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| CVE | Vendors | Products | Updated | CVSS v3.1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-68190 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-10 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB reads in rtw_get_wps_ie() rtw_get_wps_ie() iterates over IE data from network frames without validating that the IE header and payload fit within the remaining buffer before reading them. Specifically: - in_ie[cnt + 1] is read without checking cnt + 1 < in_len - memcmp(&in_ie[cnt + 2], ...) accesses cnt + 2 without bounds check - in_ie[cnt + 1] is used as length without verifying payload fits Add bounds checks at the top of the loop body to break early if fewer than 2 bytes remain for the IE header, or if the declared payload extends past the end of the buffer. Also require at least 4 bytes of payload before comparing the WPS OUI. | ||||
| CVE-2026-68191 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-10 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: ath12k: fix NULL pointer dereference in rhash table destroy When unbinding the ath12k driver, kernel NULL pointer dereferences occur in irq_work_sync() called from rhashtable_destroy(). Two hash tables are affected: 1. ath12k_link_sta hash table in ath12k_base 2. ath12k_dp_link_peer hash table in ath12k_dp The issue happens because the destroy functions are called unconditionally in cleanup paths, but the hash tables are only initialized late in their respective init functions. If the device was never fully started or if the init functions failed before initializing the hash tables, the pointers will be NULL. The issues are always reproducible from a VM because the MSI addressing initialization is failing. Call trace for ath12k_link_sta_rhash_tbl_destroy: RIP: irq_work_sync+0x1e/0x70 rhashtable_destroy+0x12/0x60 ath12k_link_sta_rhash_tbl_destroy+0x19/0x40 [ath12k] ath12k_core_stop+0xe/0x80 [ath12k] ath12k_core_hw_group_cleanup+0x6b/0xb0 [ath12k] ath12k_pci_remove+0x60/0x110 [ath12k] Call trace for ath12k_dp_link_peer_rhash_tbl_destroy: RIP: irq_work_sync+0x1e/0x70 rhashtable_destroy+0x12/0x60 ath12k_dp_link_peer_rhash_tbl_destroy+0x29/0x50 [ath12k] ath12k_dp_cmn_device_deinit+0x21/0x140 [ath12k] ath12k_core_hw_group_cleanup+0x6b/0xb0 [ath12k] ath12k_pci_remove+0x60/0x110 [ath12k] Fix this by adding NULL checks before calling rhashtable_destroy() in both destroy functions. The NULL check approach was chosen because the rhashtable pointer serves as the initialization state indicator. The init can fail at various points, leaving some components uninitialized. Checking the pointer directly is simpler than adding separate state flags that would need synchronization. | ||||
| CVE-2026-68193 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-10 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: mt76: mt7925: drop TXRX_NOTIFY on non-mmio buses PKT_TYPE_TXRX_NOTIFY is an mmio-only event, but mt7925_rx_check() and mt7925_queue_rx_skb() dispatch it to mt7925_mac_tx_free() on every bus. mt7925_mac_tx_free() cleans the DMA tx queues with mt76_queue_tx_cleanup(), which calls queue_ops->tx_cleanup(). Only the mmio queue ops implement that callback; on USB it is NULL, so a TXRX_NOTIFY there calls a NULL pointer in the RX worker: BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000 RIP: 0010:0x0 Call Trace: mt7925_mac_tx_free+0x58/0x350 [mt7925_common] mt7925_rx_check+0xe2/0x130 [mt7925_common] mt76u_rx_worker+0x1b9/0x620 [mt76_usb] Drop the event on non-mmio buses via mt76_is_mmio(), as in commit 5683e1488aa9 ("wifi: mt76: connac: do not check WED status for non-mmio devices"). | ||||
| CVE-2026-68195 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-10 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: mt76: mt7615: drop TXRX_NOTIFY on non-mmio buses PKT_TYPE_TXRX_NOTIFY is an mmio-only event, but mt7615_rx_check() and mt7615_queue_rx_skb() dispatch it to mt7615_mac_tx_free() on every bus. mt7615_mac_tx_free() cleans the DMA tx queues with mt76_queue_tx_cleanup(), which calls queue_ops->tx_cleanup(). Only the mmio queue ops implement that callback; on the mt7663 USB and SDIO buses it is NULL, so a TXRX_NOTIFY there calls a NULL pointer in the RX worker. Same defect as the mt7921 and mt7925 patches in this series. Drop the event on non-mmio buses via mt76_is_mmio(), as in commit 5683e1488aa9 ("wifi: mt76: connac: do not check WED status for non-mmio devices"). | ||||
| CVE-2026-68197 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-10 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: mwifiex: fix NULL dereference when the AP has HT-cap but no HT-oper mwifiex_tdls_add_ht_oper() gates its follow-the-AP-bandwidth path on bss_desc->bcn_ht_cap being present, but then dereferences a different pointer, bss_desc->bcn_ht_oper: if (ISSUPP_CHANWIDTH40(priv->adapter->hw_dot_11n_dev_cap) && bss_desc->bcn_ht_cap && ISALLOWED_CHANWIDTH40(bss_desc->bcn_ht_oper->ht_param)) bcn_ht_cap and bcn_ht_oper are populated independently while parsing the associated AP's beacon in mwifiex_update_bss_desc_with_ie(): an AP that advertises an HT Capabilities element but no HT Operation element leaves bcn_ht_cap non-NULL and bcn_ht_oper NULL. Setting up a TDLS link to a peer while associated to such an AP then dereferences the NULL bcn_ht_oper and crashes the kernel. Every other bcn_ht_oper user in the driver NULL-checks it first. Guard on the pointer that is actually dereferenced. Found by 0sec automated security-research tooling (https://0sec.ai). | ||||
| CVE-2026-68200 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-10 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ALSA: timer: don't re-enter an instance callback that is still running The userspace-driven timer (utimer) TRIGGER ioctl calls snd_timer_interrupt() directly with no serialization, so two threads triggering the same utimer can run snd_timer_interrupt() on one snd_timer concurrently. snd_timer_process_callbacks() drops timer->lock around each instance callback and marks the in-flight callback with the single SNDRV_TIMER_IFLG_CALLBACK bit; snd_timer_close_locked() waits on that bit to drain an in-flight callback before freeing the instance. The bit cannot represent two concurrent callbacks: when a second interrupt re-queues an instance whose callback is still running, both run at once, the first to finish clears the bit, and the close-path drain then frees the instance (and its callback_data) while the other callback is still live - a use-after-free reachable by any user able to open /dev/snd/timer, both via a user timer instance and via a sequencer queue timer bound to the utimer. snd_timer_interrupt() sets IFLG_CALLBACK before dropping timer->lock, so a concurrent interrupt already observes it under the lock. Skip re-queuing an instance (and its slaves) to the ack/sack list while its callback is in flight; the accumulated pticks are delivered on the next tick, so no event is lost. | ||||
| CVE-2026-68201 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-10 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ALSA: timer: drain a slave's callback before its master detaches it snd_timer_close_locked() drains the closing instance's own in-flight callback (IFLG_CALLBACK) before freeing it, but not its slaves'. When a master instance is closed, remove_slave_links() clears each slave's ->timer; the slave's own close then reads timer == NULL and takes the branch that skips the drain entirely (snd_timer_stop_slave() also no-ops on a NULL timer). So a slave whose callback is still running when the master is closed is freed underneath the live callback, leading to use-after-free. Drain the slaves too before remove_slave_links() severs them. snd_timer_stop() has already taken this instance off the active list, so no new slave callback can be queued. Take the slaves off the ack list so a pending one can't fire either, then wait for any that is already in flight. | ||||
| CVE-2026-68202 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-10 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ALSA: seq: close a re-opened queue timer in the destructor queue_delete() closes the queue timer, then frees it. snd_seq_timer_close() clears q->timer->timeri. snd_use_lock_sync() then drains borrowers, and snd_seq_timer_delete() frees q->timer. A borrower can re-open the timer inside that window. A SET_QUEUE_CLIENT that took a queueptr() use_lock reference before the queue was unlinked runs snd_seq_timer_open() after the close. Open refuses re-open only while timeri is set, and the close just cleared it, so it re-opens timeri. snd_seq_timer_delete() does not close that instance. Its snd_seq_timer_stop() is a no-op, because running was cleared first. So it frees q->timer with the instance still live. The queue is freed next. The instance stays on the global timer with callback_data pointing at the freed queue. A non-owner START on the unlocked queue arms it. The next tick derefs the freed queue in snd_seq_timer_interrupt(). Reachable by an unprivileged user with access to /dev/snd/seq. No CAP and no queue ownership required. Close any lingering instance in the destructor. There, ->timeri can no longer change: the queue is unlinked and all use_lock borrowers have drained, so no snd_seq_queue_use() can re-open it. Close it before clearing q->timer. snd_timer_close() waits for any in-flight snd_seq_timer_interrupt() to finish, and that callback still reads q->timer (via snd_seq_check_queue()), so q->timer must stay valid until it drains. | ||||
| CVE-2026-68204 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-10 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: media: vivid: check for vb2_is_busy() when toggling caps The vivid_update_format_cap/out() functions must only be called if the capture/output queue are not busy. But for the controls that select the CROP/COMPOSE/SCALE capability that is not checked. Only when streaming starts will they be set to 'grabbed' and it is impossible to change the control, but between REQBUFS and STREAMON you are still allowed to set these controls. Since vivid_update_format_cap/out will change the format, this can cause unexpected results. Besides adding these checks, also add a WARN_ON in vivid_update_format_cap/out() if the queue is busy. I'm 90% certain that this is the cause of this syzbot bug: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=dac8f5eaa46837e97b89 But since we never have reproducers, it is hard to be certain. In any case, these checks are needed regardless. | ||||
| CVE-2026-68206 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-10 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: media: v4l2-ctrls: validate HEVC active reference counts HEVC slice parameters are shared stateless V4L2 controls, but the common validation path does not verify the active L0/L1 reference counts before driver-specific code consumes them. The original report came from Cedrus, but the active count bounds are not Cedrus-specific. Validate them in the common HEVC slice control path so stateless HEVC drivers get the same basic guarantees as soon as the control is queued. Do not reject ref_idx_l0/ref_idx_l1 entries here. Existing userspace may use out-of-range sentinel values such as 0xff for missing references, and some hardware can use that information for concealment. Keep this common check limited to the active reference counts. | ||||
| CVE-2026-68212 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-10 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: media: saa7134: Fix a possible memory leak in saa7134_video_init1 In saa7134_video_init1(), the return value of the first saa7134_pgtable_alloc() is not checked. If it fails, the function continues as if successful, leaving the driver with an invalid page table. Additionally, if vb2_queue_init() for the VBI queue fails after the video queue page table has been allocated, the allocated memory is not freed before returning. The second saa7134_pgtable_alloc() also lacks a return value check. Errors occur during device probing before the device is fully registered, the normal cleanup path in saa7134_finidev() is not executed, leading to memory leaks and potential use of uninitialized DMA resources. Check the return value of both saa7134_pgtable_alloc() calls and propagate errors. On failure of any later step, free allocated page tables to avoid memory leaks. Ensure control handlers are also released on error to prevent further resource leakage. Found by code review. | ||||
| CVE-2026-68215 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-10 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: media: radio-si476x: Unregister v4l2_device on probe failure si476x_radio_probe() registers radio->v4l2dev before allocating the V4L2 controls and before registering the video device. If any of those later steps fails, probe returns through the exit label after freeing only the control handler. A failed probe does not call si476x_radio_remove(), so the v4l2_device_unregister() there is not reached. This leaves the parent device reference taken by v4l2_device_register() behind on the error path. Unregister the V4L2 device in the probe error path after freeing the controls. | ||||
| CVE-2026-68216 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-10 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: media: pwc: Return queued buffers on start_streaming() failure The vb2 framework hands buffers to the driver via buf_queue() before calling start_streaming(). If start_streaming() returns an error without first returning those buffers via vb2_buffer_done(), vb2_start_streaming() fires WARN_ON(owned_by_drv_count) and the queued buffers leak. pwc's start_streaming() had two early returns that hit this trap: -ENODEV when the USB device was already disconnected, and -ERESTARTSYS when mutex_lock_interruptible() was interrupted by a signal. Call the existing pwc_cleanup_queued_bufs() helper with VB2_BUF_STATE_QUEUED before returning (matching the state already used by the pwc_isoc_init() error path in the same function). This mirrors the uvcvideo fix in commit 4cf3b6fd54eb ("media: uvcvideo: Return queued buffers on start_streaming() failure"). | ||||
| CVE-2026-68218 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-10 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: media: pci: dm1105: Free allocated workqueue Destroy allocated workqueue in remove() callback to free its resources, thus fixing memory leak. | ||||
| CVE-2026-3087 | 2 Microsoft, Python | 3 Windows, Cpython, Python | 2026-08-10 | 7.5 High |
| If `shutil.unpack_archive()` is given a ZIP archive with an absolute Windows path containing a drive (`C:\\...`) then the archive will be extracted outside the target directory which is different than other operating systems. Only Windows is affected by this vulnerability. | ||||
| CVE-2026-52878 | 1 Klever-io | 1 Klever-go | 2026-08-10 | 7.5 High |
| Klever-Go is the Go implementation of the Klever blockchain protocol. Versions 1.7.14 through 1.7.17 are vulnerable to a nil-pointer panic triggered by a protobuf Transaction whose embedded RawData sub-message is omitted. This omission causes RawData to decode to nil. Every transaction gossiped on the Klever-Go P2P network is decoded and validated synchronously inside the libp2p pubsub topic-validator callback, where txVersionChecker.CheckTxVersion dereferences tx.RawData.Version with no nil check. Because the libp2p pubsub callback, the underlying go-libp2p-pubsub validation worker, and Klever's own network/p2p layer install no recover(), the panic propagates and crashes the entire node process. The attacker payload is a 3-byte protobuf message; no validator key, stake, funds, or on-chain account is required, and delivery aimed at enough of the BLS validator set can halt block production, resulting in a chain halt. This issue has been fixed in version 1.7.18. | ||||
| CVE-2026-68096 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-10 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: audit: fix recursive locking deadlock in audit_dupe_exe() A deadlock occurs in the audit subsystem when duplicating executable-related rules. When a file is moved (e.g., via do_renameat2()), the VFS layer locks the parent directory (I_MUTEX_PARENT), which synchronously triggers an fsnotify_move event. If an existing executable audit rule matches the file being moved, the audit subsystem catches this event and calls audit_dupe_exe() to duplicate the watch and update the rule. Then, audit_alloc_mark() would call kern_path_parent() to resolve the path, leading to a blind attempt to acquire the exact same I_MUTEX_PARENT lock already held by the task, resulting in the following recursive locking deadlock: ============================================ WARNING: possible recursive locking detected 6.12.0-55.27.1.el10_0.x86_64+debug #1 Not tainted -------------------------------------------- mv/5099 is trying to acquire lock: ffff888132845358 (&inode->i_sb->s_type->i_mutex_dir_key/1){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: __kern_path_locked+0x10a/0x2f0 but task is already holding lock: ffff888132846b58 (&inode->i_sb->s_type->i_mutex_dir_key/1){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: lock_two_directories+0x13f/0x2b0 other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 ---- lock(&inode->i_sb->s_type->i_mutex_dir_key/1); lock(&inode->i_sb->s_type->i_mutex_dir_key/1); *** DEADLOCK *** May be due to missing lock nesting notation 6 locks held by mv/5099: #0: ffff888112a9c440 (sb_writers#13) at: do_renameat2+0x34c/0xbc0 #1: ffff888112a9c790 (&type->s_vfs_rename_key#3) at: do_renameat2+0x415/0xbc0 #2: ffff888132846b58 (&inode->i_sb->s_type->i_mutex_dir_key/1) at: lock_two_directories+0x13f/0x2b0 #3: ffff888132845358 (&inode->i_sb->s_type->i_mutex_dir_key/5) at: lock_two_directories+0x175/0x2b0 #4: ffffffffb3a1fb10 (&fsnotify_mark_srcu) at: fsnotify+0x454/0x28a0 #5: ffffffffaf886230 (audit_filter_mutex) at: audit_update_watch+0x36/0x11e0 stack backtrace: Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x6f/0xb0 print_deadlock_bug.cold+0xbd/0xca validate_chain+0x83a/0xf00 __lock_acquire+0xcac/0x1d20 lock_acquire.part.0+0x11b/0x360 down_write_nested+0x9f/0x230 __kern_path_locked+0x10a/0x2f0 kern_path_locked+0x26/0x40 audit_alloc_mark+0xfb/0x4f0 audit_dupe_exe+0x6c/0xe0 audit_dupe_rule+0x6c2/0xc00 audit_update_watch+0x4cc/0x11e0 audit_watch_handle_event+0x12c/0x1b0 send_to_group+0x5d0/0x8b0 fsnotify+0x615/0x28a0 fsnotify_move+0x1d8/0x630 vfs_rename+0xdcd/0x1df0 do_renameat2+0x9d4/0xbc0 __x64_sys_renameat+0x192/0x260 do_syscall_64+0x92/0x180 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e RIP: 0033:0x7f0491fe8c4e Code: 0f 1f 40 00 48 8b 15 c1 e1 16 00 f7 d8 64 89 02 b8 ff ff ff ff c3 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa 49 89 ca b8 08 01 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 0a c3 66 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 48 8b 15 89 RSP: 002b:00007ffc7210bf38 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000108 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f0491fe8c4e RDX: 0000000000000003 RSI: 00007ffc7210e6c8 RDI: 00000000ffffff9c RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000001 R10: 00005575eb2dae2a R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00005575eb2dae2a R13: 00007ffc7210e6c8 R14: 0000000000000003 R15: 00000000ffffff9c </TASK> The aforementioned deadlock can be consistently reproduced by running the script below: audit-dupe-exe-deadlock.sh -------------------------- #!/bin/bash auditctl -D mkdir -p /tmp/foo touch /tmp/file auditctl -a always,exit -F exe=/tmp/file -F path=/tmp/file -S all -k dr mv /tmp/file /tmp/foo/file rm -Rf /tmp/foo This patch fixes the issue by introducing struct audit_watch_ctx to pass the fsnotify event context down to audit_alloc_mark(). By utilizing the already-resolved directory inode provided by the event, we bypass the kern_path_parent() path resol ---truncated--- | ||||
| CVE-2026-68101 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-10 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amdgpu: fix check in amdgpu_hmm_invalidate_gfx For a short moment during alloc/free the userptr BO is not part of his VM, so bo->vm_bo can be NULL. Keep a reference to the VM root PD as parent of the userptr BO so that we can always use that to wait for all submissions of the VM instead of only the one involving the userptr BO. (cherry picked from commit 631849ff5d603841e74f19f4a5e30fe1f7d7cf30) | ||||
| CVE-2026-68136 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-10 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: gro: fix double aggregation of flush-marked skbs Commit 0ab03f353d36 ("net-gro: Fix GRO flush when receiving a GSO packet.") added a flush check to skb_gro_receive(), but skb_gro_receive_list() lacks the same validation. As a result, packets marked with NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)->flush may still be re-aggregated. This allows already-GRO'd packets with existing frag_list to be re-aggregated into a new GRO session, corrupting the frag_list chain structure. When skb_segment() attempts to unpack these malformed packets, it encounters invalid state and triggers a kernel panic. Scenario (Tethering/Device forwarding): 1. Driver: Generated aggregated packet P1 via LRO with frag_list 2. Dev A: Receives aggregated fraglist packet and flush flag set 3. Dev A: Re-enters GRO, skb_gro_receive_list() is called 4. Missing flush check allows re-aggregation despite flush flag 5. Frag_list chain becomes corrupted (loops or dangling refs) 6. Dev B: TX path calls skb_segment(), crashes on corrupted frag_list Root cause in skb_segment(): The check at line ~4891: if (hsize <= 0 && i >= nfrags && skb_headlen(list_skb) && (skb_headlen(list_skb) == len || sg)) { When frag_list is corrupted by double aggregation, when list_skb is a NULL pointer from skb->next, skb_headlen(list_skb) dereference NULL/corrupted pointers occurs. Call Trace: skb_headlen(NULL skb) skb_segment tcp_gso_segment tcp4_gso_segment inet_gso_segment skb_mac_gso_segment __skb_gso_segment skb_gso_segment validate_xmit_skb validate_xmit_skb_list sch_direct_xmit qdisc_restart __qdisc_run qdisc_run net_tx_action Fix: Add NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)->flush validation to the early-return check in skb_gro_receive_list(), matching the defensive programming pattern of skb_gro_receive(). | ||||
| CVE-2026-68137 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-10 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/x25: fix use-after-free in x25_kill_by_neigh() x25_kill_by_neigh() walks the global X.25 socket list looking for sockets attached to a terminating neighbour. x25_list_lock protects list membership while the lookup is in progress, but it does not pin a socket's lifetime after the lock is dropped. The function currently drops x25_list_lock before calling lock_sock(s). A concurrent close can run x25_release(), remove the same socket from x25_list, and drop the last socket reference in that window. The neighbour teardown path can then lock or inspect a freed struct sock/struct x25_sock. Take sock_hold(s) while x25_list_lock still proves that the list entry is live, then drop the temporary reference after the socket has been locked, rechecked, and released. Recheck x25_sk(s)->neighbour after lock_sock(), because another path may have disconnected the socket before this path acquired the socket lock. Restart the list walk after each disconnect because the list lock was dropped and the previous iterator state may no longer be valid. A QEMU/KASAN run against origin/master reproduced a slab-use-after-free in x25_kill_by_neigh(). | ||||