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Search Results (2 CVEs found)

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CVE Vendors Products Updated CVSS v3.1
CVE-2026-46678 1 Pydantic 1 Pydantic-ai 2026-07-30 6.8 Medium
Pydantic AI is a Python agent framework for building Generative AI applications. In versions 1.56.0 through 1.98.0, when an application opts a URL into force_download='allow-local' (disabling the default block on private/internal IPs), the cloud-metadata blocklist could be bypassed by encoding the metadata IP in an IPv6 transition form (IPv4-mapped IPv6, 6to4, or NAT64), exposing cloud IAM short-term credentials on dual-stack or translated networks. This is an incomplete fix of GHSA-2jrp-274c-jhv3 / CVE-2026-25580, whose remediation did not hold for IPv6-encoded forms of the metadata IPs. An application is affected only if it explicitly opts a FileUrl (ImageUrl, AudioUrl, VideoUrl, DocumentUrl) into force_download='allow-local' on a URL influenced by untrusted input; it is not affected when using bundled integrations to ingest user input (Agent.to_web / clai web, VercelAIAdapter, AGUIAdapter / Agent.to_ag_ui), since they do not propagate force_download from external data, nor when downloading only from developer-controlled URLs. This issue has been fixed in version 1.99.0.
CVE-2026-54249 1 Pydantic 1 Pydantic-ai 2026-07-30 6.8 Medium
Pydantic AI is a Python agent framework for building Generative AI applications. In versions 1.65.0 through 1.105.0, and 2.0.0b1 through 2.0.0b5, a client that submits message history to a Pydantic AI UI adapter (such as the Vercel AI adapter) can reference arbitrary files in the application's model-provider or cloud-storage account. While file URL parts are validated against a scheme allowlist, UploadedFile references — which point to a file by provider file ID or cloud-storage URI (e.g. s3://…, gs://…) — were forwarded without validation. Because the provider resolves an UploadedFile using the server-side identity (IAM role, service account, or provider API key) rather than the client's, an attacker can craft message history to make the server read objects from its own account or other tenants, given a referenceable identifier. Exploitation requires a valid file identifier, which is not always unguessable depending on how the application names objects. This issue has been fixed in versions 1.106.0 and 2.0.0b6.