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Search Results (37108 CVEs found)
| CVE | Vendors | Products | Updated | CVSS v3.1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-66686 | 2 Vladimir Garagulya, Wordpress | 2 Plugins Garbage Collector (database Cleanup), Wordpress | 2026-08-07 | 6.5 Medium |
| Unauthenticated Cross Site Request Forgery (CSRF) in Plugins Garbage Collector (Database Cleanup) <= 0.14 versions. | ||||
| CVE-2026-66696 | 2 Nexcess, Wordpress | 2 Gutenberg Blocks By Kadence Blocks, Wordpress | 2026-08-07 | 4.3 Medium |
| Contributor Sensitive Data Exposure in Gutenberg Blocks by Kadence Blocks <= 3.7.8 versions. | ||||
| CVE-2026-70646 | 1 Vovchic17 | 1 Aiosend | 2026-08-07 | 7.5 High |
| aiosend is a synchronous and asynchronous Crypto Pay API client. Pror to version 3.0.7, `WebhookHandler.feed_update()` deserializes the entire request body before verifying the HMAC signature. This allows an unauthenticated attacker to force expensive parsing of arbitrary JSON payloads that will ultimately be rejected, leading to unnecessary CPU and memory consumption. Version 3.0.7 fixes the issue. Some workarounds are available. Restrict request body size at the reverse proxy or web framework, rate-limit webhook endpoints, and/or reject oversized requests before JSON parsing. | ||||
| CVE-2026-53977 | 1 Bohdan Triapitsyn | 1 Openchamber | 2026-08-07 | 7.5 High |
| OpenChamber 1.11.7 contains an authentication bypass vulnerability that allows unauthenticated remote attackers to terminate the server process by sending a POST request to the /api/system/shutdown endpoint, which is registered before the authentication middleware in the Express route handler chain. Attackers can exploit the route registration order in bootstrap-runtime.js to reach the shutdown handler before auth middleware executes, causing denial of service to all active AI coding sessions and locking out legitimate remote users regardless of whether UI_PASSWORD is configured. | ||||
| CVE-2026-18276 | 1 Scripta | 1 Escriptorium | 2026-08-07 | 4.3 Medium |
| Missing authorization in the websocket consumer in Scripta eScriptorium through 26.04.1 allows a remote authenticated user to subscribe to any document's event stream and observe another user's segmentation, transcription, import, export and training activity via the object_cls and object_pk values of a join-room message, which are passed to group_add without an access check | ||||
| CVE-2026-18275 | 1 Scripta | 1 Escriptorium | 2026-08-07 | 6.5 Medium |
| Authorization bypass in the process and annotation taxonomy serializers in Scripta eScriptorium through 26.04.1 allows a remote authenticated user to run segmentation and transcription against other users' document parts, overwriting their content, via part primary keys supplied to a many=True related field whose queryset restriction was applied to the ManyRelatedField instead of its child_relation and therefore had no effect | ||||
| CVE-2026-18359 | 1 Scripta | 1 Escriptorium | 2026-08-07 | 8.5 High |
| Server-side request forgery in the METS and IIIF import URI handling in Scripta eScriptorium through 26.04.1 allows a remote authenticated user to make the server issue arbitrary HTTP requests to internal hosts, including the cloud instance metadata service, via the mets_uri or iiif_uri parameter of POST /api/documents/{pk}/imports/, because the IMPORT_ALLOWED_DOMAINS setting defaults to '*' and no address filtering, redirect cap or timeout is applied | ||||
| CVE-2026-18277 | 1 Scripta | 1 Escriptorium | 2026-08-07 | 7.1 High |
| Missing authorization in the OcrModelRight create and delete views in Scripta eScriptorium through 26.04.1 allows a remote authenticated user to grant themselves access to another user's private OCR model and to revoke any user's OCR model access via a POST request, because the ownership check is placed in get_context_data() and therefore runs only on the GET rendering path | ||||
| CVE-2026-18258 | 1 Scripta | 1 Escriptorium | 2026-08-07 | 8.8 High |
| Authorization bypass in the Line, LineTranscription, VirtualCollection, tag and process API endpoints in Scripta/eScriptorium through 26.04.1 allows a remote authenticated user to read, modify and delete other users' transcription content via primary keys supplied in the request body, which are queried against the global model manager instead of the request-scoped queryset | ||||
| CVE-2026-53985 | 1 Efstratios Goudelis | 1 Ground Station | 2026-08-07 | 7.5 High |
| Ground Station prior to 0.6.0 contains an unauthenticated denial-of-service vulnerability in the Socket.IO server's service_control event handler that allows any unauthenticated network peer to forcibly terminate the ground-station process by sending a single restart_service command. Attackers can connect to the Socket.IO server on port 7000 without credentials due to disabled authentication enforcement and a wildcard CORS policy, then emit the service_control event to terminate all active satellite-tracking sessions, SDR recording pipelines, demodulators, decoders, and rotator controllers, with repeated triggering possible in Docker deployments to create a persistent denial-of-service condition. | ||||
| CVE-2026-53984 | 1 Efstratios Goudelis | 1 Ground Station | 2026-08-07 | 9.1 Critical |
| Ground Station prior to 0.6.0 contains an unauthenticated database-destruction and arbitrary-data-injection vulnerability in the Socket.IO server's database_backup event handler that allows any unauthenticated network peer to wipe or replace the entire SQLite database by sending a single full_restore command with a caller-supplied SQL blob. Attackers can connect to the Socket.IO server on port 7000 without credentials due to disabled authentication enforcement and a wildcard CORS policy, then emit the database_backup event to drop every existing table and recreate the database from attacker-controlled CREATE TABLE and INSERT INTO statements executed via raw exec_driver_sql, permanently destroying all satellite records, orbital sources, hardware configurations, and observation schedules, or planting fabricated orbital-source URLs and observation entries that redirect the ground station to attacker-controlled servers on the next scheduled sync. | ||||
| CVE-2024-6541 | 1 Wso2 | 5 Micro Integrator, Wso2-synapse, Wso2 Api Manager and 2 more | 2026-08-07 | 6.8 Medium |
| The Class Mediator fails to correctly validate or sanitize `messageContext` properties when they are used to populate dynamic values. This allows authenticated users to potentially access or modify data across different system invocations that should be isolated. This weakness can lead to the disclosure of sensitive information belonging to other users or the unintended modification of system data by authenticated users. The exact impact depends on how `messageContext` properties are utilized within the affected WSO2 products. | ||||
| CVE-2026-48080 | 1 Open-reception | 1 Appointment-booking-software | 2026-08-07 | 8 High |
| OpenReception's appointment booking software provides an end-to-end encrypted appointment booking platform. Prior to version 1.0.2, the `GET /api/tenants/{id}` endpoint returns the full tenant record to any authenticated `TENANT_ADMIN` of that tenant, including the `databaseUrl` field. This field contains the live PostgreSQL connection string the application uses to connect to that tenant's database. In the tested official `docker-compose.prod.yml` deployment, the connection string contained the user `postgres` with `rolsuper=true` and the plaintext password from `secrets/postgres_password.txt`. Operators who configure a non-superuser PostgreSQL user via `secrets/postgres_user.txt` would expose a less privileged credential, but the disclosure of the connection string itself is independent of that choice. The same credential applies to every database managed by that PostgreSQL instance: the central `appointment_booking` database, every per-tenant database (one per tenant), and the postgres administrative database. A `TENANT_ADMIN` of one tenant who can reach `postgres:5432` (directly via internal network, indirectly via any SSRF, RCE, or file-read in the application) can read every other tenant's appointment ciphertexts, key shares, and metadata; read the central user table, including all `GLOBAL_ADMIN` accounts, password hashes, and session records; modify or delete any data in any tenant database; and/or i a superuser-scoped deployment: use PostgreSQL's `pg_read_server_files`, `COPY ... FROM PROGRAM`, and `CREATE EXTENSION` for further escalation inside the database container. This breaks the per-tenant database isolation that is otherwise the primary cross-tenant control in the application. The application code carefully scopes most queries to the calling tenant's database, but those scopings are irrelevant once the attacker holds the credentials that bypass the application entirely. Version 1.0.2 fixes the issue. | ||||
| CVE-2026-48071 | 1 Open-reception | 1 Appointment-booking-software | 2026-08-07 | 5.8 Medium |
| OpenReception's appointment booking software provides an end-to-end encrypted appointment booking platform. Prior to version 1.0.4, the PIN-type challenge throttle uses `emailHash` as the only key. The throttle rows live in the central `challenge_throttle` table, which is shared across all tenants. Every tenant's `/api/tenants/{id}/appointments/verify-challenge` endpoint increments the same row when a PIN response fails, and every tenant's `/api/tenants/{id}/appointments/challenge` endpoint reads the same row when deciding whether to issue a new challenge. When the same `emailHash` exists in multiple tenants on the same OpenReception instance (the same patient holding tunnels in two different clinics that share the platform), an attacker who knows the patient's email can lock out that patient on tenant B by issuing failed challenge responses against tenant A. The attacker needs no relationship to tenant B; the lockout propagates through the shared throttle row. The lockout escalates with repeated failures. The first lockout triggers at 4 failed attempts and lasts approximately 60 seconds. Subsequent failures escalate the lockout duration to 5 minutes, 30 minutes, and 60 minutes per the throttle service's escalation logic. Repeated bursts produce sustained denial of service against the targeted email. Version 1.0.4 patches the issue. | ||||
| CVE-2026-70557 | 1 Diboot | 1 Diboot-core | 2026-08-07 | 6.5 Medium |
| diboot-core's POST /common/load-related-data endpoint resolves caller-supplied field names to any @TableField column of any entity and returns those values for all rows, with no field or entity allowlist. The only guard, relatedDataSecurityCheck(), returns true unconditionally, so any authenticated user (including a zero-role account) can read @JsonIgnore-annotated secret fields such as IamAccount.authSecret and IamAccount.secretSalt for every account, or arbitrary secret fields of any other entity. Shiro's two-iteration MD5 with an 8-character salt is trivially crackable offline, so the disclosed admin password hashes convert to full administrative takeover. The endpoint is not example code; the official diboot-admin-ui frontend requires it, so deployments following the vendor's recommended integration expose it. The mechanism was renamed relatedData* to attachMore* on the development branch, but attachMoreSecurityCheck() also returns true unconditionally. | ||||
| CVE-2026-48075 | 1 Open-reception | 1 Appointment-booking-software | 2026-08-07 | 6.5 Medium |
| OpenReception's appointment booking software provides an end-to-end encrypted appointment booking platform. Prior to version 1.0.5, the `add-to-tunnel` endpoint creates a new appointment row in any client tunnel without any caller authentication. A request that supplies any valid `tunnelId` and any valid `emailHash` (the two need not belong to the same tunnel) results in an inserted appointment with `status = "CONFIRMED"`, attacker-controlled ciphertext fields, attacker-controlled date and duration, and an attacker-chosen agent. The endpoint validates only that some tunnel exists with the given `emailHash`, then writes the appointment using the attacker-supplied `tunnelId` directly. The `emailHash` lookup is effectively an existence check on the tenant; it does not authenticate the caller as the owner of the supplied `tunnelId`. Combined with the absence of any session, Authorization header, booking access token, or PoW, this makes the endpoint accept arbitrary appointment writes into arbitrary tunnels. By contrast, the sibling endpoint `create-new-client` (used to bootstrap a brand-new client tunnel) requires a Bearer bootstrap booking access token issued by the bootstrap-challenge / bootstrap-verify flow. The `add-to-tunnel` endpoint, intended for return-clients booking additional appointments, has no equivalent gate. The application's own middleware confirms this is intentional: `add-to-tunnel` is explicitly listed in the apiAuthHandle public-route allowlist alongside the bootstrap and challenge endpoints (which legitimately have no session). Version 1.0.5 fixes the issue. | ||||
| CVE-2024-7885 | 1 Redhat | 21 Apache Camel Hawtio, Apache Camel Spring Boot, Build Keycloak and 18 more | 2026-08-07 | 7.5 High |
| A vulnerability was found in Undertow where the ProxyProtocolReadListener reuses the same StringBuilder instance across multiple requests. This issue occurs when the parseProxyProtocolV1 method processes multiple requests on the same HTTP connection. As a result, different requests may share the same StringBuilder instance, potentially leading to information leakage between requests or responses. In some cases, a value from a previous request or response may be erroneously reused, which could lead to unintended data exposure. This issue primarily results in errors and connection termination but creates a risk of data leakage in multi-request environments. | ||||
| CVE-2026-48077 | 1 Open-reception | 1 Appointment-booking-software | 2026-08-07 | 5.3 Medium |
| OpenReception's appointment booking software provides an end-to-end encrypted appointment booking platform. Prior to version 1.1.0, the GET handler at `/api/tenants/{id}/appointments/{appointmentId}` performs no authorization check before returning the appointment record. Any party who knows or obtains a valid appointment UUID receives the full row, including channel and agent IDs, time and timezone, status, and the AES-GCM ciphertext components (`encryptedPayload`, `iv`, `authTag`, `dataKey`). The same file's DELETE handler calls `checkPermission(locals, tenantId, true)` before allowing deletion. The intent is clear: appointment records are tenant-scoped and require authentication to access. The GET handler is missing the equivalent call. The middleware chain (`apiAuthHandle`, `authGuard`) does not compensate: API paths bypass `authGuard` entirely, and `apiAuthHandle` does not block requests to non-admin paths when no token is present. Version 1.1.0 patches the issue. | ||||
| CVE-2026-48078 | 1 Open-reception | 1 Appointment-booking-software | 2026-08-07 | 5.3 Medium |
| OpenReception's appointment booking software provides an end-to-end encrypted appointment booking platform. Prior to version 1.0.5, the unauthenticated `/api/tenants/{id}/schedule` endpoint returns every non-archived channel for a tenant regardless of the channel's `isPublic` flag. Channels marked `isPublic = false` are intended to be invisible to public callers; the dashboard creates them deliberately to hide internal-only services from the patient booking UI. The schedule endpoint ignores the flag entirely and discloses channel names, descriptions, IDs, agent associations, pause status, confirmation requirements, and computed slot availability for the requested date range. The asymmetry between `addAppointmentToTunnel` (which enforces `eq(channel.isPublic, true)`) and the schedule endpoint (which does not) confirms the design intent: private channels exist as a real access boundary in the booking flow, just not in the schedule disclosure. Version 1.0.5 patches the issue. | ||||
| CVE-2026-48079 | 1 Open-reception | 1 Appointment-booking-software | 2026-08-07 | 7.4 High |
| OpenReception's appointment booking software provides an end-to-end encrypted appointment booking platform. Prior to version 1.0.2, when a user navigates to the `/logout` page, the page's server-side load handler deletes the `access_token` cookie before calling `/api/auth/logout` via an internal `event.fetch()`. The internal fetch consequently runs without the auth cookie, so `apiAuthHandle` rejects it, the logout handler never executes, and `SessionService.revokeSession()` is never called for the current session. The DB session row remains valid until its natural expiry (one week by default). The user sees a successful logout (cookie gone, UI returns to login), but any party still holding a copy of the now-deleted access token can continue making authenticated API calls until the session naturally expires. The root cause is a simple ordering mistake. The same auth subsystem implements the correct order in `/api/auth/logout`: revoke the current DB session first, then delete the cookie. The page-level wrapper does the opposite. Version 1.0.2 initiates server-side logout before removing authentication cookies and first appears in version 1.0.2. Version 2.0.0 later replaces this with a race-free client-side logout flow. | ||||