| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| PyTorch torchvision through 0.28.0, fixed in commit 4e05dc2, contains an out-of-bounds heap read vulnerability in the GIF decoder's read_from_tensor callback that passes unclamped length to memcpy. Attackers can supply malicious or truncated GIF files to cause denial of service via segmentation fault or disclose adjacent heap memory contents. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: nexthop: Increase weight to u16
In CLOS networks, as link failures occur at various points in the network,
ECMP weights of the involved nodes are adjusted to compensate. With high
fan-out of the involved nodes, and overall high number of nodes,
a (non-)ECMP weight ratio that we would like to configure does not fit into
8 bits. Instead of, say, 255:254, we might like to configure something like
1000:999. For these deployments, the 8-bit weight may not be enough.
To that end, in this patch increase the next hop weight from u8 to u16.
Increasing the width of an integral type can be tricky, because while the
code still compiles, the types may not check out anymore, and numerical
errors come up. To prevent this, the conversion was done in two steps.
First the type was changed from u8 to a single-member structure, which
invalidated all uses of the field. This allowed going through them one by
one and audit for type correctness. Then the structure was replaced with a
vanilla u16 again. This should ensure that no place was missed.
The UAPI for configuring nexthop group members is that an attribute
NHA_GROUP carries an array of struct nexthop_grp entries:
struct nexthop_grp {
__u32 id; /* nexthop id - must exist */
__u8 weight; /* weight of this nexthop */
__u8 resvd1;
__u16 resvd2;
};
The field resvd1 is currently validated and required to be zero. We can
lift this requirement and carry high-order bits of the weight in the
reserved field:
struct nexthop_grp {
__u32 id; /* nexthop id - must exist */
__u8 weight; /* weight of this nexthop */
__u8 weight_high;
__u16 resvd2;
};
Keeping the fields split this way was chosen in case an existing userspace
makes assumptions about the width of the weight field, and to sidestep any
endianness issues.
The weight field is currently encoded as the weight value minus one,
because weight of 0 is invalid. This same trick is impossible for the new
weight_high field, because zero must mean actual zero. With this in place:
- Old userspace is guaranteed to carry weight_high of 0, therefore
configuring 8-bit weights as appropriate. When dumping nexthops with
16-bit weight, it would only show the lower 8 bits. But configuring such
nexthops implies existence of userspace aware of the extension in the
first place.
- New userspace talking to an old kernel will work as long as it only
attempts to configure 8-bit weights, where the high-order bits are zero.
Old kernel will bounce attempts at configuring >8-bit weights.
Renaming reserved fields as they are allocated for some purpose is commonly
done in Linux. Whoever touches a reserved field is doing so at their own
risk. nexthop_grp::resvd1 in particular is currently used by at least
strace, however they carry an own copy of UAPI headers, and the conversion
should be trivial. A helper is provided for decoding the weight out of the
two fields. Forcing a conversion seems preferable to bending backwards and
introducing anonymous unions or whatever. |
| nebula-mesh is a self-hosted control plane for Slack Nebula mesh virtual private network. Prior to version 0.3.1, none of the response paths in `internal/web/` or `internal/api/` set the standard browser-security headers. `grep` for `Content-Security-Policy`, `X-Frame-Options`, `Strict-Transport-Security`, `X-Content-Type-Options`, `Referrer-Policy` returns zero matches across the codebase. Version 0.3.1 fixes the issue. |
| The Cozy Blocks – Page Builder for Gutenberg Editor & FSE with 600+ Patterns, 58 Blocks & Templates plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Stored Cross-Site Scripting via 'cozyCustomFont' Block Attribute in all versions up to, and including, 2.2.11 due to insufficient input sanitization and output escaping. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with contributor-level access and above, to inject arbitrary web scripts in pages that will execute whenever a user accesses an injected page. |
| In Eclipse BaSyx Go Components versions up to and including 1.0.0, ABAC-enabled deployments are vulnerable to an authorization bypass caused by inconsistent trailing-slash handling between the ABAC middleware and the HTTP router.
The shared router configuration used Chi's `middleware.StripSlashes`, so a request such as `GET /shells/` was dispatched to the registered `GET /shells` route. However, the ABAC middleware evaluated the original request path including the trailing slash. If ABAC route lookup did not find a matching slash-suffixed route, the request was passed onward and the router then stripped the slash and executed the protected handler without the intended ABAC authorization decision and without the expected ABAC query filters.
An unauthenticated or unauthorized network attacker could append a trailing slash to protected API routes to reach handlers that should have been denied by ABAC policy. Depending on the exposed component, HTTP method, and deployed policy, this could allow unauthorized read, create, update, delete, or upload operations.
The issue affects ABAC-enabled deployments of services that use the shared router and ABAC middleware, including AAS Repository, Submodel Repository, AAS Registry, Submodel Registry, Concept Description Repository, Discovery, AAS Environment upload, and related services. The issue is fixed in Eclipse BaSyx Go Components v1.0.1. |
| External control of Assumed-Immutable web parameter vulnerability in ABIS Technology Ltd. Co. AVESİS allows Accessing Functionality Not Properly Constrained by ACLs.
This issue affects AVESİS: before 202606251646. |
| Hulumi is an open-source toolkit that ships secure-by-default cloud and platform infrastructure components for Pulumi. Prior to version 1.4.0, consumers running drift detection in CI / cron could see transient adapter failures silently cached as "all clear" — masking real attacks for up to six hours — or see ordinary provider-version churn falsely promoted to incident severity. Either way, the verdict source was unreliable for downstream incident workflows that gate on it. This issue has been patched in version 1.4.0. |
| Vulnerability in the Oracle Project Contracts product of Oracle E-Business Suite (component: Internal Operations). Supported versions that are affected are 12.2.3-12.2.15. Easily exploitable vulnerability allows low privileged attacker with network access via HTTP to compromise Oracle Project Contracts. Successful attacks of this vulnerability can result in unauthorized creation, deletion or modification access to critical data or all Oracle Project Contracts accessible data as well as unauthorized access to critical data or complete access to all Oracle Project Contracts accessible data. CVSS 3.1 Base Score 8.1 (Confidentiality and Integrity impacts). CVSS Vector: (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N). |
| cJSON library is vulnerable to an integer overflow in the print_string_ptr() function in cJSON.c on 32-bit platforms. The escape_characters counter, a 32-bit size_t, can wrap around when processing strings containing approximately 858,993,460 or more control characters, causing the output buffer to be allocated based on an underestimated length. When cJSON_PrintBuffered() is used with a pre-allocated buffer, the subsequent write loop overflows the heap allocation. An attacker supplying a crafted JSON string to an application using cJSON on a 32-bit platform can cause a heap buffer overflow, potentially leading to remote code execution, information disclosure, or denial of service.
Because project creator contact attempts were unsuccessful, the vulnerability has only been confirmed in version 1.7.19 but may also affect other versions. |
| The issue is a DNSSEC validation bypass where wildcard expansion proofs (NSEC/NSEC3 records) are accepted without signature validation when the wildcard answer is a CNAME or DNAME record. |
| Out of bounds write in Codecs in Google Chrome prior to 150.0.7871.186 allowed a remote attacker to potentially perform a sandbox escape via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: High) |
| Use after free in Blink in Google Chrome prior to 150.0.7871.186 allowed a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code inside a sandbox via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: High) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
octeontx2-pf: avoid double free of pool->stack on AQ init failure
otx2_pool_aq_init() frees pool->stack when mailbox sync or retry
allocation fails, but leaves the pointer unchanged. Later,
otx2_sq_aura_pool_init() unwinds the partial setup through
otx2_aura_pool_free(), which frees pool->stack again. The CN20K-specific
cn20k_pool_aq_init() implementation has the same bug in
its corresponding error path.
Set pool->stack to NULL immediately after the local free so the shared
cleanup path does not free the same stack again while cleaning up
partially initialized pool state.
The bug was first flagged by an experimental analysis tool we are
developing for kernel memory-management bugs while analyzing
v6.13-rc1. The tool is still under development and is not yet publicly
available. Manual inspection confirms that the bug is still present in
v7.1-rc3.
Runtime validation was not performed because reproducing this path
requires OcteonTX2/CN20K hardware. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fuse-uring: fix moving cancelled entry to ent_in_userspace list
fuse_uring_cancel() moves entries that are available (these have no reqs
attached) to the ent_in_userspace list. ent_list_request_expired()
checks the first entry on ent_in_userspace and dereferences
ent->fuse_req unconditionally, which will crash on a cancelled entry
that was moved to this list.
Fix this by freeing the entry and dropping queue_refs directly in
fuse_uring_cancel(). This is safe because cancel is the cancel handler
itself - after io_uring_cmd_done(), no more cancels will be dispatched
for this command, and teardown serializes with cancel via queue->lock.
Since cancel now decrements queue_refs, fuse_uring_abort() must no
longer gate fuse_uring_abort_end_requests() on queue_refs > 0, as
cancelled entries may have already dropped queue_refs while requests are
still queued. Remove the gate so abort always flushes requests and stops
queues. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: arm64: nv: Avoid dereferencing NULL VNCR pseudo-TLB
VNCR TLB invalidation occurs from MMU notifiers or TLBI instructions,
and either can race against a vcpu not being onlined yet (no pseudo-TLB
allocated). Similarly, the TLB might be invalid, and the invalidation
should be skipped in this case.
Both kvm_invalidate_vncr_ipa() and kvm_invalidate_vncr_va() are
expected to perform the same checks, except that the latter doesn't
check for the allocation and blindly dereferences the pointer.
Solve this by introducing a new iterator built on top of the usual
kvm_for_each_vcpu() that checks for both of the above conditions,
and convert the two users to it. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
module: decompress: check return value of module_extend_max_pages()
module_extend_max_pages() calls kvrealloc() internally and returns
-ENOMEM on allocation failure. The return value is never checked.
If the initial allocation fails, info->pages remains NULL and
info->max_pages remains 0. Subsequent calls to module_get_next_page()
will attempt to dynamically grow the array by calling
module_extend_max_pages(info, 0) since info->used_pages is 0. This
results in kvrealloc(NULL, 0) returning ZERO_SIZE_PTR, which is treated
as a success, leading to a dereference of ZERO_SIZE_PTR and a kernel
oops.
Fix: add the missing error check after module_extend_max_pages() and
return immediately on failure. This matches the pattern used by every
other kvrealloc() caller in the module loading path.
[Sami: Corrected the analysis in the commit message.] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/handshake: Take a long-lived file reference at submit
handshake_nl_accept_doit() needs the file pointer backing
req->hr_sk->sk_socket to survive the window between
handshake_req_next() and the subsequent FD_PREPARE() and get_file().
The submit-side sock_hold() does not provide that. sk_refcnt keeps
struct sock alive, but struct socket is owned by sock->file: when
the consumer fputs the last file reference, sock_release() tears
the socket down regardless of any sock_hold.
Add an hr_file pointer to struct handshake_req and acquire an
explicit reference on sock->file during handshake_req_submit().
handshake_complete() and handshake_req_cancel() release the
reference on the completion-bit-winning path.
The submit error path must also release the file reference, but
after rhashtable insertion a concurrent handshake_req_cancel() can
discover the request and race the error path. Gate the error-path
cleanup -- sk_destruct restoration, fput, and request destruction
-- with test_and_set_bit(HANDSHAKE_F_REQ_COMPLETED), the same
serialization handshake_complete() and handshake_req_cancel()
already use. When cancel has already claimed ownership, the submit
error path returns without touching the request; socket teardown
handles final destruction.
The accept-side dereferences are not yet retargeted; that change
comes in the next patch. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
staging: vme_user: bound slave read/write to the kern_buf size
The SLAVE-path helpers buffer_to_user() and buffer_from_user() copy
'count' bytes into/out of the fixed-size kern_buf (size_buf ==
PCI_BUF_SIZE == 0x20000, 128 KiB) using *ppos as the offset, without
bounding *ppos + count against size_buf.
vme_user_write()/vme_user_read() only clamp count to the VME window size
(image_size = vme_get_size(resource)), which VME_SET_SLAVE sets from the
user-supplied slave.size -- validated against the VME address space (up
to VME_A32_MAX = 4 GiB), not against PCI_BUF_SIZE. When the window
exceeds 128 KiB, a write()/read() copies past the kern_buf allocation.
Clamp count against size_buf in both helpers, with an early return when
*ppos is already at/after the buffer end. *ppos is >= 0 here (the caller
rejects negative offsets), so size_buf - *ppos cannot wrap. This mirrors
the existing clamp in the MASTER-path helpers resource_to_user() /
resource_from_user(), and matches the read()/write() convention of a
short transfer at end-of-buffer.
Found by static analysis (CodeQL taint tracking + CBMC bounded model
checking) and confirmed dynamically under KASAN with the vme_fake bridge:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in _copy_from_user+0x2d/0x80
Write of size 262144 at addr ffff888004100000 by task trigger/68
_copy_from_user+0x2d/0x80
vme_user_write+0x13e/0x240 [vme_user]
vfs_write+0x1b8/0x7a0
ksys_write+0xb8/0x150 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB reads in rtw_get_sec_ie(), rtw_get_wapi_ie(), and rtw_get_wps_attr()
Three IE/attribute parsing functions have missing bounds checks.
rtw_get_sec_ie() and rtw_get_wapi_ie() iterate over a raw IE buffer
without verifying that the header bytes (tag + length) are within the
remaining buffer before reading them. Additionally, rtw_get_sec_ie()
compares the 4-byte WPA OUI at cnt+2 without checking that at least
6 bytes remain, and rtw_get_wapi_ie() compares a 4-byte WAPI OUI at
cnt+6 without checking that at least 10 bytes remain.
rtw_get_wps_attr() reads wps_ie[0] and wps_ie+2 unconditionally at
entry, before verifying that wps_ielen is large enough to contain
the 6-byte WPS IE header (element_id + length + 4-byte OUI). Inside
the attribute loop, get_unaligned_be16() is called on attr_ptr and
attr_ptr+2 without checking that 4 bytes remain in the buffer.
Add a cnt+2 bounds check before each loop body in rtw_get_sec_ie()
and rtw_get_wapi_ie(), guard each multi-byte comparison with a minimum
IE length requirement, add a wps_ielen < 6 early return in
rtw_get_wps_attr(), and add a 4-byte bounds check in its inner loop. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
crypto: krb5 - filter out async aead implementations at alloc
krb5_aead_encrypt(), krb5_aead_decrypt() in rfc3961_simplified.c and
rfc8009_encrypt(), rfc8009_decrypt() in rfc8009_aes2.c set a NULL
completion callback and treat any negative return from
crypto_aead_{encrypt,decrypt}() as terminal, falling through to
kfree_sensitive(buffer). When the encrypt_name resolves to an
async AEAD instance the request returns -EINPROGRESS, the buffer
is freed while the backend's worker still holds a pointer, and the
worker dereferences the freed slab on completion.
KASAN report under UML+SLUB with a synthetic async aead backend
bound to krb5->encrypt_name:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in t5_stub_complete+0x7d/0xc7
The helpers were written synchronously, so filter the async
instances out at allocation time instead of plumbing
crypto_wait_req() through every call site.
Reachable via net/rxrpc/rxgk.c, fs/afs/cm_security.c and
net/ceph/crypto.c on systems with an async AEAD provider bound to
the krb5 enctype name. |
