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Search Results (4 CVEs found)
| CVE | Vendors | Products | Updated | CVSS v3.1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-45100 | 1 Opensips | 1 Opensips | 2026-08-04 | 9.1 Critical |
| OpenSIPS is a Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) server implementation. Versions 3.4.0-beta through 3.6.5 and 4.0.0-beta contain a buffer overflow in the {s.b64encode} string transformation. The size check for {s.b64encode} only verifies that the input fits within the 64 KB transformation buffer, but base64 encoding expands the data by roughly a third, so an input between about 49,153 and 65,535 bytes produces more output than the buffer can hold and overflows it by up to 21,844 bytes. Because these transformation buffers sit next to each other in memory and are reused for chained transformations, the overflow writes attacker-controlled data into the adjacent buffer and corrupts values used by later transformations processing the same SIP message. A remote attacker can trigger this by sending a SIP message with a large header value (roughly 50,000 bytes or more) when the routing script applies {s.b64encode} to attacker-controlled input, making exploitability dependent on the deployment's routing configuration. This issue has been fixed in versions 3.6.6 and 4.0.0-rc1. | ||||
| CVE-2026-45103 | 1 Opensips | 1 Opensips | 2026-08-04 | 7.5 High |
| OpenSIPS is a Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) server implementation. In versions prior to 3.6.6 and 4.0.0-rc1, the TCP message framing layer parses the Content-Length header using unsigned int arithmetic with no overflow check. When an attacker sends a Content-Length value that overflows unsigned int (e.g., 4294967296), the framing layer computes a wrapped-around value (e.g., 0) and splits the TCP stream at the wrong boundary, causing the body of the first SIP message to be processed as a separate message and enabling SIP message smuggling. Because Content-Length is parsed in the transport layer before authentication, an unauthenticated, network-based attacker can smuggle arbitrary SIP messages over any TCP-based transport (proto_tcp, proto_tls, proto_ws, proto_wss) on any instance with TCP enabled, with no routing-script preconditions. This allows smuggled messages to bypass front-end SBC/proxy security policies, inherit the connection's authentication context, and evade rate limiting. This issue has been fixed in versions 3.6.6 and 4.0.0-rc1. | ||||
| CVE-2026-45084 | 1 Opensips | 1 Opensips | 2026-08-04 | N/A |
| OpenSIPS is a Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) server implementation. Versions 3.4.0 through 3.6.5 contain a denial of service vulnerability in the presence module. When the presence module's handle_publish() function processes a SIP PUBLISH request with an Event: presence header and a message body while the configuration option enable_sphere_check=1 is set, it invokes the get_content_type() macro without first calling parse_content_type_hdr(), causing it to dereference uninitialized or NULL Content-Type parsing state and crash. If a Content-Type header is present but unparsed, msg->content_type->parsed is NULL and is dereferenced as a content_t pointer; if the request lacks a Content-Type header entirely, msg->content_type itself is NULL, and both cases lead to a crash. A remote attacker can therefore cause a denial of service against an affected instance with a single PUBLISH request over UDP or TCP, using either a valid Content-Type: application/pidf+xml request or one with the header removed, and the vulnerable code path itself does not enforce authentication (though a deployment's routing configuration may require it before this route is reached). The issue has been fixed in version 3.6.6 and 4.0.0-rc1. | ||||
| CVE-2026-45538 | 1 Opensips | 1 Opensips | 2026-08-04 | 9.8 Critical |
| OpenSIPS is a Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) server implementation. In versions 4.0.0 and prior, processing a SIP message with a header name longer than 255 bytes causes a stack buffer overflow when sip_to_json() is called in the routing script. Function sip_to_json() (modules/sipmsgops/sipmsgops.c) copies SIP header names into a fixed 255-byte stack buffer without bounds checking, performing a memcpy of the full header-name length even though the SIP parser imposes no such limit (a header name can be roughly 65000 bytes). As a result, when a routing script calls sip_to_json(), a SIP message with a header name longer than 255 bytes triggers a stack buffer overflow in which both the length and content of the overwrite are attacker-controlled, corrupting the saved frame pointer and return address. A single unauthenticated UDP packet to the SIP port (5060) can crash the process or, on builds without stack protections, hijack the return address to achieve remote code execution. This affects deployments whose routing script invokes sip_to_json(). This issue was not fixed at the time of publication. | ||||
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