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| CVE | Vendors | Products | Updated | CVSS v3.1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-77805 | 2026-10-05 | 7.9 High | ||
| In Progress® Telerik® Fiddler® Classic for Windows, versions prior to v6.0.20262.10021, the integrity check applied to the external helper tools launched by the application is insufficient. Before executing a helper tool, the application only verifies that the file carries a valid Authenticode signature whose certificate subject name matches a broad allow list of publisher name fragments, rather than verifying that the file is the specific executable shipped with that version of the product. A local threat actor with low privileges who replaces one of these helper executables with any other validly signed binary from an allow-listed publisher can cause the substituted binary to be executed by the application, including with Administrator privileges for the tools that request elevation, resulting in privilege escalation and execution of unintended code. Successful exploitation requires the user to launch the affected external tool and to approve the elevation prompt without noticing that it refers to a different executable. | ||||
| CVE-2026-77321 | 1 Mauriceboe | 1 Trek | 2026-10-05 | 4.3 Medium |
| TREK is a collaborative travel planner. Prior to 3.3.0, the get_trip_summary tool in server/src/mcp/tools/trips.ts is registered for scoped OAuth MCP tokens without requiring trips:read and returns core trip summary data regardless of the delegated scopes. A token granted only an unrelated capability, such as weather:read, can receive trip metadata, member email addresses from server/src/services/tripService.ts, itinerary days, and accommodations for every trip accessible to the token's user. Cross-user trip authorization remains enforced, but the missing scope check defeats the consented least-privilege boundary and exposes trip content and third-party contact information to an MCP client that was not authorized to read it. This issue is fixed in version 3.3.0. | ||||
| CVE-2026-76907 | 1 Suitenumerique | 1 Docs | 2026-10-05 | 6.5 Medium |
| LaSuite Doc is a collaborative note taking, wiki and documentation platform. From 4.8.2 until 5.4.0, GET /api/v1.0/documents/search/ accepts sequential seven-digit document paths to scope descendant searches without requiring the caller to possess the public document UUID. An unauthenticated caller can submit an empty search query and iterate predictable path values to enumerate public document subtrees, obtaining document identifiers, titles, creator data, timestamps, and tree metadata. Each disclosed identifier can then be used through normal public-document endpoints to retrieve the document content, and differing 403 Forbidden and 404 Not Found responses reveal whether a guessed path exists. Authenticated users can similarly discover documents with authenticated link reach, while restricted documents remain protected. This issue is fixed in version 5.4.0. | ||||
| CVE-2026-71891 | 1 Legion Of The Bouncy Castle Inc. | 1 Bc-java | 2026-10-05 | N/A |
| In Bouncy Castle for Java before 1.86, BLS12_381BasicScheme.keyValidate, and so BLSPublicKeyParameters and every BasicScheme, MessageAugmentation and ProofOfPossession verify and aggregateVerify that gate on it, accepted a public key built on a foreign ECCurve that merely shares BLS12-381's field characteristic. The prime-order subgroup check trusts a point's own curve to name its cofactor, since ECPoint.satisfiesOrder returns true outright when the curve's cofactor is one, so a point on a curve with a different equation and a cofactor forged to one passed keyValidate despite not being a G1 point at all. In BC's pairing implementation such a point contributes the identity in the target group, so an aggregate signature verified against a set of public keys including it is accepted even though it contains no signature for that key and message pair, admitting a phantom signer. keyValidate now first confirms that the point's curve carries exactly the canonical G1 field, equation, order and cofactor before any subgroup check. The issue is reachable only where an application constructs an ECPoint on an explicit, non-canonical curve and accepts it as an authority-bearing key; the standard 48-byte compressed-point decoder always supplies the canonical curve and was never affected. | ||||
| CVE-2026-71890 | 1 Legion Of The Bouncy Castle Inc. | 1 Bc-java | 2026-10-05 | N/A |
| In Bouncy Castle for Java before 1.86, validation of an MLS (RFC 9420) external commit's proposal list, org.bouncycastle.mls.protocol.Group.validateExternalCachedProposals, counted the proposals by type and bounded the removed leaf index but never established that the removed leaf had anything to do with the joiner. RFC 9420 sec. 12.2 permits at most one Remove proposal in an external commit, with which the joiner removes an old version of themselves, and requires that where one is present the LeafNode in the commit's path field meet the criteria it would have to meet in an Update for the removed leaf, in particular that its credential present identifiers acceptable for the removed participant. The ordinary proposal-list validator's self-remove rule is deliberately not applied on this path, because a resync commit legitimately removes a leaf the joiner owns, but nothing was put in its place. Any party holding the group's public GroupInfo, which is precisely what an external joiner is meant to be given, could therefore commit a Remove naming any member's LeafIndex and have every member apply it, evicting that member and taking over their slot in the ratchet tree. The credential check that should have prevented this existed only in the gRPC interop harness and so protected no other caller of the public Group.externalJoin and Group.handle API. An external commit carrying a Remove is now accepted only when the removed leaf's credential is identical to the one in the joiner's own new leaf, on both the sending and the receiving side. | ||||
| CVE-2026-71887 | 1 Legion Of The Bouncy Castle Inc. | 1 Bc-java | 2026-10-05 | N/A |
| In Bouncy Castle for Java before 1.86, the high-level OpenPGP API accepted a data signature made by a signing subkey whose Subkey Binding signature carried no embedded Primary Key Binding (cross-certification) signature, in the case where that binding omits a Key Flags subpacket. RFC 9580 sec. 5.2.1.8 and sec. 10.1.3 require the embedded Primary Key Binding signature on any subkey that can issue signatures; it is the subkey's own statement that it belongs to the primary key it is bound under. OpenPGPCertificate resolved the subkey's key flags two different ways. isSigningKey() goes through getKeyFlags() and getApplyingSubpacket(), which falls back to the primary key's direct-key or primary User ID self-signature when the binding signature omits the subpacket, so the subkey inherited the primary's SIGN_DATA and counted as signing-capable; verifyEmbeddedPrimaryKeyBinding(), which enforces the requirement, reads the binding signature's own hashed subpackets, found no SIGN_DATA there, and returned early as a non-signing key without ever demanding the back signature. The same subkey was therefore signing-capable - so its signatures were attributed to the certificate and OpenPGPSignature.OpenPGPDocumentSignature.isValid() returned true - while being exempt from cross-certification, where GnuPG refuses the identical certificate and message. An attacker needs only the victim's public signing subkey, which is public material: they bind it to their own primary key with a Subkey Binding signature they are able to make, carrying no Key Flags and no embedded Primary Key Binding signature, which they cannot make without the subkey's private key, and a relying party verifying one of the victim's genuinely signed messages against that certificate is told the signature is valid and given the attacker's certificate as its issuer. Because a certificate's User IDs are self-asserted, a verifier that pins on the subkey's fingerprint or key ID while taking the identity from the enclosing certificate reports a real signature under an attacker-chosen identity. This is misattribution of a genuine signature rather than forgery of a new one: no private key is recovered, and the signature must be one the grafted subkey actually made. The low-level PGPSignature / PGPPublicKeyRing API performs no binding checks by design and is unaffected. Key Flags are a statement about the key the carrying signature refers to (RFC 9580 sec. 5.2.3.29), so a subkey no longer inherits them from the certificate-wide signatures of the primary key: a Subkey Binding signature that omits the subpacket now leaves the subkey with no capabilities rather than the primary's, which makes the flags the cross-certification check consults the same flags every other decision consults. Preferences and the other subpackets a direct-key signature carries are inherited as before, and the primary key itself, whose flags legitimately come from its own direct-key or User ID self-signature, is unaffected. | ||||
| CVE-2026-71886 | 1 Legion Of The Bouncy Castle Inc. | 1 Bc-java | 2026-10-05 | N/A |
| In Bouncy Castle for Java before 1.86, the high-level OpenPGP certificate API accepted a third-party certification or trust delegation from any component key of the issuing certificate, without requiring that component to have been granted the authority to certify. OpenPGPCertificate.getCertificationBy() and getDelegationBy() resolve a third-party signature by matching its issuer key identifier against every key of the third-party certificate, then verify the issuing component's binding chain and the signature itself; nothing checked that the issuing component carried the RFC 9580 sec. 5.2.3.29 certification key flag (CERTIFY_OTHER) when the signature was created. A subkey bound only with SIGN_DATA - the online signing subkey of exactly the offline-primary arrangement those key flags exist to express - could therefore issue a positive User ID certification over an attacker-controlled identity, or a full-trust depth-one direct-key delegation of introducer trust, and the API returned it as a valid signature chain attributed to the third-party certificate. An application treating getCertificationBy(...).isValid() or getDelegationBy(...) as an identity or trusted-introducer decision would attribute the attacker's assertion to the offline primary key. The same held for a legacy RSA subkey bound only for encryption, whose algorithm is nonetheless able to sign. This does not forge the primary key's signature or recover any private key; it promotes an already-compromised restricted subkey to the primary key's identity-issuing authority, defeating the containment the key-flag separation provides. A third-party certification or delegation is now attributed to the issuing certificate only when the component key that made it is the primary key, or is a subkey holding CERTIFY_OTHER when the signature was created, so certification-capable subkeys continue to be accepted; primary keys are accepted whatever their key flags say, since a primary key is certification-capable by construction and certificates carrying no key flags subpacket at all are common. Third-party revocations are deliberately outside the rule, since declining to honour one would keep trust alive rather than withdraw it. | ||||
| CVE-2026-71885 | 1 Legion Of The Bouncy Castle Inc. | 1 Bc-java | 2026-10-05 | N/A |
| In Bouncy Castle for Java before 1.86, the Messaging Layer Security (MLS, RFC 9420) implementation did not bind an X.509 credential to a LeafNode's signature_key. LeafNode.verify() checked a leaf's signature against the signature_key carried in the leaf itself, while the credential's X.509 certificate chain was stored but never parsed or validated, so the end-entity certificate's public key was never required to match signature_key as RFC 9420 sec. 5.3 requires. A party could therefore present another party's certificate as its credential while signing the leaf, and the enclosing KeyPackage, with an unrelated key, and be accepted under that other party's identity through KeyPackage.verify() and the Group leaf-validation path. In a deployment that admits external commits without an independent credential-admission check, an unauthenticated attacker could be admitted under a victim's X.509 identity, evict the victim (resynchronization compares whole credentials rather than signing keys), derive the current epoch, decrypt subsequent group messages, and send messages accepted as the victim. TreeKEM.LeafNode now requires the end-entity certificate's subject public key, in the cipher suite's signature encoding, to equal signature_key for an X.509 credential and rejects the leaf otherwise, including an empty chain or a certificate whose key type does not match the cipher suite; certificate-chain and identity validation to a trust anchor remain the application's responsibility per RFC 9420 sec. 5.3.1. Deployments using only basic credentials are unaffected. | ||||
| CVE-2026-71883 | 1 Legion Of The Bouncy Castle Inc. | 1 Bc-lts-java | 2026-10-05 | N/A |
| In Bouncy Castle for Java LTS before 2.73.13, the one-shot native packet ciphers for AES-CBC, CCM, CFB, CTR, GCM and GCM-SIV released the caller's key, IV and additional authenticated data arrays with JNI's ReleaseByteArrayElements in mode 0, which commits the native copy back into the Java array. Those arrays are read-only to the native code, and on a JVM that returns a copy rather than a pin the copy still holds the input bytes as they were read. The output buffer is taken through a separate critical region and committed first, so where an application passed the same Java array as both an input and the destination - encrypting in place over KeyParameter.getKey(), for example - the later mode-0 release of the key wrote the unchanged key bytes over the ciphertext that had just been produced. The call still returned the correct output length, so an application encrypting in place over its own key array was handed the raw AES key where it expected ciphertext, with nothing in the API to indicate it, and would transmit or store the key in place of the message. The read-only input arrays are now released with JNI_ABORT, freeing the native copy without copying it back, and mode 0 is reserved for arrays the native code wrote. The pure-Java packet ciphers and the streaming native modes are not affected. Bouncy Castle for Java (bcprov) is not affected, as it ships no native implementations. | ||||
| CVE-2026-67233 | 1 Rabbitmq | 1 Rabbitmq-server | 2026-10-05 | 7.1 High |
| RabbitMQ is a messaging and streaming broker. Prior to versions 3.13.15, 4.0.20, 4.1.11, 4.2.6, and 4.3.1, The shovel management resource's is_authorized/2 delegates to rabbit_mgmt_util:is_authorized_monitor/2, which accepts the monitoring tag. But allowed_methods includes DELETE, and delete_resource/2 deletes / restarts shovel runtime parameters with no additional role check. A monitoring user , intended to have read-only visibility , can therefore delete or restart any shovel in any vhost they can see. A read-only monitoring user can delete or restart any dynamic shovel , a state-changing operation that the equivalent /api/parameters endpoint correctly restricts to policymaker. Preconditions include rabbitmq_shovel + rabbitmq_shovel_management plugins enabled Attacker has credentials with the monitoring tag. This issue is fixed in versions 3.13.15, 4.0.20, 4.1.11, 4.2.6, and 4.3.1. | ||||
| CVE-2026-63645 | 1 Openobserve | 1 Openobserve | 2026-10-05 | 7.5 High |
| OpenObserve is a cloud-native observability platform. Prior to 0.90.3, OpenObserve registers the /config/runtime endpoint without authentication and serializes the complete server configuration after applying the hide_sensitive_fields keyword filter. The filter does not recognize dsn or creds field names, so meta_postgres_dsn, meta_postgres_ro_dsn, meta_ddl_dsn, and usage_reporting_creds can be returned in plaintext to an unauthenticated network client. PostgreSQL deployments can expose database credentials, and the same response can disclose the root administrator email address, internal NATS address, filesystem layout, and other deployment details. This issue is fixed in version 0.90.3. | ||||
| CVE-2026-61815 | 1 Zbateson | 1 Mail-mime-parser | 2026-10-05 | 7.2 High |
| zbateson/mail-mime-parser is a mail mime parser alternative to PHP's imap* functions and Pear libraries for reading messages in Internet Message Format RFC 822. Prior to version 3.0.6 and 4.0.2, CRLF (carriage-return / line-feed) header injection (CWE-93) affecting any application that uses this library to build or forward MIME messages with an attacker-influenced attachment filename. Attachment filenames are interpolated into the `Content-Type` and `Content-Disposition` header values without stripping CR/LF, so a filename containing `\r\n` serializes as one or more additional, attacker-controlled header lines (for example a forged `Bcc:` that silently exfiltrates a copy of the outgoing message). The untrusted filename can come directly from parsed inbound mail, so no local construction is required — an application that re-attaches or re-sends a parsed filename is exposed. Versions 3.0.6 and 4.0.2 patch the issue. Versions 1.x and 2.x are also affected but are end-of-life and will not receive patches; users on those lines should upgrade to a fixed release. If upgrading is not immediately possible, strip CR and LF from any filename before passing it to attachment APIs, and from the result of getFilename() before reusing it in a constructed message — e.g. preg_replace('/[\r\n]+/', ' ', $filename). | ||||
| CVE-2026-57177 | 1 Python-social-auth | 1 Social-core | 2026-10-05 | 4.3 Medium |
| Python Social Auth is a social authentication/registration mechanism. Prior to version 5.0.0, the LoginRadius backend did not validate OAuth state during the authentication flow. Applications using this backend were vulnerable to login CSRF. An attacker could cause a victim's browser session to complete authentication using an attacker-controlled LoginRadius token, making the victim authenticated as the attacker's LoginRadius identity. The issue affects only applications using the LoginRadius backend. The issue has been fixe in version 5.0.0 by enabling callback state validation for the LoginRadius backend. | ||||
| CVE-2026-57175 | 1 Python-social-auth | 1 Social-core | 2026-10-05 | 6.4 Medium |
| Python Social Auth is a social authentication/registration mechanism. Prior to version 5.0.0, the SAML backend accepted SAML responses on the Assertion Consumer Service endpoint without verifying that they matched a previously issued `AuthnRequest`. Applications using SAML account association could allow an attacker with a valid account on a trusted IdP to link the attacker's SAML identity to a logged-in victim's local account. The attacker could then authenticate through SAML and gain access to the victim's account. The issue affects applications using the SAML backend together with authenticated account association. The issue has been fixed in version 5.0.0 by validating SAML responses against stored `AuthnRequest` IDs. | ||||
| CVE-2026-56738 | 1 Thorsten | 1 Phpmyfaq | 2026-10-05 | N/A |
| phpMyFAQ is an open source FAQ web application. The `StopWords::add()` method inversions prior to 4.1.6 builds a SQL `INSERT` statement using `sprintf()` and inserts the user-supplied stop word value directly into the query string without calling the application's database escaping function on it. A sibling method, `StopWords::update()`, which modifies an existing stop word, correctly escapes the same kind of input. The omission is isolated to the `add()` (insert) code path. An authenticated administrator who can reach the stop-word management feature can submit a crafted value as the "word" parameter that breaks out of the SQL string literal and injects arbitrary SQL, including statements to drop tables, exfiltrate data, or modify other rows in the database. Version 4.1.6 fixes the issue. | ||||
| CVE-2026-52853 | 1 Docmost | 1 Docmost | 2026-10-05 | 5.2 Medium |
| Docmost is open-source collaborative wiki and documentation software. Prior to 0.90.1, an authenticated workspace ADMIN can use the workspace invitation flow to invite an external email address with the OWNER role because the role ceiling does not prevent ADMIN users from granting privileges above their own. When the invitation is accepted, the new account receives OWNER-level permissions, allowing the ADMIN to create a backdoor OWNER account or promote a colluding external user to the workspace's highest privilege level. This issue is fixed in version 0.90.1. | ||||
| CVE-2026-48070 | 1 Docmost | 1 Docmost | 2026-10-05 | 7.1 High |
| Docmost is open-source collaborative wiki and documentation software. Prior to 0.80.1, authenticated users can store attacker-controlled avatarUrl values that are later reused by avatar cleanup without confinement to the intended directory on local-storage deployments. A low-privileged user can cause deletion of arbitrary local files or directories reachable by the Docmost service account. This issue is fixed in version 0.80.1. | ||||
| CVE-2026-39783 | 2026-10-05 | 4.3 Medium | ||
| Missing Authorization vulnerability in WP SYNTEX Polylang polylang allows Retrieve Embedded Sensitive Data.This issue affects Polylang: from n/a through 3.8.7. | ||||
| CVE-2026-39721 | 2026-10-05 | 5.4 Medium | ||
| Missing Authorization vulnerability in Brainstorm Force Starter Templates astra-sites allows Exploiting Incorrectly Configured Access Control Security Levels.This issue affects Starter Templates: from n/a through 4.7.7. | ||||
| CVE-2026-18040 | 1 Legion Of The Bouncy Castle Inc. | 1 Bc-java | 2026-10-05 | N/A |
| In Bouncy Castle for Java before 1.86, HQC leaked secret-derived data through two side channels: its GF(2^8) arithmetic used lookup tables indexed by field elements, making the cache line touched a function of the operand, and its fixed-weight support sampler left its duplicate scan as soon as a collision was found and stored accepted positions at a secret index. Both run on secret inputs during encapsulation and decapsulation, and the sampler re-expands the secret key from its seed on every decapsulation, so an attacker able to observe cache behaviour or decapsulation timing can recover information about the HQC private key. The field arithmetic is now table-free and the sampler branch-free within a batch of candidates, with output and randomness consumption unchanged. | ||||