| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb: client: use finish_no_open() for non-regular inodes
An O_CREAT open can find an existing symlink or another non-regular
inode. cifs_atomic_open() calls finish_open() on it and attaches a
cifsFileInfo. Symlink inodes have no CIFS release operation, so the
dentry reference held by cifsFileInfo is leaked. FMODE_OPENED also
prevents the VFS from following the symlink.
Track whether cifs_do_create() returned an open server handle. For
non-regular inodes, close the handle if present, remove the pending
open, and call finish_no_open() so the VFS can continue the lookup.
Do not set FMODE_CREATED unless a regular file was opened. For
O_NOFOLLOW with __O_REGULAR, return -ELOOP before the VFS's
-EFTYPE check.
Defer closing a legacy POSIX handle on a non-regular inode until
after inode lookup. This avoids closing it again if lookup fails. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb: client: close completed creates on compound wait errors
compound_send_recv() waits for responses in order. If a later wait is
interrupted, or if a later MID fails during response synchronization, an
earlier CREATE may already have opened a remote handle. The earlier mid
is then released without invoking handle_cancelled_mid(), leaving the
remote handle open because no FID was copied to the caller.
Mark completed earlier mids as cancelled when a compound wait or MID
synchronization aborts. Keep their response buffers attached while the
MIDs are synchronized, and transfer them only after synchronization of
the processed responses, so the release path can inspect successful
CREATE responses and queue SMB2_close() after a later failure. Account for
a remote open only after the close work is allocated and before it is
queued, since the caller has not yet updated num_remote_opens. Mark the
create+close compound used by smb2_unlink() so it is not closed again.
Non-CREATE responses and compounds that already include a close keep their
existing behavior. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xfs: fix cursor and pointer handling when recovering iunlink buckets
LOLLM pointed out a bug in xlog_recover_iunlink_bucket:
1. We don't null out prev_ip after releasing it, which can lead to UAF
problems if the inodegc flush call in the loop fails.
at which point I noticed even more bugs:
2. If the inodegc flush inside the loop fails, we also leak @ip.
3. We set prev_agino to agino having already advanced agino, which
results in inodes with i_prev_unlinked set to itself.
4. If we exit the bottom of the loop with prev_ip set, then prev_ip
aliases ip and we also set its i_prev_unlinked to itself.
Bugs 3 and 4 introduce loops into the unlinked list, though these loops
don't surface because we immediately flush each unlinked inode after
loading it.
Fix all of these issues. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/sched: act_ct: fix helper UAF due to extensions realloc
While calling the helpers, a raw pointer to the extensions area is
wired into expectations list:
-> nf_ct_helper()
-> helper->help()
-> nf_ct_expect_related_report()
-> nf_ct_expect_insert()
-> hlist_add_head_rcu(&exp->lnode, &master_help->expectations)
In case the connection is not confirmed yet, more extensions can be
added afterwards with *_ext_add() calls reallocating the extension
space and leaving the now invalid pointer in the expectations list
that is later accessed while removing the expectation.
Make sure that helpers are called at the end after all the other
extensions are already added.
Note that the helper rejection now leaves the mark and labels set,
but that's not different from how the NAT was handled before or how
the mark and the labels were handled on confirmation failure. And
there are no atomicity guarantees provided by the API anyway. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/sched: act_ct: avoid modifying shared unconfirmed ct entry
In a case where skb with an unconfirmed ct entry gets cloned, we may
end up processing both again but with different sets of extensions.
The series of events:
1. The first clone wants to commit and runs the helpers wiring up
the extension pointer into the expectation list.
2. Then it looses the confirmation keeping the entry unconfirmed.
3. Second clone now wants to commit labels or run NAT and adds the
new extension for that breaking the pointer in the expectation
list causing UAF on the destruction path later.
While this is possible to trigger, there should be no practical
network pipeline where we need to process both clones without
modifications in the same zone. So, let's just reset the entry in
case for some reason we got an skb with a shared one. This doesn't
affect any known use cases, but avoids any potential problems with
sharing and modification of the unconfirmed ct entry.
Unlike openvswitch module, act_ct allows for NAT without commit.
Changing that would be a uAPI break. So, act_ct needs to reset on NAT
regardless of the commit flag to avoid reallocation of the extension
space. This, however, doesn't really change the picture for sensible
networking cases as there should be no need to run the same packet
twice (before and after the clone) through conntrack without packet
header or zone changes and without commit.
The fixes tag points to the introduction of helpers, since that's the
main UAF trigger for the sharing. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: qla2xxx: Use memset_io() to clear QLAFX00 request ring slot
For QLAFX00 the request ring is ioremapped device I/O memory
(ha->iobase + req_que_off), not DMA-coherent RAM, which is why the rest
of the FX00 path accesses it through memcpy_toio() and the wrt_reg_*
helpers. __qla2x00_alloc_iocbs() however zeroed the producer slot with a
plain memset(). On architectures such as ARM64 a regular memset() may
emit unaligned or block-zeroing instructions (e.g. DC ZVA) that are
invalid on Device memory, leading to a synchronous external abort.
Use memset_io() to clear the slot for QLAFX00, matching the I/O
accessors used elsewhere on this ring. Other adapters keep the plain
memset() on their DMA-coherent rings. The zero-fill is retained for FX00
because its IOCB builders (e.g. qlafx00_fxdisc_iocb()) copy only part of
the entry and rely on the unused tail being pre-zeroed. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
vlan: require the MAC header to be present in __vlan_insert_inner_tag()
__vlan_insert_inner_tag() only guarantees head room via skb_cow_head(),
never that mac_len bytes of MAC header are present. Its ETH_HLEN
wrappers - __vlan_insert_tag() under skb_vlan_push(), and
vlan_insert_tag() under validate_xmit_vlan() on the generic transmit
path - therefore rewrite the first 16 bytes at skb->data: a 12-byte
memmove plus two 2-byte stores at +12 and +14. No caller supplies the
bound, while the pop helpers use skb_ensure_writable()/pskb_may_pull().
An IFF_TUN device has hard_header_len == 0, so packet_snd() accepts a
one-byte AF_PACKET/SOCK_RAW frame. The first vlan push only sets a
hwaccel tag; the next - clsact "action vlan push" or
bpf_skb_vlan_push() - enters the helper with skb->len still 1. The
head comes from skbuff_small_head without __GFP_ZERO, so each push
drags bytes from beyond skb->tail into the frame. After three the
one-byte send leaves as 13 bytes carrying 11 bytes of uninitialised
slab:
0000: 5a b3 62 12 80 88 ff ff 00 b3 62 12 81
`------------------------------'
only 0x5a was sent; the rest is slab, here the top 56 bits of a
linear-map address
Require the MAC header the helper rewrites to be present, so such a
frame is dropped rather than transmitted. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xen/netfront: drop RX packets with a short Ethernet header
handle_incoming_queue() pulls pull_to bytes into the head before
calling eth_type_trans(). pull_to is the length of the first RX slot,
capped at RX_COPY_THRESHOLD, and that length comes from the backend.
Nothing checks it against ETH_HLEN.
If the first slot is shorter than ETH_HLEN and more slots follow, the
head ends up shorter than an Ethernet header while skb->len is longer,
and eth_type_trans() BUG()s in __skb_pull(). If the whole packet is
shorter than ETH_HLEN, eth_type_trans() reads the header past the end
of the data instead.
Pull at least ETH_HLEN, and drop the packet if that fails, which also
drops packets too short to hold an Ethernet header. This also checks
the return value of the pull, which was ignored. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/hugetlb: preserve mremap address delta when skipping page tables
move_hugetlb_page_tables() optimizes mremap() by advancing to the last
entry in the page table when the source page table does not exist, either
initially or after unsharing a PMD table. The common loop increment then
steps to the first entry in the next page table.
However, the code advances both the source and destination addresses to
the last entries in their respective page tables, which is wrong. The
destination address must be advanced only by the same amount as the source
address.
If the source and destination offsets within their page tables differ, the
destination address can be advanced too far, causing follow-up issues.
Fix this by advancing the destination address by the source advance
distance.
With a reproducer, we were able to trigger a kernel panic on x86-64. With
this fix in place, we can no longer reproduce the issue. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/erdma: Use IRQ-safe XArray helpers for QP and CQ tables
Locked QP and CQ lookups from EQ interrupts can deadlock with
create-path XArray updates. If an interrupt arrives while the create
path holds the plain xa_lock, the lookup spins forever trying to
acquire the same lock.
Use IRQ-safe XArray helpers for all QP and CQ create-path updates,
including the GSI QP store and error paths. Initialize both arrays with
XA_FLAGS_LOCK_IRQ so sleeping allocations preserve interrupt state. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: hci_core: Fix queuing tx_work after workqueue is drained
hci_send_acl(), hci_send_sco() and hci_send_iso() queue hdev->tx_work
unconditionally. They can run from the L2CAP/SCO/ISO socket send path
while hci_dev_close_sync() is draining hdev->workqueue (HCIDEVDOWN
racing with a socket write). Since that queue_work() is not chained
work from the tx_work worker itself, __queue_work() sees the queue
marked __WQ_DRAINING, warns "cannot queue %ps on wq %s", and drops
the work:
WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 5985 at kernel/workqueue.c:2352 __queue_work
Call Trace:
queue_work_on
l2cap_chan_send
l2cap_sock_sendmsg
...
hci_dev_close_sync() already sets HCI_CMD_DRAIN_WORKQUEUE before
draining, but only hci_cmd_work() and handle_cmd_cnt_and_timer()
check it before queuing. Route the tx_work producers through the
same guard via a shared hci_sched_tx() helper. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ALSA: usb-audio: Clamp implicit feedback packet count to URB capacity
data_ep_set_params() allocates each data URB for exactly u->packets
isochronous frames, so urb->iso_frame_desc[] has u->packets slots and
ctx->packets is the driver's only record of that limit. For an implicit
feedback sink, snd_usb_queue_pending_output_urbs() overwrites it with the
sync source's packet count, which is calculated independently from the
capture endpoint's parameters. When that count is larger,
prepare_playback_urb() and prepare_silent_urb() can write
iso_frame_desc[] past the allocation; their existing bounds limit payload
bytes, not the descriptor index.
The reproducer uses a high-speed UAC2 device declaring bInterval 1 for
implicit feedback capture (8 packets) and bInterval 4 for playback
(1 packet). On the first capture completion after the stream starts, it
accesses seven descriptors spanning 112 bytes beyond the one-packet URB:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in prepare_playback_urb (sound/usb/pcm.c:1560)
Write of size 4 at addr ffff88801e696ad0 by task vhci_rx/178
prepare_playback_urb (sound/usb/pcm.c:1560)
prepare_outbound_urb (sound/usb/endpoint.c:340)
snd_usb_queue_pending_output_urbs (sound/usb/endpoint.c:501)
snd_complete_urb (sound/usb/endpoint.c:1834)
__usb_hcd_giveback_urb (drivers/usb/core/hcd.c:1657)
usb_hcd_giveback_urb (drivers/usb/core/hcd.c:1741)
vhci_rx_loop (drivers/usb/usbip/vhci_rx.c:107)
kthread (kernel/kthread.c:436)
The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88801e696a00
which belongs to the cache kmalloc-256 of size 256
The buggy address is located 0 bytes to the right of
allocated 208-byte region [ffff88801e696a00, ffff88801e696ad0)
Record the allocated packet count per endpoint and clamp both the adopted
count and the packet-size copy to it. Fold the Format Type II delimiter
into urb_packs before the allocation loop so the recorded limit matches
every URB. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
btrfs: take commit root semaphore when iterating in mark_block_group_to_copy()
mark_block_group_to_copy() iterates over the commit root with
skip_locking=true. A concurrent transaction commit can swap and free
the commit root during iteration, causing use-after-free when
accessing extent buffers.
Fix it by using path->need_commit_sem to protect the commit root search. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
hwmon: (pwm-fan) Stop RPM timer before freeing tach data
sample_timer() rearms the RPM timer and accesses the devm-managed
ctx->tachs and ctx->pulses_per_revolution arrays. The cleanup action
which stops the timer is registered before those arrays are allocated.
Since devres releases entries in reverse order, driver detach can free
the arrays before pwm_fan_cleanup() shuts down the timer. A timer expiry
in that window accesses the freed tach data.
With a KASAN kernel, a test-only kprobe delayed entry to
pwm_fan_cleanup() while normal sysfs unbind ran. Each of three runs
reported three four-byte reads and two four-byte writes in sample_timer()
after its backing devm allocations had been freed. The helper did not
invoke the timer callback, cleanup actions or free functions.
With the fix, three matching unbind runs completed without KASAN, BUG,
WARNING, Oops or panic. Instrumentation confirmed that timer retirement
completed before the first timer backing allocation was released.
Split timer retirement from the power cleanup and register its devres
action after the timer backing data and IRQ actions are installed. This
preserves the early power rollback action while ensuring the timer is
retired before its backing data is released. Use timer_shutdown_sync()
because the callback can rearm itself. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: libipw: reject TKIP frames without a full MIC
libipw_michael_mic_verify() assumes that an skb contains an eight-byte
Michael MIC. A short TKIP frame makes the unsigned payload length wrap,
causing michael_mic() to read past the skb.
Check that the MIC is present before verifying it, and use the existing
MICHAEL_MIC_LEN constant for all MIC lengths in the verifier. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: wcn36xx: Fix potential use-after-free in TX ack timer teardown
wcn36xx_dxe_deinit() tears down the TX ack timer with timer_delete(),
which only dequeues the timer and does not wait for a callback that is
already executing; the preceding free_irq() calls synchronize the
interrupt handlers only. The callback, wcn36xx_dxe_tx_timer(), can
therefore be running past the teardown and use the wcn freed along
with the ieee80211_hw in wcn36xx_remove(): it takes wcn->dxe_lock,
reads wcn->tx_ack_skb and passes wcn->hw to
ieee80211_tx_status_irqsafe().
Fix this by using timer_shutdown_sync(), which waits for a running
callback and also prevents the timer from being rearmed again. The
timer is set up again by wcn36xx_dxe_init() on the next start, so the
start/stop cycle is unaffected.
This issue was found by an in-house static analysis tool. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb: client: fix use-after-free of iface in cifs_try_adding_channels()
cifs_try_adding_channels() iterates ses->iface_list with
list_for_each_entry_safe_from(), which captures the next entry
(niface) under iface_lock. The loop body then drops iface_lock for
the whole duration of cifs_ses_add_channel().
A concurrent interface refresh (SMB3_request_interfaces() ->
parse_server_interfaces()) marks all ifaces inactive and removes and
frees any that are not re-advertised via list_del() + kref_put(),
where release_iface() is a bare kfree(). Since niface typically has
no channel holding a reference, the list reference is its last and it
can be freed inside the unlocked window. On continue, the iterator
advance step then dereferences niface->iface_head.next, and the loop
body reads iface->rdma_capable/is_active, both on freed memory.
Fix this by never keeping an unreferenced list pointer across the
unlocked window. Each channel attempt now re-scans the list from the
head under iface_lock, takes a kref on the selected candidate, and
passes only that referenced candidate to cifs_ses_add_channel().
weight_fulfilled still tracks selection progress, so restarting the
scan preserves the original weighted distribution and the
weight_fulfilled-before-kref_put ordering on the failure path.
Add a per-pass attempts cap so a flapping interface refresh cannot
keep the inner loop spinning within a single tries increment. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb: client: fix OOB struct field reads in move_smb2_ea_to_cifs()
In move_smb2_ea_to_cifs(), the while (src_size > 0) loop condition is
insufficient. It allows iteration to continue even if the remaining
src_size is too small to contain a complete smb2_ea_info structure.
Consequently, reads of ea_name_length and ea_value_length can occur
out-of-bounds.
Fix this by ensuring src_size >= sizeof(*src) before attempting to read
any structure fields. Additionally, reject any next_entry_offset that is
smaller than sizeof(*src) or that would advance the pointer beyond the
available buffer.
Note that for calls where the server returns a malformed EA list, the
error returned to userspace changes from -ENODATA (getxattr) or
-ERANGE (listxattr) to -EIO. This correctly signals a server protocol
error rather than misleadingly indicating "attribute not present" or
"output buffer too small". |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb: client: fix reparse buffer bounds in cifs_query_reparse_point()
In cifs_query_reparse_point(), the start >= end check before casting to
struct reparse_data_buffer * only ensures the start pointer is within the
response. It fails to verify that there is enough space remaining for the
fixed 8-byte header of the structure.
If a server provides a DataOffset that leaves less than 8 bytes remaining,
the check passes, but subsequent reads of ReparseTag and ReparseDataLength
will occur out-of-bounds.
Fix this by ensuring the remaining space is at least the size of the
reparse_data_buffer structure before accessing its fields. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb/server: fix tree connection leak in smb2_tree_connect()
See the procedure below:
smb2_tree_connect
ksmbd_tree_conn_connect
xa_store(&sess->tree_conns, tree_conn->id, tree_conn)
ksmbd_counter_inc(KSMBD_COUNTER_TREE_CONNS)
ksmbd_share_tree_conn_inc(sc)
ksmbd_iov_pin_rsp // fail
status.ret = KSMBD_TREE_CONN_STATUS_NOMEM
// do not disconnect tree_conn
Disconnect the new tree connection if ksmbd_iov_pin_rsp() fails. |
