smb: client: fix potential OOB read in smb3_enum_snapshots()
If snapshot_array_size is smaller than GMT_TOKEN_SIZE,
smb3_enum_snapshots() sets ret_data_len to
sizeof(struct smb_snapshot_array) without verifying the actual length
of the server's reply.
Because SMB2_ioctl() places no lower bound on the server-supplied
OutputCount and allocates retbuf to exactly that length, a short reply
results in ret_data_len exceeding the size of retbuf. The subsequent
copy_to_user() then reads past the end of retbuf, leaking adjacent slab
memory to userspace. The subsequent clamp check is ineffective as it
only reduces ret_data_len.
Fix this by rejecting replies shorter than
sizeof(struct smb_snapshot_array) with -EIO. Note that the bound is set
to the 12-byte struct size rather than the 16-byte
MIN_SNAPSHOT_ARRAY_SIZE defined in MS-SMB2 3.3.5.15.1, because 12 bytes
is exactly what copy_to_user() attempts to read.
No advisories yet.
Solution
No solution given by the vendor.
Workaround
No workaround given by the vendor.
Wed, 07 Oct 2026 07:00:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Metrics |
cvssV3_1
|
cvssV3_1
|
Wed, 07 Oct 2026 05:00:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Weaknesses | CWE-788 |
Wed, 07 Oct 2026 00:15:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Weaknesses | CWE-125 | |
| References |
| |
| Metrics |
threat_severity
|
cvssV3_1
|
Tue, 06 Oct 2026 12:00:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Weaknesses | CWE-788 |
Tue, 06 Oct 2026 09:00:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Description | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: smb: client: fix potential OOB read in smb3_enum_snapshots() If snapshot_array_size is smaller than GMT_TOKEN_SIZE, smb3_enum_snapshots() sets ret_data_len to sizeof(struct smb_snapshot_array) without verifying the actual length of the server's reply. Because SMB2_ioctl() places no lower bound on the server-supplied OutputCount and allocates retbuf to exactly that length, a short reply results in ret_data_len exceeding the size of retbuf. The subsequent copy_to_user() then reads past the end of retbuf, leaking adjacent slab memory to userspace. The subsequent clamp check is ineffective as it only reduces ret_data_len. Fix this by rejecting replies shorter than sizeof(struct smb_snapshot_array) with -EIO. Note that the bound is set to the 12-byte struct size rather than the 16-byte MIN_SNAPSHOT_ARRAY_SIZE defined in MS-SMB2 3.3.5.15.1, because 12 bytes is exactly what copy_to_user() attempts to read. | |
| Title | smb: client: fix potential OOB read in smb3_enum_snapshots() | |
| First Time appeared |
Linux
Linux linux Kernel |
|
| CPEs | cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* | |
| Vendors & Products |
Linux
Linux linux Kernel |
|
| References |
|
|
Projects
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Status: PUBLISHED
Assigner: Linux
Published:
Updated: 2026-10-07T06:49:19.327Z
Reserved: 2026-09-25T10:25:14.322Z
Link: CVE-2026-98169
No data.
Status : Received
Published: 2026-10-06T09:17:58.480
Modified: 2026-10-07T07:17:03.450
Link: CVE-2026-98169
OpenCVE Enrichment
Updated: 2026-10-07T08:30:15Z