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| CVE | Vendors | Products | Updated | CVSS v3.1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-89633 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-21 | 9.8 Critical |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: smb: client: fix OOB read/write from unvalidated DataOffset in coalesce_t2() coalesce_t2() computes data pointers directly from server-supplied DataOffset fields with no validation against buffer bounds: data_area_of_tgt = (char *)&pSMBt->hdr.Protocol + get_unaligned_le16(&pSMBt->t2_rsp.DataOffset); data_area_of_src = (char *)&pSMBs->hdr.Protocol + get_unaligned_le16(&pSMBs->t2_rsp.DataOffset); data_area_of_tgt += total_in_tgt; ... memcpy(data_area_of_tgt, data_area_of_src, total_in_src); A small DataOffset can push a pointer below the actual byte area, overwriting header fields; a large one can push it past the buffer end, causing out-of-bounds heap reads (source) or writes (target). The BCC overflow guard does not prevent this: BCC reflects how much data is present, while DataOffset controls where in the buffer it starts. The "validate target area" comment present since the function was first written in 2005 was a placeholder that was never implemented. Add lower- and upper-bound checks for both data pointers before the memcpy, and before any target header fields are modified. | ||||
| CVE-2026-89632 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-21 | 8.2 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: smb: client: fix use-before-check of ReparseDataLength in reparse_buf_ptr() reparse_buf_ptr() reads buf->ReparseDataLength before checking that count covers the full fixed header: buf = (struct reparse_data_buffer *)((u8 *)io + off); len = sizeof(*buf); /* 8 bytes */ rdlen = le16_to_cpu(buf->ReparseDataLength); /* offset 4, 2 bytes */ if (count < len || count < rdlen + len) /* check comes after */ struct reparse_data_buffer has ReparseDataLength at offset 4. If a server returns OutputCount < 6, the read at offset 4-5 reaches past the end of the received data. The off+count bounds against iov_len were already validated, but that does not protect against count being smaller than sizeof(*buf). Split the check: verify count >= sizeof(*buf) before reading ReparseDataLength, then verify count covers the data region. | ||||
| CVE-2026-89631 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-21 | 9.1 Critical |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: smb: client: reject a tree connect response whose byte count is too small CIFSTCon() bounds its strnlen() over the byte area with the server's ByteCount minus two, which for ByteCount 0 or 1 goes negative as an int and converts to a huge size_t. The later subtraction wraps the __u16 bytes_left, and that is what bounds cifs_strndup_from_utf16(): a bound of up to 65535 against a ~16 KB cifs_req_poolp object runs off the end of the slab object, and the bytes reach userspace through tcon->nativeFileSystem in /proc/fs/cifs/DebugData. Reject a byte area too small for what the parser consumes. Two bytes is the least it can consume, and no conformant response carries fewer. The new trace point is the 129th smb_eio_trace entry, which __mode(byte) cannot represent, so the attribute goes with it. | ||||
| CVE-2026-89625 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-21 | 5.9 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: HID: sony: fix UAF of ghl_poke_timer / ghl_urb at driver unbind For GHL (Guitar Hero Live) dongles, sony_probe() arms a periodic timer: ghl_magic_poke() (the timer callback) submits sc->ghl_urb, and the URB completion ghl_magic_poke_cb() re-arms the timer with mod_timer(). sony_remove() drained the timer with timer_delete_sync() and then freed the URB with usb_free_urb(): timer_delete_sync(&sc->ghl_poke_timer); usb_free_urb(sc->ghl_urb); timer_delete_sync() does not block re-arming, and while the URB is in flight the timer is not pending, so the sync delete is a no-op. A URB completion that runs after the delete re-arms the timer, and usb_free_urb() only drops a reference -- it does not kill an in-flight URB. sc is allocated with devm_kzalloc() and freed once sony_remove() returns, so the re-armed ghl_poke_timer (embedded in sc) then fires on freed memory, a use-after-free from timer softirq. This is a disconnect/rmmod race. Poison the URB first, then shut the timer down, before freeing the URB. usb_poison_urb() kills any in-flight URB and permanently rejects further submissions, so a poke timer that is still pending cannot re-submit the URB from ghl_magic_poke() in the window before timer_shutdown_sync() runs. usb_kill_urb() would not suffice: it only cancels the in-flight URB and leaves it submittable once it returns, so the pending timer could re-submit it and put a fresh URB in flight over the freed sc. timer_shutdown_sync() then drains any last callback and blocks re-arming. The probe error path is unaffected: it is only reached before the timer is armed. Reproduced under KASAN on next-20260710 via dummy_hcd + raw-gadget emulation of the GHL PS4 dongle (VID 0x1430 / PID 0x07bb): hid-sony binds and arms the poke timer, the poke URB is held in flight, the driver is unbound (freeing sc), then the URB is released. The completion re-arms the timer on the freed sc, and the re-armed timer fires ~8 s later: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in ghl_magic_poke+0x98/0xb0 Read of size 8 at addr ffff88810b02fd50 by task swapper/0/0 ghl_magic_poke+0x98/0xb0 call_timer_fn+0x35/0x2b0 __run_timers+0x69c/0x9a0 run_timer_softirq+0x173/0x2a0 Allocated by task 169: sony_probe Freed by task 338: devres_release_group <- hid_device_remove (sony_remove) Found by 0sec (https://0sec.ai) using automated source analysis. | ||||
| CVE-2026-89624 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-21 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: HID: universal-pidff: stop the device when force-feedback init fails universal_pidff_probe() starts the device with hid_hw_start() and then, if force-feedback initialisation fails, returns the error through a label that only does "return error". The device is left started. The HID core does not unwind on the driver's behalf. __hid_device_probe() releases the devres group, closes the report and clears hdev->driver: if (ret) { devres_release_group(&hdev->dev, hdev->devres_group_id); hid_close_report(hdev); hdev->driver = NULL; } The hidraw character device that hid_hw_start() registered through hid_connect() is allocated with kzalloc() and added with cdev_device_add(), so it is not devres-managed and survives that. With hdev->driver NULL, hid_device_remove() skips hid_hw_stop() as well, because it only unwinds while a driver is still attached. The registration therefore outlives the device on both paths. Opening the surviving /dev/hidrawX writes into freed memory. KASAN reports a use-after-free write from hidraw_open() -> hid_hw_open() -> the transport's open callback, which takes a spinlock inside the freed object. A descriptor that carries a PID usage page and no input reports is enough: hidraw claims the device so hid_hw_start() succeeds, while hid->inputs stays empty so force-feedback init fails. The other failure returns in hid_pidff_init_with_quirks() - no output reports, an allocation failure, pidff_init_fields(), pidff_check_autocenter(), an unusable effect count, input_ff_create() - all reach the same label. Stop the device on that path. hid-dr.c and hid-emsff.c, which start the device with the same HID_CONNECT_DEFAULT & ~HID_CONNECT_FF mask, already do this. The two earlier gotos must keep returning without hid_hw_stop(), since neither has a started device, so give the path that fails after the start its own label. Discovered by XBOW, triaged by Baul Lee <baul.lee@xbow.com> | ||||
| CVE-2026-89622 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-21 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: HID: mcp2221: clear rxbuf after I2C/SMBus transfer completes mcp_i2c_smbus_read() stores the caller-supplied buffer pointer in mcp->rxbuf for the duration of a transfer but never clears it when the transfer finishes or times out. Once the caller frees or reuses the buffer, mcp->rxbuf becomes a dangling pointer. A delayed or spurious MCP2221_I2C_GET_DATA report can then drive mcp2221_raw_event() to memcpy device data into the freed memory, causing a write use-after-free. Route all return paths through a single exit point that clears mcp->rxbuf and mcp->rxbuf_size, so that the existing !mcp->rxbuf guard in the raw_event handler can reject any report arriving after the transfer has ended. | ||||
| CVE-2026-89601 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-21 | 8.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ext2: Fix lost inode updates for IS_SYNC inodes ext2_setsize() and ext2_xattr_set2() had a construct like: if (IS_SYNC(inode)) { sync_inode_metadata(inode, 1); } else { mark_inode_dirty(inode); } which leads to lost inode updates for IS_SYNC inodes because sync_inode_metadata() does anything only if the inode is already dirty and hence inode updates may be simply lost. Fix the problem by unconditionally marking the inode dirty and *then* call sync_inode_metadata(). | ||||
| CVE-2026-89580 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-21 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: Disable preemption in __bpf_get_stack get_perf_callchain() returns a per-CPU perf_callchain_entry buffer and releases its recursion slot via put_callchain_entry() before returning, so nothing keeps the entry reserved while __bpf_get_stack() consumes it below. A preemptible BPF program (e.g. a non-sleepable raw tracepoint program on a PREEMPT kernel, which runs under migrate_disable() but not preempt_disable()) can be scheduled out between obtaining the entry and the copy. Another task scheduled on the same CPU then reuses the same per-CPU buffer and overwrites trace->nr with a larger value. copy_len is then computed from the inflated trace->nr and can exceed the caller's buffer, causing an out-of-bounds write in the memcpy() and in the build_id path. The rcu_read_lock() taken here alone does not prevent this. It is only taken on the may_fault path, and under CONFIG_PREEMPT_RCU it does not disable preemption; it merely keeps perf's callchain buffer array alive (freed via call_rcu()) and does nothing to stop another task from reusing the entry. Disable preemption around obtaining the callchain entry and copying it into the caller's buffer, so the entry cannot be reused underneath us and trace->nr stays bounded by max_depth. Build ID resolution may fault and is therefore deferred until after preemption is re-enabled; by then the instruction pointers have already been copied into buf, so it operates only on that private copy. Note, preempt_disable() also subsumes the buffer-lifetime guarantee the rcu_read_lock() provided, since a preempt-disabled section is an RCU read-side critical section for the callchain buffers' call_rcu() reclaim. [ changed Fixes: commit ] | ||||
| CVE-2026-89574 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-21 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: dm array: validate array block headers on read array_block_check() validates blocknr and csum and nothing else, while node_check(), next to it, has bounded the structural fields since both were written. dm_array_cursor_next() takes its loop bound from the on-disk nr_entries and element_at() is unguarded pointer arithmetic, so a count larger than the block holds keeps the cursor in one block while the index grows past it and the read walks off the dm-bufio buffer -- dm_cache_load_mappings() drives it once per cache block at activation. Check the header against itself: reject a zero value_size, require max_entries to equal calc_max_entries() for that value_size and block size, and require nr_entries to fit. Equality rather than an upper bound, since a count below the real capacity trips BUG_ON() in fill_ablock() and trim_ablock(). Metadata dm-array writes satisfies all three. | ||||
| CVE-2026-89572 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-21 | 2.3 Low |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: cpufreq: apple-soc: Fix OPP table cleanup apple_soc_cpufreq_init() adds OPP tables from firmware, but some failure paths do not remove them. The driver also uses dev_pm_opp_remove_all_dynamic(), which is not the right cleanup helper for OPP tables loaded from firmware. Use the cpumask OPP helper after the policy CPU mask has been populated. Pair it with the matching cpumask remove helper on failure paths and in apple_soc_cpufreq_exit(). This also removes the separate dev_pm_opp_set_sharing_cpus() call, as the cpumask helper loads the DT OPP tables for all CPUs in the policy. | ||||
| CVE-2026-89567 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-21 | 4.7 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: jbd2: bound shrinker scans by examined checkpoint buffers The jbd2 shrinker currently accounts only checkpoint buffers that it successfully releases against nr_to_scan. Busy buffers therefore do not consume the scan budget. If a checkpoint transaction contains mostly busy buffers, the shrinker can scan its entire checkpoint list while holding journal->j_list_lock. Large checkpoint lists can result in excessive lock hold times and leave other CPUs spinning on j_list_lock, causing soft lockups or RCU stalls. Pass nr_to_scan into journal_shrink_one_cp_list() and decrement it for every buffer examined, including busy buffers. Pass NULL from checkpoint cleanup paths so their existing full-list behavior is preserved. This restores the scan-budget semantics that existed before journal_shrink_one_cp_list() was changed to always scan a complete checkpoint list. | ||||
| CVE-2026-89566 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-21 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: jbd2: check need_resched() when skipping busy checkpoint buffers journal_shrink_one_cp_list() skips busy checkpoint buffers when called with JBD2_SHRINK_BUSY_SKIP. The continue statement on this path also skips the need_resched() check at the end of the loop body. Consequently, when a checkpoint list contains mostly busy buffers, the shrinker can walk the entire list while holding journal->j_list_lock, even when a reschedule has been requested. Large checkpoint lists under memory pressure can therefore cause long lock hold times and leave other CPUs spinning on j_list_lock, resulting in soft lockups or RCU stalls. Route the busy-buffer path through the need_resched() check so that the shrinker can release j_list_lock and reschedule promptly, restoring parity with the clean-buffer path, which already checks need_resched(). This does not change which checkpoint buffers are eligible for removal. | ||||
| CVE-2026-89564 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-21 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ip: orphan prefetched skbs before multicast forwarding IPv4 and IPv6 input preserve an skb->sk association installed by bpf_sk_assign() so that local delivery can use the selected socket under RCU. Both address families can also prefetch a socket in UDP early demux. In both paths (BPF and UDP early demux) a reference is not guaranteed to be held on the socket. When a multicast packet is not locally deliverable, IPv6 hands the original skb to ip6_mr_input(). IPv4's ip_mr_input() similarly keeps the original skb when local delivery is not needed. Either path can put the skb on an unresolved multicast route queue or forward it after the receive-side RCU section ends. After the prefetched socket is destroyed, a later skb free invokes sock_pfree() and dereferences the stale skb->sk. Orphan the skb before each non-local multicast forwarding path. Local delivery retains the original skb; the existing skb_clone() calls provide multicast forwarding with a socket-free clone. | ||||
| CVE-2026-89561 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-21 | 7.5 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ipv6: rpl: fix NULL dereference of idev in ipv6_rpl_srh_rcv() ipv6_rpl_srh_rcv() dereferences idev from __in6_dev_get() without a NULL check when reading idev->cnf.rpl_seg_enabled. When the device's MTU drops below IPV6_MIN_MTU, addrconf_ifdown() clears dev->ip6_ptr through RCU_INIT_POINTER(). A packet that passed the idev check in ip6_rcv_core() can then reach ipv6_rpl_srh_rcv() with dev->ip6_ptr already NULL. Reproduced by flooding the receiving interface with ping6 traffic while flapping its MTU between 1500 and 1200: BUG: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in ipv6_rpl_srh_rcv+0xb3/0x1070 Read of size 4 at addr 00000000000006b4 by task ping6/394 CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 394 Comm: ping6 Not tainted 7.2.0-rc7-micro-vm-dev-00095-g24ef02f934ee #240 PREEMPT(full) Call Trace: <IRQ> kasan_report+0xc6/0x100 ipv6_rpl_srh_rcv+0xb3/0x1070 ip6_protocol_deliver_rcu+0x759/0x9a0 ip6_input_finish+0xa8/0x1b0 ip6_input+0xe1/0x490 ipv6_rcv+0x33d/0x460 __netif_receive_skb_one_core+0xd6/0x130 process_backlog+0x2cc/0xa00 __napi_poll.constprop.0+0x56/0x270 net_rx_action+0x327/0x730 handle_softirqs+0x11e/0x630 do_softirq+0xb3/0xf0 </IRQ> Both ipv6_rpl_srh_rcv() and ipv6_srh_rcv() are called only from ipv6_rthdr_rcv(), which already has an idev lookup. Fix the NULL dereference on the RPL path by checking idev in ipv6_rthdr_rcv(), before it calls either function. The callees take idev as an argument and no longer call __in6_dev_get(), so the packet is now dropped in one place, with SKB_DROP_REASON_IPV6DISABLED on both paths. | ||||
| CVE-2026-89552 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-21 | 4.1 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: params: fix charp corruption on allocation failure param_set_charp() stores charp parameters in allocated memory after slab is available, and releases the previous value when the parameter is updated. The previous value is released before the replacement allocation succeeds. If kmalloc_parameter() fails, the setter returns -ENOMEM with the parameter left as NULL. Failing zswap's compressor update before zswap is initialized can later trigger: BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000 RIP: 0010:strcmp+0x10/0x30 Call Trace: zswap_setup+0x3b1/0x490 zswap_enabled_param_set+0x5b/0xa0 param_attr_store+0x93/0xe0 module_attr_store+0x1c/0x30 kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x116/0x1f0 Allocate and copy the replacement first, then replace the parameter value only after allocation succeeds. | ||||
| CVE-2026-89544 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-21 | 7.5 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: SUNRPC: fix gssx_dec_option_array error path bugs Four coupled defects in the gssx XDR option-array decoder make the error paths unsafe: a NULL deref in the caller, a refcount leak on the decoded group_info, and a latent use-after-free that the leak fix would otherwise expose. gssx_dec_option_array() sets oa->count = 1 before allocating oa->data. If that allocation fails, -ENOMEM is returned with oa->count == 1 and oa->data == NULL. All other error paths jump to free_oa: which frees oa->data and NULLs it but also leaves oa->count == 1. The caller trusts the count: gssp_accept_sec_context_upcall() gssx_dec_accept_sec_context() gssx_dec_option_array() /* fails, count=1 data=NULL */ data = res.options.data[0].value /* NULL deref */ Independently, free_creds: releases the partially decoded svc_cred with a bare kfree(creds). gssx_dec_linux_creds() installs a groups_alloc() result into creds->cr_group_info; that object is kvmalloc-backed and refcounted, and only put_group_info() reaches kvfree(). A plain kfree(creds) drops the wrapper and leaks the group_info allocation. The natural fix for the leak is to call free_svc_cred(creds) before kfree(creds), but free_svc_cred() invokes put_group_info() on creds->cr_group_info unconditionally when non-NULL. The existing out_free_groups: path in gssx_dec_linux_creds() already called groups_free() on that pointer without clearing it, so once free_svc_cred() is wired in, the subsequent put_group_info() would touch freed memory. Fix all four together: - Move the oa->count = 1 assignment below the oa->data allocation so it is never set when oa->data is NULL. - Reset oa->count to 0 at free_oa: so count and data stay coherent and the caller sees an empty option array. - Call free_svc_cred(creds) before kfree(creds) at free_creds: so the refcounted cr_group_info is released. free_svc_cred() either NULL-guards each field explicitly (cr_group_info has an if() check) or delegates to a helper that is NULL-safe itself (kfree for the string fields, gss_mech_put() which guards with if(gm) at gss_mech_switch.c:342), so it is safe to call on a partially decoded svc_cred where only cr_uid/cr_gid/cr_group_info have been written and everything else is zero from kzalloc. - In gssx_dec_linux_creds()'s out_free_groups: path, release cr_group_info with put_group_info() rather than groups_free() so the teardown matches free_svc_cred()'s refcount-aware path, and clear the pointer so a later free_svc_cred() on the same creds does not release it a second time. | ||||
| CVE-2026-89543 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-21 | 4.1 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: sunrpc: fix use-after-free in __rpc_clnt_handle_event and __rpc_clnt_remove_pipedir Normal client creation goes through rpc_setup_pipedir(), which records clnt->pipefs_sb, but the mount-event path in __rpc_clnt_handle_event() calls rpc_setup_pipedir_sb() directly and never refreshes that field. The umount path also removes the directory without clearing clnt->pipefs_sb. After a late pipefs mount or any remount, rpc_clnt_remove_pipedir() compares the current superblock against a stale pipefs_sb pointer and skips cleanup, leaving pipefs dentries whose inode private data still points at a freed rpc_clnt, leading to a potential use-after-free during subsequent rpc_info_open() or rpc_show_info() calls. Fix this by properly updating clnt->pipefs_sb upon mount events and clearing it during unmount or failure paths. | ||||
| CVE-2026-89539 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-21 | 5.9 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: SUNRPC: reject duplicate CREDS_VALUE options gssx_dec_option_array() walks the wire-supplied option array and, for every entry whose name matches CREDS_VALUE, calls gssx_dec_linux_creds() on the same struct svc_cred. That helper unconditionally installs a fresh groups_alloc() result into creds->cr_group_info without releasing whatever pointer was already there: for (i = 0; i < count; i++) { ... decode name ... if (length == sizeof(CREDS_VALUE) && memcmp(p, CREDS_VALUE, sizeof(CREDS_VALUE)) == 0) { err = gssx_dec_linux_creds(xdr, creds); ... } } A reply that carries two CREDS_VALUE entries therefore overwrites cr_group_info on the second iteration and orphans the group_info allocated by the first call. The earlier free_creds path only releases the last cr_group_info via free_svc_cred(), so the first allocation's refcount stays at one and its kvmalloc-backed storage is leaked. No in-tree caller of gssp_accept_sec_context_upcall() expects more than one CREDS_VALUE per reply. Fix by tracking whether a CREDS_VALUE option has already been decoded and returning -EINVAL on any subsequent match, so the free_creds path releases the single group_info that was installed. | ||||
| CVE-2026-89537 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-21 | 9.1 Critical |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: SUNRPC: Reject short RFC 4121 MIC tokens in gss_krb5_verify_mic_v2 gss_krb5_verify_mic_v2() reads the token ID at ptr[0..1], the flags byte at ptr[2], and padding at ptr[3..7], then passes ptr + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN and cksum_len to gss_krb5_mic_build_sg(). None of these accesses check read_token->len first. The minimum safe token size is GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN (16) plus ctx->krb5e->cksum_len (12-24, depending on the enctype). All callers accept shorter tokens from the wire: - gss_unwrap_resp_integ() enforces only an upper bound (offset + len <= rcv_buf->len) before allocating mic.data = kmalloc(len) and passing it to gss_verify_mic(). A malicious NFS server can therefore supply a short checksum opaque, producing a small slab allocation that the Kerberos MIC verifier reads past. - gss_validate() enforces only len <= RPC_MAX_AUTH_SIZE (400) before passing the wire-supplied length to gss_validate_seqno_mic(), which constructs a mic xdr_netobj and calls gss_verify_mic(). - svcauth_gss_verify_header() enforces only checksum.len >= XDR_UNIT (4 bytes) before dispatching to gss_verify_mic(). - svcauth_gss_unwrap_integ() checks only that the checksum fits in gsd->gsd_scratch. Add a length guard at the top of gss_krb5_verify_mic_v2(), before any ptr[] access or scatterlist construction. Well-formed MIC tokens from gss_krb5_get_mic_v2() already have exactly GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + cksum_len bytes, so valid traffic is unaffected. | ||||
| CVE-2026-89534 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-21 | 8.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: svcrdma: Clear sc_cm_id when ADDR_CHANGE replacement fails When svc_rdma_listen_handler() handles RDMA_CM_EVENT_ADDR_CHANGE, it creates a replacement listener cm_id and returns 1, telling the CM core to destroy the old one. If the replacement allocation fails, sc_cm_id still points at the old cm_id that the CM core is about to destroy. Any subsequent dereference of sc_cm_id -- such as svc_rdma_detach()'s rdma_disconnect() call -- is a use-after-free. NULL sc_cm_id on the failure path and guard svc_rdma_detach()'s rdma_disconnect() call against NULL so that the listener can be torn down safely when the server shuts down. | ||||