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| CVE | Vendors | Products | Updated | CVSS v3.1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-68890 | 1 Microsoft | 14 Windows 10 1607, Windows 10 1809, Windows 10 21h2 and 11 more | 2026-09-08 | 7.8 High |
| Heap-based buffer overflow in Microsoft Standard XPS allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally. | ||||
| CVE-2026-67379 | 1 Microsoft | 3 Sql Server 2019, Sql Server 2022, Sql Server 2025 | 2026-09-08 | 8.5 High |
| Stack-based buffer overflow in SQL Server allows an authorized attacker to execute code over a network. | ||||
| CVE-2022-4993 | 1 Gshank | 1 Html::formhandler | 2026-09-08 | 9.1 Critical |
| HTML::FormHandler versions before 0.410000 for Perl allow attacker selected method dispatch and resource exhaustion because _apply_actions and add_error use error message text built from request data as a Locale::Maketext bracket notation template. add_error hands its first argument to the language handle as the Locale::Maketext message key, and the default handle's lexicon sets `_AUTO`, so a string that is not a lexicon entry is compiled as a bracket notation template instead of being looked up. In a bracket group the first token names a method called on the language handle and the remaining tokens are its arguments. Three kinds of text the library did not author reach that position. _apply_actions installs a `$SIG{__WARN__}` handler that stores the warning text in `$error_message`, and a captured warning survives a successful action, so a field carrying a numeric transform turns `Argument "[sprintf,%50000000d,0]" isn't numeric` into the template; a warning quotes the submitted value verbatim, so the group is well formed and dispatches. `$error_message ||= $tobj->validate($new_value)` takes a type constraint's own failure message, which renders the rejected value through a partial dumper in bracket and comma form (Devel::PartialDump when Moose can load it, Type::Tiny's own dumper always), so a field with `apply => [ Str ]` given a parameter sent more than once, which arrives as an array, gets `Reference ["a","b"] did not pass type constraint "Str"` as its template, from a request that carries no bracket character of its own. A coercion or transform exception reaches it the same way. Beyond those, a validator whose message contains the field value puts that value in the template directly, and add_error replaces the message list with the contents of an arrayref first argument (`@message = @{$message[0]} if ref $message[0] eq 'ARRAY'`), so a value arriving as an array fills the argument slots from the same request as well. A malformed group such as `[0]` makes the compile croak, and HTML::FormHandler::I18N::maketext and add_error each re-raise that as a die, so process() throws. A well formed group naming sprintf reaches CORE::sprintf with an attacker chosen field width. Any caller that applies a type constraint or a transform to an untrusted field, or whose validator passes an untrusted field value to add_error, can be made to throw an unhandled exception out of process(), or to allocate an arbitrary amount of memory in one request, and an application whose language handle subclass defines side effecting public methods makes those callable with attacker chosen arguments. The dumped type constraint message is bounded to the exception, because both dumpers quote non-numeric elements so the method slot is never an attacker chosen name. The built-in messages pass fixed templates with the value in an argument slot, where it stays inert, and the built-in field types attach explicit message callbacks, so neither is affected. | ||||
| CVE-2026-70429 | 2 Jenkins, Jenkins Project | 2 Jenkins, Jenkins | 2026-09-08 | 8.1 High |
| Jenkins 2.575 and earlier, LTS 2.568.1 and earlier handles case-insensitivity in user names and group names inconsistently, allowing attackers able to create new users or groups with names that case-insensitively match other characters to impersonate other users or be granted their permissions in some circumstances. | ||||
| CVE-2026-18916 | 1 Nlnetlabs | 1 Nsd | 2026-09-08 | 7.5 High |
| Any remote client can crash a NSD serve child, by throttling the TCP receive window after a TCP query. By continuously crashing the serve childs, the remote client can denial all TCP service to this NSD instance. | ||||
| CVE-2026-18078 | 1 Ibm | 1 I | 2026-09-08 | 4.3 Medium |
| IBM i 7.6, 7.5, 7.4, and 7.3 could allow a remote authenticated attacker to cause a denial of service due to an integer overflow. | ||||
| CVE-2026-18341 | 1 Ibm | 1 I | 2026-09-08 | 6.3 Medium |
| IBM i 7.6, 7.5, 7.4, and 7.3 could allow a remote authenticated attacker to corrupt memory due to an integer underflow. | ||||
| CVE-2026-78216 | 1 Ash-project | 1 Ash Lua | 2026-09-08 | N/A |
| AshLua exposes Ash read actions to Lua scripts run through an eval action. A read call accepts an operation (list, min, max, first, sum, avg) that builds an ad-hoc Ash.Query.Aggregate over a named field and returns its raw value. Ash field policies redact forbidden fields on returned records (replacing them with %Ash.ForbiddenField{}), but that redaction does not apply to aggregate values. A script could therefore read a field the calling actor's field policies forbid by requesting it as an aggregate instead of as a field. This includes fields that are public? true but restricted per-actor by a field policy, such as sensitive PII. The prior hardening only enforced the exposed-field allow-list (field visibility), which is a separate axis from per-actor field-policy authorization. The fix authorizes the aggregated field against the resource's field policies, so aggregating over a field the actor may not see is refused or scoped to the rows where it is visible. This issue affects ash_lua: from 0.1.0 before 0.2.2. | ||||
| CVE-2026-78230 | 1 Ash-project | 1 Ash Ai | 2026-09-08 | N/A |
| AshAi exposes Ash read actions to language-model tool calls. The read tool accepts an aggregate result type (min, max, sum, avg) that builds an ad-hoc Ash.Query.Aggregate over a named field and returns its raw value. Ash field policies redact forbidden fields on returned records (replacing them with %Ash.ForbiddenField{}), but that redaction does not apply to aggregate values. A tool caller could therefore read a field the calling actor's field policies forbid by requesting it as an aggregate; min/max in particular return an actual field value. This includes fields that are public? true but restricted per-actor by a field policy, such as sensitive PII. The tool's existing check only required the field to be public, which is a separate axis from per-actor field-policy authorization. The fix authorizes the aggregated field against the resource's field policies, so aggregating over a field the actor may not see is refused or scoped to the rows where it is visible. This issue affects ash_ai: from 0.1.0 before 1.0.3. | ||||
| CVE-2026-0799 | 1 Tcpdump | 1 Libpcap | 2026-09-08 | 8.7 High |
| In BPF instructions that load/store a value from/to a scratch memory register the register index is an unsigned 32-bit integer and must not exceed 15, but libpcap BPF interpreter does not validate the value. In particular uncommon use cases a crafted filter program can cause the interpreter to try reading and writing the OS process memory in the 16GiB starting at the current stack frame on 64-bit architectures and in the entire address space on 32-bit architectures. | ||||
| CVE-2026-31912 | 1 Tcpdump | 1 Libpcap | 2026-09-08 | 5.5 Medium |
| libpcap BPF interpreter detects neither reaching the end of the filter program buffer due to lack of a return instruction nor executing a jump instruction with an offset that translates to a pointer outside of the buffer. In particular uncommon use cases a crafted filter program can cause the interpreter to try reading the OS process memory in the 32GiB around the buffer on 64-bit architectures and in the entire address space on 32-bit architectures. | ||||
| CVE-2026-18238 | 1 Tcpdump | 1 Libpcap | 2026-09-08 | 5 Medium |
| The rpcap client code that processes a RPCAP_MSG_PACKET message received from the server incorrectly validates its headers. A malicious server can send a crafted message and cause the client to treat up to 20 bytes of the client process memory beyond the end of the buffer as if it was a part of the captured packet. | ||||
| CVE-2026-86287 | 2026-09-08 | 7.5 High | ||
| Net::IP::LPM versions before 1.12 for Perl accept malformed prefix lengths. Non-numeric and non-ASCII prefix lengths are accepted and treated as 0. Integers over 31 bits are silently truncated. A single malformed mask will poison the lookup table. The result is that the lookup will silently succeed for every address. An allow-list will allow every address, and a deny-list will block every address. | ||||
| CVE-2026-86143 | 1 Xmlsoft | 1 Libxml2 | 2026-09-08 | 6.9 Medium |
| In xmlIO in libxml2 before 2.15.4, an inconsistency in xmlOutputWriteCallback and xmlBufUse causes negative lengths to reach write callbacks, aka a lack of a check for integer overflow before calling writecallback. This has security relevance for many types of uses of that length value within a callback. | ||||
| CVE-2026-82752 | 1 Ash-project | 1 Ash | 2026-09-08 | N/A |
| Improper Validation of Specified Quantity in Input vulnerability in ash-project ash allows an attacker to store a value of arbitrary size in an attribute whose length constraint should bound it. Ash measures string length with Elixir's String.length/1, which counts Unicode graphemes, in the max_length and min_length constraints of Ash.Type.String (apply_constraints/2 in lib/ash/type/string.ex), in Ash.Resource.Validation.StringLength, and in the string_length expression function. A grapheme carries an unbounded number of combining marks, so a base character followed by a million combining acute accents is one grapheme and megabytes of data, and satisfies max_length: 2. Where the data layer imposes no independent limit (ETS, Mnesia, or a Postgres text column) the whole value is persisted, so an attacker can write an entire request body into an attribute declared with a small maximum and grow storage without bound. The counting unit also disagrees with the storage layer, which counts codepoints rather than graphemes, so a value accepted by the constraint can still be rejected or truncated by the column. A Postgres varchar(n) column bounds the value itself and is not exposed. This issue affects ash: from 0.10.0 before 3.33.0. | ||||
| CVE-2026-82751 | 2 Zenhive, Zenhive | 2 Mpp, Mpp | 2026-09-08 | N/A |
| Improper Validation of Specified Quantity in Input in ZenHive mpp allows an unauthenticated remote client to inflate the fee-payer's gas cost per sponsored payment by a large multiplier and to have the sponsor pay for provisioning an access key on the client's own account. When the server sponsors Tempo payments, MPP.Methods.Tempo.FeePayerPolicy.measure/3 in lib/mpp/methods/tempo/fee_payer_policy.ex bounds the gas fields, the fee budget, the validity window and the access list of the client-signed 0x76 envelope, but does not check whether the envelope carries the optional key_authorization field. A client can attach a fully signed key authorization, provisioning a new access key with token spending limits on its own account, alongside the normal payment call. The key and each limit entry are persistent storage writes billed as intrinsic gas to the sponsor, bounded only by the gas_limit ceiling. At the reporter's default of one key with three token limits the sponsored cost rises from about 46,587 gas to about 1,808,700 gas, and the client keeps a valid access key it paid nothing for. This issue affects mpp: from 0.2.0 before 0.16.1. | ||||
| CVE-2026-82750 | 2 Zenhive, Zenhive | 2 Mpp, Mpp | 2026-09-08 | N/A |
| Improper Validation of Specified Quantity in Input in ZenHive mpp allows an unauthenticated remote client to inflate the fee-payer's gas cost per sponsored payment by a large multiplier and to have the sponsor pay for EIP-7702 account delegations of the client's choosing. When the server sponsors Tempo payments, MPP.Methods.Tempo.FeePayerPolicy.measure/3 in lib/mpp/methods/tempo/fee_payer_policy.ex bounds the gas fields, the fee budget, the validity window and the access list of the client-signed 0x76 envelope, but never reads its aa_authorization_list field. Every signed delegation in that list is charged as intrinsic gas before the payment call runs, so a client attaching delegations from throwaway authority keys makes the sponsor pay for them within the default gas_limit ceiling. At the reporter's default of seven entries the sponsored cost rises from about 46,575 gas to about 1,884,087 gas. Because each entry is applied as a persistent set-code delegation, a client can also upgrade its own accounts to delegated code at the sponsor's expense. This issue affects mpp: from 0.2.0 before 0.16.1. | ||||
| CVE-2026-75650 | 1 Adobe | 6 Adobe Commerce, Adobe Commerce B2b, Commerce and 3 more | 2026-09-08 | 10 Critical |
| Adobe Commerce is affected by an Improper Neutralization of Special Elements Used in a Template Engine vulnerability that could result in arbitrary code execution in the context of the current user. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability to execute arbitrary code. Exploitation of this issue does not require user interaction. Scope is changed. | ||||
| CVE-2026-87052 | 2026-09-08 | 2.6 Low | ||
| A flaw was found in operator-foundry. The absence of automated dependency-update and vulnerability-scanning configurations in the repository increases the risk of undetected security vulnerabilities. This lack of automated security checks could potentially lead to the inclusion of known vulnerable components, which might then be exploited by an attacker if those underlying vulnerabilities are present and exploitable. | ||||
| CVE-2026-87056 | 2026-09-08 | 2.6 Low | ||
| A flaw was found in operator-sdk-builder. The repository lacks automated dependency-update configurations for its git submodules, Containerfile base image, and Tekton bundle references. This absence prevents the automatic flagging of stale or vulnerable dependencies. Consequently, this could lead to the inclusion of known vulnerable components in the build process, increasing the risk of security exposures. | ||||