server_start generates a fresh nonce and sends it in the challenge, and nothing later compares that value against the nonce the client returns. server_step derives the expected digest from the client's own parameters, so a response verifies whenever its digest matches the nonce it carries. The count table it also checks is keyed on the client-supplied nonce and starts empty in each new server object, so a captured first response, carrying `nc=00000001`, passes that too. RFC 2831 defines the nonce in the response as the value the server sent in the preceding challenge.
An attacker who observes one successful `qop=auth` exchange can replay the captured response against a later session for the same service, host, realm and user, and authenticate as that user without knowing the password.
Default status is the baseline for the product, each version can override it (e.g. patched versions marked unaffected).
| Vendor | Product | Default status | Versions | ||||||
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OpenCVE Enrichment is a feature of OpenCVE that uses AI to automatically link vendors and products to CVEs. Learn more on GitHub.
| Vendors | Products |
|---|---|
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Perl
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Authen::sasl::perl::digest Md5
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No advisories yet.
Solution
Upgrade to Authen-SASL 2.2100 or later.
Workaround
No workaround given by the vendor.
Mon, 07 Sep 2026 08:45:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| First Time appeared |
Perl
Perl authen::sasl::perl::digest Md5 |
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| Vendors & Products |
Perl
Perl authen::sasl::perl::digest Md5 |
Sun, 06 Sep 2026 18:00:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Description | Authen::SASL::Perl::DIGEST_MD5 versions before 2.2100 for Perl accept replayed authentication responses via unverified nonce in server_step. server_start generates a fresh nonce and sends it in the challenge, and nothing later compares that value against the nonce the client returns. server_step derives the expected digest from the client's own parameters, so a response verifies whenever its digest matches the nonce it carries. The count table it also checks is keyed on the client-supplied nonce and starts empty in each new server object, so a captured first response, carrying `nc=00000001`, passes that too. RFC 2831 defines the nonce in the response as the value the server sent in the preceding challenge. An attacker who observes one successful `qop=auth` exchange can replay the captured response against a later session for the same service, host, realm and user, and authenticate as that user without knowing the password. | |
| Title | Authen::SASL::Perl::DIGEST_MD5 versions before 2.2100 for Perl accept replayed authentication responses via unverified nonce in server_step | |
| Weaknesses | CWE-294 | |
| References |
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Projects
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MITRE
Status: PUBLISHED
Assigner: CPANSec
Published:
Updated: 2026-09-06T17:46:30.340Z
Reserved: 2026-09-06T00:13:35.358Z
Link: CVE-2026-86219
Vulnrichment
No data.
NVD
Status : Received
Published: 2026-09-06T18:17:23.027
Modified: 2026-09-06T18:17:23.027
Link: CVE-2026-86219
Redhat
No data.
OpenCVE Enrichment
Updated: 2026-09-07T08:24:32Z