No advisories yet.
Solution
addressed in tauri-plugin-updater 2.12.0, and it has to be switched on. The new requireSignedVersion option compares the version announced by the endpoint against the version recorded in the signature's trusted comment, which the signature does cover, and rejects the update when they differ.
Workaround
No workaround given by the vendor.
Wed, 23 Sep 2026 16:00:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| First Time appeared |
Tauri
Tauri tauri-plugin-updater |
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| Vendors & Products |
Tauri
Tauri tauri-plugin-updater |
Wed, 23 Sep 2026 15:30:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Metrics |
ssvc
|
Wed, 23 Sep 2026 11:45:00 +0000
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|---|---|---|
| Description | The Tauri updater plugin verifies update binaries using minisign signatures, but the signature covers only the raw binary bytes. The update manifest -- which contains the version number, download URL, and signature -- is fetched over TLS but is never itself signed or authenticated. Because the only anti-rollback check compares the manifest's version field against the current version, and that field is unsigned, an attacker who can serve a crafted manifest can force installation of any older signed release without possessing the developer's private key. | |
| Title | Tauri framework v2 missing updater signature version number validation can be exploited into forced downgrade | |
| Weaknesses | CWE-354 | |
| References |
| |
| Metrics |
cvssV3_1
|
Projects
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Status: PUBLISHED
Assigner: JFROG
Published:
Updated: 2026-09-23T14:10:35.332Z
Reserved: 2026-09-22T10:38:03.883Z
Link: CVE-2026-95625
Updated: 2026-09-23T14:10:32.174Z
Status : Received
Published: 2026-09-23T09:17:09.393
Modified: 2026-09-23T15:17:30.207
Link: CVE-2026-95625
No data.
OpenCVE Enrichment
Updated: 2026-09-23T15:36:57Z