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Search Results (37278 CVEs found)
| CVE | Vendors | Products | Updated | CVSS v3.1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-31622 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-06-01 | 8.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: NFC: digital: Bounds check NFC-A cascade depth in SDD response handler The NFC-A anti-collision cascade in digital_in_recv_sdd_res() appends 3 or 4 bytes to target->nfcid1 on each round, but the number of cascade rounds is controlled entirely by the peer device. The peer sets the cascade tag in the SDD_RES (deciding 3 vs 4 bytes) and the cascade-incomplete bit in the SEL_RES (deciding whether another round follows). ISO 14443-3 limits NFC-A to three cascade levels and target->nfcid1 is sized accordingly (NFC_NFCID1_MAXSIZE = 10), but nothing in the driver actually enforces this. This means a malicious peer can keep the cascade running, writing past the heap-allocated nfc_target with each round. Fix this by rejecting the response when the accumulated UID would exceed the buffer. Commit e329e71013c9 ("NFC: nci: Bounds check struct nfc_target arrays") fixed similar missing checks against the same field on the NCI path. | ||||
| CVE-2026-31617 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-06-01 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: usb: gadget: f_ncm: validate minimum block_len in ncm_unwrap_ntb() The block_len read from the host-supplied NTB header is checked against ntb_max but has no lower bound. When block_len is smaller than opts->ndp_size, the bounds check of: ndp_index > (block_len - opts->ndp_size) will underflow producing a huge unsigned value that ndp_index can never exceed, defeating the check entirely. The same underflow occurs in the datagram index checks against block_len - opts->dpe_size. With those checks neutered, a malicious USB host can choose ndp_index and datagram offsets that point past the actual transfer, and the skb_put_data() copies adjacent kernel memory into the network skb. Fix this by rejecting block lengths that cannot hold at least the NTB header plus one NDP. This will make block_len - opts->ndp_size and block_len - opts->dpe_size both well-defined. Commit 8d2b1a1ec9f5 ("CDC-NCM: avoid overflow in sanity checking") fixed a related class of issues on the host side of NCM. | ||||
| CVE-2026-31613 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-06-01 | 8.1 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: smb: client: fix OOB reads parsing symlink error response When a CREATE returns STATUS_STOPPED_ON_SYMLINK, smb2_check_message() returns success without any length validation, leaving the symlink parsers as the only defense against an untrusted server. symlink_data() walks SMB 3.1.1 error contexts with the loop test "p < end", but reads p->ErrorId at offset 4 and p->ErrorDataLength at offset 0. When the server-controlled ErrorDataLength advances p to within 1-7 bytes of end, the next iteration will read past it. When the matching context is found, sym->SymLinkErrorTag is read at offset 4 from p->ErrorContextData with no check that the symlink header itself fits. smb2_parse_symlink_response() then bounds-checks the substitute name using SMB2_SYMLINK_STRUCT_SIZE as the offset of PathBuffer from iov_base. That value is computed as sizeof(smb2_err_rsp) + sizeof(smb2_symlink_err_rsp), which is correct only when ErrorContextCount == 0. With at least one error context the symlink data sits 8 bytes deeper, and each skipped non-matching context shifts it further by 8 + ALIGN(ErrorDataLength, 8). The check is too short, allowing the substitute name read to run past iov_len. The out-of-bound heap bytes are UTF-16-decoded into the symlink target and returned to userspace via readlink(2). Fix this all up by making the loops test require the full context header to fit, rejecting sym if its header runs past end, and bound the substitute name against the actual position of sym->PathBuffer rather than a fixed offset. Because sub_offs and sub_len are 16bits, the pointer math will not overflow here with the new greater-than. | ||||
| CVE-2026-31612 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-06-01 | 7.5 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ksmbd: validate EaNameLength in smb2_get_ea() smb2_get_ea() reads ea_req->EaNameLength from the client request and passes it directly to strncmp() as the comparison length without verifying that the length of the name really is the size of the input buffer received. Fix this up by properly checking the size of the name based on the value received and the overall size of the request, to prevent a later strncmp() call to use the length as a "trusted" size of the buffer. Without this check, uninitialized heap values might be slowly leaked to the client. | ||||
| CVE-2026-31611 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-06-01 | 8.6 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ksmbd: require 3 sub-authorities before reading sub_auth[2] parse_dacl() compares each ACE SID against sid_unix_NFS_mode and on match reads sid.sub_auth[2] as the file mode. If sid_unix_NFS_mode is the prefix S-1-5-88-3 with num_subauth = 2 then compare_sids() compares only min(num_subauth, 2) sub-authorities so a client SID with num_subauth = 2 and sub_auth = {88, 3} will match. If num_subauth = 2 and the ACE is placed at the very end of the security descriptor, sub_auth[2] will be 4 bytes past end_of_acl. The out-of-band bytes will then be masked to the low 9 bits and applied as the file's POSIX mode, probably not something that is good to have happen. Fix this up by forcing the SID to actually carry a third sub-authority before reading it at all. | ||||
| CVE-2026-31607 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-06-01 | 9.8 Critical |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: usbip: validate number_of_packets in usbip_pack_ret_submit() When a USB/IP client receives a RET_SUBMIT response, usbip_pack_ret_submit() unconditionally overwrites urb->number_of_packets from the network PDU. This value is subsequently used as the loop bound in usbip_recv_iso() and usbip_pad_iso() to iterate over urb->iso_frame_desc[], a flexible array whose size was fixed at URB allocation time based on the *original* number_of_packets from the CMD_SUBMIT. A malicious USB/IP server can set number_of_packets in the response to a value larger than what was originally submitted, causing a heap out-of-bounds write when usbip_recv_iso() writes to urb->iso_frame_desc[i] beyond the allocated region. KASAN confirmed this with kernel 7.0.0-rc5: BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in usbip_recv_iso+0x46a/0x640 Write of size 4 at addr ffff888106351d40 by task vhci_rx/69 The buggy address is located 0 bytes to the right of allocated 320-byte region [ffff888106351c00, ffff888106351d40) The server side (stub_rx.c) and gadget side (vudc_rx.c) already validate number_of_packets in the CMD_SUBMIT path since commits c6688ef9f297 ("usbip: fix stub_rx: harden CMD_SUBMIT path to handle malicious input") and b78d830f0049 ("usbip: fix vudc_rx: harden CMD_SUBMIT path to handle malicious input"). The server side validates against USBIP_MAX_ISO_PACKETS because no URB exists yet at that point. On the client side we have the original URB, so we can use the tighter bound: the response must not exceed the original number_of_packets. This mirrors the existing validation of actual_length against transfer_buffer_length in usbip_recv_xbuff(), which checks the response value against the original allocation size. Kelvin Mbogo's series ("usb: usbip: fix integer overflow in usbip_recv_iso()", v2) hardens the receive-side functions themselves; this patch complements that work by catching the bad value at its source -- in usbip_pack_ret_submit() before the overwrite -- and using the tighter per-URB allocation bound rather than the global USBIP_MAX_ISO_PACKETS limit. Fix this by checking rpdu->number_of_packets against urb->number_of_packets in usbip_pack_ret_submit() before the overwrite. On violation, clamp to zero so that usbip_recv_iso() and usbip_pad_iso() safely return early. | ||||
| CVE-2026-31602 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-06-01 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ALSA: ctxfi: Limit PTP to a single page Commit 391e69143d0a increased CT_PTP_NUM from 1 to 4 to support 256 playback streams, but the additional pages are not used by the card correctly. The CT20K2 hardware already has multiple VMEM_PTPAL registers, but using them separately would require refactoring the entire virtual memory allocation logic. ct_vm_map() always uses PTEs in vm->ptp[0].area regardless of CT_PTP_NUM. On AMD64 systems, a single PTP covers 512 PTEs (2M). When aggregate memory allocations exceed this limit, ct_vm_map() tries to access beyond the allocated space and causes a page fault: BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffd4ae8a10a000 Oops: Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP PTI RIP: 0010:ct_vm_map+0x17c/0x280 [snd_ctxfi] Call Trace: atc_pcm_playback_prepare+0x225/0x3b0 ct_pcm_playback_prepare+0x38/0x60 snd_pcm_do_prepare+0x2f/0x50 snd_pcm_action_single+0x36/0x90 snd_pcm_action_nonatomic+0xbf/0xd0 snd_pcm_ioctl+0x28/0x40 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x97/0xe0 do_syscall_64+0x81/0x610 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e Revert CT_PTP_NUM to 1. The 256 SRC_RESOURCE_NUM and playback_count remain unchanged. | ||||
| CVE-2026-31598 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-06-01 | 7.5 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ocfs2: fix possible deadlock between unlink and dio_end_io_write ocfs2_unlink takes orphan dir inode_lock first and then ip_alloc_sem, while in ocfs2_dio_end_io_write, it acquires these locks in reverse order. This creates an ABBA lock ordering violation on lock classes ocfs2_sysfile_lock_key[ORPHAN_DIR_SYSTEM_INODE] and ocfs2_file_ip_alloc_sem_key. Lock Chain #0 (orphan dir inode_lock -> ip_alloc_sem): ocfs2_unlink ocfs2_prepare_orphan_dir ocfs2_lookup_lock_orphan_dir inode_lock(orphan_dir_inode) <- lock A __ocfs2_prepare_orphan_dir ocfs2_prepare_dir_for_insert ocfs2_extend_dir ocfs2_expand_inline_dir down_write(&oi->ip_alloc_sem) <- Lock B Lock Chain #1 (ip_alloc_sem -> orphan dir inode_lock): ocfs2_dio_end_io_write down_write(&oi->ip_alloc_sem) <- Lock B ocfs2_del_inode_from_orphan() inode_lock(orphan_dir_inode) <- Lock A Deadlock Scenario: CPU0 (unlink) CPU1 (dio_end_io_write) ------ ------ inode_lock(orphan_dir_inode) down_write(ip_alloc_sem) down_write(ip_alloc_sem) inode_lock(orphan_dir_inode) Since ip_alloc_sem is to protect allocation changes, which is unrelated with operations in ocfs2_del_inode_from_orphan. So move ocfs2_del_inode_from_orphan out of ip_alloc_sem to fix the deadlock. | ||||
| CVE-2026-31597 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-06-01 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ocfs2: fix use-after-free in ocfs2_fault() when VM_FAULT_RETRY filemap_fault() may drop the mmap_lock before returning VM_FAULT_RETRY, as documented in mm/filemap.c: "If our return value has VM_FAULT_RETRY set, it's because the mmap_lock may be dropped before doing I/O or by lock_folio_maybe_drop_mmap()." When this happens, a concurrent munmap() can call remove_vma() and free the vm_area_struct via RCU. The saved 'vma' pointer in ocfs2_fault() then becomes a dangling pointer, and the subsequent trace_ocfs2_fault() call dereferences it -- a use-after-free. Fix this by saving ip_blkno as a plain integer before calling filemap_fault(), and removing vma from the trace event. Since ip_blkno is copied by value before the lock can be dropped, it remains valid regardless of what happens to the vma or inode afterward. | ||||
| CVE-2026-31588 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-06-01 | 8.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: x86: Use scratch field in MMIO fragment to hold small write values When exiting to userspace to service an emulated MMIO write, copy the to-be-written value to a scratch field in the MMIO fragment if the size of the data payload is 8 bytes or less, i.e. can fit in a single chunk, instead of pointing the fragment directly at the source value. This fixes a class of use-after-free bugs that occur when the emulator initiates a write using an on-stack, local variable as the source, the write splits a page boundary, *and* both pages are MMIO pages. Because KVM's ABI only allows for physically contiguous MMIO requests, accesses that split MMIO pages are separated into two fragments, and are sent to userspace one at a time. When KVM attempts to complete userspace MMIO in response to KVM_RUN after the first fragment, KVM will detect the second fragment and generate a second userspace exit, and reference the on-stack variable. The issue is most visible if the second KVM_RUN is performed by a separate task, in which case the stack of the initiating task can show up as truly freed data. ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in complete_emulated_mmio+0x305/0x420 Read of size 1 at addr ffff888009c378d1 by task syz-executor417/984 CPU: 1 PID: 984 Comm: syz-executor417 Not tainted 5.10.0-182.0.0.95.h2627.eulerosv2r13.x86_64 #3 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.15.0-0-g2dd4b9b3f840-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 Call Trace: dump_stack+0xbe/0xfd print_address_description.constprop.0+0x19/0x170 __kasan_report.cold+0x6c/0x84 kasan_report+0x3a/0x50 check_memory_region+0xfd/0x1f0 memcpy+0x20/0x60 complete_emulated_mmio+0x305/0x420 kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x63f/0x6d0 kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x413/0xb20 __se_sys_ioctl+0x111/0x160 do_syscall_64+0x30/0x40 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x67/0xd1 RIP: 0033:0x42477d Code: <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b0 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007faa8e6890e8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00000000004d7338 RCX: 000000000042477d RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 000000000000ae80 RDI: 0000000000000005 RBP: 00000000004d7330 R08: 00007fff28d546df R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00000000004d733c R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 000000000040a200 R15: 00007fff28d54720 The buggy address belongs to the page: page:0000000029f6a428 refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x9c37 flags: 0xfffffc0000000(node=0|zone=1|lastcpupid=0x1fffff) raw: 000fffffc0000000 0000000000000000 ffffea0000270dc8 0000000000000000 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected Memory state around the buggy address: ffff888009c37780: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ffff888009c37800: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff >ffff888009c37880: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ^ ffff888009c37900: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ffff888009c37980: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ================================================================== The bug can also be reproduced with a targeted KVM-Unit-Test by hacking KVM to fill a large on-stack variable in complete_emulated_mmio(), i.e. by overwrite the data value with garbage. Limit the use of the scratch fields to 8-byte or smaller accesses, and to just writes, as larger accesses and reads are not affected thanks to implementation details in the emulator, but add a sanity check to ensure those details don't change in the future. Specifically, KVM never uses on-stack variables for accesses larger that 8 bytes, e.g. uses an operand in the emulator context, and *al ---truncated--- | ||||
| CVE-2026-31587 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-06-01 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ASoC: qcom: q6apm: move component registration to unmanaged version q6apm component registers dais dynamically from ASoC toplology, which are allocated using device managed version apis. Allocating both component and dynamic dais using managed version could lead to incorrect free ordering, dai will be freed while component still holding references to it. Fix this issue by moving component to unmanged version so that the dai pointers are only freeded after the component is removed. ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in snd_soc_del_component_unlocked+0x3d4/0x400 [snd_soc_core] Read of size 8 at addr ffff00084493a6e8 by task kworker/u48:0/3426 Tainted: [W]=WARN Hardware name: LENOVO 21N2ZC5PUS/21N2ZC5PUS, BIOS N42ET57W (1.31 ) 08/08/2024 Workqueue: pdr_notifier_wq pdr_notifier_work [pdr_interface] Call trace: show_stack+0x28/0x7c (C) dump_stack_lvl+0x60/0x80 print_report+0x160/0x4b4 kasan_report+0xac/0xfc __asan_report_load8_noabort+0x20/0x34 snd_soc_del_component_unlocked+0x3d4/0x400 [snd_soc_core] snd_soc_unregister_component_by_driver+0x50/0x88 [snd_soc_core] devm_component_release+0x30/0x5c [snd_soc_core] devres_release_all+0x13c/0x210 device_unbind_cleanup+0x20/0x190 device_release_driver_internal+0x350/0x468 device_release_driver+0x18/0x30 bus_remove_device+0x1a0/0x35c device_del+0x314/0x7f0 device_unregister+0x20/0xbc apr_remove_device+0x5c/0x7c [apr] device_for_each_child+0xd8/0x160 apr_pd_status+0x7c/0xa8 [apr] pdr_notifier_work+0x114/0x240 [pdr_interface] process_one_work+0x500/0xb70 worker_thread+0x630/0xfb0 kthread+0x370/0x6c0 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 Allocated by task 77: kasan_save_stack+0x40/0x68 kasan_save_track+0x20/0x40 kasan_save_alloc_info+0x44/0x58 __kasan_kmalloc+0xbc/0xdc __kmalloc_node_track_caller_noprof+0x1f4/0x620 devm_kmalloc+0x7c/0x1c8 snd_soc_register_dai+0x50/0x4f0 [snd_soc_core] soc_tplg_pcm_elems_load+0x55c/0x1eb8 [snd_soc_core] snd_soc_tplg_component_load+0x4f8/0xb60 [snd_soc_core] audioreach_tplg_init+0x124/0x1fc [snd_q6apm] q6apm_audio_probe+0x10/0x1c [snd_q6apm] snd_soc_component_probe+0x5c/0x118 [snd_soc_core] soc_probe_component+0x44c/0xaf0 [snd_soc_core] snd_soc_bind_card+0xad0/0x2370 [snd_soc_core] snd_soc_register_card+0x3b0/0x4c0 [snd_soc_core] devm_snd_soc_register_card+0x50/0xc8 [snd_soc_core] x1e80100_platform_probe+0x208/0x368 [snd_soc_x1e80100] platform_probe+0xc0/0x188 really_probe+0x188/0x804 __driver_probe_device+0x158/0x358 driver_probe_device+0x60/0x190 __device_attach_driver+0x16c/0x2a8 bus_for_each_drv+0x100/0x194 __device_attach+0x174/0x380 device_initial_probe+0x14/0x20 bus_probe_device+0x124/0x154 deferred_probe_work_func+0x140/0x220 process_one_work+0x500/0xb70 worker_thread+0x630/0xfb0 kthread+0x370/0x6c0 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 Freed by task 3426: kasan_save_stack+0x40/0x68 kasan_save_track+0x20/0x40 __kasan_save_free_info+0x4c/0x80 __kasan_slab_free+0x78/0xa0 kfree+0x100/0x4a4 devres_release_all+0x144/0x210 device_unbind_cleanup+0x20/0x190 device_release_driver_internal+0x350/0x468 device_release_driver+0x18/0x30 bus_remove_device+0x1a0/0x35c device_del+0x314/0x7f0 device_unregister+0x20/0xbc apr_remove_device+0x5c/0x7c [apr] device_for_each_child+0xd8/0x160 apr_pd_status+0x7c/0xa8 [apr] pdr_notifier_work+0x114/0x240 [pdr_interface] process_one_work+0x500/0xb70 worker_thread+0x630/0xfb0 kthread+0x370/0x6c0 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 | ||||
| CVE-2026-31586 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-06-01 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm: blk-cgroup: fix use-after-free in cgwb_release_workfn() cgwb_release_workfn() calls css_put(wb->blkcg_css) and then later accesses wb->blkcg_css again via blkcg_unpin_online(). If css_put() drops the last reference, the blkcg can be freed asynchronously (css_free_rwork_fn -> blkcg_css_free -> kfree) before blkcg_unpin_online() dereferences the pointer to access blkcg->online_pin, resulting in a use-after-free: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in blkcg_unpin_online (./include/linux/instrumented.h:112 ./include/linux/atomic/atomic-instrumented.h:400 ./include/linux/refcount.h:389 ./include/linux/refcount.h:432 ./include/linux/refcount.h:450 block/blk-cgroup.c:1367) Write of size 4 at addr ff11000117aa6160 by task kworker/71:1/531 Workqueue: cgwb_release cgwb_release_workfn Call Trace: <TASK> blkcg_unpin_online (./include/linux/instrumented.h:112 ./include/linux/atomic/atomic-instrumented.h:400 ./include/linux/refcount.h:389 ./include/linux/refcount.h:432 ./include/linux/refcount.h:450 block/blk-cgroup.c:1367) cgwb_release_workfn (mm/backing-dev.c:629) process_scheduled_works (kernel/workqueue.c:3278 kernel/workqueue.c:3385) Freed by task 1016: kfree (./include/linux/kasan.h:235 mm/slub.c:2689 mm/slub.c:6246 mm/slub.c:6561) css_free_rwork_fn (kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c:5542) process_scheduled_works (kernel/workqueue.c:3302 kernel/workqueue.c:3385) ** Stack based on commit 66672af7a095 ("Add linux-next specific files for 20260410") I am seeing this crash sporadically in Meta fleet across multiple kernel versions. A full reproducer is available at: https://github.com/leitao/debug/blob/main/reproducers/repro_blkcg_uaf.sh (The race window is narrow. To make it easily reproducible, inject a msleep(100) between css_put() and blkcg_unpin_online() in cgwb_release_workfn(). With that delay and a KASAN-enabled kernel, the reproducer triggers the splat reliably in less than a second.) Fix this by moving blkcg_unpin_online() before css_put(), so the cgwb's CSS reference keeps the blkcg alive while blkcg_unpin_online() accesses it. | ||||
| CVE-2026-31532 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-06-01 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: can: raw: fix ro->uniq use-after-free in raw_rcv() raw_release() unregisters raw CAN receive filters via can_rx_unregister(), but receiver deletion is deferred with call_rcu(). This leaves a window where raw_rcv() may still be running in an RCU read-side critical section after raw_release() frees ro->uniq, leading to a use-after-free of the percpu uniq storage. Move free_percpu(ro->uniq) out of raw_release() and into a raw-specific socket destructor. can_rx_unregister() takes an extra reference to the socket and only drops it from the RCU callback, so freeing uniq from sk_destruct ensures the percpu area is not released until the relevant callbacks have drained. [mkl: applied manually] | ||||
| CVE-2026-31488 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-06-01 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amd/display: Do not skip unrelated mode changes in DSC validation Starting with commit 17ce8a6907f7 ("drm/amd/display: Add dsc pre-validation in atomic check"), amdgpu resets the CRTC state mode_changed flag to false when recomputing the DSC configuration results in no timing change for a particular stream. However, this is incorrect in scenarios where a change in MST/DSC configuration happens in the same KMS commit as another (unrelated) mode change. For example, the integrated panel of a laptop may be configured differently (e.g., HDR enabled/disabled) depending on whether external screens are attached. In this case, plugging in external DP-MST screens may result in the mode_changed flag being dropped incorrectly for the integrated panel if its DSC configuration did not change during precomputation in pre_validate_dsc(). At this point, however, dm_update_crtc_state() has already created new streams for CRTCs with DSC-independent mode changes. In turn, amdgpu_dm_commit_streams() will never release the old stream, resulting in a memory leak. amdgpu_dm_atomic_commit_tail() will never acquire a reference to the new stream either, which manifests as a use-after-free when the stream gets disabled later on: BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in dc_stream_release+0x25/0x90 [amdgpu] Write of size 4 at addr ffff88813d836524 by task kworker/9:9/29977 Workqueue: events drm_mode_rmfb_work_fn Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x6e/0xa0 print_address_description.constprop.0+0x88/0x320 ? dc_stream_release+0x25/0x90 [amdgpu] print_report+0xfc/0x1ff ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? __virt_addr_valid+0x225/0x4e0 ? dc_stream_release+0x25/0x90 [amdgpu] kasan_report+0xe1/0x180 ? dc_stream_release+0x25/0x90 [amdgpu] kasan_check_range+0x125/0x200 dc_stream_release+0x25/0x90 [amdgpu] dc_state_destruct+0x14d/0x5c0 [amdgpu] dc_state_release.part.0+0x4e/0x130 [amdgpu] dm_atomic_destroy_state+0x3f/0x70 [amdgpu] drm_atomic_state_default_clear+0x8ee/0xf30 ? drm_mode_object_put.part.0+0xb1/0x130 __drm_atomic_state_free+0x15c/0x2d0 atomic_remove_fb+0x67e/0x980 Since there is no reliable way of figuring out whether a CRTC has unrelated mode changes pending at the time of DSC validation, remember the value of the mode_changed flag from before the point where a CRTC was marked as potentially affected by a change in DSC configuration. Reset the mode_changed flag to this earlier value instead in pre_validate_dsc(). (cherry picked from commit cc7c7121ae082b7b82891baa7280f1ff2608f22b) | ||||
| CVE-2026-31476 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-06-01 | 8.2 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ksmbd: do not expire session on binding failure When a multichannel session binding request fails (e.g. wrong password), the error path unconditionally sets sess->state = SMB2_SESSION_EXPIRED. However, during binding, sess points to the target session looked up via ksmbd_session_lookup_slowpath() -- which belongs to another connection's user. This allows a remote attacker to invalidate any active session by simply sending a binding request with a wrong password (DoS). Fix this by skipping session expiration when the failed request was a binding attempt, since the session does not belong to the current connection. The reference taken by ksmbd_session_lookup_slowpath() is still correctly released via ksmbd_user_session_put(). | ||||
| CVE-2026-31409 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-06-01 | 8.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ksmbd: unset conn->binding on failed binding request When a multichannel SMB2_SESSION_SETUP request with SMB2_SESSION_REQ_FLAG_BINDING fails ksmbd sets conn->binding = true but never clears it on the error path. This leaves the connection in a binding state where all subsequent ksmbd_session_lookup_all() calls fall back to the global sessions table. This fix it by clearing conn->binding = false in the error path. | ||||
| CVE-2026-31407 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-06-01 | 7.1 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netfilter: conntrack: add missing netlink policy validations Hyunwoo Kim reports out-of-bounds access in sctp and ctnetlink. These attributes are used by the kernel without any validation. Extend the netlink policies accordingly. Quoting the reporter: nlattr_to_sctp() assigns the user-supplied CTA_PROTOINFO_SCTP_STATE value directly to ct->proto.sctp.state without checking that it is within the valid range. [..] and: ... with exp->dir = 100, the access at ct->master->tuplehash[100] reads 5600 bytes past the start of a 320-byte nf_conn object, causing a slab-out-of-bounds read confirmed by UBSAN. | ||||
| CVE-2026-23444 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-06-01 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: mac80211: always free skb on ieee80211_tx_prepare_skb() failure ieee80211_tx_prepare_skb() has three error paths, but only two of them free the skb. The first error path (ieee80211_tx_prepare() returning TX_DROP) does not free it, while invoke_tx_handlers() failure and the fragmentation check both do. Add kfree_skb() to the first error path so all three are consistent, and remove the now-redundant frees in callers (ath9k, mt76, mac80211_hwsim) to avoid double-free. Document the skb ownership guarantee in the function's kdoc. | ||||
| CVE-2026-23394 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-06-01 | 4.7 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: af_unix: Give up GC if MSG_PEEK intervened. Igor Ushakov reported that GC purged the receive queue of an alive socket due to a race with MSG_PEEK with a nice repro. This is the exact same issue previously fixed by commit cbcf01128d0a ("af_unix: fix garbage collect vs MSG_PEEK"). After GC was replaced with the current algorithm, the cited commit removed the locking dance in unix_peek_fds() and reintroduced the same issue. The problem is that MSG_PEEK bumps a file refcount without interacting with GC. Consider an SCC containing sk-A and sk-B, where sk-A is close()d but can be recv()ed via sk-B. The bad thing happens if sk-A is recv()ed with MSG_PEEK from sk-B and sk-B is close()d while GC is checking unix_vertex_dead() for sk-A and sk-B. GC thread User thread --------- ----------- unix_vertex_dead(sk-A) -> true <------. \ `------ recv(sk-B, MSG_PEEK) invalidate !! -> sk-A's file refcount : 1 -> 2 close(sk-B) -> sk-B's file refcount : 2 -> 1 unix_vertex_dead(sk-B) -> true Initially, sk-A's file refcount is 1 by the inflight fd in sk-B recvq. GC thinks sk-A is dead because the file refcount is the same as the number of its inflight fds. However, sk-A's file refcount is bumped silently by MSG_PEEK, which invalidates the previous evaluation. At this moment, sk-B's file refcount is 2; one by the open fd, and one by the inflight fd in sk-A. The subsequent close() releases one refcount by the former. Finally, GC incorrectly concludes that both sk-A and sk-B are dead. One option is to restore the locking dance in unix_peek_fds(), but we can resolve this more elegantly thanks to the new algorithm. The point is that the issue does not occur without the subsequent close() and we actually do not need to synchronise MSG_PEEK with the dead SCC detection. When the issue occurs, close() and GC touch the same file refcount. If GC sees the refcount being decremented by close(), it can just give up garbage-collecting the SCC. Therefore, we only need to signal the race during MSG_PEEK with a proper memory barrier to make it visible to the GC. Let's use seqcount_t to notify GC when MSG_PEEK occurs and let it defer the SCC to the next run. This way no locking is needed on the MSG_PEEK side, and we can avoid imposing a penalty on every MSG_PEEK unnecessarily. Note that we can retry within unix_scc_dead() if MSG_PEEK is detected, but we do not do so to avoid hung task splat from abusive MSG_PEEK calls. | ||||
| CVE-2026-23141 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-06-01 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: btrfs: send: check for inline extents in range_is_hole_in_parent() Before accessing the disk_bytenr field of a file extent item we need to check if we are dealing with an inline extent. This is because for inline extents their data starts at the offset of the disk_bytenr field. So accessing the disk_bytenr means we are accessing inline data or in case the inline data is less than 8 bytes we can actually cause an invalid memory access if this inline extent item is the first item in the leaf or access metadata from other items. | ||||