| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
coresight: etm4x: fix underflow for usage of (nrseqstate - 1)
According to IHI006H Embedded Trace Macrocell Architecture
Specification[0], TRCSEQEVR<n> is implemented only when
TRCIDR5.NUMSEQSTATE is 0b100, in which case n ranges from 0 to 2;
otherwise, TRCIDR5.NUMSEQSTATE is 0b000.
IOW, the number of usage in the initialisation or setting
TRCSEQEVR<n> with drvdata->nrseqstate - 1 in the loop could make
underflow issue when TRCIDR5.NUMSEQSTATE is 0b000.
Therefore, introduce nr_seq_ctrls field and untie it from nrseqstate.
As part of this introduce ETM_MAX_SEQ_TRANSITIONS macro and
apply nr_seq_ctrls and above macro to TRCSEQEVR<n> relevant fields setup. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
IB/isert: reject PDUs declaring more data than was received
isert_recv_done() hands each received PDU to the opcode handlers without
ever looking at wc->byte_len, the number of bytes the HCA actually placed
in the receive descriptor. The handlers then copy that many bytes - the
data-segment length the initiator declared in the BHS
(ntoh24(hdr->dlength), via the derived unsol_data_len / imm_data_len) -
out of the fixed-size descriptor:
isert_handle_iscsi_dataout():
sg_copy_from_buffer(sg_start, sg_nents, isert_get_data(rx_desc),
unsol_data_len);
isert_handle_scsi_cmd():
sg_copy_from_buffer(cmd->se_cmd.t_data_sg, sg_nents,
isert_get_data(rx_desc), imm_data_len);
Because the declared length is never checked against wc->byte_len, an
initiator can declare a data segment larger than the bytes it actually
sent (and larger than the descriptor) and cause an out-of-bounds read of
the receive buffer.
Nothing upstream of isert closes this door:
- __iscsit_check_dataout_hdr() bounds the inbound payload against
conn_ops->MaxXmitDataSegmentLength (MXDSL) - a transmit parameter,
used here for the inbound check.
- iscsi_set_connection_parameters() sets
ops->MaxXmitDataSegmentLength = ops->TargetRecvDataSegmentLength;
and TARGETRECVDATASEGMENTLENGTH is absent from the min()-clamp list in
iscsi_check_acceptor_state(), so the value the initiator declares is
adopted verbatim (type range 512..16777215). The initiator effectively
raises its own ceiling.
- isert never clamps the negotiated value to its own fixed receive
descriptor (ISER_RX_SIZE, 9216 bytes), so the target core's bound and
the descriptor size are unrelated.
The imm_data_len == data_len path is more than an over-read: it aliases
the receive descriptor via sg_set_buf() and passes it to the backend as
the data source for the SCSI WRITE, so an over-declared length causes heap
contents past the descriptor to be written through the backend to the
backing store. The backend is the victim of the oversized scatterlist
isert hands it, not the cause; no read-back of the written bytes was
demonstrated.
Trigger: after login completes (full feature phase), an initiator that has
declared a large TargetRecvDataSegmentLength and a FirstBurstLength that
permits unsolicited/immediate data sends a PDU whose declared data-segment
length exceeds what was received. With KASAN:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in sg_copy_buffer+0x150/0x1c0
Read of size 4096 at addr ffff888109720800 by task kworker/1:0H/25
Workqueue: ib-comp-wq ib_cq_poll_work
Call Trace:
sg_copy_buffer+0x150/0x1c0
isert_recv_done+0xba6/0x2390
__ib_process_cq+0xe1/0x390
ib_cq_poll_work+0x46/0x150
isert_recv_done+0xba6 resolves to isert_handle_iscsi_dataout()
(ib_isert.c:1160), inlined through isert_rx_opcode().
Validate wc->byte_len against the framing in isert_recv_done() before the
PDU reaches any handler, and reinstate the connection if it is short.
Because the test compares without subtracting the header length, it also
rejects PDUs shorter than the iSER and iSCSI headers, which would otherwise
be parsed out of stale descriptor contents. The login handler rejects PDUs
shorter than ISER_HEADERS_LEN (commit 29e7b925ae6d ("IB/isert: Reject login
PDUs shorter than ISER_HEADERS_LEN")) but does not bound the declared
length either; that is fixed in the next patch. The data handlers had no
length check at all.
isert reads the data segment from a fixed offset: isert_get_data()
returns the iSER header plus ISER_HEADERS_LEN and makes no adjustment for
an AHS. The bytes the handlers touch are therefore exactly
[ISER_HEADERS_LEN, ISER_HEADERS_LEN + dlength), and comparing that sum
against wc->byte_len bounds precisely the region that is read. An AHS
term would only make the test stricter without bounding anything furth
---truncated--- |
| FreeRDP versions before 3.31.0 contain an out-of-bounds write vulnerability in the urbdrc client channel's urb_send_current_frame_number_result() function. A malicious RDP server can send a crafted 28-byte USB redirection message to trigger a 4-byte write past the allocated 16-byte buffer, causing denial of service when verbose asserts are enabled. |
| stb_vorbis through 1.22 contains a heap buffer overflow in start_decoder() where the codebook multiplicands allocation size is truncated from size_t to int. Attackers can craft a malicious Ogg Vorbis file with large entries and dimensions values to trigger out-of-bounds writes, causing process crashes or heap corruption. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
platform/chrome: cros_ec_typec: Reject out-of-bounds PD cap count
cros_typec_register_partner_pdos() copies the partner PDOs from the EC
TYPEC_STATUS response into the fixed caps_desc.pdo[PDO_MAX_OBJECTS] array.
memcpy(caps_desc.pdo, resp->source_cap_pdos,
sizeof(u32) * resp->source_cap_count);
...
memcpy(caps_desc.pdo, resp->sink_cap_pdos,
sizeof(u32) * resp->sink_cap_count);
PDO_MAX_OBJECTS is 7. source_cap_count and sink_cap_count are u8 fields
from the EC. The only check is that they are not both zero. If either is
larger than 7, the memcpy writes past the end of the array on the stack.
A count of 255 overflows it by about 1 KB. The EC source arrays are only
seven entries wide. A larger count reads past them too.
The ChromeOS EC firmware caps these counts today, so a compliant setup
does not hit this. The kernel should still validate these values rather
than trust them.
Validate the counts in cros_typec_register_partner_pdos() next to the
memcpy. Skip the PDO registration if either count is above PDO_MAX_OBJECTS.
The rest of cros_typec_handle_status() still runs so events are handled
and cleared. |
| FluidSynth is a software synthesizer based on the SoundFont 2 specifications. From 2.2.4 until 2.5.6, configuring synth.midi-channels above 16 allows the MIDI player to index _fluid_player_t::channel_isplaying outside its fixed-size heap allocation while tracking active channels. The resulting out-of-bounds reads and writes invoke undefined behavior and may compromise confidentiality, integrity, or availability. No crafted MIDI file is required because the unsafe condition is created by the channel-count configuration itself. Keeping synth.midi-channels at its default value of 16 avoids the vulnerable path. This issue is fixed in version 2.5.6. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
riscv, bpf: Fix kernel stack corruption in tailcall with CFI
When CONFIG_CFI_CLANG is enabled, prog->bpf_func already skips the kcfi
instruction during setup. Including it again in the tailcall jump offset
causes it to jump over an extra 4 bytes, skipping the stack pointer
adjustment, which will result in kernel stack corruption. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: iwlwifi: mei: check SAP message length before reading it
Verify the SAP message size is not larger than the local buffer before
reading the message to avoid buffer overflow. |
| OpenImageIO is a toolset for reading, writing, and manipulating image files of any image file format relevant to VFX / animation. Prior to 3.0.21.0, 3.1.16.0, and 3.2.0.3-beta1, A zbuffer-only tiled iff is exposed with a 16-bit public imagespec while the decoder retains a 32-bit internal pixel size. iffinput::read_native_tile() copies according to m_header.pixel_bytes() rather than imagespec::tile_bytes(true), and a failed read can leave m_buf nonempty so a later call copies partially initialized data into the undersized caller buffer, resulting in a heap out-of-bounds write and memory corruption. The affected implementation is identified by src/iff.imageio/iffinput.cpp, IffInput::read_native_tile(), ImageSpec::tile_bytes(true), m_header.pixel_bytes(), ZBUFFER, and m_buf, which define the relevant source path, functions, state, and trigger. This issue is fixed in versions 3.0.21.0, 3.1.16.0, and 3.2.0.3-beta1. |
| OpenImageIO is a toolset for reading, writing, and manipulating image files of any image file format relevant to VFX / animation. Prior to 3.1.16.0, A crafted 1-bit contiguous cmyk tiff is exposed through a native uint1 imagespec, so callers allocate a bit-packed buffer. tiffinput::read_native_scanline_locked() nevertheless invokes tiffinput::bit_convert() with 8-bit output and writes one expanded byte per value into that smaller buffer, resulting in a heap out-of-bounds write and memory corruption. The affected implementation is identified by src/tiff.imageio/tiffinput.cpp, TIFFInput::bit_convert(), TIFFInput::read_native_scanline_locked(), PHOTOMETRIC_SEPARATED, 1-bit CMYK, and native uint1 ImageSpec, which define the relevant source path, functions, state, and trigger. This issue is fixed in 3.1.16.0. |
| libheif is a HEIF and AVIF file format decoder and encoder. From 1.22.0 until 1.23.2, a crafted HEIF, HEIC, or AVIF item graph using nested iden and auxl references can make HeifPixelImage::transfer_channel_from_image_as() append duplicate Alpha planes with different bit depths to m_storage. HeifPixelImage::scale_nearest_neighbor() in libheif/image/pixelimage.cc allocates the destination Alpha plane using the first plane's 8-bit depth, then iterates a later 10-bit or 12-bit Alpha component and writes uint16_t samples into the same 8-bit allocation. The output geometry controls the overflow extent and the encoded sample values control the data written, allowing a remote file processed by heif_decode_image() to cause a heap out-of-bounds write. This issue is fixed in version 1.23.2. |
| In Vinyl Cache before 9.0,2, workspace buffer overflow vulnerability was found in the .upper() and .lower() string type methods of VCL. This can be used as a remote denial of service (DoS) vector to make the child process segfault or assert, and then restart. Effectively exploiting this vulnerability requires prior knowledge about the VCL in use and the ability to craft a request that contains a string that is long enough to fill the remaining workspace at the call site while staying under the different request size limits (http_req_size, http_req_hdr_len, etc.). |
| An out-of-bounds write vulnerability exists in some of the Ethernet switches because of improper validation of the username field length during Web login processing. This may allow a remote attacker to submit a specially crafted overly long input, triggering a buffer overflow that can cause the authentication process to crash and result in a Denial of Service (DoS) attack. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
cpufreq: imx6q: fix out-of-bounds write when probed more than once
imx6_soc_volt is allocated fresh on every probe, sized to the number of
ARM OPPs:
imx6_soc_volt = devm_kcalloc(cpu_dev, num, sizeof(*imx6_soc_volt),
GFP_KERNEL);
but it is filled through soc_opp_count, which has static storage and is
never reset. A second bind after an unbind keeps indexing from where the
first one stopped, and writes past the end of the new array.
Unbinding and rebinding the driver on qemu's mcimx6ul-evk, under KASAN:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in imx6q_cpufreq_probe+0x3b0/0xa34
Write of size 4 at addr c5e90480 by task binder/73
imx6q_cpufreq_probe from platform_probe+0x88/0xe4
platform_probe from really_probe+0x108/0x384
bind_store from kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x1b4/0x28c
The write lands one u32 past the end of the allocation.
soc_opp_count is only read a few lines below the loop that fills it, so it
never needed static storage. Make it a local. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: mt76: fix out-of-bounds access in mmio copy helpers
mt76_mmio_write_copy() and mt76_mmio_read_copy() iterate up to
ALIGN(len, 4), so a length that is not a multiple of four reads past the
source buffer (write_copy) or writes past the destination (read_copy).
Copy the aligned body in the loop and handle the remaining tail through a
4-byte bounce buffer, keeping the register access width unchanged. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: mt76: mt7996: validate RX band_idx before dereferencing phys[]
band_idx comes from a 2-bit descriptor field (0-3) and was used directly
to index dev->mt76.phys[] (size __MT_MAX_BAND == 3) and dereference the
result. A corrupt or reserved descriptor value could index out of bounds
or hit a NULL phy on parts with fewer bands. Reject invalid band indices,
mirroring mt7996_rx_get_wcid(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Fix offset warn check for bpf_res_spin_lock
Sashiko pointed out correctly that the case statement for
BPF_RES_SPIN_LOCK incorrectly checks offset for BPF_SPIN_LOCK.
Fix it by checking res_spin_lock_off instead. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
uprobes/x86: Move optimized uprobe from nop5 to nop10
Andrii reported an issue with optimized uprobes [1] that can clobber
redzone area with call instruction storing return address on stack
where user code may keep temporary data without adjusting rsp.
Fixing this by moving the optimized uprobes on top of 10-bytes nop
instruction, so we can squeeze another instruction to escape the
redzone area before doing the call, like:
lea -0x80(%rsp), %rsp
call tramp
Note the lea instruction is used to adjust the rsp register without
changing the flags.
We use nop10 and following transformation to optimized instructions
above and back as suggested by Peterz [2].
Optimize path (int3_update_optimize):
1) Initial state after set_swbp() installed the uprobe:
cc 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00
From offset 0 this is INT3 followed by the tail of the original
10-byte NOP.
After a previous unoptimization bytes 5..9 may still contain the
old call instruction, which remains valid for threads already there.
2) Rewrite the LEA tail and call displacement:
cc [8d 64 24 80 e8 d0 d1 d2 d3]
From offset 0 this traps on the uprobe INT3. Bytes 1..9 are not
executable entry points while byte 0 is trapped.
3) Publish the first LEA byte:
[48] 8d 64 24 80 e8 d0 d1 d2 d3
From offset 0 this is:
lea -0x80(%rsp), %rsp
call <uprobe-trampoline>
Unoptimize path (int3_update_unoptimize):
1) Initial optimized state:
48 8d 64 24 80 e8 d0 d1 d2 d3
Same as 3) above.
2) Trap new entries before restoring the NOP bytes:
[cc] 8d 64 24 80 e8 d0 d1 d2 d3
From offset 0 this traps. A thread that had already executed the
LEA can still reach the intact CALL at offset 5.
3) Restore bytes 1..4 of the original NOP while keeping byte 0 trapped
and byte 5 as CALL.
cc [2e 0f 1f 84] e8 d0 d1 d2 d3
From offset 0 this still traps. Offset 5 is still the CALL for any
thread that was already past the first LEA byte.
4) Publish the first byte of the original NOP:
[66] 2e 0f 1f 84 e8 d0 d1 d2 d3
From offset 0 this is the restored 10-byte NOP; the CALL opcode and
displacement are now only NOP operands. Offset 5 still decodes as
CALL for a thread that was already there.
Tthere is only a single target uprobe-trampoline for the given nop10
instruction address, so the CALL instruction will not be changed across
unoptimization/optimization cycles.
Therefore, any task that is preempted at the CALL instruction is guaranteed
to observe that CALL and not anything else.
Note as explained in [2] we need to use following nop10:
PF1 PF2 ESC NOPL MOD SIB DISP32
NOP10: 0x66, 0x2e, 0x0f, 0x1f, 0x84, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 -- cs nopw 0x00000000(%rax,%rax,1)
which means we need to allow 0x2e prefix which maps to INAT_PFX_CS
attribute in is_prefix_bad function.
Also changing the uprobe syscall error when called out of uprobe
trampoline to -EPROTO, so we are able to detect the fixed kernel.
The optimized uprobe performance stays the same:
uprobe-nop : 3.129 ± 0.013M/s
uprobe-push : 3.045 ± 0.006M/s
uprobe-ret : 1.095 ± 0.004M/s
--> uprobe-nop10 : 7.170 ± 0.020M/s
uretprobe-nop : 2.143 ± 0.021M/s
uretprobe-push : 2.090 ± 0.000M/s
uretprobe-ret : 0.942 ± 0.000M/s
--> uretprobe-nop10: 3.381 ± 0.003M/s
usdt-nop : 3.245 ± 0.004M/s
--> usdt-nop10 : 7.256 ± 0.023M/s
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20260509003146.976844-1-andrii@kernel.org/
[2] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20260518104306.GU3102624@noisy.programming.kicks-ass.net/#t |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: rtw89: debug: fix off by on in rtw89_ppdu_str()
This > comparison should be >= to avoid an out of bounds access. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/bnxt_re: Clear VM_MAYWRITE on DBR/toggle page mmap
bnxt_re_mmap() rejects VM_WRITE for the DBR_PAGE and TOGGLE_PAGE mmap
flags, but a read-only mapping can still retain VM_MAYWRITE. nd later
be upgraded with mprotect(PROT_WRITE). This can bypass the write check
that only runs at mmap time.
Clear VM_MAYWRITE before vm_insert_page() in the shared DBR/toggle-page
branch, matching the existing policy that userspace writes are not
expected for these pages. |
