| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| When using LookupCNAME with the cgo DNS resolver, a very long CNAME response can trigger a double-free of C memory and a crash. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Revert "media: v4l2-dev: fix error handling in __video_register_device()"
This reverts commit 2a934fdb01db6458288fc9386d3d8ceba6dd551a.
The intentions of that patch were good, but it doesn't work.
The idea is that if device_register fails, you have to do a put_device
to let the ref counter release resources.
However, the V4L2 API says that if video_register_device() fails, then
you have to call video_device_release(), which kfree()s the video_device
struct.
But the put_device() will already have freed the struct, so you end
up in a double-free scenario.
There is not really a good way of fixing this without breaking
video_register_device() into two parts, one that initializes everything,
and one that does the actual device_register, and then converting all
V4L2 drivers to this new model.
That is a massive job, and it is very unlikely that device_register
will fail.
So rather than ending up in a double-free scenario, just revert this
patch, and in that case we'll have a small memory leak. Which is a lot
more robust. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bnx2x: fix double free in bnx2x_init_firmware() error path
bnx2x_init_firmware() frees bp->init_ops, bp->init_data and
bp->init_ops_offsets in its error path without setting them to NULL.
The cleanup function bnx2x_release_firmware() frees the same three
pointers unconditionally, so if init_firmware fails and
release_firmware is later called (e.g. from __bnx2x_remove or through
the function state machine), all three are freed a second time.
Set each pointer to NULL after kfree() in the error path so that the
subsequent kfree(NULL) in bnx2x_release_firmware() is a safe no-op. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ip6_tunnel: use skb_cow_head() in ip6_tnl_xmit()
ip6_tnl_xmit() may need to expand headroom before it can push the
outer IPv6 and optional encap headers. It currently does that with
skb_realloc_headroom(), copies skb->sk ownership, consumes the original
skb, and then continues processing with the replacement skb kept only in
its local variable.
That is safe only if the helper cannot fail afterwards. But this helper
still has post-reallocation error exits. collect_md tunnels reject
non-NONE encap after the replacement, and ip6_tnl_encap() can also fail
later. In those cases the helper returns an error to its callers while
the caller still only has the original skb pointer.
Both ip6_tnl_start_xmit() and the IPv6 GRE paths free the caller skb on
error, so they can end up freeing an skb that ip6_tnl_xmit() already
consumed.
Use skb_cow_head() instead. It provides the required headroom and
writability without privately replacing the caller-owned skb, so later
error returns cannot leave callers with a stale pointer.
The Ethernet users, ip6gretap and ip6erspan, clear IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING
and already call skb_cow_head() before entering ip6_tnl_xmit(). They do
not rely on the removed skb_shared() reallocation. This also makes the
IPv6 tunnel path consistent with ip_tunnel_xmit(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: thunderbolt: Mark the connection down when bringing it up fails
Every failure path in tbnet_connected_work() undoes its own work and
returns without clearing login_sent, so the connection still looks
established. The next tbnet_tear_down() therefore takes its main branch
and repeats a teardown that already happened: it stops rings that are
already stopped, which is a dev_WARN() and fatal under panic_on_warn,
and it releases net->remote_transmit_path even on the HopID mismatch
path, where this connection never owned that id, silently freeing one
that someone else is still using.
Clear login_sent on those paths. That is enough for tbnet_tear_down() to
leave the unwound state alone, and login_received has to stay set: it
records that the peer has logged in and carries the transmit path it gave
us, which nothing on this side can make the peer send again. Two things
change beyond keeping the teardown out of the way: the logout request in
that block is no longer sent, and the peer's next login request now
re-queues our login work rather than connected_work, giving the
connection a fresh login instead of a retry on stale state. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ovl: fix double end_creating() on the casefold-mismatch path
ovl_create_real() releases the new dentry twice when the casefold
consistency check fails. The S_IFDIR branch calls end_creating() and
sets err, then falls through to the common out: label which calls
end_creating() on the same dentry again:
case S_IFDIR:
newdentry = ovl_do_mkdir(ofs, dir, newdentry, attr->mode);
err = PTR_ERR_OR_ZERO(newdentry);
if (!err && ofs->casefold != ovl_dentry_casefolded(newdentry)) {
pr_warn_ratelimited(...);
end_creating(newdentry); /* first */
err = -EINVAL;
}
break;
...
if (err)
goto out;
...
out:
if (err) {
end_creating(newdentry); /* second, same dentry */
return ERR_PTR(err);
}
end_creating() is end_dirop(), which does inode_unlock() on the parent
and dput() on the dentry, so the parent directory's i_rwsem is unlocked
twice and the dentry is put twice. The second unlock releases a lock
that is not held, which is what wedges every later creation under that
parent, and the second dput() drops a reference that was never taken.
The branch was added by commit dfc7da402ccc ("ovl: Check for casefold
consistency when creating new dentries") as a bare dput(), which already
released the reference twice; commit fe497f0759e0 ("VFS: change
vfs_mkdir() to unlock on failure.") converted both sites to
end_creating(), adding the double unlock.
This is reachable by an unprivileged user. The casefold consistency of
the layers is validated at mount time in ovl_parse_layer(), and again on
every lookup in ovl_lookup_single(), but ofs->workdir is the internal
"work" subdirectory created inside the user-supplied workdir, and that
subdirectory is not re-checked. Marking it casefolded after the mount
therefore makes every ovl_create_temp() inherit the wrong state - and
that path reaches ovl_create_real() through ovl_start_creating_temp(),
which uses start_creating() with a generated name and so never runs the
lookup-time check.
unshare -Urm
mount -t tmpfs -o casefold=utf8-12.1.0 tmpfs mnt
mkdir -p mnt/lower/d mnt/upper mnt/work mnt/merged
mount -t overlay ovl -o lowerdir=mnt/lower,\
upperdir=mnt/upper,workdir=mnt/work mnt/merged
chattr +F mnt/work/work
mkdir mnt/merged/d/sub # directory copy-up
overlayfs: wrong inherited casefold (work/#5)
and the next copy-up blocks forever on the parent's i_rwsem:
mkdir D start_creating+0x65/0xb0
ovl_start_creating_temp+0xb0/0xe0 [overlay]
ovl_create_temp+0xa3/0x1d0 [overlay]
ovl_copy_up_one+0x1f1c/0x21c0 [overlay]
ovl_copy_up_flags+0xf5/0x140 [overlay]
ovl_create_object+0xb7/0x220 [overlay]
ovl_mkdir+0x23/0x40 [overlay]
Drop the end_creating() from the branch and let out: own the cleanup,
which is what every other error path in this function already does. |
| In PCRE2 before 10.48, pcre2_jit_match mishandles a previously copied subject being passed in as a context. An incorrect free operation can occur. |
| Issue summary: OpenSSL CMP response validation passed an unexpected response
sender distinguished name directly as the format string to `ERR_raise_data()`.
Impact summary: A malicious or intercepted CMP endpoint can crash a CMP client
that enforces an expected sender or uses a pinned server certificate whose
subject becomes the default expected sender.
CWE: CWE-134 (Use of Externally-Controlled Format String)
Description: When validating a received CMP message, ossl_cmp_msg_check_update()
converts the peer-supplied sender distinguished name with X509_NAME_oneline()
and passes it directly as the format argument to ERR_raise_data(). Percent
characters survive the conversion, so a sender DN such as "CN=%s%n" reaches
BIO_vsnprintf() as an attacker-controlled format string with no matching variadic
arguments. This path is only reached when the caller configures an expected
sender or pins a server certificate, which is the normal configuration for a
CMP client validating server responses.
Since the attacker controls the format string but none of the variadic
arguments, such specifiers as %s and %n dereference or write through unrelated
stack contents and crash the client. The reliable consequence is a denial of
service, when the response comes from a malicious or intercepted CMP endpoint.
There is no controlled memory write, arbitrary-address read, or reliable path
to remote code execution.
FIPS impact: no
No FIPS modules are affected by this issue, as the CMP protocol
implementation is outside the OpenSSL FIPS module boundary. |
| Use of externally-controlled format string in Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS) allows an authorized attacker to disclose information over a network. |
| A flaw was found in CRI-O. The fix for a previous vulnerability (CVE-2022-4318) was incorrect, allowing it to be bypassed. An attacker capable of setting environment variables on a container can inject a newline character into the HOME environment variable. This issue allows the addition of arbitrary lines into /etc/passwd by use of a specially crafted environment variable. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ice: fix double-free of tx_buf skb
If ice_tso() or ice_tx_csum() fail, the error path in
ice_xmit_frame_ring() frees the skb, but the 'first' tx_buf still points
to it and is marked as valid (ICE_TX_BUF_SKB).
'next_to_use' remains unchanged, so the potential problem will
likely fix itself when the next packet is transmitted and the tx_buf
gets overwritten. But if there is no next packet and the interface is
brought down instead, ice_clean_tx_ring() -> ice_unmap_and_free_tx_buf()
will find the tx_buf and free the skb for the second time.
The fix is to reset the tx_buf type to ICE_TX_BUF_EMPTY in the error
path, so that ice_unmap_and_free_tx_buf().
Move the initialization of 'first' up, to ensure it's already valid in
case we hit the linearization error path.
The bug was spotted by AI while I had it looking for something else.
It also proposed an initial version of the patch.
I reproduced the bug and tested the fix by adding code to inject
failures, on a build with KASAN.
I looked for similar bugs in related Intel drivers and did not find any. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/vmw_pvrdma: Fix double free on pvrdma_alloc_ucontext() error path
Sashiko points out that pvrdma_uar_free() is already called within
pvrdma_dealloc_ucontext(), so calling it before triggers a double free. |
| Any application that
uses external QSPI flash for encrypted XIP on nRF5340 and relies on that
encryption for confidentiality and/or integrity of the externally stored
code. No specific nRF Connect SDK version is the root cause; the weakness
is in the on-the-fly decryption scheme. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
exit: prevent preemption of oopsing TASK_DEAD task
When an already-exiting task oopses, make_task_dead() currently calls
do_task_dead() with preemption enabled. That is forbidden:
do_task_dead() calls __schedule(), which has a comment saying "WARNING:
must be called with preemption disabled!".
If an oopsing task is preempted in do_task_dead(), between becoming
TASK_DEAD and entering the scheduler explicitly, bad things happen:
finish_task_switch() assumes that once the scheduler has switched away
from a TASK_DEAD task, the task can never run again and its stack is no
longer needed; but that assumption apparently doesn't hold if the dead
task was preempted (the SM_PREEMPT case).
This means that the scheduler ends up repeatedly dropping references on
the dead task's stack, which can lead to use-after-free or double-free
of the entire task stack; in other words, two tasks can end up running
on the same stack, resulting in various kinds of memory corruption.
(This does not just affect "recursively oopsing" tasks; it is enough to
oops once during task exit, for example in a file_operations::release
handler) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb: client: fix double-free in SMB2_open() replay
A response-bearing attempt can return a replayable error and free its
response buffer. If SMB2_open_init() fails before the next send, cleanup
retains the previous buffer type and frees that response again.
Reset response bookkeeping before each attempt to prevent the stale free. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb: client: fix change notify replay double-free
A response-bearing attempt can return a replayable error and free its
response buffer. If SMB2_notify_init() fails before the next send, cleanup
retains the previous buffer type and frees that response again.
Reset response bookkeeping before each attempt to prevent the stale free. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb: client: fix query_info() replay double-free
A response-bearing attempt can return a replayable error and free its
response buffer. If SMB2_query_info_init() fails before the next send,
cleanup retains the previous buffer type and frees that response again.
Reset response bookkeeping before each attempt to prevent the stale free. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb: client: fix query directory replay double-free
A response-bearing attempt can return a replayable error and free its
response buffer. If SMB2_query_directory_init() fails before the next send,
cleanup retains the previous buffer type and frees that response again.
Reset response bookkeeping before each attempt to prevent the stale free. |
| A format string vulnerability exists in the command line interface of AOS-CX that could lead to unauthenticated remote code execution. Successful exploitation of this vulnerability results in the ability to execute arbitrary code as a privileged user on the underlying operating system. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
staging: media: ipu7: fix double-free and use-after-free in error paths
In both ipu7_isys_init() and ipu7_psys_init(), pdata is allocated and
then passed to ipu7_bus_initialize_device(), which stores it in
adev->pdata. The ipu7_bus_release() function frees adev->pdata when the
device's reference count drops to zero.
Two error paths incorrectly call kfree(pdata) after the device teardown
has already freed it:
1. When ipu7_mmu_init() fails: put_device() is called, which drops the
reference count to zero and triggers ipu7_bus_release() ->
kfree(pdata). The subsequent kfree(pdata) is a double-free.
2. When ipu7_bus_add_device() fails: it calls auxiliary_device_uninit()
internally, which calls put_device() -> ipu7_bus_release() ->
kfree(pdata). The subsequent kfree(pdata) is again a double-free.
Note that the kfree(pdata) when ipu7_bus_initialize_device() itself
fails is correct, because in that case auxiliary_device_init() failed
and the release function was never set up, so pdata must be freed
manually.
Additionally, the error code was not saved before calling put_device(),
causing ERR_CAST() to dereference the already-freed adev pointer when
constructing the return value. Fix this by saving the error from
dev_err_probe() before put_device() and returning ERR_PTR() instead.
Remove the redundant kfree(pdata) calls and fix the use-after-free in
the return values of the two affected error paths. |
