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Search Results (3 CVEs found)
| CVE | Vendors | Products | Updated | CVSS v3.1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-14613 | 1 Redhat | 8 Build Keycloak, Build Of Keycloak, Data Grid and 5 more | 2026-07-29 | 4.3 Medium |
| A vulnerability was discovered in Keycloak's administrative interface that allows certain administrators to see information about groups they shouldn't have access to. When the new Fine-Grained Admin Permissions (FGAP v2) are turned on, an administrator who is allowed to see a specific "role" can also see a list of all groups assigned to that role. The system fails to check if the administrator has permission to see those specific groups. This could allow a restricted administrator to discover "hidden" groups and see their details, such as internal names and custom settings, which might contain sensitive deployment information. | ||||
| CVE-2026-14614 | 1 Redhat | 8 Build Keycloak, Build Of Keycloak, Data Grid and 5 more | 2026-07-29 | 5.4 Medium |
| A flaw was found in the ClientResource component of Keycloak's admin services when Fine-Grained Admin Permissions (FGAP) v2 is enabled. This issue allows a delegated administrator, who should only have limited control over specific clients, to attach or remove hidden client scopes that they are not authorized to see or manage. As a result, an attacker could inject unauthorized data or permissions into the security tokens issued to end-users, potentially tricking other applications into granting higher levels of access than intended. | ||||
| CVE-2026-14781 | 1 Redhat | 8 Build Keycloak, Build Of Keycloak, Data Grid and 5 more | 2026-07-29 | 4.8 Medium |
| A flaw exists in the org.keycloak.broker.oidc package where the OIDC broker incorrectly synchronizes the email_verified claim. When an OIDC identity provider is configured with trustEmail=true and the userinfo endpoint is enabled, Keycloak retrieves the email address from the userinfo response but retrieves the email_verified status exclusively from the id_token. The root cause is a lack of validation ensuring that the email_verified claim in the id_token actually refers to the email address returned by the userinfo endpoint. If these two sources return different email addresses, the id_token's email_verified=true claim is blindly applied to the userinfo email. Exploitation Conditions: The OIDC identity provider must have trustEmail set to true (non-default). The userinfo endpoint must be enabled (default). The attacker must control or have compromised the upstream OIDC provider. Concrete Impact: Mark arbitrary email addresses as verified in the Keycloak database. Bypass email-based security controls or verification workflows. Potential account takeover if the application relies solely on the email_verified flag from the IdP to link accounts. | ||||
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