| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
leds: trigger: Unregister sysfs attributes before calling deactivate()
Triggers which have trigger specific sysfs attributes typically store
related data in trigger-data allocated by the activate() callback and
freed by the deactivate() callback.
Calling device_remove_groups() after calling deactivate() leaves a window
where the sysfs attributes show/store functions could be called after
deactivation and then operate on the just freed trigger-data.
Move the device_remove_groups() call to before deactivate() to close
this race window.
This also makes the deactivation path properly do things in reverse order
of the activation path which calls the activate() callback before calling
device_add_groups(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipv6: prevent possible NULL deref in fib6_nh_init()
syzbot reminds us that in6_dev_get() can return NULL.
fib6_nh_init()
ip6_validate_gw( &idev )
ip6_route_check_nh( idev )
*idev = in6_dev_get(dev); // can be NULL
Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc00000000bc: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN PTI
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x00000000000005e0-0x00000000000005e7]
CPU: 0 PID: 11237 Comm: syz-executor.3 Not tainted 6.10.0-rc2-syzkaller-00249-gbe27b8965297 #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 06/07/2024
RIP: 0010:fib6_nh_init+0x640/0x2160 net/ipv6/route.c:3606
Code: 00 00 fc ff df 4c 8b 64 24 58 48 8b 44 24 28 4c 8b 74 24 30 48 89 c1 48 89 44 24 28 48 8d 98 e0 05 00 00 48 89 d8 48 c1 e8 03 <42> 0f b6 04 38 84 c0 0f 85 b3 17 00 00 8b 1b 31 ff 89 de e8 b8 8b
RSP: 0018:ffffc900032775a0 EFLAGS: 00010202
RAX: 00000000000000bc RBX: 00000000000005e0 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000010 RSI: ffffc90003277a54 RDI: ffff88802b3a08d8
RBP: ffffc900032778b0 R08: 00000000000002fc R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 00000000000002fc R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff88802b3a08b8
R13: 1ffff9200064eec8 R14: ffffc90003277a00 R15: dffffc0000000000
FS: 00007f940feb06c0(0000) GS:ffff8880b9400000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 00000000245e8000 CR4: 00000000003506f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
<TASK>
ip6_route_info_create+0x99e/0x12b0 net/ipv6/route.c:3809
ip6_route_add+0x28/0x160 net/ipv6/route.c:3853
ipv6_route_ioctl+0x588/0x870 net/ipv6/route.c:4483
inet6_ioctl+0x21a/0x280 net/ipv6/af_inet6.c:579
sock_do_ioctl+0x158/0x460 net/socket.c:1222
sock_ioctl+0x629/0x8e0 net/socket.c:1341
vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline]
__do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:907 [inline]
__se_sys_ioctl+0xfc/0x170 fs/ioctl.c:893
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7f940f07cea9 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netns: Make get_net_ns() handle zero refcount net
Syzkaller hit a warning:
refcount_t: addition on 0; use-after-free.
WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 7890 at lib/refcount.c:25 refcount_warn_saturate+0xdf/0x1d0
Modules linked in:
CPU: 3 PID: 7890 Comm: tun Not tainted 6.10.0-rc3-00100-gcaa4f9578aba-dirty #310
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:refcount_warn_saturate+0xdf/0x1d0
Code: 41 49 04 31 ff 89 de e8 9f 1e cd fe 84 db 75 9c e8 76 26 cd fe c6 05 b6 41 49 04 01 90 48 c7 c7 b8 8e 25 86 e8 d2 05 b5 fe 90 <0f> 0b 90 90 e9 79 ff ff ff e8 53 26 cd fe 0f b6 1
RSP: 0018:ffff8881067b7da0 EFLAGS: 00010286
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffffffff811c72ac
RDX: ffff8881026a2140 RSI: ffffffff811c72b5 RDI: 0000000000000001
RBP: ffff8881067b7db0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 205b5d3730353139
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 205d303938375420 R12: ffff8881086500c4
R13: ffff8881086500c4 R14: ffff8881086500b0 R15: ffff888108650040
FS: 00007f5b2961a4c0(0000) GS:ffff88823bd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 000055d7ed36fd18 CR3: 00000001482f6000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
<TASK>
? show_regs+0xa3/0xc0
? __warn+0xa5/0x1c0
? refcount_warn_saturate+0xdf/0x1d0
? report_bug+0x1fc/0x2d0
? refcount_warn_saturate+0xdf/0x1d0
? handle_bug+0xa1/0x110
? exc_invalid_op+0x3c/0xb0
? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1f/0x30
? __warn_printk+0xcc/0x140
? __warn_printk+0xd5/0x140
? refcount_warn_saturate+0xdf/0x1d0
get_net_ns+0xa4/0xc0
? __pfx_get_net_ns+0x10/0x10
open_related_ns+0x5a/0x130
__tun_chr_ioctl+0x1616/0x2370
? __sanitizer_cov_trace_switch+0x58/0xa0
? __sanitizer_cov_trace_const_cmp2+0x1c/0x30
? __pfx_tun_chr_ioctl+0x10/0x10
tun_chr_ioctl+0x2f/0x40
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x11b/0x160
x64_sys_call+0x1211/0x20d0
do_syscall_64+0x9e/0x1d0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7f5b28f165d7
Code: b3 66 90 48 8b 05 b1 48 2d 00 64 c7 00 26 00 00 00 48 c7 c0 ff ff ff ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 b8 10 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 81 48 2d 00 8
RSP: 002b:00007ffc2b59c5e8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f5b28f165d7
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00000000000054e3 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00007ffc2b59c650 R08: 00007f5b291ed8c0 R09: 00007f5b2961a4c0
R10: 0000000029690010 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000400730
R13: 00007ffc2b59cf40 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
</TASK>
Kernel panic - not syncing: kernel: panic_on_warn set ...
This is trigger as below:
ns0 ns1
tun_set_iff() //dev is tun0
tun->dev = dev
//ip link set tun0 netns ns1
put_net() //ref is 0
__tun_chr_ioctl() //TUNGETDEVNETNS
net = dev_net(tun->dev);
open_related_ns(&net->ns, get_net_ns); //ns1
get_net_ns()
get_net() //addition on 0
Use maybe_get_net() in get_net_ns in case net's ref is zero to fix this |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipv6: fix possible race in __fib6_drop_pcpu_from()
syzbot found a race in __fib6_drop_pcpu_from() [1]
If compiler reads more than once (*ppcpu_rt),
second read could read NULL, if another cpu clears
the value in rt6_get_pcpu_route().
Add a READ_ONCE() to prevent this race.
Also add rcu_read_lock()/rcu_read_unlock() because
we rely on RCU protection while dereferencing pcpu_rt.
[1]
Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000012: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN PTI
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000090-0x0000000000000097]
CPU: 0 PID: 7543 Comm: kworker/u8:17 Not tainted 6.10.0-rc1-syzkaller-00013-g2bfcfd584ff5 #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 04/02/2024
Workqueue: netns cleanup_net
RIP: 0010:__fib6_drop_pcpu_from.part.0+0x10a/0x370 net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:984
Code: f8 48 c1 e8 03 80 3c 28 00 0f 85 16 02 00 00 4d 8b 3f 4d 85 ff 74 31 e8 74 a7 fa f7 49 8d bf 90 00 00 00 48 89 f8 48 c1 e8 03 <80> 3c 28 00 0f 85 1e 02 00 00 49 8b 87 90 00 00 00 48 8b 0c 24 48
RSP: 0018:ffffc900040df070 EFLAGS: 00010206
RAX: 0000000000000012 RBX: 0000000000000001 RCX: ffffffff89932e16
RDX: ffff888049dd1e00 RSI: ffffffff89932d7c RDI: 0000000000000091
RBP: dffffc0000000000 R08: 0000000000000005 R09: 0000000000000007
R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000006 R12: ffff88807fa080b8
R13: fffffbfff1a9a07d R14: ffffed100ff41022 R15: 0000000000000001
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8880b9200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000001b32c26000 CR3: 000000005d56e000 CR4: 00000000003526f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__fib6_drop_pcpu_from net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:966 [inline]
fib6_drop_pcpu_from net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:1027 [inline]
fib6_purge_rt+0x7f2/0x9f0 net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:1038
fib6_del_route net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:1998 [inline]
fib6_del+0xa70/0x17b0 net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:2043
fib6_clean_node+0x426/0x5b0 net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:2205
fib6_walk_continue+0x44f/0x8d0 net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:2127
fib6_walk+0x182/0x370 net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:2175
fib6_clean_tree+0xd7/0x120 net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:2255
__fib6_clean_all+0x100/0x2d0 net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:2271
rt6_sync_down_dev net/ipv6/route.c:4906 [inline]
rt6_disable_ip+0x7ed/0xa00 net/ipv6/route.c:4911
addrconf_ifdown.isra.0+0x117/0x1b40 net/ipv6/addrconf.c:3855
addrconf_notify+0x223/0x19e0 net/ipv6/addrconf.c:3778
notifier_call_chain+0xb9/0x410 kernel/notifier.c:93
call_netdevice_notifiers_info+0xbe/0x140 net/core/dev.c:1992
call_netdevice_notifiers_extack net/core/dev.c:2030 [inline]
call_netdevice_notifiers net/core/dev.c:2044 [inline]
dev_close_many+0x333/0x6a0 net/core/dev.c:1585
unregister_netdevice_many_notify+0x46d/0x19f0 net/core/dev.c:11193
unregister_netdevice_many net/core/dev.c:11276 [inline]
default_device_exit_batch+0x85b/0xae0 net/core/dev.c:11759
ops_exit_list+0x128/0x180 net/core/net_namespace.c:178
cleanup_net+0x5b7/0xbf0 net/core/net_namespace.c:640
process_one_work+0x9fb/0x1b60 kernel/workqueue.c:3231
process_scheduled_works kernel/workqueue.c:3312 [inline]
worker_thread+0x6c8/0xf70 kernel/workqueue.c:3393
kthread+0x2c1/0x3a0 kernel/kthread.c:389
ret_from_fork+0x45/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:244 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ionic: fix use after netif_napi_del()
When queues are started, netif_napi_add() and napi_enable() are called.
If there are 4 queues and only 3 queues are used for the current
configuration, only 3 queues' napi should be registered and enabled.
The ionic_qcq_enable() checks whether the .poll pointer is not NULL for
enabling only the using queue' napi. Unused queues' napi will not be
registered by netif_napi_add(), so the .poll pointer indicates NULL.
But it couldn't distinguish whether the napi was unregistered or not
because netif_napi_del() doesn't reset the .poll pointer to NULL.
So, ionic_qcq_enable() calls napi_enable() for the queue, which was
unregistered by netif_napi_del().
Reproducer:
ethtool -L <interface name> rx 1 tx 1 combined 0
ethtool -L <interface name> rx 0 tx 0 combined 1
ethtool -L <interface name> rx 0 tx 0 combined 4
Splat looks like:
kernel BUG at net/core/dev.c:6666!
Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
CPU: 3 PID: 1057 Comm: kworker/3:3 Not tainted 6.10.0-rc2+ #16
Workqueue: events ionic_lif_deferred_work [ionic]
RIP: 0010:napi_enable+0x3b/0x40
Code: 48 89 c2 48 83 e2 f6 80 b9 61 09 00 00 00 74 0d 48 83 bf 60 01 00 00 00 74 03 80 ce 01 f0 4f
RSP: 0018:ffffb6ed83227d48 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff97560cda0828 RCX: 0000000000000029
RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff97560cda0a28
RBP: ffffb6ed83227d50 R08: 0000000000000400 R09: 0000000000000001
R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: ffff97560ce3c1a0 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff975613ba0a20
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff975d5f780000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f8f734ee200 CR3: 0000000103e50000 CR4: 00000000007506f0
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
<TASK>
? die+0x33/0x90
? do_trap+0xd9/0x100
? napi_enable+0x3b/0x40
? do_error_trap+0x83/0xb0
? napi_enable+0x3b/0x40
? napi_enable+0x3b/0x40
? exc_invalid_op+0x4e/0x70
? napi_enable+0x3b/0x40
? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x16/0x20
? napi_enable+0x3b/0x40
ionic_qcq_enable+0xb7/0x180 [ionic 59bdfc8a035436e1c4224ff7d10789e3f14643f8]
ionic_start_queues+0xc4/0x290 [ionic 59bdfc8a035436e1c4224ff7d10789e3f14643f8]
ionic_link_status_check+0x11c/0x170 [ionic 59bdfc8a035436e1c4224ff7d10789e3f14643f8]
ionic_lif_deferred_work+0x129/0x280 [ionic 59bdfc8a035436e1c4224ff7d10789e3f14643f8]
process_one_work+0x145/0x360
worker_thread+0x2bb/0x3d0
? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10
kthread+0xcc/0x100
? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
ret_from_fork+0x2d/0x50
? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ecryptfs: Fix buffer size for tag 66 packet
The 'TAG 66 Packet Format' description is missing the cipher code and
checksum fields that are packed into the message packet. As a result,
the buffer allocated for the packet is 3 bytes too small and
write_tag_66_packet() will write up to 3 bytes past the end of the
buffer.
Fix this by increasing the size of the allocation so the whole packet
will always fit in the buffer.
This fixes the below kasan slab-out-of-bounds bug:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in ecryptfs_generate_key_packet_set+0x7d6/0xde0
Write of size 1 at addr ffff88800afbb2a5 by task touch/181
CPU: 0 PID: 181 Comm: touch Not tainted 6.6.13-gnu #1 4c9534092be820851bb687b82d1f92a426598dc6
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.2/GNU Guix 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x4c/0x70
print_report+0xc5/0x610
? ecryptfs_generate_key_packet_set+0x7d6/0xde0
? kasan_complete_mode_report_info+0x44/0x210
? ecryptfs_generate_key_packet_set+0x7d6/0xde0
kasan_report+0xc2/0x110
? ecryptfs_generate_key_packet_set+0x7d6/0xde0
__asan_store1+0x62/0x80
ecryptfs_generate_key_packet_set+0x7d6/0xde0
? __pfx_ecryptfs_generate_key_packet_set+0x10/0x10
? __alloc_pages+0x2e2/0x540
? __pfx_ovl_open+0x10/0x10 [overlay 30837f11141636a8e1793533a02e6e2e885dad1d]
? dentry_open+0x8f/0xd0
ecryptfs_write_metadata+0x30a/0x550
? __pfx_ecryptfs_write_metadata+0x10/0x10
? ecryptfs_get_lower_file+0x6b/0x190
ecryptfs_initialize_file+0x77/0x150
ecryptfs_create+0x1c2/0x2f0
path_openat+0x17cf/0x1ba0
? __pfx_path_openat+0x10/0x10
do_filp_open+0x15e/0x290
? __pfx_do_filp_open+0x10/0x10
? __kasan_check_write+0x18/0x30
? _raw_spin_lock+0x86/0xf0
? __pfx__raw_spin_lock+0x10/0x10
? __kasan_check_write+0x18/0x30
? alloc_fd+0xf4/0x330
do_sys_openat2+0x122/0x160
? __pfx_do_sys_openat2+0x10/0x10
__x64_sys_openat+0xef/0x170
? __pfx___x64_sys_openat+0x10/0x10
do_syscall_64+0x60/0xd0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0xd8
RIP: 0033:0x7f00a703fd67
Code: 25 00 00 41 00 3d 00 00 41 00 74 37 64 8b 04 25 18 00 00 00 85 c0 75 5b 44 89 e2 48 89 ee bf 9c ff ff ff b8 01 01 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 0f 87 85 00 00 00 48 83 c4 68 5d 41 5c c3 0f 1f
RSP: 002b:00007ffc088e30b0 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000101
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ffc088e3368 RCX: 00007f00a703fd67
RDX: 0000000000000941 RSI: 00007ffc088e48d7 RDI: 00000000ffffff9c
RBP: 00007ffc088e48d7 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 00000000000001b6 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000941
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00007ffc088e48d7 R15: 00007f00a7180040
</TASK>
Allocated by task 181:
kasan_save_stack+0x2f/0x60
kasan_set_track+0x29/0x40
kasan_save_alloc_info+0x25/0x40
__kasan_kmalloc+0xc5/0xd0
__kmalloc+0x66/0x160
ecryptfs_generate_key_packet_set+0x6d2/0xde0
ecryptfs_write_metadata+0x30a/0x550
ecryptfs_initialize_file+0x77/0x150
ecryptfs_create+0x1c2/0x2f0
path_openat+0x17cf/0x1ba0
do_filp_open+0x15e/0x290
do_sys_openat2+0x122/0x160
__x64_sys_openat+0xef/0x170
do_syscall_64+0x60/0xd0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0xd8 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: sched: sch_multiq: fix possible OOB write in multiq_tune()
q->bands will be assigned to qopt->bands to execute subsequent code logic
after kmalloc. So the old q->bands should not be used in kmalloc.
Otherwise, an out-of-bounds write will occur. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/sched: taprio: always validate TCA_TAPRIO_ATTR_PRIOMAP
If one TCA_TAPRIO_ATTR_PRIOMAP attribute has been provided,
taprio_parse_mqprio_opt() must validate it, or userspace
can inject arbitrary data to the kernel, the second time
taprio_change() is called.
First call (with valid attributes) sets dev->num_tc
to a non zero value.
Second call (with arbitrary mqprio attributes)
returns early from taprio_parse_mqprio_opt()
and bad things can happen. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
pinctrl: core: delete incorrect free in pinctrl_enable()
The "pctldev" struct is allocated in devm_pinctrl_register_and_init().
It's a devm_ managed pointer that is freed by devm_pinctrl_dev_release(),
so freeing it in pinctrl_enable() will lead to a double free.
The devm_pinctrl_dev_release() function frees the pindescs and destroys
the mutex as well. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tcp: Use refcount_inc_not_zero() in tcp_twsk_unique().
Anderson Nascimento reported a use-after-free splat in tcp_twsk_unique()
with nice analysis.
Since commit ec94c2696f0b ("tcp/dccp: avoid one atomic operation for
timewait hashdance"), inet_twsk_hashdance() sets TIME-WAIT socket's
sk_refcnt after putting it into ehash and releasing the bucket lock.
Thus, there is a small race window where other threads could try to
reuse the port during connect() and call sock_hold() in tcp_twsk_unique()
for the TIME-WAIT socket with zero refcnt.
If that happens, the refcnt taken by tcp_twsk_unique() is overwritten
and sock_put() will cause underflow, triggering a real use-after-free
somewhere else.
To avoid the use-after-free, we need to use refcount_inc_not_zero() in
tcp_twsk_unique() and give up on reusing the port if it returns false.
[0]:
refcount_t: addition on 0; use-after-free.
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 1039313 at lib/refcount.c:25 refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110
CPU: 0 PID: 1039313 Comm: trigger Not tainted 6.8.6-200.fc39.x86_64 #1
Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware20,1/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS VMW201.00V.21805430.B64.2305221830 05/22/2023
RIP: 0010:refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110
Code: 42 8e ff 0f 0b c3 cc cc cc cc 80 3d aa 13 ea 01 00 0f 85 5e ff ff ff 48 c7 c7 f8 8e b7 82 c6 05 96 13 ea 01 01 e8 7b 42 8e ff <0f> 0b c3 cc cc cc cc 48 c7 c7 50 8f b7 82 c6 05 7a 13 ea 01 01 e8
RSP: 0018:ffffc90006b43b60 EFLAGS: 00010282
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff888009bb3ef0 RCX: 0000000000000027
RDX: ffff88807be218c8 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffff88807be218c0
RBP: 0000000000069d70 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffc90006b439f0
R10: ffffc90006b439e8 R11: 0000000000000003 R12: ffff8880029ede84
R13: 0000000000004e20 R14: ffffffff84356dc0 R15: ffff888009bb3ef0
FS: 00007f62c10926c0(0000) GS:ffff88807be00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000020ccb000 CR3: 000000004628c005 CR4: 0000000000f70ef0
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
<TASK>
? refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110
? __warn+0x81/0x130
? refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110
? report_bug+0x171/0x1a0
? refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110
? handle_bug+0x3c/0x80
? exc_invalid_op+0x17/0x70
? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x20
? refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110
tcp_twsk_unique+0x186/0x190
__inet_check_established+0x176/0x2d0
__inet_hash_connect+0x74/0x7d0
? __pfx___inet_check_established+0x10/0x10
tcp_v4_connect+0x278/0x530
__inet_stream_connect+0x10f/0x3d0
inet_stream_connect+0x3a/0x60
__sys_connect+0xa8/0xd0
__x64_sys_connect+0x18/0x20
do_syscall_64+0x83/0x170
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x78/0x80
RIP: 0033:0x7f62c11a885d
Code: ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 f3 0f 1e fa 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d a3 45 0c 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007f62c1091e58 EFLAGS: 00000296 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002a
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000020ccb004 RCX: 00007f62c11a885d
RDX: 0000000000000010 RSI: 0000000020ccb000 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00007f62c1091e90 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000296 R12: 00007f62c10926c0
R13: ffffffffffffff88 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 00007ffe237885b0
</TASK> |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: SCO: Fix not validating setsockopt user input
syzbot reported sco_sock_setsockopt() is copying data without
checking user input length.
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in copy_from_sockptr_offset
include/linux/sockptr.h:49 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in copy_from_sockptr
include/linux/sockptr.h:55 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in sco_sock_setsockopt+0xc0b/0xf90
net/bluetooth/sco.c:893
Read of size 4 at addr ffff88805f7b15a3 by task syz-executor.5/12578 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Protect against int overflow for stack access size
This patch re-introduces protection against the size of access to stack
memory being negative; the access size can appear negative as a result
of overflowing its signed int representation. This should not actually
happen, as there are other protections along the way, but we should
protect against it anyway. One code path was missing such protections
(fixed in the previous patch in the series), causing out-of-bounds array
accesses in check_stack_range_initialized(). This patch causes the
verification of a program with such a non-sensical access size to fail.
This check used to exist in a more indirect way, but was inadvertendly
removed in a833a17aeac7. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: validate user input for expected length
I got multiple syzbot reports showing old bugs exposed
by BPF after commit 20f2505fb436 ("bpf: Try to avoid kzalloc
in cgroup/{s,g}etsockopt")
setsockopt() @optlen argument should be taken into account
before copying data.
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in copy_from_sockptr_offset include/linux/sockptr.h:49 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in copy_from_sockptr include/linux/sockptr.h:55 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in do_replace net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c:1111 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in do_ipt_set_ctl+0x902/0x3dd0 net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c:1627
Read of size 96 at addr ffff88802cd73da0 by task syz-executor.4/7238
CPU: 1 PID: 7238 Comm: syz-executor.4 Not tainted 6.9.0-rc2-next-20240403-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 03/27/2024
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]
dump_stack_lvl+0x241/0x360 lib/dump_stack.c:114
print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:377 [inline]
print_report+0x169/0x550 mm/kasan/report.c:488
kasan_report+0x143/0x180 mm/kasan/report.c:601
kasan_check_range+0x282/0x290 mm/kasan/generic.c:189
__asan_memcpy+0x29/0x70 mm/kasan/shadow.c:105
copy_from_sockptr_offset include/linux/sockptr.h:49 [inline]
copy_from_sockptr include/linux/sockptr.h:55 [inline]
do_replace net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c:1111 [inline]
do_ipt_set_ctl+0x902/0x3dd0 net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c:1627
nf_setsockopt+0x295/0x2c0 net/netfilter/nf_sockopt.c:101
do_sock_setsockopt+0x3af/0x720 net/socket.c:2311
__sys_setsockopt+0x1ae/0x250 net/socket.c:2334
__do_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2343 [inline]
__se_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2340 [inline]
__x64_sys_setsockopt+0xb5/0xd0 net/socket.c:2340
do_syscall_64+0xfb/0x240
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0x7a
RIP: 0033:0x7fd22067dde9
Code: 28 00 00 00 75 05 48 83 c4 28 c3 e8 e1 20 00 00 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b0 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007fd21f9ff0c8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000036
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007fd2207abf80 RCX: 00007fd22067dde9
RDX: 0000000000000040 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00007fd2206ca47a R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000020000880 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 000000000000000b R14: 00007fd2207abf80 R15: 00007ffd2d0170d8
</TASK>
Allocated by task 7238:
kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:47 [inline]
kasan_save_track+0x3f/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:68
poison_kmalloc_redzone mm/kasan/common.c:370 [inline]
__kasan_kmalloc+0x98/0xb0 mm/kasan/common.c:387
kasan_kmalloc include/linux/kasan.h:211 [inline]
__do_kmalloc_node mm/slub.c:4069 [inline]
__kmalloc_noprof+0x200/0x410 mm/slub.c:4082
kmalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:664 [inline]
__cgroup_bpf_run_filter_setsockopt+0xd47/0x1050 kernel/bpf/cgroup.c:1869
do_sock_setsockopt+0x6b4/0x720 net/socket.c:2293
__sys_setsockopt+0x1ae/0x250 net/socket.c:2334
__do_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2343 [inline]
__se_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2340 [inline]
__x64_sys_setsockopt+0xb5/0xd0 net/socket.c:2340
do_syscall_64+0xfb/0x240
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0x7a
The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88802cd73da0
which belongs to the cache kmalloc-8 of size 8
The buggy address is located 0 bytes inside of
allocated 1-byte region [ffff88802cd73da0, ffff88802cd73da1)
The buggy address belongs to the physical page:
page: refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0xffff88802cd73020 pfn:0x2cd73
flags: 0xfff80000000000(node=0|zone=1|lastcpupid=0xfff)
page_type: 0xffffefff(slab)
raw: 00fff80000000000 ffff888015041280 dead000000000100 dead000000000122
raw: ffff88802cd73020 000000008080007f 00000001ffffefff 00
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: gtp: Fix Use-After-Free in gtp_dellink
Since call_rcu, which is called in the hlist_for_each_entry_rcu traversal
of gtp_dellink, is not part of the RCU read critical section, it
is possible that the RCU grace period will pass during the traversal and
the key will be free.
To prevent this, it should be changed to hlist_for_each_entry_safe. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: openvswitch: Fix Use-After-Free in ovs_ct_exit
Since kfree_rcu, which is called in the hlist_for_each_entry_rcu traversal
of ovs_ct_limit_exit, is not part of the RCU read critical section, it
is possible that the RCU grace period will pass during the traversal and
the key will be free.
To prevent this, it should be changed to hlist_for_each_entry_safe. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nfs: fix UAF in direct writes
In production we have been hitting the following warning consistently
------------[ cut here ]------------
refcount_t: underflow; use-after-free.
WARNING: CPU: 17 PID: 1800359 at lib/refcount.c:28 refcount_warn_saturate+0x9c/0xe0
Workqueue: nfsiod nfs_direct_write_schedule_work [nfs]
RIP: 0010:refcount_warn_saturate+0x9c/0xe0
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
<TASK>
? __warn+0x9f/0x130
? refcount_warn_saturate+0x9c/0xe0
? report_bug+0xcc/0x150
? handle_bug+0x3d/0x70
? exc_invalid_op+0x16/0x40
? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x16/0x20
? refcount_warn_saturate+0x9c/0xe0
nfs_direct_write_schedule_work+0x237/0x250 [nfs]
process_one_work+0x12f/0x4a0
worker_thread+0x14e/0x3b0
? ZSTD_getCParams_internal+0x220/0x220
kthread+0xdc/0x120
? __btf_name_valid+0xa0/0xa0
ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30
This is because we're completing the nfs_direct_request twice in a row.
The source of this is when we have our commit requests to submit, we
process them and send them off, and then in the completion path for the
commit requests we have
if (nfs_commit_end(cinfo.mds))
nfs_direct_write_complete(dreq);
However since we're submitting asynchronous requests we sometimes have
one that completes before we submit the next one, so we end up calling
complete on the nfs_direct_request twice.
The only other place we use nfs_generic_commit_list() is in
__nfs_commit_inode, which wraps this call in a
nfs_commit_begin();
nfs_commit_end();
Which is a common pattern for this style of completion handling, one
that is also repeated in the direct code with get_dreq()/put_dreq()
calls around where we process events as well as in the completion paths.
Fix this by using the same pattern for the commit requests.
Before with my 200 node rocksdb stress running this warning would pop
every 10ish minutes. With my patch the stress test has been running for
several hours without popping. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wireguard: netlink: check for dangling peer via is_dead instead of empty list
If all peers are removed via wg_peer_remove_all(), rather than setting
peer_list to empty, the peer is added to a temporary list with a head on
the stack of wg_peer_remove_all(). If a netlink dump is resumed and the
cursored peer is one that has been removed via wg_peer_remove_all(), it
will iterate from that peer and then attempt to dump freed peers.
Fix this by instead checking peer->is_dead, which was explictly created
for this purpose. Also move up the device_update_lock lockdep assertion,
since reading is_dead relies on that.
It can be reproduced by a small script like:
echo "Setting config..."
ip link add dev wg0 type wireguard
wg setconf wg0 /big-config
(
while true; do
echo "Showing config..."
wg showconf wg0 > /dev/null
done
) &
sleep 4
wg setconf wg0 <(printf "[Peer]\nPublicKey=$(wg genkey)\n")
Resulting in:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __lock_acquire+0x182a/0x1b20
Read of size 8 at addr ffff88811956ec70 by task wg/59
CPU: 2 PID: 59 Comm: wg Not tainted 6.8.0-rc2-debug+ #5
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x47/0x70
print_address_description.constprop.0+0x2c/0x380
print_report+0xab/0x250
kasan_report+0xba/0xf0
__lock_acquire+0x182a/0x1b20
lock_acquire+0x191/0x4b0
down_read+0x80/0x440
get_peer+0x140/0xcb0
wg_get_device_dump+0x471/0x1130 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: wilc1000: prevent use-after-free on vif when cleaning up all interfaces
wilc_netdev_cleanup currently triggers a KASAN warning, which can be
observed on interface registration error path, or simply by
removing the module/unbinding device from driver:
echo spi0.1 > /sys/bus/spi/drivers/wilc1000_spi/unbind
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in wilc_netdev_cleanup+0x508/0x5cc
Read of size 4 at addr c54d1ce8 by task sh/86
CPU: 0 PID: 86 Comm: sh Not tainted 6.8.0-rc1+ #117
Hardware name: Atmel SAMA5
unwind_backtrace from show_stack+0x18/0x1c
show_stack from dump_stack_lvl+0x34/0x58
dump_stack_lvl from print_report+0x154/0x500
print_report from kasan_report+0xac/0xd8
kasan_report from wilc_netdev_cleanup+0x508/0x5cc
wilc_netdev_cleanup from wilc_bus_remove+0xc8/0xec
wilc_bus_remove from spi_remove+0x8c/0xac
spi_remove from device_release_driver_internal+0x434/0x5f8
device_release_driver_internal from unbind_store+0xbc/0x108
unbind_store from kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x398/0x584
kernfs_fop_write_iter from vfs_write+0x728/0xf88
vfs_write from ksys_write+0x110/0x1e4
ksys_write from ret_fast_syscall+0x0/0x1c
[...]
Allocated by task 1:
kasan_save_track+0x30/0x5c
__kasan_kmalloc+0x8c/0x94
__kmalloc_node+0x1cc/0x3e4
kvmalloc_node+0x48/0x180
alloc_netdev_mqs+0x68/0x11dc
alloc_etherdev_mqs+0x28/0x34
wilc_netdev_ifc_init+0x34/0x8ec
wilc_cfg80211_init+0x690/0x910
wilc_bus_probe+0xe0/0x4a0
spi_probe+0x158/0x1b0
really_probe+0x270/0xdf4
__driver_probe_device+0x1dc/0x580
driver_probe_device+0x60/0x140
__driver_attach+0x228/0x5d4
bus_for_each_dev+0x13c/0x1a8
bus_add_driver+0x2a0/0x608
driver_register+0x24c/0x578
do_one_initcall+0x180/0x310
kernel_init_freeable+0x424/0x484
kernel_init+0x20/0x148
ret_from_fork+0x14/0x28
Freed by task 86:
kasan_save_track+0x30/0x5c
kasan_save_free_info+0x38/0x58
__kasan_slab_free+0xe4/0x140
kfree+0xb0/0x238
device_release+0xc0/0x2a8
kobject_put+0x1d4/0x46c
netdev_run_todo+0x8fc/0x11d0
wilc_netdev_cleanup+0x1e4/0x5cc
wilc_bus_remove+0xc8/0xec
spi_remove+0x8c/0xac
device_release_driver_internal+0x434/0x5f8
unbind_store+0xbc/0x108
kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x398/0x584
vfs_write+0x728/0xf88
ksys_write+0x110/0x1e4
ret_fast_syscall+0x0/0x1c
[...]
David Mosberger-Tan initial investigation [1] showed that this
use-after-free is due to netdevice unregistration during vif list
traversal. When unregistering a net device, since the needs_free_netdev has
been set to true during registration, the netdevice object is also freed,
and as a consequence, the corresponding vif object too, since it is
attached to it as private netdevice data. The next occurrence of the loop
then tries to access freed vif pointer to the list to move forward in the
list.
Fix this use-after-free thanks to two mechanisms:
- navigate in the list with list_for_each_entry_safe, which allows to
safely modify the list as we go through each element. For each element,
remove it from the list with list_del_rcu
- make sure to wait for RCU grace period end after each vif removal to make
sure it is safe to free the corresponding vif too (through
unregister_netdev)
Since we are in a RCU "modifier" path (not a "reader" path), and because
such path is expected not to be concurrent to any other modifier (we are
using the vif_mutex lock), we do not need to use RCU list API, that's why
we can benefit from list_for_each_entry_safe.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-wireless/ab077dbe58b1ea5de0a3b2ca21f275a07af967d2.camel@egauge.net/ |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Fix DEVMAP_HASH overflow check on 32-bit arches
The devmap code allocates a number hash buckets equal to the next power
of two of the max_entries value provided when creating the map. When
rounding up to the next power of two, the 32-bit variable storing the
number of buckets can overflow, and the code checks for overflow by
checking if the truncated 32-bit value is equal to 0. However, on 32-bit
arches the rounding up itself can overflow mid-way through, because it
ends up doing a left-shift of 32 bits on an unsigned long value. If the
size of an unsigned long is four bytes, this is undefined behaviour, so
there is no guarantee that we'll end up with a nice and tidy 0-value at
the end.
Syzbot managed to turn this into a crash on arm32 by creating a
DEVMAP_HASH with max_entries > 0x80000000 and then trying to update it.
Fix this by moving the overflow check to before the rounding up
operation. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Fix hashtab overflow check on 32-bit arches
The hashtab code relies on roundup_pow_of_two() to compute the number of
hash buckets, and contains an overflow check by checking if the
resulting value is 0. However, on 32-bit arches, the roundup code itself
can overflow by doing a 32-bit left-shift of an unsigned long value,
which is undefined behaviour, so it is not guaranteed to truncate
neatly. This was triggered by syzbot on the DEVMAP_HASH type, which
contains the same check, copied from the hashtab code. So apply the same
fix to hashtab, by moving the overflow check to before the roundup. |
