EIO cleanup order in queue_rq
On -EIO, the RDMA queue_rq path reports a host path error and then
still cleans up the command and unmaps the SQE DMA. The path error
helper completes the request, so that is double cleanup and DMA unmap
after the request is already complete.
Unmap the SQE first, then report the host path error. Skip the outer
command cleanup on that path. |
