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| CVE | Vendors | Products | Updated | CVSS v3.1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-118667 | 1 Langchain-ai | 2 Langgraph, Langgraph-sdk | 2026-10-30 | 4.3 Medium |
| LangGraph Python SDK is used to connect to running LangGraph API servers, manage assistants, threads and stream runs from Python applications. From langgraph-sdk 0.4.0 until 0.4.6, and from langgraph 1.2.3 until 1.2.14 when RemoteGraph v3 streaming uses an affected langgraph-sdk version, the synchronous and asynchronous v3 stream get_tree and _fetch_state helpers interpolate caller-controlled assistant_id and thread_id values into authenticated GET request paths without using _quote_path_param. Relative path segments can therefore be normalized into another readable path on the configured server while retaining authentication headers. This issue is fixed in langgraph-sdk 0.4.6 and langgraph 1.2.14. | ||||
| CVE-2026-113617 | 1 Wordpress-extensions | 1 Automated Import Products To Cart | 2026-10-30 | 9.9 Critical |
| The Automated Import Products to Cart WordPress plugin before 1.0.4 does not sanitize a user-supplied file path before using it to read and delete files, allowing users with minimal permissions, such as subscribers, to read arbitrary files (including ones containing the database credentials) and delete arbitrary files on the server. | ||||
| CVE-2026-113692 | 1 Bmc | 1 Bmc It Service Management Suite | 2026-10-30 | N/A |
| Path traversal in the SmartIT file-management feature of BMC IT Service Management Suite versions 25.3.01, 25.4.01, and 26.1.01 allows authenticated administrators to read files outside the intended directory. | ||||
| CVE-2026-117183 | 1 Otoyo | 1 Astro‑notion‑blog | 2026-10-30 | N/A |
| A path traversal vulnerability in the FeaturedImage component of astro-notion-blog 0.13.0 allows attackers to escape the intended directory, as well as read and overwrite files on the server via a crafted URL. | ||||
| CVE-2026-118988 | 1 Perl | 1 Callbackery | 2026-10-30 | N/A |
| CallBackery versions before 0.60.1 for Perl let unauthenticated clients read the POD of any file via path traversal in the /doc route. Every CallBackery application mounts its documentation plugin at /doc, ahead of any session check. The route passes the requested name to Pod::Simple::Search->find without validation. find splits the name on "::" and joins the parts into a file path, so a name such as "..::..::..::etc::motd" escapes @INC. Any file the server process can read is reachable. Only POD is rendered, but a file with a POD directive and no "=cut" is POD to the end of the file. | ||||
| CVE-2026-119979 | 1 Element Labs | 1 Lm Studio | 2026-10-30 | 8.8 High |
| LM Studio before 0.4.22+1 contains a path traversal vulnerability in the model downloader's resolveDownloadRequest that allows attackers to write files outside the models directory using backslash-separated traversal filenames. Attackers can trick users into downloading a crafted model repository that plants a plugin manifest.json, install-state.json and mcp-bridge-config.json, running an attacker-supplied Python payload on every launch. | ||||
| CVE-2026-62331 | 1 Mtzanidakis | 1 Praktor | 2026-10-30 | 8.2 High |
| praktor is a multi-agent Claude Code orchestrator with Telegram input and output, Docker isolation, and a Mission Control UI. Prior to 0.9.1, both Telegram upload sites in `internal/telegram/bot.go` concatenate the attacker-controlled document filename into a destination path without sanitization, and `path.Join` collapses parent-directory traversal. A remote Telegram user who can message the bot can therefore write outside `uploads/` within the persistent agent workspace mounted at `/workspace/agent`. Because `allow_from: []` permits all senders by default, no prior authentication or privilege is required in that configuration. The attacker can plant or overwrite `CLAUDE.md`, instruction, skill, hook, or configuration files that the Claude agent reads and operates on across later runs, turning a document upload into stored instruction injection. The demonstrated arbitrary-write scope is the persistent agent workspace volume, not an unrestricted host-filesystem write. This issue is fixed in version 0.9.1. | ||||
| CVE-2026-51851 | 1 Agent-zero | 1 Agent-zero | 2026-10-30 | N/A |
| modelscope agent-zero 1.7, 1.8, 1.9, and 1.10 is vulnerable to Directory Traversal in python/helpers/file_browser.py:FileBrowser.save_text_file. The save_text_file method accepts user-controlled file paths without normalization or validation, allowing path traversal attacks. | ||||
| CVE-2026-62965 | 1 Sabnzbd | 1 Sabnzbd | 2026-10-30 | N/A |
| SABnzbd is an open source automated Usenet download tool. Prior to 5.1.0Beta3, orphan-job management in `sabnzbd/api.py` accepts the user-controlled `value` parameter without path confinement before `os.path.join()` with `download_dir`. An absolute path discards that base directory. An attacker with a valid API key can invoke `mode=status` with `name=delete_orphan` to reach `_api_delete_orphan` and `remove_all()` in `sabnzbd/filesystem.py`, which uses `shutil.rmtree()` for recursive deletion. The advisory also identifies `_api_add_orphan` and `_api_delete_all_orphan` as affected by the path-validation issue, while its concrete arbitrary-deletion trace is through `_api_delete_orphan`. The API key is stored in plaintext in `sabnzbd.ini`. The attacker can delete files or directories writable by the SABnzbd process, including configuration, queue data, and downloads, but system files outside the regular user's ownership are not affected. This issue is fixed in version 5.1.0Beta3. | ||||
| CVE-2026-61725 | 2026-10-30 | 6.1 Medium | ||
| sevenz-rust2 is a Rust-native 7z compressor and `decompress`or. Prior to 0.21.1, extracting an attacker-supplied 7z archive can write or overwrite files outside the destination directory. In `src/util/decompress.rs`, `decompress_impl` computes each destination with `dest.join(entry.name())` without normalizing the archive's UTF-16 entry name or verifying containment, and `default_entry_extract_fn` writes to it with `File::create`. Parent-directory components escape the extraction root, and an absolute entry path makes the join discard the destination entirely. The convenience entry points `decompress`, `decompress_file`, `decompress_with_password`, and `decompress_file_with_password` all use this default path. Overwriting writable configuration, startup, cron, or build files can lead to code execution or persistence. The archive bytes are the attacker-controlled trust boundary, including for applications that automatically unpack uploaded or otherwise untrusted archives. This issue is fixed in version 0.21.1. | ||||
| CVE-2026-119328 | 1 Immich-app | 1 Immich | 2026-10-30 | 6.5 Medium |
| Immich is a high-performance self-hosted photo and video management solution. Prior to 3.3.0, the unauthenticated machine-learning /predict endpoint in machine-learning/immich_ml/main.py accepted an options object and passed its values into model construction in machine-learning/immich_ml/models/base.py without restricting security-sensitive parameters. An attacker with network access to the service could set cache_dir to an arbitrary writable path, causing model downloads to write there and causing clear_cache() to pass that path to shutil.rmtree() after selected model-loading failures. Depending on filesystem permissions and the selected path, this could modify files in mounted data locations or recursively delete an attacker-selected directory. The model-name allowlist prevents this issue from becoming arbitrary-model deserialization or code execution. This issue is fixed in version 3.3.0. | ||||
| CVE-2026-116240 | 1 Pgadmin | 1 Pgadmin 4 | 2026-10-30 | 6.5 Medium |
| In server mode pgAdmin 4 validates a path into the user's storage directory with check_access_permission(), which builds the absolute path with get_abs_path(). Several callers then acted on a path they built differently, so the path checked and the path used could name different files: - Opening a file in the Query Tool, the Google client secret and, on Windows, Import/Export Data, Backup, Restore and saving a file joined the path to the storage directory after stripping leading slashes and backslashes. On POSIX a path checked as a name inside storage could become an absolute path once stripped, so any file the pgAdmin account can read could be opened; on Windows a path naming a drive discarded the storage directory, so these could read, or write, outside it. - Listing a folder decoded the path a second time after the check, so a folder named like an encoded "..", which a user can create, listed any directory on the host. - Download, delete, rename and the file-exists check appended the path to the storage directory without a separator, so in a deployment where one user's storage directory name is a prefix of another's, another user's files could be read, deleted or moved; download also checked the path appended to itself. - Creating a folder could create one in another user's directory. The fix makes check_access_permission() return the path it checked and every caller act on that path, decodes folder paths once, and opens, deletes and renames files relative to directories opened from the storage directory without following symbolic links. Desktop mode is not affected. This issue affects pgAdmin 4: before 9.19. | ||||
| CVE-2026-116249 | 1 Pgadmin | 1 Pgadmin 4 | 2026-10-30 | 8.4 High |
| In server mode pgAdmin 4 resolves a server's password file, SSL certificate, key, CRL and SSH tunnel identity file relative to the user's storage directory, but get_complete_file_path() only stripped leading slashes before joining the two. A path such as "../<another user>/.pgpass", set through the server dialog, the REST API or a servers.json import, therefore named another user's file, and connecting used that user's saved passwords, client certificate or SSH key. The sslkeylogfile connection parameter was passed to libpq unchanged, so a path outside storage let libpq create or append a file as the account running pgAdmin. make_conninfo() also quoted connection parameter values but not their names, so a crafted parameter name could smuggle additional keyword=value pairs past these checks. The fix requires the resolved path, with symbolic links followed, to stay inside the user's storage directory or the named shared storage directory, confines sslkeylogfile the same way, and accepts only exact libpq keywords as connection parameter names. A refused path or keyword is reported instead of letting libpq fall back to a default. This issue affects pgAdmin 4: before 9.19. | ||||
| CVE-2026-119342 | 1 Stirling | 1 Stirling Pdf | 2026-10-30 | 5.3 Medium |
| Stirling-PDF is a locally hosted web application that facilitates various operations on PDF files. From 2.13.1 until 2.13.2, the POST /api/v1/convert/svg/pdf endpoint renders attacker-supplied SVG through Apache Batik, and a scheme-less root-relative image reference bypasses SvgSanitizer.isExternalUrl() before Batik resolves it against the file:///input.svg document base as a same-origin local file. The convert() and addSvgAsPage() paths in app/core/src/main/java/stirling/software/SPDF/utils/SvgToPdf.java can then render image-decodable server files into the returned PDF when sanitization is enabled, including without authentication on login-disabled deployments or with non-admin access when login is enabled. The issue discloses PNG, JPG, GIF, or SVG content and provides an existence oracle only for image-decodable paths; plain text, binary files, directories, XInclude text, external entities, explicit file URLs, and tested HTTP references are not disclosed through this mechanism. This issue is fixed in version 2.13.2. | ||||
| CVE-2026-115604 | 3 Brainstorm Force, Brainstormforce, Wordpress-extensions | 3 Suredash, Suredash, Suredash | 2026-10-30 | 5 Medium |
| Subscriber Arbitrary File Deletion in SureDash <= 1.12.3 versions. | ||||
| CVE-2026-79866 | 1 Hpe | 1 Aos | 2026-10-30 | 9.6 Critical |
| An unauthenticated path traversal vulnerability exists in the PAPI protocol in AOS-8. Successful exploitation of this vulnerability could allow an unauthenticated adjacent attacker to read, modify, and delete files on the underlying operating system. | ||||
| CVE-2026-104739 | 2026-10-30 | 4.9 Medium | ||
| The JS Help Desk – AI-Powered Support & Ticketing System plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to arbitrary file deletion due to insufficient file path validation in the setSupportCustomImage function in all versions up to, and including, 5.0.1. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with administrator-level access and above, to delete arbitrary files on the server, which can easily lead to remote code execution when the right file is deleted (such as wp-config.php). Exploitation requires a two-step sequence: an administrator first saves a traversal-crafted value in the support_custom_img configuration field, then triggers deletion by uploading a new support custom image, at which point setSupportCustomImage() resolves and deletes the attacker-controlled path. | ||||
| CVE-2026-84243 | 1 The Gnu C Library | 1 Glibc | 2026-10-30 | 7 High |
| The gettext family of functions in the GNU C Library version 2.0 and later accept LANGUAGE environment variable entries that contain '/' or that are equal to "..", unless the program is setuid or setgid (AT_SECURE). An attacker who can set LANGUAGE in the environment of a program that uses gettext can make it load a message catalog (.mo file) from an arbitrary location in the file system. A crafted .mo file can crash the program through out-of-range offsets, or supply translations whose format directives do not match the arguments passed by the program. That causes undefined behaviour in the printf family of functions and may allow arbitrary code execution with the privileges of the program. The safety of message catalogs relies on them being installed in trusted, read-only locations, and the directory traversal bypasses this. The fix for CVE-2014-0475 rejects ".." path components in locale names passed to setlocale or taken from the LC_ALL, LC_* and LANG environment variables. gettext reads LANGUAGE directly and appends each colon-separated entry to the message catalog directory, so that fix did not cover LANGUAGE. LANGUAGE is only used when the LC_MESSAGES locale is not "C", "C.<encoding>" or "POSIX", so the attacker must also be able to select another installed locale, for example through LANG or LC_ALL. Exploitation also requires that the attacker can place the crafted file in a location readable by the target program, and that the environment crosses a trust boundary without the program running as AT_SECURE. An example is an SSH server that accepts LANGUAGE and LANG from clients through the AcceptEnv directive and restricts an account to a forced command; the attacker may use this to escape the restriction. | ||||
| CVE-2026-90871 | 2 Progress, Progress Software | 2 Ws Ftp Server, Ws Ftp Server | 2026-10-30 | 5.3 Medium |
| Improper limitation of a pathname to a restricted directory in Progress Software WS_FTP Server versions prior to 2024.0.7 and 2025.0.4 on Windows could allow an unauthenticated attacker to affect files outside the intended directory. | ||||
| CVE-2026-90866 | 2 Progress, Progress Software | 2 Ws Ftp Server, Ws Ftp Server | 2026-10-30 | 9.1 Critical |
| A path traversal vulnerability in Progress Software WS_FTP Server versions prior to 2024.0.7 and 2025.0.4 on Windows could allow a delegated Host Administrator to access locations outside their authorized scope, potentially enabling remote code execution. | ||||