{"dataType": "CVE_RECORD", "dataVersion": "5.2", "cveMetadata": {"cveId": "CVE-2026-82761", "assignerOrgId": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db", "state": "PUBLISHED", "assignerShortName": "EEF", "dateReserved": "2026-08-31T01:00:10.817Z", "datePublished": "2026-09-17T13:09:01.534Z", "dateUpdated": "2026-09-17T18:26:08.563Z"}, "containers": {"cna": {"affected": [{"collectionURL": "https://repo.hex.pm", "cpes": ["cpe:2.3:a:team-alembic:ash_authentication:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*"], "defaultStatus": "unaffected", "modules": ["'Elixir.AshAuthentication.Strategy.MagicLink.SignInPreparation'", "'Elixir.AshAuthentication.Strategy.MagicLink.SignInChange'", "'Elixir.AshAuthentication.TokenResource.Actions'"], "packageName": "ash_authentication", "packageURL": "pkg:hex/ash_authentication", "product": "ash_authentication", "programFiles": ["lib/ash_authentication/strategies/magic_link/sign_in_preparation.ex", "lib/ash_authentication/strategies/magic_link/sign_in_change.ex", "lib/ash_authentication/token_resource/actions.ex"], "programRoutines": [{"name": "'Elixir.AshAuthentication.Strategy.MagicLink.SignInPreparation':prepare/3"}, {"name": "'Elixir.AshAuthentication.Strategy.MagicLink.SignInChange':change/3"}, {"name": "'Elixir.AshAuthentication.TokenResource.Actions':revoke/3"}], "repo": "https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication", "vendor": "team-alembic", "versions": [{"lessThan": "4.15.0", "status": "affected", "version": "3.9.0", "versionType": "semver"}, {"lessThan": "5.0.0-rc.14", "status": "affected", "version": "5.0.0-rc.0", "versionType": "semver"}]}, {"collectionURL": "https://github.com", "cpes": ["cpe:2.3:a:team-alembic:ash_authentication:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*"], "defaultStatus": "unaffected", "modules": ["'Elixir.AshAuthentication.Strategy.MagicLink.SignInPreparation'", "'Elixir.AshAuthentication.Strategy.MagicLink.SignInChange'", "'Elixir.AshAuthentication.TokenResource.Actions'"], "packageName": "team-alembic/ash_authentication", "packageURL": "pkg:github/team-alembic/ash_authentication", "product": "ash_authentication", "programFiles": ["lib/ash_authentication/strategies/magic_link/sign_in_preparation.ex", "lib/ash_authentication/strategies/magic_link/sign_in_change.ex", "lib/ash_authentication/token_resource/actions.ex"], "programRoutines": [{"name": "'Elixir.AshAuthentication.Strategy.MagicLink.SignInPreparation':prepare/3"}, {"name": "'Elixir.AshAuthentication.Strategy.MagicLink.SignInChange':change/3"}, {"name": "'Elixir.AshAuthentication.TokenResource.Actions':revoke/3"}], "repo": "https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication", "vendor": "team-alembic", "versions": [{"changes": [{"at": "18dfdb36c14aa6a61df8572bce2d5ec36b1d9840", "status": "unaffected"}, {"at": "9ef6864b8833d3b795427a7b8dc518a4997d41ab", "status": "unaffected"}], "lessThan": "*", "status": "affected", "version": "cf3d227ef25912cf1b0c5fa80f20001f5c46a102", "versionType": "git"}]}], "cpeApplicability": [{"nodes": [{"cpeMatch": [{"criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:team-alembic:ash_authentication:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*", "versionEndExcluding": "4.15.0", "versionStartIncluding": "3.9.0", "vulnerable": true}, {"criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:team-alembic:ash_authentication:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*", "versionEndExcluding": "5.0.0-rc.14", "versionStartIncluding": "5.0.0-rc.0", "vulnerable": true}], "negate": false, "operator": "OR"}], "operator": "AND"}], "credits": [{"lang": "en", "type": "remediation developer", "value": "James Harton"}, {"lang": "en", "type": "reporter", "value": "Peter Ullrich"}, {"lang": "en", "type": "analyst", "value": "Jonatan M\u00e4nnchen / EEF"}], "dateAssigned": "2026-09-11T18:05:13.000Z", "descriptions": [{"lang": "en", "supportingMedia": [{"base64": false, "type": "text/html", "value": "<p>Time-of-check Time-of-use (TOCTOU) Race Condition vulnerability in team-alembic AshAuthentication allows an attacker holding a leaked magic link to replay its single-use token and authenticate as the target subject. A magic link configured with <code>single_use_token?</code>, which is the default, is meant to be redeemable exactly once, but nothing serialises the token's validity check against its consumption, so concurrent redemptions of one token all succeed and each yields a full user token.</p>\n<p>Sign-in verifies the JWT with <code>Jwt.verify/4</code> and revokes it only afterwards: <code>AshAuthentication.Strategy.MagicLink.SignInPreparation</code> revokes in a <code>Query.after_action</code> callback, and <code>AshAuthentication.Strategy.MagicLink.SignInChange</code> in an <code>after_transaction</code> hook that runs once the sign-in has already committed. <code>AshAuthentication.TokenResource.Actions.revoke/3</code> writes the revocation as an upsert, so a concurrent duplicate revocation silently succeeds instead of conflicting and no request ever loses the race.</p>\n<p>This issue affects ash_authentication: from 3.9.0 before 4.15.0 and from 5.0.0-rc.0 before 5.0.0-rc.14.</p>"}, {"base64": false, "type": "text/markdown", "value": "Time-of-check Time-of-use (TOCTOU) Race Condition vulnerability in team-alembic AshAuthentication allows an attacker holding a leaked magic link to replay its single-use token and authenticate as the target subject. A magic link configured with `single_use_token?`, which is the default, is meant to be redeemable exactly once, but nothing serialises the token's validity check against its consumption, so concurrent redemptions of one token all succeed and each yields a full user token.\n\nSign-in verifies the JWT with `Jwt.verify/4` and revokes it only afterwards: `AshAuthentication.Strategy.MagicLink.SignInPreparation` revokes in a `Query.after_action` callback, and `AshAuthentication.Strategy.MagicLink.SignInChange` in an `after_transaction` hook that runs once the sign-in has already committed. `AshAuthentication.TokenResource.Actions.revoke/3` writes the revocation as an upsert, so a concurrent duplicate revocation silently succeeds instead of conflicting and no request ever loses the race.\n\nThis issue affects ash_authentication: from 3.9.0 before 4.15.0 and from 5.0.0-rc.0 before 5.0.0-rc.14."}], "value": "Time-of-check Time-of-use (TOCTOU) Race Condition vulnerability in team-alembic AshAuthentication allows an attacker holding a leaked magic link to replay its single-use token and authenticate as the target subject. A magic link configured with single_use_token?, which is the default, is meant to be redeemable exactly once, but nothing serialises the token's validity check against its consumption, so concurrent redemptions of one token all succeed and each yields a full user token.\n\nSign-in verifies the JWT with Jwt.verify/4 and revokes it only afterwards: AshAuthentication.Strategy.MagicLink.SignInPreparation revokes in a Query.after_action callback, and AshAuthentication.Strategy.MagicLink.SignInChange in an after_transaction hook that runs once the sign-in has already committed. AshAuthentication.TokenResource.Actions.revoke/3 writes the revocation as an upsert, so a concurrent duplicate revocation silently succeeds instead of conflicting and no request ever loses the race.\n\nThis issue affects ash_authentication: from 3.9.0 before 4.15.0 and from 5.0.0-rc.0 before 5.0.0-rc.14."}], "impacts": [{"capecId": "CAPEC-29", "descriptions": [{"lang": "en", "value": "CAPEC-29 Leveraging Time-of-Check and Time-of-Use (TOCTOU) Race Conditions"}]}], "metrics": [{"cvssV4_0": {"Automatable": "NOT_DEFINED", "Recovery": "NOT_DEFINED", "Safety": "NOT_DEFINED", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "attackRequirements": "PRESENT", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "baseScore": 9.1, "baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "providerUrgency": "NOT_DEFINED", "subAvailabilityImpact": "NONE", "subConfidentialityImpact": "NONE", "subIntegrityImpact": "NONE", "userInteraction": "NONE", "valueDensity": "NOT_DEFINED", "vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N", "version": "4.0", "vulnAvailabilityImpact": "NONE", "vulnConfidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "vulnIntegrityImpact": "HIGH", "vulnerabilityResponseEffort": "NOT_DEFINED"}, "format": "CVSS", "scenarios": [{"lang": "en", "value": "GENERAL"}]}], "problemTypes": [{"descriptions": [{"cweId": "CWE-367", "description": "CWE-367 Time-of-check Time-of-use (TOCTOU) Race Condition", "lang": "en", "type": "CWE"}]}], "providerMetadata": {"orgId": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db", "shortName": "EEF", "dateUpdated": "2026-09-17T13:09:01.534Z"}, "references": [{"tags": ["related", "vendor-advisory"], "url": "https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/security/advisories/GHSA-23gr-vcp4-r27q"}, {"name": "EEF CNA record for CVE-2026-82761", "tags": ["related"], "url": "https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-82761.html"}, {"name": "OSV record EEF-CVE-2026-82761", "tags": ["related"], "url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-82761"}, {"name": "Introducing commit cf3d227 in team-alembic/ash_authentication", "tags": ["related"], "url": "https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/commit/cf3d227ef25912cf1b0c5fa80f20001f5c46a102"}, {"name": "Fix commit 18dfdb3 in team-alembic/ash_authentication", "tags": ["patch"], "url": "https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/commit/18dfdb36c14aa6a61df8572bce2d5ec36b1d9840"}, {"name": "Fix commit 9ef6864 in team-alembic/ash_authentication", "tags": ["patch"], "url": "https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/commit/9ef6864b8833d3b795427a7b8dc518a4997d41ab"}], "source": {"discovery": "INTERNAL"}, "title": "Magic link single-use tokens replayable via TOCTOU race in AshAuthentication"}, "adp": [{"metrics": [{"other": {"type": "ssvc", "content": {"timestamp": "2026-09-17T18:25:13.930894Z", "id": "CVE-2026-82761", "options": [{"Exploitation": "none"}, {"Automatable": "yes"}, {"Technical Impact": "total"}], "role": "CISA Coordinator", "version": "2.0.3"}}}], "title": "CISA ADP Vulnrichment", "providerMetadata": {"orgId": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0", "shortName": "CISA-ADP", "dateUpdated": "2026-09-17T18:26:08.563Z"}}]}}

{}

{"affected": [{"affectedData": [{"collectionURL": "https://repo.hex.pm", "cpes": ["cpe:2.3:a:team-alembic:ash_authentication:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*"], "defaultStatus": "unaffected", "modules": ["'Elixir.AshAuthentication.Strategy.MagicLink.SignInPreparation'", "'Elixir.AshAuthentication.Strategy.MagicLink.SignInChange'", "'Elixir.AshAuthentication.TokenResource.Actions'"], "packageName": "ash_authentication", "packageURL": "pkg:hex/ash_authentication", "product": "ash_authentication", "programFiles": ["lib/ash_authentication/strategies/magic_link/sign_in_preparation.ex", "lib/ash_authentication/strategies/magic_link/sign_in_change.ex", "lib/ash_authentication/token_resource/actions.ex"], "programRoutines": [{"name": "'Elixir.AshAuthentication.Strategy.MagicLink.SignInPreparation':prepare/3"}, {"name": "'Elixir.AshAuthentication.Strategy.MagicLink.SignInChange':change/3"}, {"name": "'Elixir.AshAuthentication.TokenResource.Actions':revoke/3"}], "repo": "https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication", "vendor": "team-alembic", "versions": [{"lessThan": "4.15.0", "status": "affected", "version": "3.9.0", "versionType": "semver"}, {"lessThan": "5.0.0-rc.14", "status": "affected", "version": "5.0.0-rc.0", "versionType": "semver"}]}, {"collectionURL": "https://github.com", "cpes": ["cpe:2.3:a:team-alembic:ash_authentication:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*"], "defaultStatus": "unaffected", "modules": ["'Elixir.AshAuthentication.Strategy.MagicLink.SignInPreparation'", "'Elixir.AshAuthentication.Strategy.MagicLink.SignInChange'", "'Elixir.AshAuthentication.TokenResource.Actions'"], "packageName": "team-alembic/ash_authentication", "packageURL": "pkg:github/team-alembic/ash_authentication", "product": "ash_authentication", "programFiles": ["lib/ash_authentication/strategies/magic_link/sign_in_preparation.ex", "lib/ash_authentication/strategies/magic_link/sign_in_change.ex", "lib/ash_authentication/token_resource/actions.ex"], "programRoutines": [{"name": "'Elixir.AshAuthentication.Strategy.MagicLink.SignInPreparation':prepare/3"}, {"name": "'Elixir.AshAuthentication.Strategy.MagicLink.SignInChange':change/3"}, {"name": "'Elixir.AshAuthentication.TokenResource.Actions':revoke/3"}], "repo": "https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication", "vendor": "team-alembic", "versions": [{"changes": [{"at": "18dfdb36c14aa6a61df8572bce2d5ec36b1d9840", "status": "unaffected"}, {"at": "9ef6864b8833d3b795427a7b8dc518a4997d41ab", "status": "unaffected"}], "lessThan": "*", "status": "affected", "version": "cf3d227ef25912cf1b0c5fa80f20001f5c46a102", "versionType": "git"}]}], "source": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db"}], "cveTags": [], "descriptions": [{"lang": "en", "value": "Time-of-check Time-of-use (TOCTOU) Race Condition vulnerability in team-alembic AshAuthentication allows an attacker holding a leaked magic link to replay its single-use token and authenticate as the target subject. A magic link configured with single_use_token?, which is the default, is meant to be redeemable exactly once, but nothing serialises the token's validity check against its consumption, so concurrent redemptions of one token all succeed and each yields a full user token.\n\nSign-in verifies the JWT with Jwt.verify/4 and revokes it only afterwards: AshAuthentication.Strategy.MagicLink.SignInPreparation revokes in a Query.after_action callback, and AshAuthentication.Strategy.MagicLink.SignInChange in an after_transaction hook that runs once the sign-in has already committed. AshAuthentication.TokenResource.Actions.revoke/3 writes the revocation as an upsert, so a concurrent duplicate revocation silently succeeds instead of conflicting and no request ever loses the race.\n\nThis issue affects ash_authentication: from 3.9.0 before 4.15.0 and from 5.0.0-rc.0 before 5.0.0-rc.14."}], "id": "CVE-2026-82761", "lastModified": "2026-09-17T14:17:33.423", "metrics": {"cvssMetricV40": [{"cvssData": {"Automatable": "NOT_DEFINED", "Recovery": "NOT_DEFINED", "Safety": "NOT_DEFINED", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "attackRequirements": "PRESENT", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED", "baseScore": 9.1, "baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED", "exploitMaturity": "NOT_DEFINED", "integrityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED", "modifiedAttackComplexity": "NOT_DEFINED", "modifiedAttackRequirements": "NOT_DEFINED", "modifiedAttackVector": "NOT_DEFINED", "modifiedPrivilegesRequired": "NOT_DEFINED", "modifiedSubAvailabilityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED", "modifiedSubConfidentialityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED", "modifiedSubIntegrityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED", "modifiedUserInteraction": "NOT_DEFINED", "modifiedVulnAvailabilityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED", "modifiedVulnConfidentialityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED", "modifiedVulnIntegrityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "providerUrgency": "NOT_DEFINED", "subAvailabilityImpact": "NONE", "subConfidentialityImpact": "NONE", "subIntegrityImpact": "NONE", "userInteraction": "NONE", "valueDensity": "NOT_DEFINED", "vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X", "version": "4.0", "vulnAvailabilityImpact": "NONE", "vulnConfidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "vulnIntegrityImpact": "HIGH", "vulnerabilityResponseEffort": "NOT_DEFINED"}, "source": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db", "type": "Secondary"}]}, "published": "2026-09-17T14:17:33.423", "references": [{"source": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db", "url": "https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-82761.html"}, {"source": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db", "url": "https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/commit/18dfdb36c14aa6a61df8572bce2d5ec36b1d9840"}, {"source": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db", "url": "https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/commit/9ef6864b8833d3b795427a7b8dc518a4997d41ab"}, {"source": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db", "url": "https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/commit/cf3d227ef25912cf1b0c5fa80f20001f5c46a102"}, {"source": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db", "url": "https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/security/advisories/GHSA-23gr-vcp4-r27q"}, {"source": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db", "url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-82761"}], "sourceIdentifier": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db", "vulnStatus": "Received", "weaknesses": [{"description": [{"lang": "en", "value": "CWE-367"}], "source": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db", "type": "Secondary"}]}

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