| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| Integer underflow (wrap or wraparound) in Windows Kernel Mode Driver allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally. |
| A flaw was found in sssd. A local unprivileged user could send a specially crafted request with a zero-length body to the Network Security Services (NSS) responder. This could lead to a denial-of-service condition, causing the NSS responder to become unstable or terminate. This vulnerability affects the availability of the system responder. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ecryptfs: reject too-small tag 70 packets
ecryptfs_parse_tag_70_packet() subtracts fixed metadata fields from the
parsed packet body size to derive the encrypted filename size. A
malformed packet with a body smaller than those fixed fields can underflow
that size calculation.
Reject tag 70 packets before the subtraction unless the body contains the
signature, cipher code, and at least one byte of encrypted filename data. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
hugetlb: only adjust reservation during unmapping if mapcount is 0
Since df7a6d1f6405, __unmap_hugepage_range can adjust reservations. In
the case of folio mapped in both a parent and a child, if the parent
unmaps the range first, the reservation adjustment will result in an
underflow of the reserved count. Once the child unmaps the range, the
count is restored. Change __unmap_hugepage_range() to check the mapcount
before adjusting the reservation. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
SUNRPC: xdr_buf_trim: clamp buf->len to avoid underflow
xdr_buf_trim() trims `len` bytes from the tail of an xdr_buf by
walking the tail, pages, and head iovecs. Each per-section step
uses min_t() so it never removes more bytes than that section
holds, but the final accounting at the fix_len label subtracts the
total bytes actually consumed from buf->len without any clamp:
fix_len:
buf->len -= (len - trim);
When the caller has set buf->len to a value smaller than the sum
of the iov_lens, (len - trim) can exceed buf->len and the unsigned
subtraction wraps to near UINT_MAX. gss_krb5_unwrap_v2() reaches
xdr_buf_trim() in exactly that state:
buf->head[0].iov_len -= GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + headskip;
buf->len = len - (GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + headskip);
xdr_buf_trim(buf, ec + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + tailskip);
buf->len is a small wire-derived value while the iov_lens are at
page scale, so the per-section loops legitimately consume far more
bytes than buf->len records. The wrapped buf->len then propagates
as the authoritative stream bound into every downstream XDR
decoder.
Fix by clamping the decrement so buf->len bottoms out at zero:
buf->len -= min_t(unsigned int, buf->len, len - trim);
On the normal path where the iov_lens sum to buf->len, (len - trim)
is always <= buf->len and the result is identical to before. No
callers change behavior outside the underflow case. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
svcrdma: Fix offset arithmetic in read_chunk_range
svc_rdma_read_chunk_range() walks a Read chunk's segment list to
build a sub-range starting at byte offset and spanning length bytes
for a Position-Zero or Call chunk. Two arithmetic defects in the
per-segment loop produce wrong DMA lengths and a u32 underflow:
pcl_for_each_segment(segment, chunk) {
if (offset > segment->rs_length) {
offset -= segment->rs_length;
continue;
}
dummy.rs_handle = segment->rs_handle;
dummy.rs_length = min_t(u32, length,
segment->rs_length) - offset;
dummy.rs_offset = segment->rs_offset + offset;
First, the skip predicate uses '>' instead of '>='. When offset
equals the segment's full rs_length, the segment is fully consumed
and should be skipped, but the loop falls through into the body.
The resulting dummy.rs_length is min_t(u32, length, rs_length) -
rs_length, which underflows to a near-UINT_MAX u32 when length is
smaller than rs_length, or is zero otherwise.
Second, the length formula subtracts offset from the min_t() result
rather than from segment->rs_length before the cap. For offset > 0
the segment's residual is rs_length - offset, not rs_length, so the
cap must be applied to the residual. With the current bracketing,
whenever length is smaller than rs_length - offset the per-segment
length becomes length - offset instead of length, silently dropping
offset bytes from the rebuilt chunk. Combined with the boundary
case above it also enables the u32 underflow path, which propagates
a huge nr_bvec into svc_rdma_build_read_segment() and a multi-MiB
kmalloc_array_node() in svc_rdma_get_rw_ctxt().
Additionally, svc_rdma_read_call_chunk() can invoke this function
with length == 0 when the last Read chunk ends exactly at the end
of the Call chunk. With the corrected >= predicate, every segment
is skipped and the function returns the initial -EINVAL, rejecting
a valid request. Return success immediately when length is zero.
Also break out of the loop once length is fully consumed to avoid
passing zero-length segments to svc_rdma_build_read_segment().
Fix by using '>=' so a fully-consumed segment is skipped, by
moving '- offset' inside min_t() so the cap is applied to the
segment's residual length, by returning success for zero-length
requests, and by stopping iteration when the requested range has
been consumed. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
sctp: fix stream->outcnt underflow on duplicate RECONF responses
A cached RECONF chunk may contain more than one request parameter. A
duplicate response can therefore find and process the same ADD_OUT request
again while another parameter is still outstanding, rolling back outcnt
twice and possibly underflowing it.
Track outstanding request types as bits and clear each bit after its first
response. Later responses for the same request are then ignored. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
staging: rtl8723bs: rtw_mlme: add bounds checks before ie_length subtraction
Add guards to ensure ie_length is large enough before subtracting
fixed IE offsets to prevent unsigned integer underflow. |
| Integer underflow (wrap or wraparound) in Microsoft Windows SCSI Class System File allows an unauthorized attacker to disclose information over a network. |
| Acrobat Reader is affected by an Integer Underflow (Wrap or Wraparound) vulnerability that could lead to disclosure of sensitive memory. An attacker could leverage this vulnerability to disclose sensitive information. Exploitation of this issue requires user interaction in that a victim must open a malicious file. |
| Time-of-check time-of-use (toctou) race condition in Windows USB Audio Class driver (usbaudio.sys) allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally. |
| An out-of-bounds read in Qt NFC's language code length parsing allows a physically proximate attacker to cause a denial of service or limited memory disclosure via a crafted NFC tag. |
| Integer underflow (wrap or wraparound) in Windows File History Service allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally. |
| Integer underflow (wrap or wraparound) in Windows GDI+ allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges over a network. |
| Integer underflow (wrap or wraparound) in Microsoft Standard XPS allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally. |
| Out-of-bounds read in Push Message Routing Service allows an authorized attacker to disclose information locally. |
| Integer underflow (wrap or wraparound) in Windows USB Audio Class driver (usbaudio.sys) allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally. |
| Integer underflow (wrap or wraparound) in Microsoft Standard XPS allows an unauthorized attacker to execute code over a network. |
| Integer underflow (wrap or wraparound) in Windows Remote Access Connection Manager allows an authorized attacker to execute code over a network. |
| Integer underflow (wrap or wraparound) in SQL Server allows an authorized attacker to disclose information locally. |
